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1 . 0  INTRODUCTION 
Most of  t h e  manned space f l i gh t  programs planned by NASA f o r  t h e  l a t e  
1970's and 1980's  are concentra ted  on e a r t h  o r b i t a l  ope ra t i ons .  These w i l l  
use  t h e  s h u t t l e  and a v a r i e t y  of manned and unmanned payloads de l i ve r ed  t o  
o r b i t  by t h e  b h u t t l e .  
The Safe ty  i n  Ear th  Orb i t  Study examined f i v e  s p e c i f i c  s a f e t y  i s s u e s  
a s soc i a t ed  wi th  t he se  opera t ions .  The s t udy  l o g i c  used is  shown i n  
Figure 1-1. The kive  i s s u e s  were s tud i ed  a s  f i v e  s e p a r a t e  t a s k s  and t h e s e  
were performed i n  t h e  o rder  shown. 
RAM4B HAZARDS 
HAZARDS RESOLUTION 
0 DESIGN 6 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES 
ACCEPTABLE RISKS, INCLUDING RATIONALE 
RESIDUAL HAZARDS 0 SUPPORTING RESEARCH 6 TECHNOLOGY (SRT) REQUIREMENTS 
0 UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES 
- 
I 
Figure  1-1. Study Logic 
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This volume p r e s e n t s  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  a n a l y s i s  f o r  the  f i r s t  t h r e e  t a sk s ,  
which a r e  shown by t h e  heavy o u t l i n e  i n  t he  s tudy  l og i c .  Tbse t h r e e  t a sk s  
used hazardlemergency analyses  a s  a  prime technique f o r  gene ra t i ng  s a f e t y  
requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s .  These l a t t e r  form an important  p a r t  of t h e  s tudy  
ou tpu t ,  and a r e  documented s e p a r a t e l y  i n  Volumes IV and V of t h i s  r epo r t .  
1.1 SCOPE 
The s tudy scope covered t h e  veh i c l e s  shown i n  F igure  1-2. 
SHUTTLE ORB I TER 
INTEGRAL TANK 
DROP TANK 
SHUTTLE PAYLOADS 
SORTIE MODULES 
SATELLl TES 
UPPER STAGE VEHICLES 
SPACE STATION 
l NlTlAL (6-MAN) 
G R O W T H  (12-MAN) 
Figure  1-2. Vehicles Considered i n  Study 
I n i t i a l  t a sk s  were based on ths  i n t e g r a l  t ank  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  b u t  emphasis 
was later  swi tched t o  t h e  drop tank o r b i t e r  as t h i s  concept developed. The 
assumptions made were broad  enough t h a t  no  r e s u l t s  w e r e  i n v a l i d a t e d  by t h i s  
change . 
S h u t t l e  payloads considered inc luded  manned and unmanned s o r t i e  payloads 
( i . e . ,  a t t a ched  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r ) ,  s a t e l l i t e s  d e l i v e r e d  t o  e a r t h  o r b i t ,  and 
p o t e n t i a l  upper s t a g e  veh i c l e s ,  such as t h e  tug ,  Agena, Centaur,  e t c . ,  used t o  
d e l i v e r  unmanned payloads t o  o r b i t s  beyond t he  o r b i t e r ' s  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  
The space  s t a t i o n s  considered were modular s t a t i o n s  d e l i v e r e d  t o  earth 
o r b i t  and assembled by t h e  o r b i t e r .  I n i t i a l  6-man ve r s ions  and growth ve r s i ons  
w i th  up t o  1 2  men, as def ined  i n  r e cen t  Phase B s t u d i e s ,  were s tud i ed .  
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To t h e  maximum e x t e n t  pos s ib l e ,  t h e  analyses  were performed w i t h  t h e  min- 
imum con f igu ra t i on  o r i e n t e d  and o p e r a t i o n a l  assumptions pos s ib l e ,  i n  o rde r  t o  
have the  r e s u l t s  a p p l i c a b l e  over  a s  wide a range of changes from c u r r e n t l y  
planned programs a s  pos s ib l e .  
Within the  scope of t h e  veh i c l e s  descr ibed,  t h e  s tudy  is bounded by t he  
fo l lowing s tudy  ground r u l e s  : 
The main concern is personnel  s a f e t y .  A lesser emphasis was 
p laced on avoiding damage t o  o r  l o s s  of t h e  veh i c l e s .  
The ana ly s i s  was conf ined t o  t h e  manned on-orbi t  phase of  
miss ions .  Launch, boost ,  d e o r b i t ,  r een t ry  and l and ing  of  
t h e  o r b i t e r ,  o r  unmanned opera t ions  of  t h e  s t a t i o n  and 
upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  away from t h e  o r b i t e r  were n o t  con- 
s i d e r e d .  
The s t udy  r e s u l t s  cover only t h e  s p e c i f i c  concerns of t he  
s tudy .  They must n o t  b e  assumed t o  cover a l l  s a f e t y  
a spec t s  of  t h e  r e l evan t  veh i c l e s .  
1 . 2  STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The s tudy  concerned i t s e l f  wi th  f i v e  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e s .  These i s s u e s  and 
t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  are :  
Hazardous payloads. - The o b j e c t i v e  was to  i d e n t i f y  hazards  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  c e r t a i n  o r b i t e r  payloads and t o  de t e m i n e  
s a f e t y  r e q u i r e m n t s  and gu ide l i ne s .  
Docking. The o b j e c t i v e  was t o  compare a  number of  d i f f e r e n t  
approaches f o r  docking a n  o r b i t e r  t o  a  space  s t a t i o n ,  and t o  
recommend t h e  methods p r e f e r r e d  from a  s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view. 
On-board s u r v i v a b i l i t y .  The o b j e c t i v e  was t o  d e t e m i n e  t h e  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n a l  and o t h e r  requirements  f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  
s o r t i e  module and space  s t a t i o n  t o  al low personne l  t o  s u r v i v e  
on-board emergencies.  
Tumbling s p a c e c r a f t .  The purpose was t o  d e t e m i n e  prac:ical 
means f o r  a r r e s t i n g  t h e  motion of out -of -contro l  tumb!.ing 
s p a c e c r a f t  by e x t e r n a l  means, o r  t o  allow on-board pe rsonne l  
t o  escape from a s p a c e c r a f t  i f  tumbling cannot be a r r e s t e d .  
Escape and rescue .  The o b j e c t i v e  was t o  determine t h e  app l ic -  
a b i l i t y  o f  previous  o r  new concepts  f o r  e s cape ,  r escue  and b a i l -  
ou t  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  s o r t i e  modules and space s t a t i o n .  
Th i s  volume p r e sen t s  t he  t e c h n i c a l  ana lyses  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  t a sks .  
The l a s t  two tasks  a r e  repor ted  i n  Volume I11 of t h i s  r epo r t .  
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1.3  RELATIONSHIP TO OTHEX STUDIES 
The Safe ty  i n  Ear tn  Orb i t  Study was performed i n  the context  of e, wide 
range of r e l a t e d  s t u d i e s ,  This r e l a t i o n s r ~ i p  is  show, i n  Figure 1-3. 
The most import .mt ,f these  s t u d i e s  a r e  t h e  Phase B s t u d i e s  on the  space 
s t a t i o n ,  s h u t t l e  and FUM (Research and Applications Modules). These s t u d i e s  
were t h e  main sources  of  da t a  on t h e  s t a t i o n ,  s h u t t l e  and s o r t i e  module, 
respec t ive ly .  Phas 2 A s t .udies  on the  Tug, Orbit-to-Orbit S h u t t l e  (00s) and t h e  
Chemical Interorbi ' - .al .  S h u t t l e ,  and sys  te rn  s t u d i e s  on t h e  O r b i t a l  Operations and 
the  In-Space Propel l   as*^ Log i s t i c s  S tud ies  provided add i t i ona l  information, both 
on ' re levant  hardware tkements and on opera t iona l  modes. 
A good in t e r chmge  of  information was poss ib l e  w i th  a l l  these  s t u d i e s  f o r  
which NR was a prime con t r ac to r  (subcontractor  on t h e  RAM). The interchange of 
information and ideas  genera l ly  flowed i n  both d i r ec t ions .  This in terchange was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  f r u i t f a l  wi th  t h e  O r b i t a l  Operations Study and the  s a f e t y  portiuil  
(Phase 2) of t h e  ISPLS s tudy.  
Addi t ional  s a f e t y  background was obtained fiam e a r l i e r  s a f e t y  s t u d i e s  by 
Boeing (on t h e  space s t a t i o n ) ,  Lockheed (on t h e  s h u t t l e ) ,  and from ongoing 
s t u d i e s  by the  Aerospace Corporation (on the  s h u t t l e  and on escape and rescue) .  
A p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e f u l  cooperat ive  e f f o r t  was a l s o  e s t a b l i s h e d  wi th  the Pennsyl- 
vania  S t a t e  Univers i ty  on t h e  dynamics of turrbling spacecraf t .  
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Figure 1-3. Rela t ionship  t o  Other S tud ies  
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1.4  BASELINE MIDEL 
The b a s e l i n e  model d i scussed  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  d e s c r i b e s  t y p i c a l  s h u t t l e  
o r b i t e r  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s ,  s h u t t l e  miss ions ,  and t h e  i n t e r f a c e s  w i t h  t h e  s h u t t l e  
payloads,  s o r t i e  modules, and t h e  space  s t a t i o n .  
While t h i s  model is t y p i c a l ,  many v a r i a t i o n s  have  been o r  a r e  be ing con- 
s i d e r e d .  The a t tempt  has  been mede t o  make t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  e n t i r e  s t u d y  as 
i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  th4; concepts ,  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s ,  o p e r a t i o n a l  modes, des ign  d e t a i l s ,  
and program schedu les  as p o s s i b l e ,  s o  a s  n o t  t o  i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  s tudy  a s  t h e  
s p a c e  program eva lves  . This has been done by d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  problems para- 
m e t r i c a l l y ,  and n o t  typ ing  t h e  ana lyses  t o  s p e c i f i c  des igns ,  s i z e s ,  o r  miss ions .  
The d e s c r i p t i o n  of the  b a s e l i n e  model t h a t  fo l lows,  t h e r e f o r e ,  should  b e  read  
as rl : s x i b i n g  t y p i c a l  c u r r e n t  concepts ,  and n o t  t h e  concepts  assumed f o r  t h e  
s t u d y  . 
1.4.1 Typica l  S h u t t l e  Mission 
A t y p i c a l  s h u t t l e  miss ion ,  shown i n  Figure  1-4, w a s  genera ted  from NR 
Phase B s h u t t l e  d a t a  t o  i d e n t i f y  approximate p r o j e c t i o n s  of s h u t t l e  func t ions  
and t i m e l i n e s ,  and t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  scope of t h i s  s tudy  w i t h i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  
mission.  Ear th  o r b i t  is  i n t e r p r e t e d  f o r  purposes of  t h e  s t u d y  a s  encompassing 
t h a t  p o r t i o n  of t h e  miss ion  t h a t  s t a r t s  w i t h  o r b i t  i n j e c t i o n  and t e rmina tes  w i t h  
d e o r b i t .  On-orbit t i m e  can b e  up t o  30 days. 
SAFETY IN EARTH ORBIT -~ 
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Figure  1-4. Typica l  S h u t t l e  Mission 
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A t  launch ( to )  t h e  o r b i t e r  and boos te r  a r e  mated and remain mated u n t i l  
s tag ing ,  a t  which time sepa ra t ion  occurs and t h e  boos t e r  f l i e s  back t o  a landing 
s i t e ,  whi le  t h e  o r b i t e r  i n i t i a t e s  a main engine b u m  t o  e f f e c t  i n j e c t i o n  i n t o  a 
93  by 185 km (50 by 100 n m i )  o r b i t  at approximately to + 9 minutes. Immediately 
a f t e r  pos t - inser t ion  checks on o r b i t e r  subsystems, t he  o r b i t e r  cargo bay doors 
are opened t o  expose the  o r b i t e r  space r a d i a t o r s  on the  i n s i d e  of t h e  cargo bay 
doors t o  space. This occurs a t  approximately 9 t o  40 minutes a f t . ? r  launch. A t  
approximately 50 minutes, t h e  apogee of the 9 3  by 185 km (50 x 100 n m i )  o r b i t  
is obtained and a c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n  burn is  performed t o  c i r c u l a r i z e  the  o r b i t e r  
i n  the  185 km (100 n m i )  phasing o r b i t .  Af t e r  i n i t i a l  phasing r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  
t a r g e t  v e h i c l e  i s  accomplished, rendezvous and phasing adjustments are made dur- 
ing a s e r i e s  of Hohmann t r a n s f e r  burns t o  a c i r c u l a r  o r b i t  approximately 18.5 km 
(10 n mi) below the t a r g e t  vehic le .  F ina l  phase adjustments a r e  made p r i o r  t o  
i n i t i a t i n g  t h e  terminal  phase i n i t i a t i o n  burn t o  complete t h e  rendezvcas , s t a t i o n -  
keeping, and docking opera t ions .  
During the  subsequent on-L r b i t  s tay t ime  a t  t h e  t a r g e t  veh ic le  o r b i t ,  t h e  
o r b i t e r  can e i t h e r  be  a t tached  t o  o r  can stat ion-keep a t  a s a f e  d i s t ance  from 
the  t a r g e t  veh ic le .  
Shor t ly  bef o re  deo rb i t ,  phasing with  a landing s i te  is accomplished, 
system checks a r e  made, and t h e  cargo bay doors are closed.  The deo rb i t  burn 
which follows w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  e n t r y  t o  t h e  e a r t h ' s  atmosphere a t  approximately 
122 km (400,000 f e e t )  and subsequent approach and landing a t  t h e  p re se l ec t ed  
landing site. 
It is s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay doors would be closed 
f o r  only 112 hour t o  1 hour  whi le  on o r b i t  f o r  a s h u t t l e  mission of any dura- 
t ion .  
1.4.2 Typica l  O r b i t e r  Model 
The primary o r b i t e r  concepts considered i n  the  study a r e  shown i n  Figures 
1-5 and 1-6. The i n t e g r a l  tank o r b i t e r  concept r e s u l t i n g  from NR Phase B 
s h u t t l e  s t u d i e s  is shown i n  Figure 1-6 and includes  such f e a t u r e s  as a 4.6 m 
15-ft-diameter by 18.3 m 60-ft-length cargo bay with hinged cargo bay doors, 
two manipulators w i th  pe r iphe ra l  i l lumina t ion ,  v i s u a l  and opera t ing  a id s ,  a 
manipulator opera tor  s t a t i o n ,  and an a i r l o c k  docking p o r t  which i n t e r f a c e s  wi th  
the  crew and passenger compartments and with  a personnel t r a n s f c r  po r t  leading 
t o  t h e  cargo bay. This conf igura t ion  includes  i n t e g r a l  LH2 and L1)2 prope l l an t  
tanks f o r  t he  main propulsion system used f o r  o r b i t  i n j e c t i o n ,  and t h e  a u x i l i a r y  
propulsion s y s  tern used f o r  o r b i t  maneuvering and a t t i t u d e  cont ro l .  An air- 
breathing propulsion system, which employs JP f u e l  and turbofan angines, is 
incorporated t o  provide t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  short-dtirat ion powered descent a f t e r  
veh ic l e  en t ry ,  powered landing and go-around, and veh ic l e  f e r r y  aperat ions .  
The drop tank o r b i t e r  conf igurat ion r e s u l t i n g  from NR Phase B ex tens ion  
s t u d i e s  is shown i n  Figure  1-6 and d i f f e r s  from the previous cc~nf igura t ion  , 
primari ly  i n  t h a t  i t  f ea tu re s  an e x t e r n a l  j e t t i s o n a b l e  L02/LH2 ascent  p rope l lan t  
tank, employs s t o r a b l e  hypergol ic  p rope l l an t s  (ni t rogen t e t r o x i d e  and Aerozine 
50) for  t h e  o r b i t  maneuvering and a t t i t u d e  con t ro l  systems. I t  is a l i g h t e r  
veh ic l e  than the  i n t e g r a l  tank o r b i t e r  wi th  a geometry which requi red  r e l o c a t i o n  
of t h e  a i r l o c k  docking p o r t  t o  t h e  nose of t h e  veh4cle. 
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Figure 1-6. Drop Tank Orbiter Concept 
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The i n i t i a l  MDAC o r b i t e r  concept, which i s  s i m i l a r  t o  the  NR i n t e g r a l  
tank o r b i t e r ,  a l s o  employs i n t e g r a l  LO2 and LH2 prope l l an t  tanks. Hawever, a 
r o t a t i c n  payload deployment mechanism concept is used in l i e u  of an a r t l c u l a t i n g  
manipuLator, ae shown i n  Figure 1-7. 
' ~ D O C K I N G  FRAME 
EXTEND ED) 
Figure 1-7. MDAC Payload Deployment Mechanism 
1.4.3 T v ~ i c a l  O r b i t e r  Pavloads 
Orb i t e r  payloads considered i n  the  study include the  f ollawing: 
Unmanned pa l le t - type  s o r t i e  payloads, which remain a t tached 
t o  the  o r b i t e r ,  These may reriain i n  the  cargo bay, o r  be 
deployed out  of i t  f o r  exposure t o  space. 
Manned s o r t i e  modules, which remain a t tached  t o  the  o r b i t e r .  
These a l so  may remain i n  t h e  cargo bay, o r  be  deployed out  of 
i t  during o r b i t a l  operat ions .  These may be flown combined 
with  an .inmanned p a l l e t  payload. 
Automated payloads. These inc lude  s a t e l l i t e s  and s u b s a t e l l i t e s  
de l ivered  t o  o r b i t  by the  o r b i t e r  and opera te  detached from t h e  
o r b i t e r .  These a l s o  can be r e t r i e v e d  f o r  s e r v i c i n g  o r  r e t u r n  
to  ea r th .  
Upper s t a g e  veh ic les  wi th  t h e i r  payloads. These a r e  used as a 
s h u t t l e  t h i r d  s t a g e  t o  d e l i v e r  payloads beyond the  o r b i t e r ' s  
capab i l i t y .  The upper s t a g e  veh ic les  considered as candidates 
include:  
o Agena 
o Centaur 
o Burner I1 
o Transtage 
o Apollo s e r v i c e  module (SH) 
o Tug o r  o rb i t - to -orb i t  s h u t t l e  (00s) 
Space Dlvlnicm 
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The Centaur, tug, and OOS, and possibly the  SM, a r e  co~.;idered reusable  
and may be r e t r i w e d ,  The others are expendable, These include t h e  modules 
required f o r  buildup of the permanent s t a t i o n ,  cargo modules f o r  l o g i s t i c s  
resupply, experiment modulus, and replacement modules a s  required.  A 1  A theee 
m d u l e s  are r e tu rnab le  t o  e a r t h  i n  the  o r b i t e r .  
1.4,4 Typical  Space S t a t i o n  hbdel 
The primary modular space s t a t i o n  ( S S )  concepts being considered by NR 
and MDAC f o r  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t i o n  a r e  ehown in Ngures  1-8 and 1-9. As shown 
i n  Figure 1-8, the NR i n i t i a l  s t a t i o n  cons is t s  of nine modules requir ing a 
like number of s h u t t l e  f l i g h t s  f o r  the  s t a t i o n  buildup. S imi l a r  da t a  f o r  t h e  
MDAC i n i t i a l  modular s t a t i o n  a r e  presented i n  Figure 1-9. 
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IOC - 6 MEN 
I 
Launch No, Modu 1 e 
- -- 
Module Elements 
Power 
Control/Crew 
ECS/ Labs 
Crew/Cargo 
RAM 
RAM 
Power generation and conversion, IVA/EVA a i r -  
lock, guidance and cont ro l ,  react ion control ,  
consumables 
Solar array,  emergency hatch, G N 2 ,  5d2 
Control center ,  personal hygiene, da ta  analys is ,  
commander/exec stateroom i s o t m i c  exercise  area,  
photo lab,  crew stateroom, waste management 
equipment 
Environmental control  and l i f e  support equip- 
ment, nadi r  a i r lock ,  mechanical lab,  op t i ca l /  
e l e c t r i c a l  lab,  bioscience/earth observation 
laboratory 
Environmental control  and 1 i f e  support equip- 
ment, zeni th a i r lock ,  gal ley,  dining and 
recrea t ion ,  physics/biomedical l a b  
Control center ,  personal hygiene, medical and 
crew care, camander/executive stateroom, crew 
stateroom 
Crew, propel lants ,  consmables 
Experiments 
Experiments 
NR Modular Space S ta t ion  
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Launch No. Module . I Module Elements 
Solar array,  propellant tankage, system 
comnunication, da ta  management, displays/  
control  a ,  onboard checkout, pump-down 
accumulator, atmosphere supply, control  
moment gyros, guidance and control ,  hori-  
zon sensor, e l e c t r i c a l  power supply, 
r eac t  ion control  
General Purpose 
Laboratory 
Crew/Operations Module 
Logistics Module 
Crew quarters ,  e lec t ronics ,  hygiene, 
casnmand control console, ga l  ley/wardroom, 
' crew 
L 
quarters ,  food s torage 
Data evaluation, secondary and experi- 
ment control consoles, a i r lock  chamber 
and controls ,  biomedical lab, opt ica l  
lab,  i so la t ion  and t e s t  lab, EVA a i r lock ,  
a i r lock  chamber, mechanical sciences lab,  
hard da ta  processing f a c i l i t y ,  e l e c t r i c a l /  
e lec t ronics  l a b  
Prope'lant cargo, l iqu id  and gas cargo, 
s o l i d  cargo, cargo handling aids ,  crew 
t r a n s f e r  tunnel, and a i r lock  
Figure 1-9. MDAC MSS Buildup Sequence/ I n i t i a l  S t a t  ion 
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2.0 HAZARDOUS EARTH ORBITAL SHUTTLE PAYLOADS, 
CARGO TRANSFER, AND HANDLING 
Many different kinds of payloads will be carried into orbit in the orbiter 
cargo bay. The purpose of this task was to identify, analyze, and recommend 
solutions of the hazards resulting feom (a) the delivery, deployment, and 
retrieval of hazardous payloads, and from (b) the transfer and handling of 
general types of cargo. Three particular areas  of concern were investigated 
since they concern the safety of the orbiter and its crew and passengers 
while in orbit. These areas and the sections in which they appear are: 
Upper stage vehicles as  they a r e  transported in the orbiter cargo 
bay, deployed, and retrieved. These vehicles include expendable 
stages, mainly using storable o r  solid propellants, and reusable 
cryogenic stages. Hazards. specific to on-orbit orbiter aborts 
a re  included. (Section 2 .l) 
Hazardous fluid v2ssels transported and off-loaded in earth orbit 
in the orbiter as  cargo o r  a s  part  of a payload. Orbiter on-ordit 
abort hazards a r e  included. (Section 2.2) 
The handling and transport of cargo betweer, the orbiter, sortie 
modules, and Space Station. (Sect ion 2.3) 
The technical analyses for these three subtasks a r e  reported in 
Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2. 3, respectively. Section 2. 5 summarizes the 
residual hazards from this task and how they a r e  resolved. Hazard/ 
emergency analyses a r e  contained in Appendix C of this volume. 
The primary output of this task i s  the se t  of recommended require- 
ments and guidelines. These a r e  contained in Volumes IV and V of this 
report. A set  of conclusions, based on the hazardlemergency analyses and 
the other supporting analyses of Appendix A, is given in Section 2.4, together 
with the supporting rationale. 
Tt is believed that the assumptions inherent in this task a r e  few and 
simple. These are: 
The Shuttle orbiter has the capability to operate in earth orbit 
independently of other vehicles in orbit, of the payload, o r  of 
the ground. 
Space Division 
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The orbiter has the inherent capability to return to earth with all its 
crew and passengers. 
The orbiter payloal or  payloads are  carried in a single cargo bay. 
This cargo bay is protected during boost and reentry by a cargo bay 
door or  doors, which form a part of the orbiter, and can be opened 
and closed by the orbiter crew. The cargo bay is  not pressurized 
o r  pressurizable in orbit. 
The orbiter has the capability to deploy payloads out of the cargo 
bay, when required, and to retrieve and stow recoverable modules 
and payloads. 
The orbiter and Space station have docking capability. 
So long as  these assumptions remain valid, the results of this task 
should be applicable. In addition, assumptions applicable to specifie 
hazardslemergency analyses have been recorded individually in the par- 
ticular analyses (see Appendix D). 
2.1 UPPER STAGE VEHICLES AS SHUTTLE PAYLOADS 
The purpose of this subtask was to identify the hazards associated 
with the transportation, deployment, and retrieval in earth orbit of upper 
stage vehicles, and to determine the safety measures required to deal with 
these. Both expendable stages and reusable stages were considered. The 
orbiter on-orbit abort hazards subsequent to these types of payloads were 
also analyzed. 
A large range of upper stage vehicles is currently being considered 
for use in the shuttle orbiter. These stages will be used to launch unmanned 
payloads into higher orbits than the orbiter capability. Both existing 
vehicles such ae the Agena and Centaur, modified existing vehicles such as  
Agenals and Centaur's with larger tanks, and new vehicles such as orbit-to- 
orbit shuttle (00s) and the tug, a re  being considered. Ir general, only the 
cryogenic stages (Centaur, OOS and tug) a re  being considered reusable, 
but the Apollo service module could also be reusable. In addition to the 
liquid propellant stages, a solid propellant stage (Burner 11) was also con- 
sidered in the study as typical of solid stages. 
Sections 2. 1. 1 and 2. 1. 2 identify potential hazards. Appendix A con- 
tains eome specific supporting analyses. The hazardlemergency analyses 
and the resulting requirements and guidelines a re  contained in Appedix D 
and i r ~  Volumes IV and V of this report. 
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2. 1. 1 Hazardous Elements of Upper Stage Vehicles 
The upper stage vehicles considered in this subtask were: 
r, Agena 
Centaur 
Transtage 
a Burner I1 
Apollo service module 
Orbit-to-orbit Shuttle (OOS)/tug 
It is  believed that the hazards identified from these vehicles a r e  
typical of al l  upper stage vehicles that may be carried in the Shuttle orbiter 
in the foreseeable future. The modified versions of the Agena and the 
Centaur a s  presently conceived differ only in the sizing of the tanks. The 
subsystems will be the same a s  on the current stages. The OOS and the 
tug a t  the time this report was prepared were in Phase A Definition and 
therefore exact data on the subsystems to be used a r e  not available. How- 
ever, the results of the Phase A studies a t  North American indicate that 
the OOS/tug hazards a r e  fully covered by the other vehicles considered. 
Xazardous elements of the upper stage vehicles considered a r e  listed 
in Table 2- 1. 
2. 1. 2 Identified Hazards 
Potential hazards were identified by considering the hazardous 
elements of each upper stage vehicle (Section 2. 1. 1) and potential failure 
modes a s  applicable to each operation (Appendix A). . These potential 
hazards a r e  listed for each upper stage vehicle in Tables A-4 through A-8, 
listed by mission phase. Because of lack of detailed hardware definition, 
hazards for the OOS/tug have not been identified in this detail, but the 
Centaur hazards may be regarded a s  typical of the OOS/tug. 
The individual hazards (identified in Tables A-4 through A-8 of 
Appendix A) were consolidated into 15 classes of hazards, applicable in 
general to a l l  the upper stage vehicles. The hazard/emergency analyses 
of Appendix D of this report were performed for each of these classes of 
hazards. 
These 15 classes of hazards are:  
1. 1.00 1 Explosion/rupture of a pressurized container in an  upper 
stage vehicle inside o r  near orbiter. 
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1. 1.002 Combination of mutually reactive upper stage vehicle fluids 
leading to explosion o r  fire inside o r  near orbiter. 
1. 1.003 Inadvertent detonation of explosive charge on upper stage 
vehicle inside o r  near orbiter. 
1. 1. 004 Rapid decomposition of monopropellants located in o r  
leaking from the upper stage vehicle while inside o r  near 
orbiter. 
1. 1.00 5 Uncontrolled combustion in active upper stage vehicle 
reaction control engines while near the orbiter. 
1.1.006 Leakage of corrosive fluids from upper stage vehicle tanks 
while inside the orbiter. 
1. 1.007 Inadvertent s tar t  of an upper stage vehicle main o r  react ion 
cont ro l  rocket engine while in s ide  o r b i t e r  cargo bay. 
1. 1.008 Inadvertent separation of an upper stage vehicle attach 
point while in the orbiter. 
1. 1. 009 Loss of attitudeltranslation control of upper stage vehicle 
upon release from orbiter. 
i. 1.010 Hangup of upper stage vehicle during release from arbiter.  
1. 1.0 11 Rupture of common bulkhead tanks in upper stage vehicle 
while in o r  near orbiter. 
1. 1.012 Loss of pressurization in pressure stabilized upper stage 
vehicle structure while in o r  near orbiter. 
1. 1.0 13 Inability to dump propellants o r  pressurants in retrieved 
upper stage vehicle. 
1. 1.014 Inability to dump upper stage vehicle propellants o r  pres-  
surante during orbiter abort. 
1. 1.015 Inability to close cargo bay doors after retrieval of upper 
stage vehicle because of interference with upper stage 
vehicle. 
The numbers refer to the hazarcilemergency analyses in Appr ndix D 
of this report, in which these a r e  analyzed. 
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Table 2-1. Hazardous Elements of  Upper Stage Vehicles 
Fluid Propellants : 
Nitrogen Tetroxide 
Aerozene -50 
Hydrogen Peroxide 
Liquid Oxygen 
Liquid Hydrogen 
Yonomethyl Hydrazine 
Water/Glycol 
Unsymmetrical Dimethyl 
Hydrazine 
Inhibi ted Red Fuming N i t r i c  
Acid 
Pressurized Containers : 
Helium Tanks 
Nitrogen Tanks 
Hitrogen Tetroxide Tanks 
Aerozene -50 Tanks 
Hydrogen Peroxide Tanks 
Liquid Oxygen Tanks 
Liquid Hydrogen Tanks 
Mor omethyl Hydrazine Tanks 
Water/Gly:ol Tanks 
Unsymmetrical Dimethyl 
Hydrazine 
Inhib i ted  Red Fuming Nitric 
Acid 
RCS Propellants:  
Aerozene -50 + Nitrogen 
Te troxide 
Monomethyl Hydrazine + 
Nitrogen Tetroxide 
Hydrogen Gas + Nitrogen 
Tetroxide 
Corrosive Fluids : 
Nitrogen Tetroxide 
Hydrogen Peroxide 
Liquid Oxygen 
Inhibi ted Red Fuming N i t r i c  
Acid 
Lent aur Trans t age 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Table 2-1. Hazardous Elements of Upper Stage Vehicles (Cont) 
Pyrotechnics : 
Connections Between Modules - 
Cutters  
Helium Valves 
Solid Propellant Ign i t e r s  
Turbine S t a r t  Solid Pro- 
p e l l a n t  Charges 
Explosive Bolts - Payload 
Separation 
Linear Shaped Charge - Panel 
Separation 
Destruct Shaped Charges 
External Extensions - 
Antennae 
Main Engine 
RCS Engine 
S t a b i l i t v  Source: 
Gyro Reference 
Accelerometers 
Coqu te r /F l igh t  Control 
Attachment Methods : 
Explosive Bolts 
Linear Shaped Charge 
Not Defined 
Att i tude Hold/Translation 
Capabi l i t ies  : 
Translat ion - Main Engine 
-RCS 
- Auxiliary 
Att i tude Hold - RCS Couples 
- Off-Center 
* ( ) Number of  d i rec t ions  
- 
Agena 
X 
X 
X 
X .  
X 
1 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X(1)' 
X 
Centaur rrans t age Burner I I 
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2 . 2  HAZARDOUS FLUID VESSELS AS SHUTTLE PAYLOADS 
The purpose of this subtask was to identify the hazards associated 
with the various fluid vessels which may be transported in the Shuttle orbiter 
cargo bay as  part  of a payload, and to determine the safety requirements 
and guidelines to deal with these hazards. 
In general, hazards exist either because the fluid is  inherently hazard- 
ous, e. g.,  toxic o r  corrosive, o r  because of the conditions under which i t  i s  
transported; e. g., at high pressure o r  as  a cryogen. The Shuttle crew o r  
passengers a re  normally only directly exposed to the hazard when a manned, 
pressurized experiments module is carried on the orbiter as  part  of a sortie 
module. Situations in which crew or  passengers have exposed themselves 
to the hazardous fluids in extravehicular activity (EVA) have also been con- 
sidered. The main safety concern has turned out to involve damage to the 
orbiter, particularly the cargo bay area;  and this, of course, jeopardizes 
personnel safety indirectly by precluding return to earth. 
A major a rea  not covered in this study is  the transportation into space 
by the Shuttle of large quantities of propellants for logistic resupply of such 
vehicles as  a tug, orbital propellant depot, and chemical o r  nuclear propul- 
sion stages. The reason is  that the entire subject of logistics resupply of 
propellants and propellant transfer is being studied in a concurrent NASA 
study at  the Space Division, In-Space Propellant Logis tics and Safety Study, 
Contract NAS8- 27692. Project I1 of this study i s  specifically concerned 
with the safety aspects. 
Sections 2.2.  1 to 2. 2 . 4  identify hazardous fluids involved in the 
orbiter payloads (except upper stage vehicles, which were covered in 
Section 2. 1). Section 2. 2. 5 summarizes the hazards, and the remaining 
sections contain some specific supporting analyses. . The hazard/emergency 
analyses a r e  contained in Appendix D and the resulting requirements and 
guidelines in Volume IV and V of this report. 
2.2. 1 Hazardous Experiment Fluids 
Hazardous experiment fluids were identified by a review of Volumes I1 
through VIII of the Blue Book, Preliminary Edition of Reference Ear th  
Orbital Research and Applications Investigations, 15 January 1971. This 
document was selected because it is  used as a baseline NASA document to 
define a manned spaceflight research capability to be conducted in Earth 
Orbital Space Stations and Shuttles and is therefore not oriented specifically 
to any single program. The eight Blue Book volumes are: 
Volurne I Summary 
Volume I1 Astronomy 
Volume 111 Physics 
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Volume IV Earth Observations 
Volume V Cammuni cations /Navigation 
Volume VI Materials Sciences and Maintenance 
Volume VII Technology 
Volume VIII Life Sciences 
The results of the Blue Book review a re  listed in Tables A-9 through 
A- 15 of Appendix A. The experiment and subexperiment for each diucipline 
a r e  listed together with the subexperiment basic fluid requirements. (The 
tables also include materials which were identified and listed for use in 
other tasks. ) Container quantities, pressures,  and volumes a re  indicated 
when specified. Worthy of particular note is  the potential use of mercury 
for the quantum effects at  low temperature and zero g physics experiments, 
and a requirement in excess of 1100 kg (2500 lb) of LHZ to support long-term 
cryogenic storage technology experiments, 
2. 2. 2 Hazardous Sortie Module Fluids 
Sortie modules include research and applications module (RAM), RAM 
support module (RSM), mission support module (MSM) , and palletized 
experiment payloads which remain attached to the orbiter and a r e  used as  
reusable space laboratories: o r  support facilities. 
Because of the level of detail available from the current Shuttle Orbital 
Applications /Requirements (SOAR) and research and applications module 
studies, it  was not possible to identify specific hazardous fluids associated 
with al l  program elements. However, since for normal sortie missions 
these modules will be attached to the orbiter, and the orbiter will provide 
necessary experiment attitude control and propulsion, propellants a r e  not 
required in theee modules. A possible exception may exist i f  t1.e RSM o r  
MSM is uszd to service and refuel automated payloads, in which case sig- 
nificant quantities of propellants would be required. The RSM will provide 
environmental control and life support facilities for the experiment crew 
in addition to providing facilities to support the conduct of experiments. For  
a typical seven-day experiment sortie mission, i t  will require fluids in the 
approximate quantities and with approximate container characteristics as 
listed in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2. RAM Support Module Fluids for Seven-Day Mission 
No. of: 
Containe rs 
2 
2 
1 
Not defined 
a 
Fluid 
LO 
LH 
LN2 
GN;! 
Fluid 
Quantity 
Kg (lb) 
3 lO(680) 
34(7 5 )  
60(133) 
4. 5(10) 
Container 
Volume 
Ad3 (ft3) 
0.23 (7. 1) 
0.36 (12.6) 
0.23 (8. 1) 
Not defined 
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Hazardous fluids other than those applicable to sor t ie  mis  s ions which 
were identified during review of the 1971 NASA Experiment Blue Book were 
not identifiable. 
2.2. 3 Hazardous Station Fluids 
.- 
Hazardous fluids a r e  required by both the S D  and McDonnell Douglas 
(MDAC) designs of the Modular Space Stations during the station buildup and 
normal  operations phases. Station modules containing hazardous fluids for 
attitude control, electrical  power generation, and pressurization will be 
delivered by the Shuttle during the buildup phase, Resupply of station sub- 
system consumables will be accomplished under the present concepts via an 
orb i te r  delivered cargo o r  logis tics module. 
The SD station is planned to generate GO2 and GHZ by water electrol- 
ysis  during normal operations. During buildup, i t  requires delivery of 
high-pressure gases on the initial modules to support subsequent buildup 
ope rations. After station buildup, delivery of water  for electrolysis and 
GN2 for atmosphere leakage makeup via the cargo module will be the pr imary  
station subsys tem resupply fluids. The expected fluid quantities, tank quan- 
tities, and pressures  for the SD station core  and power module buildup 
launches and the cargo module resupply for station subsystems ;re shown 
in Table 2-3. This includes fluid quantities required for station repressur -  
ization, EVA support, and 48-hour emergency support. 
Table 2-3, Expected Hazardous Fluids - NR Modular Station Subsystems 
CORE MODULE POWER MODULE CARGO MODULE 
iontainer Characteris tics Container Characteristics ontainer Characteristics 
Fluid 
Q ~ Y  Q ~ Y  vo 1 
Kg (lb) ~ s ( f t 3 )  
88 (194) 2 .31(10.9) 
A l l  pressures 2.06 x 107 ~ / m 2  ( 
Fluid 
Q ~ Y  
Kg (lb) 
125 (274) 
88 (194) 
15 (34) 
58(127) 
100 psi) . 
Q ~ Y  
3 
3 
3 
3 
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On the MDAC station, significant quantitiee [approximately 106 kg/ 
month (233 lb/month) for three months] of N2H4 (hydrazine) will be required 
on the initial powor/subsysterns modale launch to provide station attitude 
and maneuver control prior to the installation of control moment gyroa 
(CMG1s) and before the activation of resistojets which require C02 (carbon 
dioxide) in quantities capable of being generated by the crew. High-pressure 
atmospheric supply bottles of GO2 and CNZ in significant quantities a r e  also 
intended to be contained in the power/subsystems module. Resupply of the 
station, after initiation of the resistojet system, will require smaller 
quantities of N2H4 than those required on the initial launch, but will require 
substantial quantities of high-pressure GO2 and GN2 for atmospneric leakage 
r e  supply. 
2, 2.4 Hazardous Automated Payload Fluids 
Automated payloads a r e  capable of being operated in a free-flying mode 
after release from the orbiter. The automated payloads range in size from 
a 136 kg (300 lb) earth orbiting small applications technology satellite to a 
11,400 kg (25,000 lb) high energy astronomical observatory (HEAO) in low 
earth orbit. When an upper stage vehicle is required, as  for automated 
planetary payloads, the payload total weights can approach the maximum 
payload of 29,500 kg (65,000 lb), of which approximately 70 percent is pro- 
pellants. While propellant quantities for small satellites of the 136 kg (300 lb) 
class a r e  not considered significant, propellant requirements for attitude 
control and orbit makeup of large low earth orbit payloads, such a s  the HEAO, 
can be significant. Although cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen could be used for 
propulsion for  short duration automated payload missions, i t  is more likely 
that solid propellants and storable propellants such a s  cold gas GN2, mono- 
propellants such art hydrazine, A-50, hydrogen peroxide, and monomethyl 
hydrazine, and hypergolic o r  ignitable bipropellants will be employed. Small 
quantities of cryogenics may 'be required, however, to cool experiment 
sensors,  a s  in infrared astronomy experiments. 
2'. 2. 5 Summary of Hazardous Fluid Vessels in Orbiter Payloads 
Hazardous fluids identified for the upper stage vehicles, Blue Book 
experiments, Space Station, sor5.e modules, aild automated payloads a r e  
summarized in Table 2-4 together with the hazardous characteristics of 
the fluid and accountability to the payload element. 
2.2.6 Identified Hazards 
Each fluid vesrrel to be transported in the orbiter cargo bay ir  arao- 
ciated with a se t  of d i s c r e k  hazards. This sot depends oz the hazardma 
properties of the fluid, the quantity of fluid, it# rtorage conditionr, it8 
location in the orbiter, and the mode of operation (8. g., whether manned 
Space Division 
North Amercan Fiockwell 
Table 2-4, Swnmary of Hazardous Fluid Vessels i n  Orbi ter  Payloads 
HAZARDOUS FLUID 
CRYOGENICS 
LN2 
LO2 
LHe 
LH2 
Slush Hydrogen 
Solid Cryogen 
Undefined Cryogen 
LNe 
LA, 
Superfluid Helium 
Dry Ice (LC02) 
GAS 
_C 
02 
N 2  
'42 
Unspecified Gas 
He 
Hydrocarbons 
Carbon Tet raf  lour!.de (CF4) 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) 
Carbon Dioxide (C02) 
Nitric Oxide (NO) 
Acetylene (HC= CH) 
Diborane (B2Hg) 
Xenon (Xe) 
I PROGRAM ELEMENT 
UPPER STAGE BLUEBOOK 
HAL ARD VEHICLE t EXPERIMENT 
I 
$ uh 4 4  
r( a m  
U 0 0  
d O) k r l  
82Ut C - c t t u w  
-. 
B 
B X X X  
B 
B X  X 
B X  X 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
x x x x  
A 
X X  X 
A 
X X 
X 
X X  X 
A 
C X 
A X  X 
x x  X 
C 
-- 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X X  
X X  X X  
X X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X X  
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X X 
X X X X  
X 
X 
Foo tnotes: A = Simple asphyxiant C - Extremely toxic when 
B - Can cause severe burns and heated to decomposition 
t issue damage on contact X - Applicable or present 
with skin 
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f Hazardous Fluid Vessels i n  Orbi ter  Payloads ( C m t )  
1 
I 
0 
4 
0 
2 
g: E d r c  + a 0  
u 0 0  a 
4 0 )  b r (  $ 
,X.rga b M a u B  M 
-' -- i f 
Table 
PROGRAM ELEMENT 
BLUEBOOK 
EXPERIMENT I- . - UPPER STAGE VEHICLE I HAZARD 
HAZARDOUS FLUID 
;AS - (Continued) 
Sulfur Hexaflouride (SFg) 
dethane (CHq) 
Propane (CH3CH2CH3) 
Unspecified Combustibles 
3ydrogen Sulf ide (HzS) 
dydrazine (N2H4) 
Nuclear Emulsion 
Hydrocarbons 
rrimethlalminum (AL (CH3) 3) 
Freon 
Hercury 
Phenol (C6HsOH) 
Forma 1 deh yde 
Liquid Metals 
Po tass im Sodium Niebate 
Potassium Sodium C i l i c a t e  
Solvent 
Sallium Arsenide Solution 
Liquid Galliun 
Fused S i l i c a t e  Solutions 
Hexane (CH3 (CH2) 4CH3) 
Methanol (M9)  
Pent ane (CH3 (CH2) 3CH3) 
Ethanol (CH~CHZOH) 
Freon I1 
Freon II4BZ 
Freon 21 
Glycol 
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Table 2-4. Summary o f  Hazardous c l u i d  Vessels ir, Orb i t e r  Payloads (Cont) 
- - 
HAZARD 
PROGRAM ELEMENT 
- - 
UPPER STAGE 
VEHICLE 
BLUEBOOK 
EXPERIMEiJT OTHER 
1 G 0 3  Q, Uh r ld 
HAZARDOUS FLUID 
L1QiJID (Continued) 
IITRI ZNO S i l i cnne  (S-13) 
IITRI ZNO S i l i c a t e  (Z-9) 
LMSC Thermatrol T L O ~  
S i l i cone  (6A-100) 
Schteldahl  GT-1015 
Lubricants 
Hydroquinones 
C2H4 
Nitrogen Tetroxide (N2O4) 
A-50 (50% UDMH + 50% 
Hydrazine) 
Hydrogen Peroxide (H202) 
Monomethyl Hydrazine 
X x 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
x x  X 
x 
X X 
C X X X  
X X X X  
C X X X  
--- 
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or unmanned). In addition, further hazards may be introduced by the inter - 
action of a fluid tank and a piece of Shuttle equipment (e. g. , a water tank 
next to a high-temperature source), or by the colocation of two tanks, each 
of which i s  relatively safe on its own (em g., O2 and H2 tanks next to each 
other). 
Upon review of all the potential hazards, it was found possible to 
condense these into five generalized classes of hazard. For purposes of 
this study, it was found both practical and desirable to use the fallowing 
classes a s  the hazard or emergency: 
1.2.001 Exposure of the o r b i t e r  crew o r  passengers  t o  a 
toxic environment released from a vessel in the 
payload containing a toxic fluid. 
1.2.002 A fire in the cargo bay resulting from release 
and ignition of a flammable fluid in an unpressurized 
payload. 
1.2.003 A f i re  in a pressurized payload in ! re cargo bay 
resulting from release and ignition of a flammable 
fluid. 
1.2.004 A corrosive environment in the o r b i t e r  cargo bay 
resulting from leakage or rupture of a payload vessel 
containing a corrosive fluid. 
1.2.005 An explosion in the o r b i t e r  cargo bay of a p o t e n t i a l l y  
explosive payload vessel. 
The numbers refer  to the hazardlemergency analyses i n  Appendix D of 
this report, in which these a re  analyzed. 
Fluids stored in pressure vessels also present an explosion hazard. 
This type of explosion hazard i s  not indicated in Table 2-4, because this i s  
a characteristic of the storage conditions and quantities rather than of the 
fluid. Every fluid stored as a gas, or a s  a liquid under pressure, exhibits 
this hazard to some extent or other (see Appendix A). 
2.3 CARGO HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN SHUTTLE 
ORBITER, SORTIE MODULES, AND SPACE STATION 
The purpose of this subtask was to identify the hazards associated with 
the handling and transportation of cargo between the Shuttle orbiter, sortie 
modules, and Space Station in earth orbit, and to determine the safety 
requirements and guidelines to deal with these hazards. 
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A review of the potential missions currently envisioned for the Shuttle 
in sortie modes, and later on for the Space Station, shows that a large and 
varied range of supplies will be transported into space by the Shuttle. Much 
of this cargo will be transferred from the Shuttle orbiter (the logistics supply 
vehicle) to the user  vehicle (Space Station, sortie module, satellite, or  
reusable orbital propulsion stage). Some will be transferred f rom the 
orbiter in modular form, e. g., a s  a cargo module, a s  a module of a station, 
or  a s  a prepackaged payload for a propulsion stage. Individual cargo 
packages, such a s  food supplies, experiments, subsystems modification 
kits, o r  spares and fluid resupply tanks, will in turn need to be transferred 
from some of these modules to their ultimate user  location in other modules. 
In some cases,  individual packages will be transferred, manually or  
mechanically, directly from the orbiter cargo bay to a use r  satellite or  
other spacecraft. And finally, return cargo to earth, such a s  data packages, 
empty tanks, waste material, and replaced components will be returned in 
similar ways from the user  vehicles to the orbiter for return to earth. 
This subtask i s  concerned with operations of all  these cargo handling 
and transfer operations that involve discrete individual pieces of cargo. 
These transfers involve mainly the orbiter, sortie modules, and the Space 
Station. The transfer of complete modules o r  complete Shuttle payloads, 
such a s  upper stage vehicles and nayloads, i s  not considered here (see 
Sections 2.1 and 3.0). The transfer of bulk quantities of propellants for the 
re-fuelling of space-based propulsion stages i s  not covered here. The design, 
operatiotal, and safety aspects a r e  being evaluated in a concurrent study a t  
SD, In -S~ace  Propellant Logistics and Safety Study, Contract NAS8-27692. 
The targo that may be handled and transferred i s  identified in 
Section 2.3.1; the traffic model (what cargo, from which vehicle, and to 
which vehicle) in Section 2.3.2; and potential cargo handling and transfer 
methods in Section 2. 3.3. The potential hazards a r e  identified in 
Section 2.3.4, and the remaining sections contain some specific supporting 
analyses. The hazardslemergency analyses and the resulting requirements 
and guidelines a r e  contained in Appendix D of this volume, and in Volumes IV 
and V of this report. 
2. 3. 1 Candidate Cargo 
The candidate cargo materials to be handled and transferred between 
orbiter, sortie modules, and Space Station were d e ~  ired from the logistics 
resupply requirements developed in the NR Phase B Space Station study. In 
this study the station was planned to complete the experiments contained in 
the NASA Experiments Blue Book, a s  well a s  logistically supply a crew of 
6 to 12 men for up to 10 years in earth orbit. On-board experiments, 
attached and detached experiments modules, and free-flying satellite support 
were included in the operations. Since the current missions for the Shuttle 
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sortie missions a re  less ambitious than this, both in terms of experiments 
to be carried out and of number of man-months in orbit, the candidate cargo 
manifest for the Space Station includes all individual cargo (excluding 
satellites and propulsion stages) currently being ccnsidered for the Shuttle, 
sortie, and station programs. 
The candidate list of cargo which was made up to define the cargo 
module characteristics extracted from Space Station Program Phase B 
Definition (Cargo Module Definition, DRL-47, North American Rockwell, 
Space Division, 3D 70-5040, MSC-00759, January 1971 ), i s  listed in 
Table 2. f , Candidate items which a r e  inherently or potentially hazardous 
a re  iden. -. su i=l this list by an asterisk. 
A more complete identification of hazardous payload fluids, together 
with their hazardous characteristics, i s  included in Section 2.2 of this 
volume. In addition, nuclear safety considerations ar ise  from some radio- 
active materials needed for specific experiments. Specific radioactive 
materials identified from the NASA Blue Book are  discussed in Appendix A. 
2.3.2 Cargo Handling and Transfer Model 
Table 2-6 indicates the cargo transfer flow between spacecraft 
elements. The letters H or N indicate that cargo, hazardous or  nonhazardous, 
respectively, is  to be transferred from the element in the left-hand vertical 
column to the corresponding element in the top horizontal row. This analysis 
follows from the definition of the various p r q r a m  elements and from the NR 
Phase B Space Station operational model useti in Section 2.3.1. In accordance 
with conclusions reached ic the hazardslemergency analysis of this section, 
i t  has been assumed in this model that no hazardous cargo will be carried in 
or through the orbiter crew compartment or  airlock. The analysis has shown 
that all cargo can be transported to space and transferred a s  required without 
violating this assumption. 
2.3.3 Methods of Cargo Handling and Transfer 
Many methods a r e  available for the transfer of cargo. The main con- 
cepts for shirtsleeve transfer a re  shown in Figure 2-1, based on classifi- 
cations defined by MDAC. These range from strictly hand-carry methods 
with no mechanical assists, to trolley systems that employ cages and remote 
controls. The MDAC concept of a cable guide system i s  categorized under 
manual-aided methods. 
For solid cargo transfer between a pressurized environment and an 
unpressurized environment, such a s  camera film reloading and retrieval 
from an unpressurized pallet, an airlock would be required. In addition, 
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Table 2-5. Space Sta t ion  Logistics Resupply 
Cargo Item 
* Liquid hydrogen 
* Liquid oxygen 
* Liquid nitrogen 
* Liquid helium 
* Miscellaneous cry0 
* Atmosphere 
* Argon 
* Neon 
* Helium 
* Carbon dioxide 
* Oxygen 
* M trogen 
* Calibrat ion gas 
* Miscellaneous cry0 
Water-animals 
Water-no meta l l ic  content 
Water-s ter i le  t r i p l e  
d i s t i l l e d  
Photo process chemicals 
Emulsion 
Chemicals 
Film-35 mm 
* Hydrazine 
Life support 
Service items 
Sta t ion  spares 
* Hazardous Items 
-- - 
Cargo Item 
. Film-35 nun cine 
Film-70 mm 
Film-150 film 
Film-225 mm 
F i l m  16 mm 
Film-9 x 14 mm 
Cultures (food) 
Specimens and food 
Food (animals) 
Tape, video 
Tape, audio 
Tape and microfilm 
Magnetic tapes 
Specimens spares 
Logistics 
Micrometeroid col lec tor  
Ballooms 
Dry samples 
Diary, l o g i s t i c s  
Lab supplies 
Physiological Measurement 
supplies 
Accessories 
F i l m  p la te s  
Probes 
Waste ( re  turn) 
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in,travehicular and extravehicular activity (IVA and EVA) would be involved 
if the cargo transfer were performed manually. Use of manipulators attached 
to the orbiter, such a s  shown in Figure 2-2, small specialized manipulators 
attached to a manned payload module, and other mechanisms controllable 
from a shirtsleeve environment a r e  being considered to avoid IVA. and EVA. 
The small specialized manipulatars would provide dexterity, positioning 
accuracy, and control capability in excess of the larger Shuttle manipulator. 
Two basic alternatives available for the transfer of fluids a r e  bulk 
transfer in self-contained tanks, and plumbed transfer in which fluids a r e  
pumped from one fixed container to another across  an interfacing element 
such a s  a docking port. 
2. 3.4 Identified Hazards 
Potential hazards which can occur during cargo handling and transfer 
operations were identified by considering possible combinations of the 
following: 
Candidate cargo, both hazardous and non-hazardous, from 
Section 2.3.1. 
The cargo handling and transfer model of Section 2.3.2. 
The different methods of cargo handling and transfer discussed 
in Section 2. 3. 3. 
The hazards o r  emergencies were considered to a r i se  from two 
sources, a s  follows: 
Failures or  accidents related to hazardous cargo items f rom 
Section 2. 3.1 in otherwise normal handling and transfer operations. 
Malfunctions, failures, o r  accidents related to the cargo handling 
and transfer mechanisms, including human e r rors ,  considering 
both hazardous and nonhazardous cargo. 
The resulting hazards and emergencies were grouped into five 
generalized hazard/emergencies, which cover all the individual situations 
to the level of detail appropriate to this etudy. These hazards/emergencies 
are:  
1.3.001 Spillage o r  leakage of hazardous fluid o r  material 
during manual transfer in pressurized modules. 
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1. 3.002 Spillage or leakage of hazardous fluids or materials 
during mechanically assisted or remote transfer in 
pressurized modules. 
1.3.003 Spillage or leakage of hazardous fluid or material 
during remote transfey in unpressurized area. 
1.3.004 Failure of transfer mecharism. and/or 108s of control 
of cargo during transfer in pressurized or unpressurized 
areas. 
1.3.005 A radioactive environment in a sortie module or Space 
Station, resulting from exposure or escape of radioactive 
material during transfer and handling of radioactive 
materials. 
The numbers refer to the haza,rd/emergency analyses in Appendix I) of 
this report, in which these were analyzed. 
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2.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMNENDATIONS 
The main ou tpu t s  of t h i s  t a s k  a r e  t he  s a f e t y  requirements  and guide- 
l i n e s  which r e s u l t  from t h e  hazardlemergency ana lyses .  The hazard/  
emergency ana ly se s  a r e  conta ined i n  Appendix D ,  and inc lude  t h e  requ i re -  
ments and gu ide l i ne s .  The requirements  and gu ide l i ne s  a r e  a l s o  presented  
i n  Volumes I V  and V of t h i s  r e p o r t ,  arranged under t h e  a p p l i c a b l e  v e h i c l e  
( S h u t t l e  o r b i t e r ,  s o r t i e  mcdule, upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s ,  o r  Space S t a t i o n ) .  
Conclusions from t h i s  t a s k ,  based on t h e  hazard/emergency ana lyses ,  
and supported by t h e  ana lyses  i n  Appendix A ,  a r e  presented  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i q  
paragraphs.  
The o r b i t e r  desigr. is extremely s e n s i t i v e  t o  even smal l  
exp los ions  i n  t he  cargo bay. Uncontained exp los ions  equ iva len t  
t o  a s  l i t ~ l e  a s  5 g (0.01 l b )  of TNT may r e s u l t  i n  exceeding 
t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  des ign  l i m i t  of t h e  cargo bay s t r u c t u r e  (14 kN/m , 
2 p s i )  fram b l a s t  overpressure .  By comparison, a hand grenade 
i s  equ iva len t  t o  10 g (0.025 l b )  of TNT and a f u l l y  loaded 
Centaur t o  approximately 2700 kg (6000 l b )  of TNT. 
Any s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  of  a loaded upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  whi le  i n  
t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay which r e s u l t s  i n  l a r g e  l e a k s  of bo th  
f u e l  and o x i d i z e r  w i l l  a lmost  c e r t a i n l y  be c a t a s t r o p h i c  t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r .  
* The energy con ten t  of even t h e  s m a l l e s t  l i q u i d  p rope l l an t  upper 
s t a g e  v e h i c l e  i f  r e l e a sed  suddenly, is f a r  more than can be 
t o l e r a t e d  by t h e  o r b i t e r .  The v e h i c l e  a c c e l e r a t i o n s  caused by 
t h e  r e a c t i o n  of  t h e  l e ak ing  f l u i d s  w i l l  ensure  mixing, and an 
i g n i t i o n  source  w i l l  almost c e r t a i n l y  be p resen t  dur ing t h e  
p rocess  of  s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e .  A chemical r e a c t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  
can be expected,  and t h i s  w i l l  probably propagate f a s t e r  than 
t h e  rate a t  which t h e  f l u i d s  can d i s p e r s e  i n  space ,  even wi th  
t h e  cargo bay doors  open. Every e f f o r t  must t h e r e f o r e  be made 
t o  prevent  s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  whi le  1:- 
o r  nea r  t h e  o r b i t e r .  Remedial meamres  a r e  n o t  considered 
p r a c t i c a l ,  and have not been recommended. 
@ I f  t h e  l eakage  of l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of  payload f l u i d s  i n t o  t h e  
o r b i t e r  cargo bay :LS considered c r e d i b l e  dur ing  boost  o r  whi le  
t h e  o r b i t e r  is  i n  o r b i t  w i t h  t h e  ca rgo  bay doors  c losed ,  then  
a d d i t i o n a l  ven t ing  of  t h e  cargo bay beyond t h a t  provided by t h e  
o r b i t e r  f o r  normal ven t ing  rwy be r equ i r ed  t o  avoid p o t e n t i a l  
ove rp r e s su r i z a t i on  of t h e  cargo bay. T h i s  may need t o  be 
considered and provided f c r  i n d i v i d u a l l y  f o r  each  payload which 
c o n t a i n s  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of f l u i d s .  
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The chemical and physical  behavior of gaaes,  l i q u i d s ,  and cryogenic 
f l u i d s  is not  well understood i n  t h e  zero-g and zero o r  very low 
pressure  environment encountered i n  space. An important a r ea  of 
uncer ta in ty  as t o  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of leaking f l u i d e  t h e r e f o r e  
e x i a t s ,  and t h e  s e v e r i t y ,  o r  even t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  of hazards such 
a s  combustion, chemical r eac t ion ,  corrosion, attachment of f rozen 
gases t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e ,  e t c . ,  cannot be properly evaluated a t  
present .  In  t h e  hazard/emergency ana lyses  i n  t h i s  t a sk ,  t h e  worst- 
case assumption was made t h a t  e f f e c t a  which are t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
poss ib le ,  such as sus ta ined  combustion of leaking hypergc '.its, w i l l  
indeed occur. 
Launching a Space S t a t i on  o r  s o r t i e  modules pressur ized a t  
1 atmosphere can presen t  t h e  o r b i t e r  wi th  h considerable  hazard. 
A t y p i c a l  s t a t i o n  module of 140 m3 (5000 i t 3 )  volume has an 
explosive  p o t e n t i a l  of 10 kg (22 l b )  TNT equiva len t .  This arises 
because of t h e  energy which could be re leased  i n  t h e  vacuum 
environment of space from t h e  contained atmosphere. I f  t h i s  
energy is ins tantaneously  re leased ,  e.g., by s t r u z t u r a l  f a i l u r e  
of t h e  module, t h e  r e s u l t i n g  b l a s t  and shrapnel  would cause 
ca t a s t roph ic  damage t o  t h e  o r b i t e r .  A rap id  release of t h e  
conten ts  of t h e  module when the  cargo bay doors arg closed,  wilh- 
out  any b l a s t  e f f e c t s ,  could st i l l  p re s su r i ze  t h e  cargo bay t o  
about 20 kN/m2 (3 p s i ) ,  o r  about 50 percent  above its present  
des ign l i m i t .  Rapid r e l e a s e  of t he  module r o n t e n t s  when t h e  cargo 
bay doors are open, o r  a slow enough relea,, so  t h a t  t he  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay vent  system can adequately r e l i e v e  t h e  pressure ,  would 
not  r e s u l t  i n  damage. 
Many d i f f e r e n t  f l u i d s ,  of varying degrees of hazard and i n  varying 
q u a n t i t i e s ,  are c u r r e n t l y  planned f o r  t r anspor t a t i on  t o  and from 
space by t h e  o r b i t e r  and f o r  use i n  s o r t i e  modules and on t h e  Space 
S ta t ion .  While many general  s a f e t y  requirements and gu ide l ines  
have been i d e n t i f i e d ,  and an adequate l e v e l  of s a f e t y  appears 
poss ib le  t o  both t h e  personnel involved and t h e  spacecraf t ,  more 
s p e c i f i c  s a f e t y  featuxee than def ined in. t h i s  s tudy  must await a 
more d e t a i l e d  d e f i n i t i o n  of t he  spacec ra f t ,  payloads, and t h e i r  
planned opera t ions  than is c u r r e n t l y  ava i l ab l e .  
Cargo handling i n  space p re sen t s  s o m  s p e c i f i c  h izards  asro-.iated 
wi th  t h e  zero-g environment and with  t h e  l imi t ed  remedial and 
escape pro**isions ava i l ab l e .  I n  add i t i on  t o  normal s a f e t y  
f e a t u r e s  required on t h e  ground, s p e c i f i c  requiremaats m d  gu ide l ine r ,  
such as t e t h e r i n g  o f  heavy cargo a t  a l l  t imes,  double-containiug 
hazardous cargo,  and providing mechanical assist whara propuls ive  
fo rces  are poss ib le ,  have been iden t i f i ed .  
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The m a i ~  recommendations from this  task are contained in the safety 
requirements and guidelines developed during the hazardlemergency analyses. 
Specific top-level recommendations arising from these and from supporting 
analyses are described In the fol.lowii .I, paragraphs. 
The cargo bay doors on the orbiter should be opened as early as  
possible and closed as  late a s  possible while in orbit when hazardous 
fluids o r  large quantities of propellants a r e  carried in the orbiter 
cargo bay. This minimizes hazards from leakage, explosions, 
contamination, etc. 
The liquid contents of upper stage vehicles being returned to 
earth should be dumped to space before deorbiting the orbiter. 
The purpose rs to avoid the possibility of an uncontrolled increase 
in internal upper stage vehicle pressure during reentry o r  on the 
ground, possibl-1 from an unexpected heat leak. The acceptable 
1-vel of residual liquids and gas before retrirning to earth should 
be such that an insu la t i~n  failure, leakage, or a crash  landing 
will not result in overpressurization, !ire, or a similar accident. 
The capability should be provided for the orbiter to deorbit, reenter, 
and land with 2 fully loaded upper stage vehicle. This condition 
may ar ise  from a failure to deploy the upper stage vehicle (perhaps 
because . ;  'zck of time following an abort situation) and failure to 
dump upper stage vehicle propellants. While such a combination 
of events may be quite improbabiz, the consequences could be 
catastrophic, and the condition should be designed for a s  being 
credible. It i s  not recommended that reduced factors of safety be 
considered for t h i s  situation, bu t  the reentry and landing load 
cr i ter ia  should be less severe than the nor1i.d desib . cases (e.g., 
La conditians instead of 3a) for th i s  maximum weight condition, 
t o  avoid combining unrealistically severe worst-case design cases. 
The pilot in such situations w i l l  undoubtedly take extra care t o  
avoid a hard landing. 
Upper stage vehicles must be man-compatible; i.e., man-rating 
safety cr i te r ia  must be applied t o  systexs and functions of the 
upper stage vehicle which could create a hazard t o  the orbiter 
while the upper stage vehicle is i n  or near the orbiter. These 
cr i ter ia ,  which are not  currently defined, must be defined 
consistently for the Shurtle and for upper stage vehicles. One 
possibflity i s  that a fl ight test  of the upper stage vehicle be 
performed in the Shuttle using f l u i d s  which are physically 
similar to the propellants bu t  which do not react ckemically. 
For example, LN 2 /LH 2 may be used to simulate L O ~ / L H ~ .  Such a 
f l i g h t  test  may be cost effective because i t  can also replace 
much of the ground qualification testing. 
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Because of t h e  c r j ' i c a l i t y  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  of a f a i l u r e  of a 
pressur ized s o r t i e  o r  Space S t a t i on  module i n  t he  cargo bay 
while i n  space, two a r e a s  should be s tud ied  fu r the r :  
I d e n t i f y  and e l imina te  f a i l u r e  modes which can cause major 
s t r u c t u r a l  o r  o the r  f a i l u r e s  of pressur ized s o r t i e  o r  Space 
S t a t i o n  modules during boost ,  on-orbit ,  and r een t ry  phases. 
Consider ven t ing  t h e  modules t o  space while they a r e  s t i l l  
i n  t h e  cargo bay, t o  reduce t h e  explosive  po ten t i a l .  The 
necessary atmosphere can be taken up i n  a number of high- 
p ressure  tanks  w i th in  t he  module. This has t h e  e f f e c t  of 
reducing t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  damage, both by reducing t h e  
energy content  per  tank, and by reducing t h e  pressure  
t h a t  can be generated i n  expanding t h e  gas  from a ruptured 
tank t o  t h e  cargo bay volume. 
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2.5 RESIDUAL HAZARDS AND HAZARDS RESOLUTION 
This section summarizss the hazards identified in Sections 2. 1 to 2.3 
and their resolution, and presents the resulting requirements for supporting 
research and technology. 
2.5.1 Resolution of Identified Hazards 
The disposition of the 25 hazards identified i n  Sections 2 .1  t o  2.3 is 
shown in Table 2-7. Th i s  shows the judgments of the investigation as t o  
which hazards would be resolved by implementation of the recdmended require- 
ments and guidelines, and which are residual hazards; which of the residual 
hazards represent acceptable risks; and which require supporting research and 
technology (SRT) or must a t  present be considered unresolved safety issues. 
This hazards resolution has been performed i n  accxdance w i t h  the procedures 
and definitions described i n  Appendix D. 
2.5.2 Supporting Research and Technology Requirements 
The supporting research and technology requirements resulting f rom 
the areas  of uncertainty of this task a r e  listed below (the main originating 
hazards /emergency a r e  indicated in parenthesis): 
Tne behavior of pressurized cryogenics, gases, and liquid a s  
they explode into vacuum or  into a large evacuated container 
should be understood. The purpose would be to determine the 
explosive contents under different conditions and the damage that 
can result. The subject can initially be studied analytically and 
the key results verified by laboratory tests (1.1001, 1.2.005). 
Current and new techniques for designing, constructing, and 
operating tanks which can fail under pressure without producing 
shrapnel should be pursued (1.1001, 1.2.005). 
The use of strain measuremen;..: on pressxrized tanks should be 
explored a s  a means of detecting impending failures on the tanks. 
This method has the potential a ava~ tage  over conventional methods 
of monitoring temperatures and p'essures of the contents that i t  
can detect failures of the tank due to imperfections o r  weaknesses 
of the tank, a s  well a s  overpressurization (1.1001, 1.2.005). 
The potential for chemical combination of mutually reactive fluids 
and decomposition of monopropellants in a zero-g and low to 
zero-pres sure environment should be investigated to evaluate 
Hazard No. 
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Table 2-7. Hazards Resolution 
Hazard I 
Ixplosion/rupture of a pressurized 1 
:ontainer i n  an upper s t age  vehicle  
Lnside or  near o r b i t e r .  
;ombination of mutually reac t ive  
lpper s tage  vehicle  f l u i d s  lead- 
ing t o  explosfan o r  f i r e  ins ide  
)r near okbi te r  . 
lnadvertent detonation of explos- 
Lve charge on upper s t age  vehicle  
Lnside c r  near o rb i t e r .  
Rapid decomposition of mono- 
?ropel lants  located i n  o r  
Leaking from the  upper stage 
vehicle while ins ide  o r  near 
o rb i t e r .  
Jncontrolled combustion i n  ac t ive  
Jpper s tage  vehicle  reac t ion  
~ o n t r o l  engines while near the 
ogbi ter ,  
. . 
,eakage o f  corrosive f l u i d s  from 
lpper stage vehicle tanks while 
~ n s i d e  the  o r b i t e r .  
Inadvertent start of an upper 
s t age  vehicle  main o r  reac t ion  
cont ro l  rocket engine while in- 
s i d e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay. 
Inadvertent separat ion of an 
upper s tage  vehicle  a t t ach  point  
while i n  the  o rb i t e r .  
Loss of a t t i t u d e i t r a n s l a t i o n  
cont ro l  of upper s t age  vehicle  
upon re lease  from orb i t e r .  
Hangup of upper s t age  vehicle  
during release from orb i t e r .  
Hazard No. 
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Table 2-7. Hazards Resolution (Cont) 
Hazard 
Rupture of common bulkhead tanks i n  
Jpper s t a g e  veh ic l e  while i n  o r  
near o r b i t e r .  
Loss of p re s su r i za t ion  i n  p ressure  
s t a b i l i z e d  upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  while 
i n  o r  nehr o r b i t e r .  
I n a b i l i t y  t o  dump p rope l l an t so r  
pressurants  i n  r e t r i eved  upper s t a g e  
vehicle .  
I n a b i l i t y  t o  dump upper s t age  veh ic l e  
p rope l lan ts  o r  p ressuran ts  during 
o r b i t e r  abor t .  
I n a b i l i t y  t o  c l o s e  cargo bay doors 
a f t e r  r e t r i e v a l  of upper s t a g e  
veh ic le  because of  i n t e r f e r ence  
with upper s t a g e  veh ic le .  
Exposure of t h e  o r b i t e r  crew o r  
passengers t o  a tox ic  environment 
re leased  from a vessel i n  t he  payload 
containing a t o x i c  f l v i d .  
A f i r e  i n  t he  cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  from 
release and i g n i t i o n  of a flammable 
f l u i d  i n  an unpressurized paylaod. 
A f i r e  i n  a pressur ized  payload i n  thc 
cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  from release and 
i g n i t i o n  of a flammable f l u i d .  
A co r ros ive  environment i n  t he  o r b i t e :  
cargo bay r e s u l t i n g  from leakage o r  
rup ture  of a payload vessel containinl 
a cor ros ive  f l u i d .  
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Table 2-7. Hazards Resolution (Cont) 
Hazard No. Hazard . - 
1.2.005 An explosion i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay 
of a p o t e n t i a l l y  explosive  paylead 
Sp i l l age  o r  leakage of hazardous f l u i d  
o r  m a t e r i a l  during manual t r a n s f e r  i n  
pressur ized modules. 
Sp i l l age  o r  leakage of hazardous f l u i d s  
o r  materials during mechanically 
a s s i s t e d  o r  remote t r a n s f e r  i n  
pressur ized modules. 
Sp i l l age  o r  leakage of hazardous f l u i d  
o r  m a t e r i a l  during remote t r a n s f e r  i n  
unpressurized area. 
IFai lure  of t r a n s f e r  mechanism and/or I X 
l o s s  of c o n t r o l  of cargo during 
t r a n s f e r  i n  p ressur ized  o r  un- 
p ressur ized  areas. 
A r ad ioac t ive  environment i n  a s o r t i e  
module o r  space s t a t i o n ,  r e s u l t i n g  
from exposure o r  escape of r a d o a c t i v e  
material during r ans fe r  and handling 
of r ad ioac t ive  materials. 
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how severe this hazard is. Some insight can be gained by 
theoretical studies, but full confidence would require small-scale 
laboratory tests in simulated or actual zero-g conditions. Fo r  
monopropellant decomposition, the catalytic effect of different 
spacecraft materials should be investigated, as  well. This would 
require valid pressures,  temperatures, and concentrations, but 
the zero- g environment could probably be dispensed with except 
a s  a final verification (1. 1.002 and 1. 1.003). 
a. The behavior of corrosive fluids in zero g should be investigated 
to determine how serious the hazard of a leaking corrosive fluid 
could be, and to determine practical protection methods and 
remedial measures. Means for detecting the location of the 
corrosive fluid or of the corrosive action should also be investi- 
gated. This research should cover the range of pressures from 
full spacecraft pressures down to a vacuum. A particular point 
to be investigated should be the behavior of corrosive fluids which 
a r e  frozen in a space environment and thaw out and become more 
active upon return to an earth environment (1.1006, 1.2.004). 
The flammability and chemical reactivity of spacecraft and payload 
materials under low pressure conditions representative of fluid 
leakage into the orbiter cargo bay should be investigated. The 
reactive gases should be fluids such a s  oxyge.-, hydrogen, N2O4, 
etc., which may be carried a s  propellants, cargo, or  experiment 
fluids. The purpose would be (a) to under stand the mechanics and 
dynamics of chemical reactions under zero-g and low-pres sure 
conditions, and (b) to map areas  of flammability and reactivity in 
terms of materials, pressures,  temperatures, etc., for  use  a s  a 
guide in  materials selection for forthcoming spacecraft (1.2.002). 
Means for  detecting and suppressing f i res  in a zero-g pressurized 
environment should be investigated. This research should include 
understanding of ignition, heat transfer, and flame propagation; 
effects of a i r  currents due to forced convectior and low-g accel- 
eration; and the convection effects of applying f i re  extinguishers to 
the fire. Both manned and unmanned situations should be con- 
sidered. The investigation should consider a broad systems 
approach to t!:e problem so as to lead to practical recommendations 
for space applications. Tests should be considered for  the Skylab 
program to supplement the current proposed effort (1.2.003). 
Means should be developed for locating spilled hazardous fluids 
and ,materials in a zero-g manned environment and for neutralizing 
or  collecting and disposing of these (1.3.001, 1.3.002). 
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3.0 SHUTTLE TO SPACE STATION DOCKING OPTIONS 
The Space S t a t i o n  Program Phase B Def in i t i on  s t u d i e s  i d e n t i f i e d  a concern 
as t o  t he  bes t  way t o  e f f e c t  docking between t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  and the  space 
s t a t i o n .  The s a f e t y  aspects  of b r ing ing  these  two l a rge  and massive veh ic les  
together  were a prime considerat ion i n  t he  suggested docbing methods. The 
s a f e t y  i s s u e s  became more acu te  when the  modular apace s t a t i o n  was considered, 
because of the  more frequent l o g i s t i c s  r e s u ~ n l y  cycle  of approximately once 
per  month i n  which a module is  exchanged, li id because of the  assembly opera- - 
t i o n s ,  during which the  space s t a t i o n  is b- l i l t -up a module a t  a time. This 
involves many docking opera t ions ,  many of them with  an unmanned veh ic l e  
during s t a t i o n  build-up. Compared with  t he  modular space s t a t i o n ,  the  LO m 
(33 f t )  diameter s t a t i o n  was t o  be suppl ied l o g i s t i c a l l y  on a 3 t o  6 month 
cycle ,  and only i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  docking was the  s t a t i o n  unmamed. 
Among t h e  systems t h a t  have been considered f o r  docking a re :  
The d i r e c t  docking of the  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  t o  the  space 
s t a t i o n ,  a s  i n  the  Apollo Program. 
The use of manipulators,  on e i t h e r  the  o r b i t e r  o r  s t a t i o n ,  
t o  e f f e c t  a more mechanically determinate docking maneuver, 
and a t  a much lower contact  ve loc i ty  &han i s  p r a c t i c a l  wi th  
d i r e c t  docking . 
An extendable soft-dock system which provides a l a r g e r  d i s -  
tance between t h e  docking veh ic les  a t  i n i t i a l  contact ,  and 
reduces the  docking loads through the  f l e x i b i l i t y  of the  
sys  t e m ,  
Free-flying and docking the  i nd iv idua l  space s t a t i o n  o r  o the r  
modules between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n ,  s o  as t o  avoid the  c lo se  
proximity of o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n .  The s t a t i o n  and o r b i t e r  
stat ion-keep a t  some d is tance  from each o the r .  
The purpose of t h i s  t a sk  was t o  i d e n t i f y ,  analyze and recommend 
r e s o l u t i o n  of the  hazards involved i n  t h e  suggested methods f o r  docking 
the  o r b i t e r  t o  t he  modular space s t a t i o n ;  and t o  make recommendations as 
t o  t h e  pre fe r red  docking methods from the  s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view. 
Three kinds  of operat ions  were considered, a s  follows: 
Assembly of modular space s t a t i o n .  This includes  a l l  phases from 
the assembly of t he  two i n i t i a l  unmanned modules, through build-up 
t o  a f u l l y  manned opera t iona l  s t a t i o n .  
Normal resupply docking. This c o n s i s t s  of the pe r iod ic  rou t ine  
l o g i s t i c s  b r ing ing  up and docking of resupply o r  new modules t o  
t he  s t a t i o n ,  and t h e  undocking and r s t u r n  t o  e a r t h  of empty o r  
otherwise unwanted modules, 
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Emergency docking. A s i t u a t i o n  has occurred which makes the  
docking subs t a n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  and int roduces  add i t i ona l  hazards. 
The comparison of the  var ious  docking opt ions  was divided i n t o  two 
e s s e n t i a l l y  uncoupled t rade-offs .  One trade-off  was between t h r e e  docking 
systems, and the  o the r  between two docking modes. The t h r e e  docking systems 
a r e  : 
0 Direc t  docking system 
Extendable tunnel  docking system 
Manipulator docking sys  tem 
The two docking modes a r e :  
0 Orb i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode 
0 Free-flying module docking mode 
The hazards i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h i s  t ask ,  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  analyses ,  a r e  appl i -  
cab le  t o  any combination of docking veh ic les  which use the  docking systems and 
modes considered he re ,  providing a t  l e a s t  one of t he  veh ic les  i s  manned. The 
compariscns and eva lua t ions  of t h e  systems and modes, and the  c o n c l u ~ i o n s  and 
recommendations reached, however, cannot be appl ied  t o  a l l  such veh ic l e  com- 
b ina t ions  without c a r e f u l  re-evaluation.  The reason is  t h a t  the  e f f e c t s  and 
c r i t i c a l i t y  of tile hazards may d i f f e r  according t o  t he  conf igura t ion ,  s i z e ,  
mass, contro!. Lystems, and o the r  f ea tu re s  of t h e  veh ic les .  The f u r t h e r  these 
f e a t u r e s  vary from the  o r b i t e r ,  space s t a t i o n  and ind iv idua l  free-f l y ing  mod- 
u l e s  considered here ,  t he  less the  confidence t h a t  can be  placed on the  appl i -  
c a b i l i t y  of t h e  r e s u l t s  and conclusions. 
Fur ther  d i f f e r e n c e s  which may i n v a l i d a t e  t he  r e s u l t s  of t h i s  t a s k  arise 
when a d d i t i o n a l  hazards e x i s t  because of t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  veh ic les .  For 
example, when one of t he  docking veh ic l e s  is a propulsion s t a g e  (e.g., a tug) 
o r  contains  l a r g e  q u a n t i t i e s  of p rope l l an t s  (e.g., a p rope l l an t  depot) ,  hazards 
assoc ia ted  wi th  p rope l l an t  s lo sh ,  l eaks ,  e tc . ,  must be a d d i t i o n a l l y  considered. 
Forces due t o  p rope l l an t  s l o s h  dur ing docking, f o r  example, n e g l i g i b l e  on the  
o r b i t e r  (while i n  o r b i t ) ,  t he  s o r t i e  modules and t h e  space s t a t i o n  compared. t o  
t h e  docking loads,  and have no t  t he re fo re  been considered t o  produce any hazard 
dur ing docking. Another example is  a reusab le  nuc lear  s h u t t l e ,  which poses 
nuc lear  r a d i a t i o n  hazards. For such veh ic l e s ,  t h e  conclusions of t h i s  t a s k  
must be re-assessed. 
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The analyses are presented as follows: 
Section 3.1 The docking aystems and modes conaidered and described 
Section 3.2 The potential hazards associated with docking are identified 
3ectton 3 . 3  ' The docking syster,.r are compared and evaluated 
Section 3.4 The docking modes are compared and evaluated 
Section 3.5 Emergency docking is considered 
Section 3.6 The conclusions and recommendations of the task are presented 
Section 3.7 The identified hazards are resolved according to procedures 
described earlier. 
Supporting analyses are presented in Appendix 8, and hazard/emergency 
analyses in Appendix D, The resulting requirements ,:nd guidelines are contained 
in Volumes IV and V. 
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3.1 BASELINE MODEL 
The base l ine  model described i n  t h i s  s ec t ion  i l l w t r a t e s  t h e  f ea tu re s  
of the  t h r e e  docking systems, the  two docking modee, and the asaembly, 
normel resupply docking and emergency docking operat ions  which were consi- 
dered during t h i s  tnsk. This base l ine  mo'del s p e c i f i c a l l y  descr ibes  f ea tu re s  
p e r t i n e n t  t o  t h i s  task.  To place  the  docking opera t ions  i n  the  context  of 
the  wider perspec t ive  of the  space program being comibered ,  the  reader  is 
r e f e r r e d  t o  the  base l ine  model i n  Section 1 .4 .  
While the  desc r ip t ions  1.n t h j s  base l ine  model a r e  f ad r ly  d e f i n i t e ,  a 
conscious attempt has been made t o  descr ibe  thoee f e ~ t u r e s  which a r e  s i g n i f i -  
cant  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  the  d i f f e r ences  between the  var ious  docking systems nnd 
modee, p a r t i c u l a r l y  a s  they a f f e c t  t h e  s a f e t y  i s s u e s .  A ~ e c t i o n  hae been 
added a t  the  end of each s u b s e c t i o n  which descr ibes  poss ib le  v a r i a t i o n s  
which would not  a f f e c t  t he  s a f e t y  t rade-offs  and conclusione. Such var ia -  
t i ons  should be considered as  t y p i c a l  only ,  and not  exhaustive.  
Direct  Docking System 
The d i r e c t  docking system involvee the  approach of t he  two d o c k h g  
vehic les  r i g h t  up t o  each o the r  s o  t h a t  the  i n t e g r a l l y  a t tached docking 
mechanisms can make contact  f o r  i n i t i a l  capture.  The system is character-  
i zed  by the  w e  of t h e  propuls ive  c a p ~ b i l i t y  of one of the  mating veh ic les  
t o  e f f e c t  f i n a l  c losure  and docking contact  and a r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  and s t i f f  
impact a t t enua t ion  s t r o k e  of the  docking system. Typical ly ,  t h i s  s t r o k e  is 
approximately 0.3 m (10 i n )  o r  less. 
The NR and MDAC docking system concepts developed i n  t he  Space S t a t j o n  
Phase B s t u d i e s  a r e  d i r e c t  docking s y s t e m .  These are shown i n  Figure 3.1-1. 
Both systems a r e  s i m i l a r  i n  t h a t  they a r e  s t r u c t u r a l l y  i n t e g r a l  wi th  the 
docking vehicles .  They employ a docking r i n g  o r  frame with  veh ic le  d i ~ n m e n t  
f ea tu re s ,  docking i n t e r f a c e  s e a l s ,  capture  l a t c h e s ,  impact a l t e r n a t o r e ,  equip- 
ment f o r  r e t r a c t i n g  the  mated vehicleo a f t e r  capture ,  and c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  
r i d i g i z i n g  the  docking i n t e r f a c e .  Although the  a t t enua t ion  s t r o k e  c a p a b i l i t y  
may be var ied by the  design,  both of thr qe use  t h e  s h o r t  s t r o k e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
of  d i r e c t  docking systems. 
The use of the  d i r e c t  docking system is i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 3.1-2 
f o r  t he  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking. This may occur v i a  an in termediate  payload 
to  the  modular space s t a t i o n ,  as shown i n  t he  t op  illuetrrrtiorr i n  which t h e  
o r b i t e r  is de l ive r ing  a module t o  the s t a t i o n ;  o r  d i r e c t l y  a t  the  o r b i t e r  
docking i n t e r f a c e ,  as i n  t he  lawer i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  i n  which the  o r b i t e r  is 
r e t r i e v i n g  a module f o r  r e tu rn  t o  ear th .  Di rec t  docking may also occur whan 
a f ree- f ly ing  module docks e i t h e r  to a s t a t i o n  o r  t o  an o r b i t e r .  
The d i r e c t  docking system requ i r e s  t he  d i s s i p a t i o n  of r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  
energy l e v e l s  because of t h e  coarse v e l o c i t y  c o n t r o l  expected f o r  p r a p l e i v e  
uuiaeuvers of t h e  l a r g e  uwsee involved. 
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Figure 3.1-1. Direct Docking Sy~taa  Concepts 
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3.1.2 Extendable Tunnel Docking System 
The extendable tunnel  docking system uses an ex tens ion  mechanism of some 
kind s o  as t o  extend the  docking mechanism on one of the  two docking veh ic les  
some d i s t ance  from the  veh ic l e  before  e f f e c t i n g  i n i t i a l  con tac t  and capture ,  
and is then r e t r a c t e d  t o  draw t h e  two vehic les  toge ther  f o r  r i g id i z ing .  The 
d i s t i ngu i sh ing  f e a t u r e s  of t he  extendable tunnel  docking system a r e  t h a t  i t  
provides a long sepa ra t ion  d i s t ance  of t h e  two vehic les  a t  the  i n s t a n t  of f i r s t  
con tac t ,  i t  provides s t a b i l i t y  a f t e r  cap ture  and dur ing draw down and a f fo rds  
a long s t o r k e ,  low s t i f f n e s s  a t t enua t ion  capab i l i t y .  Although the  system is 
c a l l e d  an extendable tunnel  system because the  p a r t i c u l a r  concept analyzed 
uses an i n f l a t a b l e  extendcble tunnel ,  t h e  system may use o the r  means f o r  pro- 
v id ing  t h e  extension and s t i f f n e s s .  Mechanical l inkages ,  and hydrau l ic ,  
e l e c t r i c a l  o r  mechanical ac tua t ion  could be  used. The important f ea tu re s  are 
t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  long extension,  and adequate bending and t o r s i o n a l  s t i f f n e s s .  
One extendable tunnel  dccking system concept adapted from a concept con- 
s ide red  f o r  the  Apollo, is shown i n  Figure 3.1-3. It employs a docking po r t  
a t t ached  t o  one end of an accordian-l ike bellows tube, extendable t o  approx- 
imately 3 rn (10 f t )  i n  l eng th ,  t he  o t h e r  end of which is at tached t o  one of 
t h e  docking veh ic les .  The s t r o k e  a t t enua t ion  c a p a b i l i t y  is  approximately 10 
times g r e a t e r  than f o r  d i r e c t  docking systems. The tunnel  c o n s i s t s  o f  a 
double walled bellows which is f u l l y  r e t r a c t a b l e  t o  a locked pos i t i on  f o r  
stowage during non-docking o r b i t a l  operat ions .  Deployment of the  tunnel  f o r  
docking opera t ions  c o n s i s t s  of extending the  bellows from i t s  r e t r a c t e d  posi- 
t i o n  by pressur iz ing  the  volume contained between the  double walls a t  a rela- 
t i v e l y  low pressure.  Docking is performed wi th  t he  tunnel  f u l l y  deployed. 
The impact a t t enua t ion  c a p a b i l i t y  is obtalned from release of gas through 
r e s t r i c t i v e  o r i f i c e s  dur ing compression of the  tunnel.  Reel mechanisms o r  
equivalent  devices r e t r a c t  t he  tunnel  during the  r i g i d i z i n g  procedure a f t e r  
capture. P re s su r i za t ion  of the  tunnel  a f t e r  r i g i d i z i n g  and dur ing docked 
opera t ions  is n o t  necessary because the  tunnel  is outs ide  the  docking seals. 
A vers ion  of t h i s  docking system was designed a t  NR f o r  the  Apollo i n  
1963, and t e s t e d  as p a r t  of  t h e  f i n a l  eva lua t ion  and s e l e c t i o n  of t he  docking 
system. I t  was one of four  extendable systems designed and t e s t e d  f o r  t h i s  
purpose. Tests i n  two-dimensional simulated docking of t h i s  system, which 
had a 75 cm (30 inch) diameter tunnel ,  and extended t o  approximately 3.7 m 
(12 f t )  , showed t h a t  i t  was f e a s i b l e ,  and had no major problems. The o the r  
t h r e e  extendable systems consis ted of a small (10 cm, 4 inch)  i n f l a t a b l e  
tunnel ,  and two extendable s t e m  devices;  these  t h ree  systems genera l ly  
encountered con t ro l  problems due t o  i n s u f f i c i e n t  s t i f f n e s s ,  and required use 
of t h e  r e a c t i o n  c o n t r o l  system t o  assist i n  damping the  lateral motions. 
These four  extendable systems were compared with  t h r e e  d i r e c t  docking 
systems. The probe and drogue system s e l e c t e d  f o r  t he  Apollo w a s  one of t he se  
t h r e e  d i r e c t  docking systems. 
The extendable tunnel  system can be used i n  two d i f f e r e n t  methods. I n  
t h e  f i r s t  method, i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 3.1-4, t h e  docking system is f i r s t  
f u l l y  extended, and i n i t i a l  con tac t  and cap ture  are e f f e c t e d  by propuls ive  
maneuvering of t h e  whole vehicle .  I n  t h e  second method, i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Fig- 
u r e  3.1-5, t h e  two veh ic l e s  stat ion-keep a t  a r e l a t i v e l y  close d i s t a n c e  
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before  t h e  docking system is extended, and i n i t i a l  con tac t  and capture  a r e  
e f f e c t e d  by extending the  docking system r e l a t i v e  t o  the  s t a t i o n a r y  veh ic le .  
The f i r s t  method r equ i r e s  t he  docking system t o  absorb a l l  of the  k i n e t i c  
energy of t he  moving veh ic les ,  whereas i n  the  second method t h i s  energy has 
been taken ou t  by the  propulsion system, and t h e  docking system need only 
absorb t h e  energy of the  moving dockirg 'sys tem i t s e l f .  The f i r s t  method, i n  
which the  system is f i r s t  extended and the  whole veh ic le  moves t o  dock, was 
genera l ly  considered i n  t h e  analyses  t h a t  follow, as t h i s  poses the  more 
s t r i n g e n t  s a f e t y  i s sues .  The r e s u l t s  of the  analyses ,  and the  conclusions,  
are appl icab le ,  however, whichever method is used. 
3.1.3 Manipulator Docking System 
The manipulator docking system is charac te r ized  by the  use of a manipu- 
l a t o r  on one of t h e  docking veh ic les  t o  e f f e c t  capture of the  o t h e r  one and 
t o  b r i n g  the  two veh ic l e s  toge ther  f o r  docking, l a t c h i n g  and r i g i d i z i n g .  
The p a r t i c u l a r  f e a t u r e s  which make the  manipulator docking system d i f f e r e n t  
from the  o the r  systems a re :  
(a) The two docking veh ic l e s  s t a t i o n  keep a t  some stand-off d i s t ance  
before  docking. 
(b) A con t ro l  system i s  used t o  deploy the  manipulator and e f f e c t  
i n i t i a l  con tac t  and capture of the  o t h e r  veh ic le .  
(c) The manipulator is con t ro l l ed  t o  b r ing  the  two vehic les  together  
a t  a ].ow con t ro l l ed  ve loc i ty  t o  e f f e c t  alignment and l a t c h i n g  
of the  docking hatches.  The energy a t t enua t ion  requirements are 
low 
(d) The manipulator has  many degrees of freedom i n  a r t i c u l a t i o n ,  s o  
t h a t  i t  can maneuver the  two veh ic l e s  through r e l a t i v e l y  complex 
pos i t ions .  
It should be  noted t h a t  the  f i r s t  t h r ee  i tems abov2 are a l s o  character-  
i s t i c  of the  extendable tunne l  docking system when used i n  the method wi th  
t h e  veh ic l e s  s t a t i o n  keeping and the  docking system e f f e c t i n g  capture  and 
c losure .  It is  only t h e  las t  f ea tu re ,  the  complexity of t h e  manipulator,  
t h a t  d i s t i ngu i shes  the  manipulate; system from t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  vers ion  of 
the  extendable tunnel  system. 
A t y p i c a l  manipulator conf igurat ion is shown i n  Figure 3.1-6. This 
c o n s i s t s  of a mul t i - jo inted mechanical aram approximating 20 m (60 f t )  i n  
l eng th  a t tached  t o  one of the  docking vehicles .  It has  a shoulder ,  elbow 
and w r i s t ,  whose func t ions  and a r t i c u l a t i o n  correspond wi th  t he  same p a r t s  
of a human aram. A v a r i e t y  o f  spec i a l i zed  t o o l s  can be a t tached  t o  t he  w r i s t  
t o  perform the  s p e c i f i c  func t ions  of each missioc. 
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Figure 3.1-6. Typical Manipulator Concept 
Ons concept f o r  in teg ra t ing  the manipulator i n t o  the o r b i t e r ,  r e su l t -  
ing  from NR Phase B s tud ies ,  is shown i n  Figure 3.1-7. Features include two 
manipulators with per ipheral  i l luminat ion,  v i s u a l  (video) and operating a ids ,  
and a manipulator operator s t a t i o n  i n  the o r b i t e r  for manually control l ing 
o r  observing automatic control  of the manipulator. The docking functions 
have generally been conceived as being performed by e i t h e r  manipulator on 
i t s  own, the second one providing a backup function. The manipulators a re  
normally stowed along the length of the cargo bay, and a re  protected from 
the boost and re-entry environments by the cargo bay doors. 
For p r a c t i c a l  nomenclature purposes, the manipulator o r  maniplllators 
i re  assumed to be on the  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  i n  t h e  remainder of t h i s  task.  
The r e s u l t s  and conclusions apply whatever vehicle  the manipulators are on, 
however; i n  which case wherever the term "orbiter" is used, t h i s  should be 
replaced by "the vehicle  with the manipulators. " 
MA NIPUATOR 
OPERATOR STATION 
(CARGO SRCIAllST 
fLOODLlGtiT 6 TV CAMtlU 
(BOTH MANIPUUTORS) 
AIRLOCK DOCKING PORT 
Figure 3.1-7. NR Phaee B Orbiter with Manipulator6 
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Three b a s i c  methods can be used f o r  manipulator docking. These a r e ,  
respec t ive ly :  
o S t a t i o n  keeping method 
o Dual dock method 
o Dual manipulator method 
and a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 3.1-8. 
The s t a t i o n  keeping method r equ i r e s  t h a t  the  o r b i t e r  and the  t a r g e t  
veh ic le  s t a t i o n  keep i n  an a t t i t u d e  hold mode wi th in  reach d i s tance  of t he  
manipulator. While maintaining the  posl. t i o n ,  t he  o r b i t e r  uses the  mani- 
pu l a to r  t o  remove the payload module from the  cargo bay and maneuvers i t  
t o  e f f e c t  docking with  the  t a r g e t  vehic le .  Removal of a module from the  
t a r g e t  veh ic l e  would be s i m i l a r l y  accomplished. 
The dual  dock method r equ i r e s  manipulator capture  of the  t a r g e t  veh ic le .  
In  t h i s  technique,  the  o r b i t e r  and t a r g e t  veh ic l e  s t a t i o n  keep wi th in  reach 
d i s t ance  of the  manipulator,  which reaches ou t ,  captures  the  t a r g e t  veh ic l e ,  
and r e t r a c t s  i t  t o  a docking p o s i t i o n  on an o r b i t e r  docking por t .  Af t e r  
t h i s  operat ion i s  accomplished, the  o r b i t e r  employs the  manipulator t o  
remove the  payload module from the  cargo bay and a t t a c h  i t  t o  the  s e l ec t ed  
docking p o r t  on the  t a r g e t  veh ic le .  Removal of a module from the  t a r g e t  
veh ic le  r equ i r e s ,  as before ,  capture  and docking of the t a r g e t  veh ic le  
p r i o r  t o  module removal by the  manipulator. 
The d m 1  manipulator method combines f ea tu re s  from the  o ther  two 
methods, and requi res  two manipulators,  as the  name implies.  One ~ a n i p u l a t o r  
is  used t o  ca?ture the  t a r g e t  veh ic l e ,  as  i n  the  dua l  dock method. Ins tead  
of docking the  t a r g e t  veh ic le  t o  the  o r b i t e r ,  however, t h e  f i r s t  manipulator 
is used t o  hold the  t a r g e t  veh ic l e  i n  a f ixed pos i t i on .  The second mani- 
pu l a to r  is  now used a s  i n  the  s t a t i o n  keeping method t o  deploy and dock 
the  mdoule t o  the  t a r g e t  veh ic le .  The t a r g e t  veh ic le  is  at tached t o  the  
o r b i t e r ,  b u t  because of the  f l e x i b i l i t y  of the  manipulator,  more loose ly  
than i n  t he  dual  dock method. 
I n  a l l  t h ree  of these  methods the  undocking is performed i n  t h e  reverse  
order  of the  docking. 
A l l  t h r e e  methods have been considered i n  t he  s tudy task .  
Orbi  t e r - t o 4  t a t i o n  Docking Mcde 
Two d i f f e r e n t  modes of docking a r e  poss ib l e  wi th  each of the  docking 
systems descr ibed e a r l i e r .  These a r e  the  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode 
and the  f ree- f ly ing  module mode. 
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STATIONKEEPING DOCKING METHOD DUAL MANIPULATOR DOCK1 NG 
METHOD 
DUAL DOCK DOCKING METHOD 
Figure 3.1-8. Stationkeeping, Dual Manipulator and Dual Dock Methods 
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The o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode is  charac te r ized  bv the  docking 
of the  o r b i t e r  t o  t he  s t a t i o n  a s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 3.1-9 o r  v i ce  versa .  
This means t h a t  t h e  two vehic les  approach each o the r  t o  w i th in  the  d i s t ance  
required by the  p a r t i c u l a r  docking system w e d ,  i .e. ,  wi th in  0 .3  t o  20 m 
(1 t o  60 f t )  . The o r b i t e r  may have a module deployed s o  t h a t  the  docking 
i n t e r f a c e  is between the  a t tached  module sand the  space s t a t i o n  (Figure 
3.1-2A), o r  the  docking may be direp+!.y t o  t he  o r b i t e r  docking i n t e r f a c e  
(Figure 3,1-2B), I n  e i t h e r  case ,  t h i s  mode r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  attachment 
through t h e  docking p o r t  i n t e r f a c e  of two l a r g e  masses, namely the  o r b i t e r  
and s t a t i o n ,  which a r e  each of the  order  of 90,000 kg (200,000 l b ) .  
3 , l .S  Free-Flying Module Docking Mode 
The f ree- f ly ing  module docking mode, i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 3,1-10 
uses a f ree-f lying module t o  f l y  between and dock t o  the  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n .  
I n  t h i s  way t h e  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n  can s t and  o f f  from each o the r  i n  s t a t i o n  
keeping modes a t  a r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  d i s tance ,  which may i n  p r a c t i c e  be 150m 
t o  1 , 5km (500 f t  t o  1 m i ) .  The f ree-f lying module may be  manned o r  unmanned. 
A l l  dockings occur between an ind iv idua l  module, t y p i c a l l y  of 9,ON kg (20,000 l b )  
mass, and the  s t a t i o n  o r  o r b i t e r .  Docking impact energies  a r e  t he re fo re  only 
20 p e r  cent  o r  s o  of those involved i n  t he  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode 
( a t  the  same ve loc i ty )  . 
Each f ree-f lying module involved i n  t h i s  mode r equ i r e s  a t t i t u d e  con t ro l ,  
propuls ion,  guidance and comnunications c a p a b i l i t y  . r h i s  may be achieved 
i n  t h r e e  d i s t i n c t  ways: 
0 I n t e g r a l  systems module 
0 Space-based mini-tug 
0 Ground-based mini-tug 
I n  t h e  i n t e g r a l  systems module (Figure 3.1-lOA), a l l  the  guidance, 
con t ro l  and o the r  funct ions  a r e  provided by syrjtems on board each of t h e  
involved modules, I f  the  modules are t o  be  maned  during the  f ree-f lying 
maneuver, l i f e  support  systems must a l s o  be  included,  
I n  t h e  two mini-tug concepts (Figure 3.1-10B, t hese  funct ions  are 
provided i n  a sepa ra t e  mini-tug veh ic l e ,  l e a v i , ~ g  the  f ree-f lying modules 
f r e e  of t he se  a d d i t i o n a l  system requirements. The mini-tug is envisioned 
as a r e l a t i v e l y  smal l  module, s i n c e  the  propr..lsion needs are small .  11.- 
addi t ion  t o  t h e  funct ions  mentioned e a r l i e r ,  i t  must be  ahlc ts dock and 
undock with  t h e  f ree- f ly ing  modules, s t a t i o n  and o r b i c e r  and must a l s o  be 
ab le  t o  f ree-f ly  without an a t t ached  module. The advantage of t h e  mini-tug 
is t h a t  a s i n g l e  mini-tug can provide the  func t ions  f o r  a l l  t h e  f ree-f lying 
modules, whereas i n  the  i n t e g r a l  systems module concept, each module must 
contain  t h e  var ious  systems; 
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I n  t he  ground based mini-tug concept, the  mini-tug is a t tached  t o  the  
module t o  be de l ivered  before  launch. O r b i t a l  operat ions  f o r  docking are 
i d e n t i c a l  t o  those  of the  i n t e g r a l  systems module concept. Af te r  docking 
t o  t he  space s t a t i o n ,  however, the  mini-tug is undocked from the  de l ivered  
module and flown back t o  the  o r b i t e r  f o r  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  and prepara t ions  
f o r  t h e  next  f l i g h t ,  ox is used t o  r e t u r n  another module from the  s t a t i o n  
t o  t he  o r b i t e r  f o r  r e tu rn  t o  e a r t h .  
I n  t he  space based mini-tug concept, the  mini-tug is based a t  the  s t a t i o n ,  
I t  f l i e s  t o  t he  o r b i t e r ,  docks t o  the  payload module and f l i e s  i t  t o  the  
s t a t i o n ,  Modules a r e  t r ans fe r r ed  from the  s t a t i o n  t o  t he  o r b i t e r  i n  the  
reverse  order ,  
3,1,6 - Assembly and Normal Resupply Docking Operations 
Docking opera t ions  a r e  comon t o  the  s t a t i o n  assembly and t o  noraa l  
resupply opera t ions ,  During the  assembly, docking is  required t o  assemble 
modular space s t a t i o n  elements i n t o  a modular space s t a t i o n  which is capable 
of support ing a crew and the  rou t ine  conduct of experiments. During t h e  
normal resupply phases, docking i s  required t o  support  cargo and experiments 
resupply,  crew r o t a t i o n ,  and waste d i sposa l .  
The most s i g n i f i c a n t  considerat ions  f o r  docking, as r e l a t e d  t o  the  
mission phases, is  t h a t  docking during the  asaembly of the  s t a t i o n  involves 
(1) dockings wi th  an unmanned s t c t i o n  and (2) con t inua l ly  changing mass 
characterf  s t i c s  of t he  s t a t i o n ,  Since these  considerat ions  do no t  r e s u l t  
in opera t iona l  ?if ferences beageen assembly and resupply dockings, they ere 
t r e a t e d  as one s e t  of operat ions  f o r  t h i s  t ask ,  
The primary modular space s t a t i o n  concepts being considered a t  the  
cur ren t  time by NR and MDAC f o r  a 6-man space s t a t i o n  are shown i n  Figures 
1-8 and 1-9. These f i g u r e s  include t h e  buildup sequence and the  c a p a b i l i t y  
wi th in  each module a f t e r  buildup. 
The NR s t a t i o n  cons i s t s  of n ine  modules requi r ing  a l i k e  number of 
o r b i t e r  f l i g h t s  and e i g h t  dockings, The KDAC s t a t i o n  r equ i r e s  four  o r b i t e r  
f l i g h t s  and th ree  dockings, as shown, t o  achieve a 2-man crew i n i t i a l  cont- 
inuous manning capab i l i t y .  Two more. l o g i s t i c s  module f l i g h t s  and two Resear .. 
and Appl icat ion Module (RAM) f l i g h t s  a r e  required t o  provide 6-man continuou ,; 
manning with i n i t i a l  s t a t i o n  experimentation c a p a b i l i t y  cons i s t en t  wi th  t he  
NR s t a t i o n .  
Both s t a t i o n s  are capable,  a f t e r  buildup t o  t he  i n i t i a l  s t a t i o n ,  of  
support ing a crew of s i x  and can expand t o  growth s t a t i o n  wi th  a crew of  
up t o  1 2  and increased experimental capab i l i t y  wi th  the  add i t i on  of  more 
modules. 
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Emergency Dockina 
i 
Analysis of t h e  docking systems included considerat ion of emergency 
docking t o  i d e n t i f y  hazards and considerat ions  i n  t radeof f  eva lua t ions ,  
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and eva lua t ion  c f  p o t e n t i a l  emergencies has shown t h a t ,  
s o  fir 6 aocking is concerned, emergency docking is charac te r ized  by one 
of t he  following two s i t u a t i o n s :  
(1) A time c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  on t h e  o r b i t e r ,  f ree-f lying module, 
o r  s t a t i o n ,  i n  which a docking is requi red  t o  save o r  prevent 
i n j u r y  t o  personnel  o r  damage t o  t h e  veh ic l e s ,  o r  otherwise 
prevent a hazardous o r  dangerous s i t u a t i o n  from reaching 
capast rophic  proport ions .  
Examples of  time c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  f i r e ,  fumes, impending 
explosion,  leakage,  atmospheric depressurization, f a i J u r e  of l i f e  
support ,  power f a i l u r e  and i a j u r e d  personnel .  
(2) Docking t o  a veh ic l e  which has l o s t  o r  experienced degradation 
of a c r i t i c a l  docking funct ion.  
Examples a r e  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  f a i l u r z  and docking t o  a slowly 
tumbling veh ic le .  
Both of these  emergency docking opera t ions  have Seen considered i n  the  
subsequent analyses.  
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3.2 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATlON 
This s ec t ion  described the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of po tenc ia l  hazards associa ted 
with the  docking systems and modes described i n  the  previous s ec t ion  (Section 
3.1, Baseline Model). 
The general  method used t o  i d e n t i f y  these  hazards cons i s t s  of s e t t i n g  out  
the  functions which have t o  be performed, and then considering what hazards 
may a r i s e  i n  each funct ion from equipment f a i l u r e s ,  opera t iona l  e r r o r s ,  
unexpected environments and major malfunctions o r  accidents .  The sec t ion ,  
therefore ,  s t a r t s  wi th  an ana lys i s  of the  docking funct ions ,  and continues 
with a methodical i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of hazards pecu l ia r  t o  t he  var ious  docking 
systems and modes. 
The hazards i d e n t i f i e d  were reviewed by a number of.NR/SD p i l o t s  and 
NASA as t ronauts  f o r  c r e d i b i l i t y  and completeness. Their  comments have been 
incorporated i n  t he  ana lys i s  t h a t  follows. 
3.2.1 "anctional Analysis of Docking Systems 
Top-level funct ions  required by the  docking systems f o r  docking of two 
spacecraf t  were defined and are l i s t e d  i n  Table 3-1. These are general ,  and 
are appl icable  t o  any set of vehicles ,  and t o  a l l  the  docking systems and 
docking modes considered. Individual  d i f fe rences  between docking systems and 
modes a r e  i d e n t i f i e d  and compared 'later. The top-level  funct ions  have been 
divided f o r  convenience i n t o  four  d i f f e r e n t  maneuver phases: 
Pre-contact 
Contact 
a Pos t-contac t 
a Undocking 
A comparison of t h e  t h ree  docking systems being considered ( d i r e c t  dock, 
extendable tunnel  and manipulator) shows t h a t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  means a r e  
w e d  i n  t he  t h r e e  systems t o  meet the  func t iona l  requirements. These d i f f e r -  
ences are high-lighted i n  Table 3-2, i n  which t h e  design f ea tu re s  used f o r  
each function are i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  the  th ree  docking systems. Only those  func- 
t ions  i n  which inherent  d i f fe rences  e x i s t  between the  systems are shown. 
Al ternate  means f o r  performing a function wi th in  a given system are a l s o  shown. 
A s  can be seen from the  t ab l e ,  the  primary d i f f e r ences  i n  t h e  systems are 
re l a t ed  t o  the  f i n a l  c losure  funct ion i n  the  pre-contact phase, t h e  energy 
a t tenua t ion  function i n  t h e  contact  phase, and the  cap ture  and draw-down func- 
t i o n ~  i n  t he  post-contact phase. The two methods i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  t h e  extendable 
tunnel  system (Section 3.1.2) d i f f e r  only i n  the  method of energy a t tenua t ion .  
The th ree  methods of using the  manipulator docking system described i n  Sect ion 
3.1.3 and shown i n  ~ i g u r e  3.1-8 d i f  f o r  considerably i n  t h e i r  operat ions  when 
examined one l e v e l  below t h e  top-level funct ions  of Table 3-1. These are com- 
pared i n  Table 3-3, using the  s i x  key operat ions  of a t t a c h ,  r e l ea se ,  extend, 
r e t r a c t ,  dock, and undock. 
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Table 3-1. Top-Level Functions Required f o r  Docking 
?re-Contact F l ight  Phase 
Acquisition - One vehicle  must loca te  the  other  e i t h e r  v isua l ly  
or e lec t ronica l ly .  I\ 
Gross Orientat ion - One vehicle must maintain a t t i t u d e  hold, 
while the other  t r a n s l a t e s  and ro ta te s  i n t o  alignment. The 
vehicle maintaining a t t i t u d e  hold w i l l  be ca l led  the "passive" 
vehicle.  
S ta t ion  Keeping - The ac t ive  vehicle must s t a t i o n  keep with the  
passive vehicle f o r  inspection of the docking por t  condition. 
Active vehicle a t t i t u d e  hold is required. 
Deploy Docking System - The ac t ive  vehicle  must deploy or  arm 
the ac t ive  portion of the docking system. 
Fine Orientation - The ac t ive  vehicle  must f i n e  a l ign  the  ac t ive  
docking system with respect  t o  the  passive vehicle  docking por t  
i n  both t r ans la t ion  and ro ta t ion .  
Final  Closure - The ac t ive  vehicle docking in te r face  must be 
maneuvered t o  contact the  passive vehicle  docking port .  La te ra l  
d r i f t  and res idual  a t t i t c d e  misalignment must be corrected 
during a x i a l  closure.  
Contact Phase 
1. Enerm Attenuation - The ac t ive  vehicle  docking system must 
absorb the energy of r e l a t i v e  motion between the  two vehicles.  
Pos tocontact Phase 
1. Capture - The ac t ive  vehicle  mating system must provide connection 
t o  the passive vehicle.  
2. Att i tude Alignment - Residual a t t i t u d e  misalignments between the 
vehicles  m u s t  be corrected e i t h e r  by ac t ive  vehicle maneuvering 
o r  by the capture mechanism pr io r  t o  sea t ing  the mating in te r -  
faces. I f  the  capture mechanism provides a t t i t u d e  alignment, 
the ac t ive  vehicle  must be placed i n  the  f r e e  mode (i.e., no 
a t t i t u d e  hold).  The passive vehf c l e  remains i n  the  a t t i t u d e  
hold mode, Fa i lure  t o  i n h i b i t  a t t i t u d e  hold on one of the 
vehicles  w i l l  cause both cont ro l  systems t o  f i g h t  t o  hold t h e i r  
respect ive misaligned a t t i t u d e s  . 
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Table 3-1. Top-Level Functions Required f o r  Docking (Cont .) 
Pos t 4 o n t a c t  Phase (Continued) 
3.. D r a w  Down - The docking i n t e r f a c e s  must be drawn toge ther  t o  
. remove r e s idua l  a t t enua t ion  s t r o k e  and s e a t  the  i n t e r f a c e s .  
4. Rinid iz inq  - The docking i n t e r f a c e s  must be s t r u c t u r a l l y  connected 
e i t h e r  automat ical ly  o r  manually t o  provide the  requi red  i n t e r -  
veh icu la r  s t i f f n e s s  f o r  combined veh ic l e  maneuvering. This 
funct ion a l s o  can s e a t  p ressure  s e a l s  i f  i n t e r v e h i c u l a r  press-  
u r i z a t i o n  is required.  
Undockinn Phase 
Gl r in id i ze  - The docking i n t e r f a c e s  must be s t r u c t u r a l l y  d i s -  
connected t o  provide a f l e x i b l e  coupling f o r  independent veh ic l e  
maneuvering. This  funct ion can a l s o  unseat p ressure  seals and 
be combined with  t h e  separa t ion  func t ion ,  
Separate  - The docking i n t e r f a c e s  must be  phys ica l ly  separated.  
Energy s t o r e d  i n  the  docking system may be used t o  provide o r  
augment s epa ra t ion  forces .  
Recycle Docking System - The docking i n t e r f a c e  must be l e f t  i n  a 
condi t ion t o  dock again. The r i g i d i z i n g  l a t c h e s  s h a l l  ex t enJ  
t h e  a t t enua to r s  t o  the  unstroked pos i t i on ,  t h e  capture  l a t che% 
s h a l l  be  unlocked and recycled,  and the  docking systems szored.  
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Table 3-2. Comfarison of Design Features of Docking Systems by Function 
Function 
're-Contact phase : 
De.p loy Do ~ k 1 . n ~  
Sys t e m  
Final  Closure 
:ontact Phase: 
Energy A t  ten- 
uation 
'0s t Contact Phase: 
Capture 
At t i tude  Align- 
ment 
Draw Down 
Rigidizing 
Indocking Phase: 
Unrigidi ze 
Separate 
Recycle Dock- 
ing  System 
Direct Dock 
Rota?able docking 
mechanism and/or 
d i r e c t  dock system 
Propulsive man- 
euver 
Shock absorbers 
Capture mechanism 
Capture mechanism 
or  propulsive 
maneuver 
Capture nechanism 
re t rac t ion  
Latching (or  
equivalent)  
mechanism 
Latching (or  
equivalent)  mech- 
anism re lease  
Stored docking 
sys tern energy 
and/or propulsive 
maneuver 
Recycle la tches  
and a t tenuators  
)OCKINti - SYSTEM 
Extendable Tunnel 
Extendable tunnel 
Propulsive man- 
euver o r  tunnel 
extension 
h l n e l  a i r  
compression 
Capture mechanism 
Tunnel o r  propul- 
s i v e  maneuver 
Tunnel r e t r a c t i o n  
Latching (or  
equivalent)  
mechanism 
Latching (or  
equivalent)  mech- 
anism re lease  
Stored docking 
sys  tern energy 
and/or tunnel ex- 
tension and/or 
propulsive maneuver 
Recycle l a t ches  
and a t tenuators ,  
stow tunnel 
- .  
Manipulator 
Manipulator 
Manipulator 
extension 
Manipulator j o i n t  
torque 
Manipulator 
Manipulator 
Manipulator 
r e t r a c t i o n  
Latching (or  
equivalent)  
mechanism 
Latching (or  
equivalent) mech- 
anism re lease  
Stored docking 
system energy 
and/or manipulator 
extension and/or 
propulsive maneuver 
Recycle l a t ches  
and a t tenuators ,  
stow manipulator 
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Table 3-3. Comparieon of Operations fo r  Manipulator Docking Methods 
Operation 
Attach manipulator t o  module i n  cargo 
bay 
Extend manipulator 
Attach manipulator t o  s t a t i o n  
Attach manipulator t o  module i n  cargo 
bay 
Extend manipulator 
Dock module to  s t a t i o n  
Release manipulator from module 
Retract  manipulator 
Dock s t a t i o n  t o  o r b i t e r  
Release manipulator from s t a t i o n  
Attach manipulator t o  module i n  cargo 
bay 
Extended manipulator 
Dock module t o  s t a t i o n  
Releass manipulator from module 
Attach manipulator t o  s t a t i o n  
Undock s t a t i o n  from o r b i t e r  
Extend manipulator 
Release manipulator from s t a t i o n  
Re t r a c t  manipulator 
S ta t ion  
Keeping 
METHOD 
Dual 
Dock 
Dual 
Manipulator 
1)- Manip %1 
2)- Manip %2 
Space Division 
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An appreciable  d i f f e r e n c e . i s  seen i n  t h e  number of operat ions  required 
by each of the  t h ree  methods. The s t a t i o n  keeping method uses only 5 opera- 
t i o n s ,  the  dual  dock 14,  and the  dual  manipulator 9 (4 by one manipulator 
and 5 by the  o t h e r ) ,  
The funct ions  shown i n  Table 3-3 are f o r  the  o r b i t e r  docking a module t o  
the  s t a t i o n .  The opera t ions  required f o r  undocking a module from the  s t a t i o n  
a r e  func t iona l ly  i d e n t i c a l  and can be obtained by revers ing the  order  of the  
func t ions  shown and s u b s t i t u t i n g  the  antonym f o r  t h e  words r e t r a c t  ( i . e . ,  
extend) , r e l e a s e  ( a t t ach )  , t o .  (from), and dock (undock) . 
3.2.2 Functional  Analysis  of  Docking Modes 
A func t iona l  comparison of t he  two docking modes considered,  i . e , ,  
o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode and f ree- f ly ing  module docking mode, shows 
t h a t  the  d i f fe rences  occur i n  the  number and o rde r  of dockings which occur 
r a t h e r  than the  d e t a i l 3  of how the  docking is done. Each of the  t h ree  
docking systems considered can be used with  e i t h e r  of the  docking modes. 
The two docking modes including th ree  v a r i a t i o n s  discussed i n  Sect ion 
3.1.5 f o r  t h e  fzee-f lying module mode a r e  compared i n  Table 3-4 i n  terms of 
t h e  t h ree  key funct ions  of undock, f ree-f ly ,  and dock. The t a b l e  descr ibes  
a t y p i c a l  o r b i t e r  mission i n  which the  o r b i t e r  d e l i v e r s  one module t o  the  
s t a t i o n  and r e tu rns  another s t a t i o n  module t o  e a r t h .  
It is apparent from the  t a b l e  t h a t  t h e  Space Based and Ground Based 
Mini-Tugs involve the  most opera t ions  (15 and 9 opera t ions ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ) ,  
a s  opposed t o  6 operat ions  each f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  and i n t e g r a l  
systems f ree-f lying modes. 
I f  the  comparison is  confined t o  t he  space s t a t i o n  assembly operat ions  
only,  i n  which modules are del ivered t o  the  s t a t i o n  b u t  n o t  re turned  t o  
the  o r b i t e r ,  only the  items ind ica t ed  by the  a s t e r i s k s  a r e  involved. The 
comparison now shows t h a t  t he  space based and mini-based tug,  each requi re  
s i x  func t ions ,  and the  i n t e g r a l  systems module and o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  modes 
th ree  each. 
Hazards Common t o  A l l  Docking Systems and Modes 
Hazards were i d e n t i f i e d  by consider ing the  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of poss ib le  
equipment f a i l u r e s ,  ope ra t iona l  e r r o r s ,  unexpected environments and major mal- 
funct ions  o r  acc iden ts  dur ing each of t he  func t ions  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  Sect ions  
3.2.1 and 3.2.2, The hazards f e l l  i n t o  two categor ies :  those connnon t o  a l l  
the  docking systems and modes considered, and those  s p e c i f i c  t o  i nd iv idua l  
systems o r  modes. 
The hazards common t o  a l l  systems and modes are i d e n t i f i e d  by 2.1.XXX 
numbers, and are as follows: 
Space Division 
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Table 3-4 .  Functional  Comparison of Orb i t e r  t o  S t a t ion  
and Tree-Flying Module Docking Modes 
Function 
Undock from s t a t i o n  
Free-fly t o  o r b i t e r  
Dock to  del ivered payload 
module 
Undock de l ivered  payload 
module from o r b i t e r  
Free-fly (or  f l y )  t o  s t a t i o n  
Dock del ivered payload module 
t o  s t a t i o n  
Undock from de l ivered  payloac 
module 
Free-fly ( transpose) t o  e a r t l  
bound module 
Dock to  earthbound module 
Undock earthbound module fror 
s t a t i o n  
Free-fly t o  o r b i t e r  
Dock to  o r b i t e r  
Undock from earthbound modulc 
Free-fly t o  s t a t i o n  
Dock t o  s t a t i o n  
X- -" ~ e l i v e r  -and dock a 'module. 
Y = Undock and r e t u r n  a module. 
MODE 
1 Free-Fly Module 
I i rec t  Doc' 
Orb i t e r  
t o  
S t a t ion  
Space 
Based 
lini-Tug 
-- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Ground 
Based 
Mini-Tug 
I n t e g r a l  
Systems 
Module I' 
Space Division 
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2.1.001 Impairment o r  v i s i b i l i t y  a t  c r i t i c a l  moment during docking. 
2.1.002 Loss of vehic le  cont ro l  p r i o r  t o  docking contact.  
2.1.003 Loer of vehic le  cont ro l  a f t e r  i n i t i a l  contact during docking. 
2.1.004 Fai lure  t o  i n h i b i t  a t t i t u d e  hold of one vehic le  
of ter capture during docking. 
2.1.005 Loss of docking system function o r  control .  
2.1.006 Fai lure  of o r b i t e r  payload module deployment mechanism p r i o r  t o  
docking. 
2.1.007 Hardware protrusions i n  the docking tunnel. 
2.1.008 Unsecured equipment and personnel during docking. 
2.1.009 Degradation of l i f e  support system during docking. 
2.1.010 Docking hatch opened when pressure equal izat ion incomplete. 
2.1.011 E l e c t r i c  discharge during i n i t i a l  dockiud contact.  
The cor re la t ion  of these hazards with the docking functions during 
which they can a r i s e  i s  shown by the x ' s  i n  Table 3-5, 
302.4 Hazards Speci f ic  t o  Individual  Docking Spatems 
- 
Hazards iden t i f i ed  by examination of the  docking funct ions become more 
s p e c i f i c  when consideration is given t o  each of the  three docking systems 
previously described. These hazards are numbered as follawe: 
2.2.XXX Specif ic  t o  the  d i r e c t  docking system. 
2.3.XW( Specif ic  t o  the  extended tunnel docking s y s t m .  
2.4 .XXX Specif ic  t o  the  manipulator docking 8ystem. 
2.2.001 Loss of vehicle  cont ro l  i n  close priximity tci  o ther  vehicle  
during dc .:king. 
2.2.002 Loss of a t tenuat ion capabi l i ty  during docking. 
2.3.001 Loss of vehicle  control  p r i o r  t o  docking contact by 
extendable tunnel. 
2.3.002 Loss of vehicle  control  a f t e r  capture by extendable tunnel 
docking sys tern. 
2.3.003 Loss of pressure i n  the pneumatic extension and energy 
absorption mechanism of the docking system. 
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Table 3-5. Correlation of Comon Hazards with Docking Functions 
Flight Phase : 
Docking 
Function 
Pre-Contact 
Acquisition 
Groae Oriem 
tat ion 
Stationkeep. 
Deploy dock. 
sys .  
Fine orient .  
Final Clos. 
:ontact Phase : 
Energy Atten 
?ost Contact 
Phase : 
Capture 
Attitude 
Align. 
Draw down 
Rig i d  tz ing 
lndocking  had 
Unrigidizing 
Separation 
Recycle Sye. 
Hazard 
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2.4.001 Loaa of v a h i c l r  con t ro l  p r i o r  t o  cap ture  by a ~ n i p u l a t o r  
during docking. 
2.4.002 Losr of veh ic l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  cap ture  by manipulator 
dur ing docking. 
2.4.003 Loer of manipulator j o i n t  motor c o n t r o l  during docking, 
2.4.004 Loer of manipulator computer aided c o n t r o l  eyetem dur ln8 docking. 
3.2.5 Hazards Spec i f i c  t o  Ind iv idua l  Docking Modss 
The hazards associa ted with each of the  docking modes are genera l ly  the  
same; i , e . ,  t he  "common" hazards. This does no t  mean t h a t  a l l  the  docking 
modes a r e  t o  be considered equal ly  s a f e ,  s i nce  the  c r i t i c a l i t y  of  the same 
hazard can be very d i f f e r e n t  depending on the  s i z e s  and ccnf igura t ion  of the  
veh ic les  invol-end. Thus f a i l u r e  t o  i n h i b i t  a t t i t u d e  hold a f t e r  capture  may 
be merely an inconvenience when a f r e e  f l y i n g  modu1.e docks t o  an o r b i t e r  o r  
a u t a t i o n ,  s ince  the  bending moments induced-at  t he  docking ' i n t e r f a c e  w i l l  be 
small; bu t  the  same hazard occurr ing when the  o r b i t e r  docks t o  the  s t a t i o n  
could be ca tas t rophic ,  and r e s u l t  i n  s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e ,  because of the  l a rge  
c o n t r o l  moments and i n e r t i a s  involved. S imi la r ly ,  l o s s  of veh ic le  con t ro l  
p r i o r  t o  docking i s  much more l i k e l y  t o  r e s u l t  i n  contac t  and damage i n  the  
o r b i  t e r - to -s ta t ion  mode, because of the  comp1.e~ geometries and large masses 
involved, than i n  the  f ree- f ly ing  module mode. 
Althollgh the re  is no way of quant i fying the  e f f e c t s  or  geometric alld 
mass d i f fe rences  i n  the  docking modes, t he  c r i t i c a l i t y  of the  "common" 
hazards must ic general  be judged t o  be more severe  f o r  the  orb i te r - to -  
s t a t i o n  mode than f o r  the  f ree-f l y ing  module mode, 
No add i t i ona l  hazards have been i d e n t i f i e d  as pecu l i a r  t o  the  o r b i t e r -  
t o - s t z t i on  docking mode. 
The f r e a  f l y i n g  module docking mode has  t h e  aame b a r i c  set of hazards 
as any docking maneuver un le ra  i t  is unmanned and con t ro l l ed  e i t h e r  by 
computer a ided rystem- o r  by remote human cont ro l .  The requirement t h a t  
the  f r e e  f l y i n g  module must be  deployed from t h e  cargo bay is not  an 
a d d i t i o n a l  hazard; i t  only increases  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  of v e h i c l e  damage i f  
veh ic l e  con t ro l  i e  l o a t  i n  close proximity to  t h e  o r b i t e r .  This hazard 
has  been i d e n t i f i e d  as coumon t o  any docking manewer. 
The following a d d i t i o n a l  hazards are i d e n t i f i e d  with F-ee 
f l y i n g  modules : 
2.5.001 Loss of Communications/Command c a p a b i l i t y  during docking by 
unmanned f r e e  f l y i n g  module. 
?..5.002 Loss of  propuls ion or  con t ro l  c a p a b i l i t y  dur ing docking 
by manned f r e e  f l y i n g  module. 
2.5.003 Loss of  l i f e  support  c a p a b i l i t y  during docking by manned f r e e  
f l y i n g  module. 
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The use of a mini-tug ad a maneuvering veh ic le  t o  dock with and f ree-  
f l y  a cargo module t o  the  s t a t i o n  does not  in t roduce add i t i ona l  hazards 
than any o the r  docking mode. There a r e ,  however, more docking opera t ions  
required,  as discussed e a r l i e r ,  s o  t h a t  the  occurrence of an accident  
is more l i k e l y .  
3.3 COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF DOCKING SYSTEMS 
I n  order  t o  determine t h e  pre fe r red  docking system o r  docking node 
from a s a f e t y  po in t  of view, a comparison and evaluat ion must be made 
between the  d i f f e r e n t  opt ions  considered based on the  important s a f e t y  
eva lua t ion  criteria.  Universal  s tandards f o r  c r i ter ia  t o  measur, ur 
eva lua te  s a f e t y  do not  e x i s t .  Therefme a number of d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  
a r e  used i n  what follows t o  compare ;he var ious  systems and modes. 
For t h e  docking systems, these  comparisons were made on the  following 
criteria. 
Number of hazards 
C r i t i c a l i t y  of hazards 
0 Risk, o r  combination of p robab i l i t y  and c r i t i c a l i t y  
Operat ional  complexity 
Design impact of applying the  s a f e t y  requirements and gu ide l ines  
Residual  hazards 
The r e s u l t s  of these  comparisons a r e  presented i n  Sect ion 3.3 .la The 
evaluat ion of t h e  systems, l e e . ,  deciding the  r e l a t i v e  merits of the  opt ions  
(from a s a f e t y  po in t  of view) depends on the  r e l a t i v e  importance placed on 
each of the  above s i x  c r i t e r i a ,  and is covercd i n  Sec t ion  3 .3 .2 .  
Fina l  conclusions and recommendations a r e  presented i n  Sect ion 3.6. 
Since 11 of the  hazards i d e n t i f i e d ,  t h e i r  e f f e c t s ,  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
requirements and gu ide l ines  a r e  common t o  a l l  t h r e e  docking eystems, the  
comparisons i n  t h e  following s e c t i o n s  a r e  confined t o  those hazards which 
a r e  s p e c i f i c  t o  each of the  t h ree  systems, It is these  d i f f e r ences  which 
w i l l  determine the  p re fe r r ed  system. 
3 ,3 .1  Comparison of Docking Systems 
A cow&-,&son of the number of  hazards t h a t  are d i r e c t l y  assoc ia ted  
wi th  the  t h r e e  candidate  docking systems is as  follow^: 
Di rec t  docking system - 2 hazards 
0 Extendable tunnel  system - 3 hazards 
,, Manipulator docking system - 4 hazards 
A  anp par is on based on haw c r i t i c a l  t h e  hazards are, must  be der ived 
from levels of c r i t i c a l i t y .  These may be def ined as fol laws,  f o r  purposes 
of t h i s  s tudy,  i n  decreasing o rde r  of s eve r i t y .  
0 Lose of personnel  
Vehicle damage 
0 Docking system damage 
@A@ space ni~islon North A m a n  Rodtwell 
This assumes t h a t  the docking system is  maintainable or  replaceable, 
so  t h a t  damage t o  the docking system is l e s s  c r i t i c a l  than other ,  possibly 
i r reparable ,  damage t o  the spacecraf t ,  . 
The c r i t i c a l i t y  of the hazards which a re  s p e c i f i c  to  the docking systems 
i s  shown i n  Table 3-6, "Personnel 10~s" hazards a re  i d m t i f i e d  f o r  the s ta- 
tionkeeping and dual manipulator methods of the manipulator system. The d ~ a l  
dock manipulator system has four  vehicle  damage hazards, compared t o  one each 
fo r  the d i r e c t  docking and extendable tunnel eye terns. 
Table 3-6, C r i t i c a l i t y  of Hazards Specif ic  to  Docking System 
Docking System 
Cri t i c a l 1  tv  
Extendable 
TIInnel- i la to r  S t  a tion-Keep, 
& Dual Manip. Dual Dock 
P 
' toss of personnel 
Vehicle damage 
i ocking system damage 
I 
 (Numbers iden t i fy  hazcrds - see  S ~ U U . ~ ) ,  I 
A fu r the r  refinement can be made by comparing not  only the c r i t i c a l i t y  
of each hazard, but a l s o  the r e l a t i v e  probabi l i ty  of occurrence. Such 
estimates a r e  at bes t  subject ive,  bu t  should nevertheless be factored i n t o  
a f u l l  evaluation. Since only r e l a t i v e  pro1 a b i l i t i e s  are required f o r  
comparison, these a re  judged merely an "low", "medium" and "high." The 
combination of c r i t i c a l i t y  and probabi l i ty  can only be s h w n  ee a nmtrix. 
Based on the assumption tha t  the recolnnended guidel ines  and requirements 
are met ,  the judgements on the hazards of the  three  systems are mi follow : 
Space Oivsion 
Vorth American Rockwell 
The r e s u l t s  of these  comparisons a r e  summarized i n  Figure 3.3-1. The 
manipulator system thus has the  worst combination of number of hazards ,  
c r i  t i c a l i  ties and p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of occurrence, with the  s ta t ionkeeping and 
dua l  manipulator methods having two hazards wi th  t he  worst poss ib le  combina- 
t i o n  of c r i t i c a l i t y  and probabi l i ty .  
Another compatieon is on the  b a s i s  of the opera t iona l  complexity. The 
system with the  most opera t ions  is exposed to  the  g r e a t e s t  r i sk .  The 
s i g n i f i c a n t  opera t ions  were taken to  be t he  f r e e  f l y  maneuver, t he  a t tach-  
ment and detachment of a manipulator t o  a module, and the  docking and 
undocking of a module, including r i g i d i z i n g ,  a t  a docking por t .  The 
comparison is ahawn i n  a able 3 .7 .  This t a b l e  covers t he  normal resupply 
docking, when a new module is being de l ive red  t o  t he  s t a t i o n  and another 
one is re turned t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  f o r  r e t u r n  t o  ea r th .  
The t h r e e  methods f o r  t he  manipulator docking system are shown 
sepa ra t e ly ,  s i n c e  they d i f f e r  i n  t he  number of operat ions .  There is a l s o  
a poss ib le  v a r i a t i o n ,  as shown by the  a s t e r i s k e d  numbers, according t o  
System 
Direct Docking 
Extendable Tunnel 
Manipul s t o r  
Station-keeping 
Dual dock 
Dual manipulator 
Operation 
*The higher number app l i e s  when the  o r b i t e r  must be reposi t ioned 
t o  reach t h e  module being returned.  
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whether the  re turned module can be reached by the  o r b i t e r  manipulator 
without repos i t ion ing  from i ts  de l ive ry  pos i t i on ,  or whether t h e  o r b i t e r  
must r epos i t i on  i t s e l f  by a f r e e  f l y i n g  maneuver t o  reach the  re turned  
module. 
The d i r e c t  docking and the  extendable tunnel  systems involve two 
free f l y ,  and two dockings and undockings each. The manipulator docking 
system involves, i n  add i t i on ,  t he  a t t ach ing  and detaching opera t ions  of 
t h e  manipulator,  and a v a r i a b l e  number of f r e e  f l y ,  docking and undocking 
maneuvers, depending on the  method used and the  geometry involved. No 
clear-cut  statement can be made t h a t  one system requ i r e s  more opera t ions  
than another.  
In  order  t o  compare the  docking systems on the  b a s i s  of design impact 
of applying the  s a f e t y  requirements and u ide l ines  , only those s a f e t y  
requirements and gu ide l ines  which a r e  s p e c i f i c  t o  one o r  o the r  of t h e  
systems and which have a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on the  design need be considered. 
It is assumed t h a t  each system is designed i n  the  f i r s t  p lace  t o  perform 
i ts  normal funct ions  and t h a t  each system can perform these  func t ions  
equa l ly  well. Thus d i f f e r ences  i n  weight, complexity, c o s t ,  o r  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  
which are inheren t  t o  the  systems a r e  not  evaluated.  It is only the  
a d d i t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  required f o r  s a f e t y  (as  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t he  hazards/  
emergency analyses)  t h a t  are evaluated* S ign i f i can t  des ign impact is 
considered t o  mean the  add i t i on  of mechanisms, motors, a c t u a t o r s ,  and 
s i m i l a r  l e v e l s  of hardware, f o r  s a f e t y  reasons.  Addition of wir ing,  
sensors ,  e l e c t r o n i c s  redundancy, a d d i t i o n a l  software requirements o r  s p e c i a l  
procedures a r e  not  considered s i g n i f i c a n t  design Impact. 
Analysis of the  e leven "common" hazardslemergency analyses  (2.1.001- 
2.1.011) shows t h a t  the  impact of the  requirements and guidel ines  is essen- 
t i a l l y  of equal  impact on the  t h ree  systems. Furthermore, many of the  
requirements and gu ide l ines  from the  "spec i f ic"  hazard/emergency analyses  
I t  a r e  t he  sane as f o r  t he  "common" ones. Of the  remaiaing spec i f i c "  require-  
ments and gu ide l ines ,  the  following a r e  considered t o  have s i g n i f i c a n t  des ign 
impact; these  r e f e r  t o  the  extendable tunnel  and manipulator docking systems: 
Extendable tunnel  
2.3.003-2. Extendable docking systems s h a l l  be designed s o  t h a t  
the  extension mechanism s h a l l  r e t a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  r i g i d i t y  following 
any s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  t o  prevent uncontrolled veh ic le  motion o r  contact .  
Manipulators 
2.4.003-3. Arm j o i n t s  s h a l l  be  designed t o  lock on ind ica t ion  of 
j o i n t  motor f a i l u r e ,  Lock s h a l l  incorpora te  a s l i p  c lu t ch  c a p a b i l i t y  
t o  prevent s t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e s .  
2.4.003-9. Two o r  more manipulators c \al l  be provided i n  a manfpu- 
l a t o r  docking system. Each manipulator s h a l l  be capable of performing 
docking by i t s e l f ,  and s h a l l  a l s o  be capable of continuing any docking 
funct ion i n  the  event of a f a i l u r e  of the  o the r  manipulator a t  any 
s t a g e  of t he  docking. 
2.4.003-10. An emergency j e t t i s o n i n g  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided 
f o r  manipulators, independent of t he  normal manipulator system. This 
s h a l l  be capable of  j e t t i s o n i n g  the  manipulator fol lowing a f a i l u r e  
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or  accident which does not allow stowage of the manipulator and 
configuring the o r b i t e r  f o r  reentry and landing. 
Furthermore, i f  the manipulator docking system is considered f o r  
t r ans fe r r ing  personnel between o r b i t e r  and r t a t i o n  using the  rtationkeeping 
o r  the dual  manipulator methods, the following two addi t ional  requirements 
become applicable.  Because t h e i r  purpose is t o  safeguard the  t ransfer red  
personnel, they have a major design impact. 
2.4.003-6. Modules which are used f o r  personnel t r ans fe r  by mani- 
pulator  docking s h a l l  be provided with EVA pressure s u i t s  f o r  a11 
on-obard personnel, and with EVA e x i t  capab i l i ty  so  that the  personnel 
can escape t o  the  o r b i t e r  o r  the  space s t a t i o n  i n  the  event the  module 
becomes stranded between vehicles  by a manipulator f a i l u r e .  
2.4.003-7. Modules which a r e  used f o r  personnel t r ans fe r  by 
manipulator docking sha:l provide emergency l i f e  support fo r  
a l l  on-board personnel, u n t i l  they can escape o r  be rescued by 
externa l  means i n  the event the module becomes stranded between 
vehicles by a manipulator f a i l u r e .  
The lass conparison is i n  terms of res idual  hazards, Of the "specific" 
hazards i d e n t i f i e d ,  a l l  have been judged t o  be r e s idua l  hazards; i.e. even 
a f t e r  the recommended requirements and guidel ines  have been implemented, 
the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of damage t o  vehic le  o r  docking system cannot be eliminated. 
The comparison therefore shows: 
Direct docking system - 2 res idual  hazards 
Extendable tunnel system - 3 res idual  hazards 
Manipulator docking system - 4 res idua l  hazards 
3.3.2 Evaluation of Docking Systems 
. The previous sec t ion ,  3.3.1, presented a comparison of the  three  
docking systems according t o  s i x  c r i t e r i a .  I n  these sec t ions  these r e s u l t s  
a r e  evaluated; 1.e. a judgment is made on the r e l a t i v e  importance of the  
r e s u l t s  of the comparisons, i n  order  t h a t  reco~rmendatione may be made from 
the  s a f e t y  point of view. 
The most s ign i f i can t  sa fe ty  consideration is the  s a f e t y  of the  
personnel. There are appreciable personnel s a f e t y  implications i n  using 
the  manipulator docking system i n  the stat  ionkeeping and dual manipulator 
methods t o  t r ans fe r  peruonnel between o r b i t e r  and s t a t ion .  These methods 
can lead t o  stranding personnel i n  the  t ransfer red  module i f  the  manipulator 
f a i l s ,  with the  fu r the r  po ten t i a l  of personnel loss i f  t h e  malfunction cannot 
be corrected i n  time or i f  the  personnel cannot escape o r  be rercued. The 
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o the r  systems, and the  dua l  docking method of t he  manipulator system do 
no t  have t h e  xiak of personnel loss dur ing personnel  transfer, s ince  
personnel w i l l  only t r a n s f e r  through t h e  docking p o r t  a f t e r  A g i d i z i n g  
of t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n ,  when e i t h e r  ves se l  can provide adequate 
personnel  s a f e t y .  
The sane i saue  can be considered from the  po in t  of view of how much 
of a deaign impact i t  is t o  make these  two methods adequately s a f e  f o r  
personnel  t r a n s f e r .  To do t h i s ,  t h e  two requirements, 2.4.003-6 and -7, 
i d e n t i f i e d  i n  Sect ion 3.3.1., f o r  EVA c a p a b i l i t y  and f o r  emergency l i f e  
support  on each module used f o r  personnel  t r a n s f e r ,  must be m e t .  This 
is undoubtedly a very major design impact. The weight and volume of 
implementing these  requirements would be chargable t o  t h e  module, thus 
reducing t h e  u se fu l  payload and a v a i l a b l e  volume. Furthermore, these  
requirements cannot abso lu t e ly  remove t h e  r i s k ,  s i n c e  t h e  na ture  of t h e  
f a i l u r e  and t h e  escape or  rescue t i m e  'cannot be  d e f i n i t e l y  es tab l i shed .  
This r i s k  of personnel  l o s s  t he re fo re  remains a r e s i d u a l  hazard of t h e  
manipulator docking system used i n  t hese  two methods f o r  personnel t r a n s f e r .  
These must t he re fo re  be regarded as s t rong  s a f e t y  disadvantages. The 
f a c t  t h a t  only  one docking and undocking is involved i n  each normal s t a t i o n  
resupply mission compared wi th  2 o r  more f o r  t he  o t h e r  systems is not  con- 
s ide red  a s i g n i f i c a n t  s a f e t y  advantage, s i n c e  it merely a f f e c t s  the  
p robab i l i t y  of a hazard,  t o  a degree which is not  known o r  measurable. 
A comparison of t he  t h r e e  systems, excluding t h e  manipulator system 
f o r  personnel  t r a n s f e r  i n  t h e  two methods j u s t  d iscussed,  does not  show 
any o the r  s t rong  s a f e t y  reasons  f o r  p re fe r r ing  one system over another.  
AT1 t h r e e  systems show t h e  same c r i t i c a l i t y ,  wi th  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  of causing 
veh ic l e  damage. The manipulator docking system ( i n  t h e  dual  docking 
method) e x h i b i t s  more modes f o r  causing damage, and wi th  a r e l a t i v e l y  
higher  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  than t h e  o t h e r  systems, because of t h e  mechanical and 
c o n t r o l  complexity of  t he  manipulator i t s e l f .  I f  con t ro l  of e i t h e r  t h e  
manipulator o r  of one of t he  veh ic l e s  is  l o s t  a t  a c r u c i a l  phase, damage 
is q u i t e  l i k e l y  because of t he  l a r g e  volume swept by the  manipulator 
envelope. The s p e c i f i c  s a f e t y  requirements, al though f a i r l y  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  
would not  no t iceab ly  a f f e c t  t h e  development of t h e  system. 
The d i r e c t  docking system, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, has  t h e  one r e l a t i v e l y  
severe  r i s k  t h a t  a con t ro l  system f a i l u r e  when the  two v e h i c l e s  are close 
t o  each o t h e r ,  can r e s u l t  i n  inadver ten t  contact  and damage. The h igher  
con tac t  v e l o c i t y  of t h i s  system (up to  0.3 rn l sec ,  1 f t / s e c )  compared to 
t h e  manipulator system (up to  0.03 m/sec, 0.1 f t / s e c )  could be  expected to  
r e s u l t  i n  both less reac t ion  time f o r  corretciive a c t i o n  and more damage. 
The extendable . tunne1 system appears,  from the  comparison, to  have t h e  
lowest p r o b a b i l i t y  of causing damage. This occurs  because of t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  
l a r g e  separa t ion  of t h e  v e h i c l e s  (about 3 m, 10  f t )  dur ing t h e  cri t ical  
i n i t i a l  con tac t  and cap ture  phases o f  t h e  docking maneuver. This makes t h e  
8ystem r e l a t i v e l y  t o l e r a n t  to  approach condi t ion e r r o r s  and to  con t ro l  system 
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f a i l u r e s ,  allowing adequate time f o r  crew diagnosis and correc t ive  act ion.  
I n  addi t ion,  the  most c r i t i c a l  f a i l u r e  mode iden t i f i ed  is f a i l u r e  of the 
extension mechanism, which is assumed t o  be a pneumatically i n f l a t e d  tabe. 
Should a d i f f e r e n t  extension mechanism be used which has a more benign 
f a i l u r e  mode, the  extendable tunnel system would be q u i t e  a t t r a c t i v e  from 
the sa fe ty  point of view, exhib i t ing  a lwer c r i t i c a l i t y  than the other  
systems. It must be remembered however t h a t  t h i s  system has not  been 
adequately r tudied o r  developed, i n  a f u l l y  developed and p rac t i ca l  system 
which are not apparent a t  present.  
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3.4 COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF DOCKING MODES 
Because t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  and f r e e  f l y i n g  module modes d i f f e r  a t  
an o v e r a l l  concept l e v e l  r a t h e r  than a d e t a i l e d  system l e v e l ,  the  comparisons 
and eva lua t ion  a r e  made on d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  from those f o r  the  docking 
systems. These c r i t e r i a  a r e  : 
o The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  crew i n j u r y  o r  l o s s  
o The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  veh ic l e  l o s s  
o The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  veh ic l e  damage 
o The c o s t  and payload impact of requi red  s a f e t y  
These c r i t e r i a  a r e  discussed and evaluated as a whole f o r  each docking 
mode, r a t h e r  than compared ind iv idua l ly  f o r  the  two docking modes. This 
s e c t i o n  is the re fo re  arranged i n  an eva lua t ion  s e c t i o n  f o r  each of the  two 
modes, and concluded with  a comparison of the  two modes. 
Evaluation of Orbiter-to-Stat ion Docking Mode 
The hazards i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  the  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode have the  
p o t e n t i a l  of causing mador damage t o  t he  o r b i t e r  and/or t h e  s t a t i o n ,  bu t  do 
no t  d i r e c t l y  lead t o  personnel  i n j u r y  o r  l o s s .  The damage would r e s u l t  from 
inadver ten t  con tac t  of p a r t s  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  no t  intended t o  make contac t .  
Because both veh ic les  a r e  l a r g e  and have complex geometries, wi th  many pro- 
truberances,  such as cargo bay doors,  wings and manipulators on the  o r b i t e r ,  
and s o l a r  pane ls ,  antennas and experiments a i r l o c k s  on the  s t a t i o n ,  almost 
any unprogrammed motion can lead  t o  contac t  and damage. 
While t h e  damage t o  t he  s t r u c t u r e  o r  equipment would no t  normally be 
expected t o  l ead  t o  personnel  i n j u r y  o r  l o s s ,  t h i s  cannot be ru led  ou t  as 
an eventual  consequence of t he  damage. For example, i f  t he  aerodynamic 
s u r i a c e s  of the  o r b i t e r  a r e  damaged s o  as t o  preclude r een t ry ,  and escape 
o r  rescue is not poss ib le  w i th in  t h e  time c o n s t r a i n t  imposed by t h e  l i f e  
support  c a p a b i l i t y ,  then crew l o s s  would r e s u l t .  O r ,  aga in ,  i f  a massive 
pene t ra t ion  of t h e  pressur ized  s t r u c t u r e  of the  s t a t i o n  occurs,  personnel  
l o s s  from depressur iza t ion  is poss ib le .  
Generally,  however, the  e f f e c t s  would be l imi t ed  t o  damage t o  t h e  veh ic l e ,  
and the  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  personnel  i n j u r y  o r  l o s s  should be  assessed as a second 
order  e f f e c t .  The proximity of t h e  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n ,  e i t h e r  of  .which can 
provide f o r  t h e  long term s a f e t y  of personnel  (one by r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  and t h e  
o the r  by i d r t u e  of its inhe ren t  long dura t ion  c a p a b i l i t y ) ,  and the  assumed 
EVA c a p a b i l i t y  v i r t u a l l y  ensure t h a t  personnel  who su rv ive  the  immediate 
accident  can be  safeguarded . 
The p o s s i b i l i t y  of l o s s  of one veh ic le  following a docking acc iden t  is 
q u i t e  real, however. The o r b i t e r  is vulnerable  i n  a number of ways. The 
cargo bay doors must be  closed before  reen t ry ;  damage t o  t he  c lo s ing  mechanism, 
o r  t o  the  doors themselves, could r e s u l t  i n  t he  i nges t ion  of  ho t  r e e n t r y  gases ,  
l ead ing  t o  thermal degradation of t he  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  The wings, fuse lage  
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and t a i l  su r f aces  a r e  p a r t  of t h e  aerodynamic conf igura t ion ,  and damage can 
a f f e c t  the  s t a b i l i t y  and con t ro l  of the  veh ic le  i n  t he  atmosphere. The crew 
cabin a l s o  i s  near  the  docking p o r t ,  and damage t o  t h a t  could preclude r e t u r n  
t o  e a r t h .  I f  an assessment of t he  damage prevents r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h ,  a very 
complex and c o s t l y  rescue and r e p a i r  s h u t t l e  mission would be requi red ,  pro- 
bably wi th  much EVA maintenance. I n  extteme cases t he  o r b i t e r  would be w r i t t e n  
o f f  a s  a complete l o s s ,  and the  rescue mission would concentra te  on saving the  
personnel  and placing the  o r b i t e r  on a s a f e  reen t ry  o r b i t .  
The space s t a t i o n ,  being modular i n  na tu re ,  is much more t o l e r a n t  t o  
damage. Damage would genera l ly  be confined t o  one module, and t h i s  could 
be  re turned t o  e a r t h  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  f o r  r e p a i r  o r  replacement. This could 
be q u i t e  d i f f i c u l t ,  however, i f  the  a f f ec t ed  module were the  core module, 
s i n c e  a l l  o the r  modules a r e  a t tached  t o  it. I n  such a case  the  space s t a t i o n  
may be temporari ly abandoned, and a new core module brought up i n  due course. 
The space s t a t i o n  would then be re-assembled about t h i s  module, and the  damaged 
core module re turned t o  ea r th .  Damage t o  the  s o l a r  a r rays  ( r e l a t i v e l y  l i k e l y  
because of the  l a r g e  a r ea  exposed) could s i m i l a r l y  lead  t o  temporary s t a t i o n  
ab andonmen t . 
No requirements o r  g u i d e l i n t s  have been i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the  hazardlemer- 
gency analyses  which apply s p e c i f i c a l l y  only f o r  the  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  
docking mode. The "common" requirements and gu ide l ines  are equal ly  appl icab le  
t o  the  f r e e  f l y i n g  docking mode, and have equal  design and cos t  impact when 
appl ied t o  e i t h e r  mode. The impact of s a f e t y  on t h e  cos t  and payloads f o r  
the o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode i s  the re fo re  minimal. 
Evaluation of Free-Flying Module Docking Mode 
The f r e e  f l y i n g  module docking mode has a very d e f i n i t e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
personnel  loss .  I f  l o s s  of t he  propulsion,  con t ro l  o r  l i f e  support  capa- 
b i l i t y  occurs whi le  the  module is f r e e  f l y i n g  between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n  
wi th  personnel  onboard, personnel  l o s s  can occur. Escape can only be  . e f fec ted  
by EVA t o  +he o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n .  Rescue is poss ib l e  by t_ie o r b i t e r ,  b u t  
only i f  the  module can s t i l l  b e  s t a b i l i z e d  (For docking) and i f  adequate l i f e  
support  c a p a b i l i t y  remains. The p o s s i b i l i t y  of personnel  l o s s  must t he re fo re  
be r a t e d  as r e l a t i v e l y  high. I n  con t r a s t  t o  t he  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking 
mode, l o s s  of personnel  can fo'llow d i r e c t l y  as a consequence of syRtem 
f a i l u r e ,  and does not  depend on a propagation of un l ike ly  e f f e c t s .  
The p o t e n t i a l  f o r  personnel  l o s s  appears t o  be about t h e  same f o r  t h e  
. 
i n t e g r a l  s y s  tema module, space-based mini-tug o r  ground-based mini-tug 
approaches. A l l  t h r e e  involve one f r e e  f l i g h t  of t h e  manned module f o r  each 
manned module t r a n s f e r  maneuver, and the re fo re  expose the  personnel  t o  equal  
r i sk .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  propuls ion,  guidance and l i f e  support  systems f a i l u r e  
which could a f f e c t  personnel  s a f e t y  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same whether t h i s  
equipment is loca ted  i n t e g r a l l y  on the  module o r  i n  t he  mini-tug. The mini- 
tugs t h e m e l v e s  have more f l i g h t s  than t h e  i n t e g r a l  systems module (5 f l i g h t s  
f o r  t he  space-based and 3 f o r  t h e  ground-based mini-tug; compared with 2 f o r  
t h e  i n t e g r a l  syatems module). However, t h e  number of manned f l i g h t s  is t h e  
same (2  i n  each case). The r i s k .  t o  personnel  is the  same i n  each case. 
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Providing a spare  mini-tug i n  t he  program provides a back-up rescue 
c a p a b i l i t y ,  bu t  t h i s  is  a v a i l a b l e  by the  o r b i t e r ,  anyway. It does not  reduce 
the  r i s k  from a f a i l u r e  which causes the  f r e e  f l y ing  module t o  l o s e  a t t i t u d e  
con t ro l ,  t o  tumble out-of-control,  o r  t o  f l y  o f f  i n  a t r a j e c t o r y  beyond the  
propuls ive  c a p a b i l i t y  of t h e  spa re  mini-tug t o  catch up and r e t u r n  i t .  
I n  t h i s  r e spec t ,  the  redundancy provided by the  spa re  mini-tug is  f a r  
b e t t e r  employed a s  on -ba rd  redundancy of t he  c r i t i c a l  eystems, s o  t h a t  any 
f a i l u r e  (except a ca t a s t roph ic  f a i l u r e  which dest roys  t h e  whole mini-tug) 
can be promptly counteracted,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  of the  veh ic l e ' s  motion. This 
conclusion,  t h a t  b u i l t - i n  requndancy is  s a f e r  than a spa re  veh ic le ,  app l i e s  
equal ly  t o  t h e  i n t e g r a l  systems module and the  two mini-tug concepts, 
The p o s s i b i l i t y  of an inadver ten t  c o l l i s i o n  between the  f r e e  f l y i n g  
module and the  o r b i t e r  o r  space s t a t i o n  is about as l i k e l y  as f o r  the  
o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode. The r e s u l t a n t  damage, however, is l i k e l y  
t o  be  much less, f o r  two reasons.  F i r s t l y ,  t h e  geometry of a s i n g l e  module 
docking t o  orbi  t e r  o r  s t a t i o n  is much s impler ,  s o .  t h a t  fewer po in t s  on the  
two vehic les  w i l l  come i n t o  contact .  Secondly, t he  mass of a f r e e  f l y ing  
module is  only about 10 t o  20 percent  of t h e  mass of e i t h e r  o r b i t e r  o r  
s t a t i o n ,  s o  t h a t  t he  energy involved i n  the  c o l l i s i o n  is r e l a t i v e l y  small .  
As f o r  the  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode, inadver ten t  c o l l i s i o n  could 
lead  t o  personnel  l o s s ,  b u t  only as a secondary e f f e c t .  The p robab i l i t y  of 
personnel  l o s s  on t h e  s t a t i o n  o r  o r b i t e r  must be considered less than on t h e  
o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  mode, because of t h e  expected smal le r  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  damage. 
The p robab i l i t y  of personnel  l o s s  on t h e  f r e e  f l y i n g  module is higher  than 
on e i t h e r  of t h e  two l a r g e  veh ic l e s ,  however, because the  f r e e  f l y i n g  module 
is more vulnerable  t o  ac-cidents, A given pene t r a t i on  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  w i l l  
l ead  t o  more rap id  depressur iza t ion ,  because of t he  smaller volume; dual  
p ressure  volumes are not l i k e l y  on the  f r e e  f l y i n g  module; and the  dura t ion  
of t h e  prime and the  emergency l i f e  support  capabi1it.y w i l l  be  of t h e  order  
of hours r a t h e r  than days, as  on the  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n .  
When considering the  impact of s a f e t y  on t h e  design complexity of t h e  
f r e e  f l y i n g  module docking mode, t h i s  must be judged t o  b e  a major impact. 
The requirement f o r  a l i f e  .support system on the  module is not  considered as 
a s a f e t y  requirement, as i t  is needed f o r  the  normal veh ic l e  f -mct ioo  of 
t r anspor t i ng  personnel. The redundancy ' required i n  t h i s  system, t h e  added 
redundancy i n  t h e  cont ro l ,  power, propulsion and' comunica t ion  systems , the  
EVA s u i t s  and EVA c a p a b i l i t y ,  and the  eme'rgency l'ife support  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  
a r e  d i r e c t l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  s a f e t y .  These a r e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  the hazard/  
emergency analyses  r e f e r r i n g  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  t h e  f r e e  f l y i n g  module docking 
mode (No. 's 2.5.001 t o  2.5.003) . These requirements considerably a f f e c t  
t he  n e t  payload c a p a b i l i t y  of each f r e e  f l y i n g  module, as w e l l  as t he  volume 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  f o r  cargo. 
Q p i c a l  weights and volumes f o r  these  s a f e t y  rc~quirements are shown i n  
Table 3-8 f o r  a 6-mau vehicle .  534 kg (1180 l b )  and 3 m3 (106 f t 3 )  of u se fu l  
cargo are l o s t .  This assumes t h a t  t he  EVA s u i t s  me r e l a t i v e l y  l igh tweight  
emergency s u i t s ,  wi th  a simple oxygen purge 8ystem, capable of one-half  hour 
l i f e  support ,  r a t h e r  than a normal po r t ab l e  l i f e  support  system. 
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Table 3-8. Typical Increuiecte i n  Weights and Volumes f o r  
Meeting Safety Requirements on a Manned Frea- 
Flying Module 
Item 
Redundant Systems I 
Comnunications 
Power (4  hrs)  
Environmental Control (4 h r s )  
Reaction Control (20 Ib j e t s )  
6 Pressure Garment Assemblies and 
Oxygen Purge Systems 
2-Man A i r  lock I 
Emergency L i fe  Support (48 hrs )  I 
3.4.3 Evaluation of Free-Flyinn Module Docking Mode used for Unmanned 
Operations Only . 
A considerably d i f f e r e n t  sa fe ty  evaluation of the f r e e  f ly ing  module 
docking mode ar ioes  if t h i s  mode is' used only f o r  t r ans fe r r ing  unmanned 
payloads, and the o r b t t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  mode is used when personnel t r ans fe r  
between the vehicles  is involved. This comb?ned mode could be p r a c t i c a l  
i f  a mini-tug has been developed f o r  o ther  purposes and is avai lab le  f o r  
docking unmanned payloads, o r  i f  some o r b i t e r  such ua a space tug, 
have the propulsion and cont ro l  capabi l i ty  b u i l t  i n t o  them, and requi re  
t r ans fe r  from the o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  and v ice  versa. 
The advantages associated with docking a smaller m a s s  t o  the  o r b i t e r  
o r  s t a t i o n ,  k d  of the simpler geometry reducing the po ten t i a l  f o r  damage 
on co l l i s ion ,  apply t o  t h i s  mode i n  t h e  same way as de,,cribed f o r  the 
(manned) f r ee  f ly ing  module mode i n  Section 3.4.2. The disadvantages of 
having a r e l a t i v e l y  high po teu t i a l  of personnel loss ,  and of severely impact- 
ing the  weight and volume of the transported payload, no longer apply, haw- 
ever. Solo. equipment, namely cont ro l  systems, propulsion, copnunicatiods, 
e tc . ,  would sti l l  require '  redundancy (see Hazard/Emergency Analysis NO. 
2.5.001) , t o  ensure the wliole vehicle  is not l o s t .  But th i s  ' ie a general  
system sa fe ty  requirement, applicable t o  the module becauee it  i e  a f r e e  
f ly ing  module, and is  not d i r e c t l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  the docking mode. - 
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This mixed mode therefore provides sa fe ty  advantages over the  o r b i t e r  
t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode on i ts  own, and over the  f r e e  f ly ing  module docking 
mode on its own. These advantages apply s o  long as the f r e e  f lying module 
is not used at a l l  f o r  ?ersonnel t r ans fe r ,  The o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking 
mode can be w e d  f o r  the t r ans fe r  of personnel o r  of unmanned cargo, aa 
required. The overa l l  r: sks a re  minimized, however, when the o r b i t e r  t o  
s t a t i o n  mode is used fo r  personnel t r a n s f e r ,  t o  minimize r i s k s  t o  personnel, 
and a l l  unmanned t r ans fe r  i e  performed by the f r e e  f lying mode, which mini- 
mizes r i s k s  t o  the o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n ,  
The disadvantages of t h i s  mixed mode a re  not sa fe ty  disadvantages, but  
a re  associated with the program complexity of having two docking modes i n  
the program. The docking system can be designed t o  handle upto a 10:l  range 
i n  docking masses, as would be required,  and does not need d i f f e r e n t  energy 
at tenuat ion s y s t e m  f o r  the two cases. Of course, 1.f the f r e e  f ly ing  module 
capabi l i ty  o r  the  mini-tug were needed only f o r  increasing the  docking s a f e t y ,  
the cost  of these developments would then have t o  be considered against  the 
incremental sa fe ty  which is obtained, and the concept would be very unat t ract-  
ive ;  but i f  the systems a re  developed f o r  o ther  reasons, t h i s  addi t ional  sa fe ty  
is  obtained f o r  a very small cost  only, 
3 . 5 EMERGENCY DOCK1 MG CONSIDERATIONS 
The reasons f o r  emergency docking, ee tabl iah  ce r t a in  requiremmtu t h a t  
w i l l  determine which of the three  docking concepts should be favored from 
an emergency docking standpoint.  The reasons f o r  emergency docking t h a t  
appear t o  cover the majority of poss ib i l f  t i e s  are as foilowe: 
A t i m e  c r i t i c a l  malfunction of a system i n  e i t h e r  manned/paseive 
o r  manned/active vehicles ,  thpt i f  docked t o  the other ,  would 
provide succor o r  p e m i  t m i s s i ~ n  continuance. 
Retr ieval  of a disabled, unmanned, f r e e  f lying,  module o r  disabled 
unmaxined s t a t i o n  f o r  the purpose of salvage o r  deorbi t  of debris.  
Time c r i t i c a l  t ransfer  of disabled crew which could prevent 
f a t a l i t y .  
Time cr i t ica l  t r ans fe r  of suppl ies  which would prevent crew 
d i s a b i l i t y  , 
Conditions t h a t  may complicate e? emergency docking, o ther  than system mol- 
functions or  diaabled crew, a re  the requirement t o  have the sun i n  a p a r t i -  
cu lar  or ien ta t ion  during docking and the requirement t o  dock a t  nigh . 
The time c r i t i c a l  emergency docking reasons (3 out  of 4) ,  by t h e i r  
nature,  would favor the docking system and mode requir ing the s h o r t e s t ,  
operat ional  time l i n e  f o r  the docking maneuver. A f a i r  measure of time 
l i n e  is the number of functions a docking system m u s t  perform t o  complete 
the docking maneuver. 
Thia would favor the o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode over the f r e e  
f ly ing  module roode, and the  d i r e c t  docking system over the extendable tunnel 
and manipulator docking eye tcme. The f r e e  f ly ing  module mode, i n  pa r t i cu la r ,  
considerably extends t h e  t o t a l  time from i n i t i a t i o n  of  the docking nranewer 
t o  i ts  completion. 
However, the importance af reducing the  docking ti- i n  evaluating the  
merits of the various docking systems and modes muet be kept i n  perspective. 
Given t h a t  t time c r i t i c a l  emergezcy has occurred, the probabi l i ty  t h a t  it 
occure wh=n the o r b i t e r  and e t a t i o n  are posit ioned and configured 60 t h a t  
they can i n i t i a t e  a docking maneuver immediately i e  vary remote* It i e  only 
i n  that unlikely c l r c u s t a n c e  t h a t  the  time t o  e f f e c t  the rescue is e l p a i f l -  
cantly affec ted  (as a percentage) by a reduction i n  t h e  docking time. For 
example, i f  t he  emergency occurs i n  the  space s t a t i o n ,  the  chances art  t h a t  
no o r b i t e r  i e  i n  space a t  the time. A ehutaie rescue misrion may t y p i m l l y  
take 10 hours from an alert t o  rendezvous. The difference betPnsm one rsthod 
of docking and m o t h e r  may be 19 d n u t e s  ( i n  en sa+rgency d), and t h l r  time 
i s  unlikely to be cr i t ica l  t o  the ruccarr  of the rercw. S i d h r l y ,  even i f  
an o r b i t e r  ir  in o t b i t  a t  rhe t*, i t  may be two bourr before orbite car ba 
phcucd aad matched; a large tim colpared with the 15 riautem d l f f e r m c a  k m n  
the docking methodo. 
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When considering the  two dockirlg modes, the  time advantage i s  c l e a r l y  
i n  the  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode. I n  t h i s  case the  added time f o r  
deploying and f r e e  f l y i n g  a module t o  t h e  d i s t r e s s e d  veh ic l e  could be upto 
a few hours,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  a mini-tug i s  involved, and t h i s  could be  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  add i t i on  t o  t h e  t o t a l  time ave i l ab l e .  
The two emergency docking s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  involve spacecraf t  systems 
malfunctions could be  too hazardous f o r  an approach with  a d i r e c t  docking 
system. I f ,  f o r  example, the  t a r g e t  vehic le  has  low a t t i t u d e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
and zannot maintain " a t t i t u d e  hold", r e s u l t i n g  i n  a tumbling r a t e ,  i t  may be 
impossible f o r  the  a c t i v e  docking veh ic le  t o  chase the  t a r g e t  docking po r t  
i n  both r o t a t i o n  and t r a n s l a t i o n .  I f  a f r e e  tumbling veh ie l e  r o t a t e s  about 
i ts  cen te r  of mass, a docking po r t ,  loca ted  some d is tance  away from the  cen te r  
of mass w i l l  have a c i r c u l a r  motion, and w i l l  be  o r ien ted  a t  some angle t o  the  
plane of ro t a t i on .  Of t h e  th ree  docking systemi consideled,  only the  manipu- 
l a t o r  has the  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  add i ts d e x t e r i t y  t o  t h a t  of t h e  a c t i v e  veh ic le  
i n  the  task  of captur ing a tumbling t a r g e t  veh ic le .  Such a maneuver would, i n  
general ,  r equ t r e  degrees of freedom not  neces sa r i l y  b u i l t  i n t o  the  manipulator, 
and could be q u i t e  hazardous i f  t h e  tumbling axis is  changing rap id ly .  This  
problem is  discussed i n  Sec t ion  2.0 of Volume 111. 
I f  the  t a r g e t  veh ic l e  is inadver ten t ly  spinning about an axis through 
o r  near the  docking p o r t ,  the  manipulator docking system i s  again t h e  only 
concept, of the  t h ree ,  t h a t  could s p i n  synchronize i t s  capture  i n t e r f a c e  
with respec t  t o  t h e  turning t a r g e t  veh ic l e  docking p o r t ,  and de-spin and 
dock. I n  e i t h e r  the  tumbling mode o r  t he  r o l l  s p i n  mode, t h c  manipulator 
would a l s o  be favored, from a s a f e t y  s tandpoin t ,  because of i ts  c a p a b i l i t y  
t o  e f f e c t  capture  a t  a d i s tance .  
I f  t he  emergency cons i s t s  of t h e  pass ive  veh ic l e  having l o s t  a t t i t u d e  
hold capab i l i t y  and i t  is e i t h e r  tumbling very slowly, w i th in  t he  design 
capab i l i t y  of t h e  docking system, o r  is s u b j e c t  t o  unpredic table  motions 
due t o  venting,  the  d i r e c t  docking system would be  the  l e a s t  de s i r ab l e ,  
because of the  c lo se  approach of the  two vehic les .  The manipulator system 
would o f f e r  t he  b e s t  and s a f e s t  method, wi th  t h e  extendable tunne l  an i n t e r -  
mediate choice. 
I n  summary, emergency docking cons idera t ions  favor t he  o r b i t e r  t o  
s t a t i o n  docking mode over the  f r e e  f l y i n g  module mode because of its quicker 
time response; al though the  d i r e c t  docking system i s  the  qu ickes t  system, t h e  
manipulator system has  advantages i n  increased separa t ion  between the  veh ic les  
and i n  capab i l i t y  t o  d e a l  wi th  out-of-control vehic les .  
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3.6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This sec t ion  summarizes the  conclusions reached from the s a f e t y  evalua- 
t ion  of the docking systems and modes, and presents  the  r e su l t ing  recc- menda- 
t f  ons. 
The conclusions reached on the docking systems a re  summarized as 
follows : 
a Each of the three  docking systems -- d i r e c t  docking, extendable 
tunnel and manipulator -- can be made adequately sa fe ,  
The "docking vehicle  active" and the "docking vehicle  passive,  
docking system active" methods of using the extendable tunnel 
dockina system show no s i g n i f i c a n t  sa fe ty  differences.  
a The s t a t i o n  keeping and the dual manipulator methods of using 
the manipulator docking system have the po ten t i a l  of personnel 
loss  i n  the  event of l o s s  of manipulator control  before a manned 
attached module is docked. This remains a res idual  hazard even 
when complex emergency l i f e  support requirements are added t o  the 
manned modules. The dual docking method requires  more operations 
t o  e f f e c t  docking, but  does not have the  po ten t i a l  f o r  l o s s  of 
personnel, 
a A l l  th ree  docking systems have the p o t e n t i a l  of damage t o  the  
docking system and damage t o  the vehicles.  The damage t o  the  
spacecraf t  could, i n  ce r t a in  circumstances , be c r i t i c a l  enough 
to  r e s u l t  i n  l o s s  of vehicle  o r  l o s s  of personnel. 
a The d i r e c t  docking system has the  g r e a t e s t  po ten t i a l  f o r  inadvertent 
co l l i s ion  because of the close proximity of the  docking vehicles.  
a The manipulator docking system has the minimum po ten t i a l  f o r  inadvert- 
ent  c o l l i s i o n  between vehicles  because of the  r e l a t i v e l y  l a rge  separa- 
t ion  dis tance a t  i n i t i a l  capture,  but has more f a i l u r e  modes which 
can r e s u l t  i n  inadvertent contact and damage. 
a The d i r e c t  docking can perform a time c r i t i c a l  emergency docking 
quicker than the o ther  systems. The manipulator docking system 
has more po ten t i a l  f o r  docking with an out-of-control, tumbling 
o r  epinning spacecraft .  
The hazards and r i s k s  of the three systems a r e  not equally w e l l  
understood because of the d i f fe ren t  development a t a tus  of the  sys terns. 
The d i r e c t  docking system is r e l a t i v e l y  w e l l  understood from G e m i n i  
and Apollo experience, the manipulator system has been defined t o  
some extent  i n  the  Shu t t l e  Phase B a tudies ,  but  has not  been t e s t ed  
o r  simulated at  the time of t h i s  study, and t h e  extendable tunnel 
system is  only i n  a conceptual s tage.  
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0 The s a f e t y  advantages and disadvantages of the  th ree  systems a r e  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  balanced and unce r t a in t i e s  i n  the  cur ren t  system 
d e f i n i t i o n  a r e  such t h a t  a ranking of the  system from the  s a f e t y  
po in t  of view cannot. be made a t  presen t .  
0 I f  the  docking systems, when developed, opera te  as assumed i n  the  
study,  i.e., without any major a d d i t i o n a l  complications i n  the  
design o r  a d d i t i o n a l  hazards, then the  extendable tunnel  system 
appears t o  r equ i r e  the  l e a s t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  make i t  adequately s a f e ,  
and the  manipulator s y s  tem the most . 
The conclusions reached on the  docking modes are summarized a s  
follows : 
The f r e e  f l y ing  docking mode has a p o t e n t i a l  f o r  personnel  l o s s  
when used t o  t r a n s f e r  personnel  between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n .  
The necessary s a f e t y  requirements f o r  6 men on the  f r e e  f l p i n  
module reduce the  payload c a p a b i l i t y  by 500 kg (1200 1b) and g m3 
(100 f t 3 ) ,  bu t  the  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  personnel  l o s s  remains a r e s i d u a l  
hazard. 
The f r e e  f l y i n g  module docking mode precludes t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
a s i n g l e  acc iden t  r e s u l t i n g  i n  l o s s  of both t h e  o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n .  
No s i g n i f i c a n t  s a f e t y  d i f f e r ences  e x i s t  between the  i n t e g r a l  sys  terns 
module, space based mini-tug and ground based mini-tug methods of 
using the  f r e e  f l y i n g  module docking mode. 
The o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode has more p o t e n t i a l  of causing 
major damage t o  t he  o r b i t e r  and/or s t a t i o n  than the  f ree- f ly ing  
docking mode bu t  does no t  d i r e c t l y  l ead  t o  personnel  l o s s .  Loss of 
ersonnel  ox l o s s  of a v e h i c l e  as a r e s u l t  of t h e  damage is poss ib le  
pat not  l i k e l y .  
0 Use of t h e  f r e e  f l y i n g  mode f o r  t r a n s f e r r i n g  only unmanned modules 
between o r b i t e r  and s t a t i o n  e l imina tes  t he  p o t e n t i a l  of personnel  
l o s s  during t r a n s f e r .  I t  a l s o  has a reduced p o t e n t i a l  f o r  veh ic l e  
contact  and damage compared t o  the  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n ,  docking mode 
because of the  s impler  geometry and smal le r  docking energy involved. 
0 The o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  docking mode provides s i g n i f i c a n t l y  quicker  
docking than t h e  f r e e  f l y i n g  module mode i n  t he  event of a time 
c r i t i c a l  docking requirement. 
The recommendations t h a t  r e s u l t  from t h i s  task a re  based on the 
following precedence of s a f e t y  se. ac t ion  c r i t e r i a :  
A system o r  mode which has the l e s s e r  po ten t i a l  f o r  personnel 
loes  is preferred.  
Of t h e  remaining choices, the system o r  mode i n  which the  sa fe ty  
requirements and guidel ines  can r e s u l t  i u  a s i g n i f i c a n t l y  lesser 
r i s k  ( i n  terms of probabi l i ty  and sever i ty  of damage) is preferred.  
Where die requirements and guidel ines  r e s u l t  i n  e s s e n t i a l l y  equal 
r i  the choice i n  which the requirements and guidelines r e s u l t  
ir . + i f i c a n t l y  less design impact i s  preferred.  
The capab i l i ty  to  b e t t e r  deal  with an emergency s i t u a t i o n  is 
considered i n  the recommendations, but is weighted r e l a t i v e l y  
l i g h t l y  because there is no clear-cut advantage to  any of the 
systems o r  modes, and because of the low probabi l i ty  of an 
emergency docking being required. 
These recommendations are:  
The d i r e c t  docking, extendable tunnel,  and manipulator docking 
systems should a l l  be considered as  acceptable docking systems 
from the sa fe ty  point of view. 
The s t a t i o n  keeping and dual  manipulator methods of using the  
manipulator docking system should be re jec ted  as p r a c t i c a l  
options f o r  personnel t r ans fe r  i n  normal operations because 
of t h e i r  high po ten t i a l  f o r  personnel loss .  The methods a r e  
acceptable f o r  t r ans fe r  of unmanned modules, o r  f o r  emergencies. 
The use of the free-flying docking mode f o r  the t r ans fe r  of 
manned modules should be re jec ted  f o r  normal operations because 
of the  po ten t i a l  f o r  personnel loss .  The mode may be used 
i n  emergencies. 
The orbi ter- to-s tat ion docking mode should be considered 
acceptable from the sa fe ty  point of view with any of the  
acceptable docking systems. 
I f  minf -tugs (such as remote caneuvering un i t s )  o r  modules 
with self-contained propulsion, cont ro l  and docking c a p a b i l i t i e s  
(such as the space tug) are developed f o r  o ther  purposes and are 
avai lab le ,  t h e i r  use i n  t r ans fe r r ing  unmanned modules or payloads 
between 0rbite.r and s t a t i o n  should be considered as an acceptable 
docking mode. Use of t h i s .  f ree-f lying module mode f o r  unmanned 
payloads i n  conjunction with the  use of t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  s t a t i o n  mode 
f o r  all manned modules has s i g n i f i c a n t  s a f e t y  advantages. 
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3.7 RESIDUAL HAZARDS AND HAZARDS RESOLUTION 
This s e c t i o n  summarizes the  hazards i d e n t i f i e d  i n  Sect ions  3.2.3 t o  3.2.5 
and t h e i r  r e so lu t ion  as def ined i n  Sect ion 2.0, and presen ts  t he  r e s u l t i n g  
requirements f o r  support ing research and technology . 
Resolution of I d e n t i f i e d   hazard^ 
The d i s p o s i t i o n  of t h e  23 hazards i d e n t i f i e d  i n  Sect ions  3.2.3 t o  3.2.5 
is shown i n  Table 3-9. This shows the  judgements of the  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  a s  t o  
which hazards should be resolved by implementation of t he  recommended require-  
ments and gu ide l ines ;  which a r e  r e s i d u a l  hazards;  which of t he  r e s i d u a l  hazards 
represen t  acceptable  r i o k s ;  and which r equ i r e  support ing research and technology 
(SRT) o r  must a t  p resen t  be considered as umesolved s a f e t y  i s sues .  This hazards 
- r e so lu t ion  has been performed i n  accordance with t he  procedures and d e f i n i t i o n s  
described i n  Appendix A. 
3.7.2 Supporting Research and Technology Requirements 
The support ing research and technology requirements r e s u l t i n g  from the 
areas  of uncer ta in ty  of t h i s  t ask  a r e  l i s t e d  below. The main o r i g i n a t i n g  
hazards/emergency are ind ica t ed  i n  paren thes i s .  
The f e a s i b i l i t y  using a non-coll is ion approach pa th  dur ing the  
docking maneuver u n t i l  the  approach v e l o c i t y  i s  reduced t o  w i th in  
t h e  docking a t t enua t ion  c a p a b i l i t y  should be inves t iga ted .  O r b i t a l  
mechan:!cs , guidance, p rope l l an t s  p e n a l t i e s ,  o p t i c a l  a id s  and human 
f ac to r s  should be considered,  and d e t a i l e d  procedures developed. 
The r i s k s  and o t h e r  f a c t o r s  of t h i s  method should be  evaluated 
and compared with  the  d i r e c t  (col l is ion-path)  approach. 
The dynamics of t h e  docking maneuver under var ious  nominal and 
worst  case condi t ions  should be i nves t iga t ed  t o  assure  t h a t  design 
requirements and opera t iona l  procedures a r e  a v a i l a b l e  under a l l  
c r ed ib l e  condi t ions  t o  ensure t he  s a f e t y  of t h e  veh ic les .  Spec i a l  
a t t e n t i o n  should be given t o  veh ic le  condi t ions  wi th  maximum of f -  
s e t s  of t h e  docking p o r t  from the  cen te r  of g rav i ty ,  and t o  con t ro l  
s y s  tern o r  propulsion f a i l u r e s  immediately before  o r  a f t e r  contact .  
a Simulation s t u d i e s  of t h e  dynamics and crew c a p a b i l i t i e s  of t he  
manipulator docking sys  t e m  should be conducted a t  t he  earliest 
poss ib l e  t i m e  i n  o rder  t o  understand the  dynamic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of t h e  system and t o  i d e n t i f y  and reso lve  hazards which a r e  no t  
apparent  from conceptual s t u d i e s .  A s a f e t y  ana lys i s  should be  
an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  of such s imulat ions .  
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Iazard No, 
Table 3-9. Hazard8 Resolution 
Hazard 
tmpalrment o r  v i s i b i l i t y  a t  c r i t i c a l  
noment during docking. 
Loss of vehicle control  p r io r  t o  
docking contact.  
Loss of vehicle  control  a f t e r  
hi t i a l  contact during docking. 
Failure t o  i n h i b i t  a t t i t u d e  hold of 
one vehicle  a f t e r  capture during 
iocking . 
Loss of docking system function o r  
control. 
Failure of o r b i t e r  payload module 
deployment mechanism p r i o r  t o  dock- 
Lng . 
Hardware protrusions i n  the docking 
tunnel. 
Unsecured equipment and personcel 
during docking. 
Degradation of l i f e  support system 
h r i n g  docking. 
Docking hatch opened when pressure 
equal izat ion incomplete. 
E l e c t r i c  discharge during i n i t i a l  
docking contact. 
Loss of vehicle cont ro l  i n  c lose  
proximity t o  o ther  vehicle during 
docking, 
Loss of a t tenuat ion capabi l i ty  dur- 
Inn do-. 
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7 
Hazard No. 
2.3.001 
2.3.002 
2.3.003 
- 
2.4.001 
2.4.002 
2.4.003 
2.4.004 
2.5.001 
2.5.002 
Table 3-9. Hazards Resolut ion  (Cont .) 
Hazard 
Loss of v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  p r i o r  t o  
docking con t ac t  by extendable  
tunnel .  
Loss of v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
capture  by extendable  t unne l  
docking system. 
Loss of  p r e s su re  i n  t he  pneumatic 
extens ion and energy absorp t ion  
~echanism of t h e  docking system. 
Loss of v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  p r i o r  t o  
cap tu re  by manipula tor  dur ing dockir 
Loss of v e h i c l e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  
cap tu re  by manipulator  dur ing dockir 
Loss of manipulator  j o i n t  motor 
c o n t r o l  during docking. 
Loss of manipulator  computer 
a ided c o n t r o l  system dur ing docking 
Loss of Communications /Command 
c a p a b i l i t y  dur ing  docking by 
unmanned f r e e  f l y i n g  module. 
Loss of  p ropu ls ion  o r  c o n t r o l  
c a p a b i l i t y  dur ing  docking by 
manned f r e e  f l y i n g  module. 
Loss of l i f e  suppor t  c a p a b i l i t y  
dur ing  docking by manned f r e e  
f l y i n g  module. 
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4.0 PERSONNEL TRAFFIC PATTERNS, ESCAPE ROUTES AND 
ON-BOARD SURVIVABILITY 
The purpose of this task was to analyze the personnel traffic patterns, 
escape routes, and on-board survivabilitys from a safety standpoint for the 
orbiter with crew and passenger, sortie modules, and for the Modular Space 
Station. Among the primary areas of concern are (a) where separately press- 
ure isolatable compartments are recommended, (b) whether dual access to each 
area is essential, (c) feasibility of dual escape routes and from each area to 
other areas not common to each other, (d) number, location and size of air- 
locks, and (e) location of hatches, 
Three particular situations were investigaged insofar as they concern 
the safety of the orbiter, sortie module, and space station personnel while 
. in orbit: 
a Normal operations, in which no emergency exists, were assessed in 
order to specify recommendations which would minimize the danger 
of crew injury should an emergency arise. 
0 Emergency operations, where an emergency has arisen. 
a Extravehicular and Intravehicular activities (EVA) and (IVA), where 
such activity is required in the performance of experiments, vehicle 
maintenance or repair, or as a resu't of an emergency situation. 
Generalized candidate configurations, typical of the many variations 
possible and those which have been or are being considered, were modeled 
for the orbiter, sortie modules, and Modular Space Station, and evaluated 
for their ability to satisfy safety requirements which evolved from an 
analysis of identified credible emergencies, 
Specific baseline configurations, representative of those resulting 
from current advanced studies, were similarly evaluated for the orbiter, 
sortie modules, and space station in order to generate specifically applicable 
safety data for these vehicles which may materially effect their configuration 
or selection. In all cases, the minimum possible configurational changes 
from the baseline are recommended if required to meet safety criteria, 
The analyses are presented in the following order: 
4.1 Credible emergencies are identified for all the vehicle considered. 
4.2  The orbiter is analyzed with an unmanned payload, and conclusions 
reached. 
4 . 3  The analysis is extended to a manned sortie module attached to the 
orbiter, and conclusions reached. 
4.4 The space station is analyzed, during normal operations, during 
assembly, and during resupply by an orbiter, and conclusions reached. 
@A@ space Division NorthAmencanRockwell 
Supporting malysis are presented in Appendix C. Hazardlemergency analyses 
performed for each baseline vehicle configuration, are contained in Appendix D. 
The requirements and guidelines are contained in Volumes IV and V. 
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4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF CREDIBLE EMERGENCIES 
The assessment of escape rou te s  and compartmentation i s o l a t i o n  required 
the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of c r ed ib l e  emergencies from which conf igura t ion  or ien ted  
and support ing requirements could be generated through subsequent hazards 
ana lys i s .  The de r iva t ion  of support ing requirements, such a s  those which are 
subsystems o r  ope ra t iona l ly  o r i en t ed ,  a r e  necessary t o  make conf igura t ions  
acceptable ,  bu t  are secondary ob jec t ives  as compared t o  those requirements 
which d r i v e  v e h i c l e  compartmentation. 
Exis t ing s a f e t y  documentation from the  s h u t t l e ,  modular space s t a t i o n ,  
and RAM veh ic l e  programs, t he  Boeing Space S t a t i on  Safety  Study, t he  Lockheed 
Safety s t u d i e s ,  as we l l  a s  documentation from previous t a sks  of t h i s  study 
were reviewed i n  order  t o  e s t a b l i s h  c r e d i b l e  emergencies t o  which veh ic l e  
compartmentation is sens i t i ve .  Catas t rophic  emergencies .are  not  considered. 
Eleven c red ib l e  cmergencies, which can be grouped i n t o  emergency c l a s s e s  
which include f i r e / t o x i c  environment, explosion,  l o s s  of p ressure ,  inopera t ive  
hatches ,  and inopera t ive  docking po r t s ,  r e su l t ed  from t h i s  review, and a r e  
l i s t e d  i n  Table 4.1-1 toge ther  with t he  corresponding assigned hazards ana lys i s  
number and veh ic l e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  
Two types of f i r e s  can be  defined t o  cover t h e  spectrum of f i r e s  poss ib le .  
A small f i r e  is  one which is  of a magnitude which can be manually cgn t ro l l ed  
and ext inguished,  does no t  r equ i r e  evacuation of t he  a f f ec t ed  compartment, 
and causes only minor damage from t h e  generated h e a t ,  smoke, fumes, and o the r  
combus t i o n  by-products. 
Conversely, a l a r g e  f i r e  is one which r equ i r e s  evacuation of the  a f f ec t ed  
compartment and possesses the  p o t e n t i a l  of causing major damage t o  the  veh ic l e  
and i n j u r y  t o  the  crew. It i r  the l a r g e  f i r e  which is  of p r l w r y  interest to  
t h i s  t ask ,  a t  a level which requi re8  evacuation bu t  doe8 not r e s u l t  i n  crew 
in ju ry .  
I n  add i t i on  t o  t he  t o x i c  environment c rea ted  by a f i r e ,  atmospheric 
contamination can r e s u l t  from i n t e r n a l  leakage ( f l u i d s  l eak ing  i n t o  the  
hab i t ab l e  environment) , o r  from release of b i o l o g i c a l  substances i n t o  the  
atmosphere. 
A f i r e  and t o x i c  environment are combined i n t o  .!ngle emergency because 
they lead  t o  the  same evacuation and compar tmentation requirements. 
An explosion is  considered a c red ib l e  emergency due t o  the  numerous 
p o t e n t i a l  explosive  sources  assoc ia ted  wi th  t he  o r b i t e r ,  s t a t i o n ,  and s o r t i e  
modules such as p roge l l an t s ,  high pressure  gases,  cryogenics,  and experiment 
f l u i d s .  Many emergency s i t u a t i o n s  can l ead  t o  emergency evacuation of a 
compartment. These s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  considered c r ed ib l e  and the re fo re  m u s t  
be considered. 
Table 4.1-1. Credible Emergencies 
Credible Emergency 
F i r e l t o x i c  environment 
Explosion 
Emergency evacuation 
Loss of p ressure  
Fa i lu re  t o  open i n t e r n a l  hatch between 
pressure  i s o l a t a b l e  volumes 
F a i l u r e  t o  open docking hatch a f t e r  docking 
F a i l u r e  t o  c lo se  docking hatch before  
undocking 
I n a b i l i t y  t o  use docking hatch f o r  EVA when 
EVA required 
Fa i lu re  t o  c l o s e  e x t e r n a l  a i r l o c k  hatch when 
r e tu rn ing  from EVA 
Fa i lu re  t o  open i n t e r n a l  a i r l o c k  hatch when 
r e tu rn ing  from EVA 
Fa i lu re  t o  d o s e  IVA a i r l o c k  ha tch  on 
depressurized/contaminated s i d e  o r  t o  
open hatch on p re s su r i zed lhab i t ab l e  s i d e  
when r e tu rn ing  from EVA. 
Appl icab i l i ty  
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Loss of pressure,  as defined f o r  t h i s  task  meens loss  of presrure of a 
normally prearurized habi tab le  volumr, Rapid loss  of preasur i ra t ion  can 
r e s u l t  from a co l l i e ion  between vehicle8 o r  between a vehicle  and apace 
debris ,  meterold penetrat ion,  or the  inadvertent  puncture of a vehicle  
pressure s h e l l  from within,  
An inoperat ive hatch is a hatch which f a i l s  t o  open or  c losr .  Two 
types of hatches a r e  involved i n  t h i s  emergency c las s ,  These a re  i n t e r n a l  
and externa l  hatchelr, An i n t e r n a l  hatch its used t o  i s o l a t e  praesure v o l \ m s  
within a vehicle ,  An externa l  hatch opens t o  space. A hatch which i e  i n  
cluded with each dockins por t  i s  refer red  t o  herein ae a docking hat;&. A 
docking hatch can be used as  e i t h e r  an i n t e r n a l  o r  ex terna l  hatch, depending 
on whether the docking in te r face  is open t o  space o r  is clcsed t o  another 
vehicle  , 
The po ten t i a l  e f f e c t s  of four of these emergrncies, namely, f i r e l t o x i c  
environment, explosion, emergency evacuation and loss  of presrur iza t ion ,  
required de f in i t ion  t o  c l a s s i f y  the l e v e l  of these emergancics t o  be con- 
s idered f o r  analysis .  The primary aasuauptions f o r  t h i s  task ,  as they a f f e c t  
react ion time, need t o  evacuate a compartmant, injuredl incapaci ta tcd personnel, 
res tora t ion  t o  a sh i r t s l eeve  environment, and po ten t i a l  . t o  c a w e  c %her crediblu 
emergencies a re  l i e  ted i n  Table 40 1-2 
Table 4.1-2, Assumad Effec ts  f o r  Variabl;. ?.eve1 
Credible Emergencies 
Explosion 
Emergency Evacuation 
Loss of Pressurizat ion 
Yes Yes Yes 
0 Yes Yes No . Yee 
5 Yes No .No No 
2-8 Yes No No No 
For.example, the  type of f i r e  or toxic environment conridered requires  
rapid (0.5 min) evacuation, but does not r e r u l t  i n  personnel in jury ,  and allows 
f o r  aventual re turn  to the  affected c m a r t m e n t .  More severe accidents,  which may 
in ju re  personnel, o r  which do mt allow r h i r t r l e e v e  re tu rn  t o  the  af fec ted  c o w  
partment, a r e  considered undez "uplor ion"  and "emergency evacuation". 
4.2 SAFETY OF ORBlTER CONFIGURATIONS 
Seven possible  o r b i t e r  configurations a r e  evaluated f o r  t h e i r  inherent 
capabi l i ty  t o  cope with the  credib le  emergencies iden t i f i ed  i n  Section 4.1. 
In addi t ion t o  the l e v e l  of emergencies considered with respect t o  reac t ion  
time and e f f e c t ,  which were given i n  Table 4.1-1, the following major 
assumptions vere required to  scope the analys is  t o  within workable bounds. 
These are: 
a Emergencies, other  than hatch f a i l u r e s ,  a re  not  considered on 
air locks.  
a De-orbit/ret:.rn t o  ear th  requires  crew par t i c ipa t ion  i n  crew 
compartment . 
0 Rescue vehicle is  not  avai lable .  
No double emergencies are considered. 
Airlocks a re  s ized  f o r  two crewmen o r  a l l  crewmen. I f  s ized  
f o r  a l l  crewmen, they a r e  t r ea ted  and evaluated a s  a second 
volume . 
Passage cr aany pe-sonnel through an a i r lock ,  two a t  a time, 
is not acct cable. 
0 Airlock compartment f o r  EVA can be crew compartment, passenger 
compartment, o r  a i r lock.  
0 Planned EVA w i l l  be accomplished through an air lock.  
Cafety is a o t  achieved v i a  EVA. 
Each of the seven candidate o r b i t e r  configurations,  was evaluated within 
the cons t ra in ts  of the assumptions, t o  de termhe the  operat ional  opt ions 
avai lab le  t o  cope with each credib le  emergency. Analysis of the  operat ional  
options resul ted i n  secondary configurational,  subsystems, and operational 
requirements necessary t o  make the option viable. 
4.2.1 Candidate Orbi ter  Configurations 
The baseline configuration of the  o r b i t e r  is composed of an a i r lock ,  and 
a crew and passenger compartment as shown i n  Figure 4.2-1. This is the  f i n a l  
configuration resul t ing  .from the  WR Phase B study. The a i r lock ,  which is of a 
s i z t  t o  accomodate a t  a minimum, two sui ted  crewmen, is located a t  the forward 
end of the o r b i t e r ,  is f i t t e d  with a docking port ,  and an EVA hatch at t h e  
docking port. An emergency e x i t  hatch, usable only on the  ground bacause i t  
leads t o  the  closed wheel w e l l  when on-orbit,  i s  located opposite the docking 
port. Accessibi l i ty  t o  t h e  crew/passenger compartment is provided v i a  a hatch 
at  the  a i r lock  t o  crew/paseenger compartment interface.  The crew/paeeenger 
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EMERGENCY / 
EX1 T (GROUND) / 
PASSENGERS 
Figure 4.2-1. Baseline Or3iter Configuration 
compartment is a s i n g l e  pressure 
crew and a passenger compartment 
access between the compartments. 
volume but  is  separated,  a rea  w i s e ,  i n t o  a 
by a f loor ,  i n  which a door is f i t t e d  f o r  
Subsystems equipment is housed i n  under a 
second f l o o r  i n  the passenger compart&nt. ~ e c a u s e  t h i s  configuration is  
base l ine  f o r  the  current  s h u t t l e  s tud ies ,  i t  i s  given p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis i n  
t h i s  task ,  and is used as a b a s i s  from which s i x  o ther  se lec ted  candidate con- 
f igura t ion  concepts a r e  developed. 
The se lec ted  configurations a r e  based on the number of p r a c t i c a l  ways 
i n  which the following compartments can be arranged: 
1. Crew compartment 
2, Passenger compartment 
3. Airlock 
Compartments which a re  not inhabi table ,  such as  the cargo bay, a r e  not  
included. 
A s implif ied means was employed f o r  d,=picting the  o r b i t e r  compartmentation 
arrangements, an example of which is  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 4.2-2, together 
with the seven se lec ted  candidate configurations.  The basel ine o r b i t e r  con- 
f igura t ion  sketch is shown a t  the upper l e f t  corner of the f igure ,  The ~ q u l v a -  
l e n t  compartmentation schematic is  shown d i r e c t l y  opposite the sketch with the 
a? rlock iden t i f i ed  v i t h '  hatched l i n e s ,  
The locat ion of hatches,  doors and openings a r e  outputr of the analys is  
and therefore are not indicated i n  the  .candidate o r b i t e r  configurations,  . 
From the  schematic representat ions,  however, a hatch,  door, o r  opening may 
be located anywhere there  is a s o l i d  l i n e ,  
CANDIDATE COhFIGURATICNS 
I C I P  1 CREWIPAS SENGER COMPARTMEKT 
rq CREW COMPARTMEKT 
[ P I PASSENGER COMPARTMENT 
AIRLOCK 
Figure 4.2-2. Candidate Orbi ter  Configurations 
4.2.2 Orbiter Compartmentation Analysis 
4.2.2.1 Operational Options 
The operat ional  options ava i l ab le  f o r  a l l  emergency s i t u a t i o n s  are shown, 
together M t h  t h e i r  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  o r b i t e r  configurations,  i n  
Figures 4.2-3A through Figure 4.2-36, The s ing le  option, which is universal ly  
avai lab le  f o r  a l l  emergencies is  t o  "take t h e  risk". A program decis ion not  
t o  accept the sa fe ty  recommendations implies t h a t  the  r i s k  associated with 
the  emergency is being taken. 
Within the  operat ional  options avai lab le  t o  cope with a f i r e / t o x i c  environ- 
ment, the  requirement t o  extinguish the  i i r e ,  purge the  atmosphere, and re tu rn  
t o  the  af fec ted  compartment is fundame-tal. t o  a l l ,  as shown in Figure 4.2-3A. 
The underlying r a t i o n a l e  f o r  the  comnonal i t y  is t h a t  i n a b i l i t y  t o  extinguish 
the  f i r e  would be a catastrophe, and the  i r d i i i t y  t o  purge t h e  atmosphere 
and re turn  t o  the  af fec ted  compartment would r e s u l t  i n  l o s s  of t h e  mission. 
h l y  the  f i r e  i s o l a t a b l e  compartment option is compatible with t h e  s ing le  
compartment configurations. The f i r e  f s o l a t a b l e  compartment, as appl icable  
here, means t h a t  it is capable of i so la t ing  the  atmosphere within t h e  com- 
partment from the  smoke, Pumes, hea t ,  o r  otherwise tox ic  enviroment  generated 
within t h e  af fec ted  compartment. The primary means f o r  accomplishing t h i s  
i s o l a t i o n  is envisioned t o  be through crea t ion  of a small pos i t ive  d e l t a  
pressure i n  the  i s o l a t a b l a  compartment r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  af fec ted  compartment 
TO PRESSURE ISOLATAELE EXTINGUISH FIRE 6 
PLWE ATMOSPHERE 
- 
B. -Y6& ISOUTABLE 1 q EXTINGUISH FIRE 6 
COMPARTMENT* PURGE ATMOSPHERE RETURN 
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COMPATIBLE 
CONFIGURATIONS 
X X X X X  
X X X X X X X  
* ISOLATES ATMOSPHERE, BUT NO SIGNIFICANT AP CAPABILITY 
Figure 4.2-3A. Options - FireIToxic Environmant 
which could be produced by a s l i g h t  venting t o  space capabi l i ty  of the  
affected compartment. Two areas  which a f f e c t  venting capab i l i ty  a r e  of major 
concern, however, with t h i s  approach. These a r e  the capab i l i ty  t o  d i s s i p a t e  
the generated heat  of a f i r e ,  and the  prevention of excessive pressures due 
t o  t h i s  heat. An examination, documented i n  Appendix A, i n t o  the heat  and 
pressure produced by a f;.re within a given volume disclosed t h a t  these para- 
meters a r e  f a r  beyond p r a c t i c a l  s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t s  i f  a l l  the  oxygen i n  a given 
mixed atmosphere volume, approximating t h a t  of a s o r t i e  module, is  used t o  
support combustion of an unlimited quant i ty  of combustible material .  The 
amount of combustible mater ia l s ,  i n  terms of  t o t a l  Btu's, within a pressurized 
volume should, therefore,  be control led within predetermined acceptable limits. 
An explosion has but one option as indicated i n  Figure 4.2-3B, f o r  the  
s i n g l e  compartment configuration; t o  rescue the in jured ,  dea l  with o ther  
e f f e c t s  which can be any of the other  c redib le  emergencies, and t o  abort .  
With two compartment configurations,  the  in jured  can be evacuated t o  the 
second compartment, a ~ d  a decision made as t o  whether t o  re turn  o r  abort .  
COMPATIBLE . 
CONFIGURATIONS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
EXPLOS TON 
EMERGENCY EVACUATION 
I 1 
X X X X X  
A. -. - 
X X X X X X X  
TO PRESSURE ISOLATAELE 
-ARTMEN? X X X X X  
Pigure 4.2-3B. Options - Explosion and Emergency Evacuation 
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Emergency evacuation t o  a pressure i s o l a t a b l e  compartment is required 
t o  cope with s i t u a t i o n s  which may require  evacuation of a compartment i n  
order  t o  safeguard personnel from ' r i sks  of an impending emergency. This 
option i e  not compatible with t h e  s ing le  compartment configurations,  there- 
fore ,  the r i s k  of t h i s  emergency occurring must be taken f o r  these configura- 
t ions.  
The options avai lab le  t o  cope with loss  of pressure a re  many and complex, 
as can be seen from Figure 4.2-3C. A l l  options,  however, employ one o r  more 
of the  same bas ic  parameters; s u i t s  f o r  crew, s u i t s  f o r  crew and passengers, 
passenger abor t  i n  crew compartment, o r  passenger abort  i n  passenger compart- 
menc. Suf f i c i en t  time i s  avai lable  (2-8 minutes) t o  evacuate the depressurized 
compartment, and seek refuge i n  an adjoining compartment i n  a s h i r t s l e e v e  
environment. It is a l s o  assumed t h a t .  the crew i n  a l l  cases m u s t  u l t imately 
r e tu rn  t o  the crew compartment t o  e f f e c t  an abort .  The. options a r e  segregated, 
f o r  each configuration, i n t o  those which a re  applicable t o  a depressurized 
crew compartment and those which apply t o  a depressurized passenger compart- 
ment. Configuration a i r locks  a r e  assumed t o  be 2-man a i r locks  and a r e  used 
only as an a i r lock  t o  t r ans fe r  the crew IVA from a pressurized passenger com- 
p a r t w n t  t o  a depressurized crew compartment. 
ALL INTO SUITS ABORT X X X X X X X  
-L ALL TO -.- C]- - 
PASS. INTO SUITS 
* PASSENGER ca4Pmm (PC) DBPRESSIRLIZED 
** CBgY CQ@- (CC) D E P E S S U U Z E D  
Figure 4.2-3C. Options - Loss of Pressure 
x x x x x  
X X X X X  
x x x x x  
X  
Space Division 
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With re fe rence  t o  Figure 4.2-3D, i n a b i l i t )  t o  c lo se  an e x t e r n a l  hatch 
upon r e t u r n  from EVA is assumed t o  be assoc ia ted  only  with two compartment 
o r b i t e r  conf igurat ions  o r  a s i n g l e  compartment conf igurat ion with  an a i r l ock .  
The premise f o r  t h i s  assumption i e  t h a t  t h i s  emergency can only occur dur ing 
I planned EVA and t h a t  i t  is no t  reasonable from a s a f e t y  po in t  of view t o  
plan EVA from a s i n g l e  compartuent o r b i t e r  conf igurat ion which would r equ i r e  
a l l  personnel  t o  don s u i t s .  It is  assumed t h a t ,  f o r  a s i n g l e  compartment 
o r b i t e r ,  a  por tab le  a i r l o c k  would be  c a r r i e d  i n  the  cargo bay f o r  missions 
i n  which EVA was planned. Planned EVA from the  v i a b l e  conf igurat ions  can 
be performed e i t h e r  from an a i r l o c k  o r  from the  crew o r  passenger compart- 
ments. However, f o r  those conf igura t ions  which have an a i r l o c k ,  planned 
EVA i s  assumed t o  o r i g i n a t e  from the  a i r l ock .  Two fundamental opt ions  a r e  
ava i l ab l e  t o  cope with  the  f a i l u r e  t o  c lose  the  EVA hatch.  One opt ion is  
t o  c lose  redundant a i r l o c k  hatches  which a r e  i n  s e r i e s ,  and the  o the r  i s  t o  
re-enter  t h e  veh ic l e  v i a  an a l t e r n a t e  compartment. While use of redundant 
hatches does n o t  l ead  t o  a requirement. f o r  " s u i t s  f o r  a l l"  f o r  any configura- 
t i o n ,  re-entry i n t o  the  veh ic l e  v i a  an alternate compartment does r equ l r e  " s u i t s  
f o r  a l l "  f o r  t he  "s ing le  compartment with a i r lock"  and "dual compartment" 
conf igurat ions .  For the  conf igura t ion  i n  which the  crew and passenger com- 
partments a r e  separa ted  by an a i r l o c k ,  a  unique s i t u a t i o n  is  presented i n  
t h a t  dur ing W A  t he  a i r l o c k ,  the  crew and passenger compartments a r e  i s o l a t e d  
from one another. A hatch f a i l u r e  at  t h i s  t i m e  would r equ i r e  en t ry  i n t o  
e i t h e r  the  passenger o r  crew compartments, each of which is adjacent  t o  the  
a i r l ock .  I f  a l l  passengers a r e  required t o  be i n  t he  passenger compartment 
dur ing EVA, then t h e  most v i a b l e  op t ion  is t o  e n t e r  v i a  the  crew compartment. 
This op t ion  requi res  only s u i t s  f o r  t h e  two crewmen. 
C W A T  IBLE 
CONFIGURATIONS 
i 
A. . CLOSE REDUNMBI AI- COWTIWUll X X X X  X  X  
COMPT. HATCH (I1 SERIES) MISSION 
DEPRESSURIZE COHTINW 
ADJACENT CUMPT MISSION 
A t L  I N ,  DEPRESS. . . 
SUITS ; PC 
x 
r 
, & I N r  , DEPRESS , - R€PUSS 
SUITS - CC 
- 
cc ONLY 
* No PLANNED EVA FOR SINGLE CREW/PASSENGER COPIPARTMENT 
** PASSENGERS STAY SUITED IN PASS. COWT, OR SHIRTSLEEVE IN CREW COMPT. 
A SEE TE31T 
Figure 4.2-3D. Optione - F a i l u r e  t o  Close External Airlock Hatch When 
Returning From EVA (Resulting i n  inability t o  Returzi Prom EVA) 
@A! Space Diviskm North American R&well 
Complex oprions a re  not  iden t i f i ed  where simple so lu t ions ,  inherent ly  
avai lab le  i n  the  configuration, are avai lable .  For example, the "all  i n  
suits" cpt ion is  not shown as being compatible with the  two compartment with 
a i r lock  configurations f o r  "EVA v i a  airlock" because a simplez solutiot* , 
requir ing depressurizat ion of an adjacent compartment, is avai lab le  which 
does not require  s u i t s .  
I n a b i l i t y  t o  open an i n t e r n a l  EVA hatch (reference Figure 4.2-33) t o  
gain ent ry  i n t o  the vehicle a f t e r  EVA Ls an emergency which i s  not  appl icable  
t o  the  s i n g l e  compartment configuration f o r  the same reasons as previously 
d i s c u s e d  f o r  the i n a b i l i t y  t o  open an externa l  EVA hatch. I n  t h i s  einergency, 
the crewmen returning from EVA has the capabi l i ty  t o  en te r  the a i r lock ,  c lose 
the ex te rna l  EVA hatch,  and pressurize the a i r lock  t o  enable coping with the  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  a s h i r t s l e e v e  environment via  a redundant opening mechanism, o r  
by use of a second ingress/egress  hathc i n  the a i r lock  compartment. A th i rd  
opt ion,  ava i lab le  only t o  two compartments with a i r lock  configurations,  re- 
qui res  e v a c u a t i o ~  of one of the two compartments t o  enable ent ry  by EVA i n t o  
the evacuated compartment. 
* NO PLANNED EVA 
A SEE TEXT 
x x x x x x  
Space Division 
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Many dockings wi th  manned and unmanned o r b i t a l  elements a r e  planned 
f o r  the  o r b i t e r .  These dockings can presen t  a unique s a f e t y  s i t u a t i o n  i f  
t he  docking hatch on t h e  o r b i t e r  cannot be closed t o  permit  undocking and 
sepa ra t ion  from the  docked veh ic le .  The op t ions  developed t o  cope with  
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  ( reference Figure 4.2-3F) consider t h a t  the  docking p o r t  
wi th  docking hatch can. be loca ted  on the  a i r l o c k ,  crew compartment, passenger 
compartment, o r  t he  i n t e g r a l  crewlpassenger compartnent. Only one opt ion,  
t o  provide a redundant docking hatch i n  s e r i e s ,  is  compatible wi th  a l l  o r b i t e r  
conf igurat ions .  Thie op t ion  i e  a l s a  t he  only -1 t e rna t ive  which provides f o r  
cont inuat ion of the  mission f o r  a l l  configurucions. A docking por t lha tch  on 
the  a i r l o c k  a l s o  enables cont inuat ion of the  s i s s i o n  f o r  a l l  a i r l o c k  con- 
f i gu ra t ions  except the  conf igurat ion i n  which the  passenger and crew compart- 
ments are separated by the  a i r l ock .  Mission abo r t  would be  required f o r  
t h i s  conf igurat ion because the  de-pressurized a i r l o c k  would sepa ra t e  t he  
crew and passenger compartments. Placement of t h e  docking por t lha tch  on an 
a i r l o c k  o r  on the  passenger compartment are the  only options ava i l ab l e  which 
permit  coping with  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i n  a s h i r t s l e e v e  environment, and as such 
do no t  in t roduce a requirement f o r  s u i t s  f o r  crew o r  passengers. 
COMPATIBLE 
CONFIGURATIONS 
-- 
.--- CLOSE REDUNDANT DOCKING ,_ 
HATCH (IN SERIES) 
- - 
(DOCKING HATCH ALL TO cc ~ R E S S  - PC I-- ---I ABORT 1 
-. . . .  - 
DEPRESS PC ABORT 
X X X X X X X  
X X X X X  
X X X X X  
Figure 4.2-3F. Options - F a i l u r e  t o  Close Docxlng Hatch Before Undockinn 
I (Resulting In  I n a b i l i t y  t o  ~ n d o c k )  
Spece D M s h  
North American Rockwdl 
Emergency EVA may be required t o  perform a v i sua l  inspection of ex terna l  
s t ruc tures  , subsys tern, o r  equipment, , o r  otherwise t o  ascer ta in  and/or e f f e c t  
the b e s t  course of correct ive act ion avai lab le  t o  cope with c e r t a i n  emergency 
s i tua t ions .  
An example of such an emergency s i t u a t i o n  would be where a module, 
docked t o  an a i r lock  equipped with an EVA ingress/egress  hatch on the  
docking por t ,  cannot be undocked and i s  blocking EVA egress f o r  inves t iga t ion  
and correc t ive  action. 
The options avai lable  t o  cope with the s i t u a t i o n  of i n a b i l i t y  t o  open 
an EVA hatcb when emergency EVA is  required a r e  shown i n  Figure 4.2-36 
and encompass a l t e rna t ives  of s u i t s  f o r  a l l ,  a backup EVA hatch i n  the  com- 
partment used f o r  EVA, o r  use of one of two compartwnts as a backup EVA 
a i r lock  i n  two compartment/airlock configurations,  
COMPATIBLE 
CONFIGURATIONS 
A ... USE BACKLP EVA HATCH TN 
COMPT. USED FOR EVA 
- - - - .. - - . - - - - - .----- 
X X X X X X X  
X X X X  
Figure 4.2-3G. Optione - h a b i l i t y  t o  Use Docking Hatch f r  r EVA When EVA 
Required (Because of Obetruction, Wheu bergency  EVA Required) 
The baeic requirement, however, or ig ina t ing  f r a u  t h i s  emergency, and 
inherent i n  a11 option. is that two EVA i n g r e s a l e g r e s ~  path. are required. 
Space Division 
North American Rockwell 
4 . 2 , 2 . 2  Major Eafety Requirements 
The multitude of options ava i l ab l r  t o  cope with each emergency l r a d  t o  
d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  of requirements f o r  each compatible o r b i t e r  configuration, 
These requirements a re  idenr i f i ed ,  cor re la ted  t o  the or ig ina t ing  emergency, 
and grouped i n  accordance with t h e i r  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  each o rb i  t a r  conf igura- 
t ion ,  A log ica l  reduction of the  groupad requirements is made t o  a r r i v e  at  
a recornmended minimum acceptable set  f o r  the configuration. This process 
is  i l l u s t r a t e d  and documented i n  Figures 4.2-46 through 4.2-40. 
Hatch requirements a r e  an Important consideration but a r e  not major 
configuration dr ivers  and, thkrefore,  a l l  hatch requirements r e l a t i v e  t o  the 
parameters of locat ion,  dual opening (hatch within a hatch) o r  dual closing 
(back t o  back) are consolidated under ' the  column t i t l e d  "Hatch Requirements". 
Reference is made t o  the  previous options sec t ion  f o r  de ta i l ed  hatch require- 
ments. 
These charts  contain s u f f i c i e n t  information t o  aecer ta in  tha  impact 
on vehicle  configuration of the  elimination of one o r  more requirement 
options* If ,  f o r  example, e igh t  p s i  s u i t s  were elimicated ae a v iable  
requirement option on the  two compartment with a i r lock  o r b i t e r  configura- 
t ions  due t o  a programmatic decis ion,  the' remaininq v iable  alternatives 
could readi ly  be determined, as shown by Figure 4.2-4E. The remaining 
v iab le  a l t e rna t ives  encompass s u i t s  f o r  a l l ,  capzbi l i ty  t o  perform an abort  
i n  a vacuum environment, passenger abort  i n  s u i t s ,  and paesenger abor t  i n  
the crew compartment. The v iable  requirement ne ts  r e s u l t i n g  a r e  s u i t s  f o r  
a l l  (3.5 ps i )  with passenger abort  i n  s u i t s ,  ar sh i r t s l eeve  paesenger abort  
in t h e  crew compartment. The capabi l i ty  t o , i  t f o d  an abort  i n  a vacuum is 
common to  both s e t s  of requirements, From t h e  
l a t t e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n  which the passengers a r e  
environment is preferred.  , 
: 
A summary of the recommended requirements 
sa fe ty  point  of viev the 
aborted i n  a sh i r t s l eeve  
f o r  a l l  eeven candidate 
o r b i t e r  configuratiolu is rhown i n  f igure  4.2-5. Only one configuration, 
the  two compartment with an a i r lock  i n  betwe?n, is i d e n t i f i e d  as n o t '  accept- 
ab le  because a problem i n  the a l r lock  can i s o i n t e  .the passengers f rom the . 
crew compartment. 
. . . * I  . 
. . . . .  . , .  
Five options were iden t i f i ed  f o r  comparing the  conkigurations t o  
a r r i v e  a t  r e l a t i v e  sa fe ty  ra t ings .  These r e l a t e  t o  the  number and type of 
s u i t s ;  whether IVA o r  EVA is required t o  e f f e c t  t r ans fe r  of personnel t o  the 
crew compartmexit i n  the event of an emergency; and whether a refuge cmpar t -  
ment i s  avai lable .  These f i v e  options axe: 
C u r 8 m q /  
?a1 lura  
Pi ra /Toxi c Environnnt 
Explosion 
Lomm of Preaeura 
Pai l  t o  Clorr External 
EVA Hatch 
Fa i l  t o  Open Intarnal  
EVA Hatch 
Fai l  t o  Clwe  Dockin8 
Hatch for  Undockinl 
Inab i l i ty  to  Uma Dockina 
Hatch for  EVA vhan EVA 
, Required 
X - &quiromnt 
Radundant Opaninl, C l o e i n ~ ;  Location 
Figure 
I LO.. of Pr..Ur. 
?dl t o  Open Inc.rna1 
EVA Match 
m i l  t o  C l ~ a  Dockin6 
Hatch for  Undoekint 
I Ineb i l i ty  t o  U8. Dockina 
I Math  f o r  EVA ICI 2% Required 
ICCOIQ3(DtD 1-- --- - - - ,  
X - Ra~.quir.unt 
X I X  X 
Major Safety Requiremento, Crew/Passenger Compartment 
w&t q.aisl, Cloring; Location 
Figure 4.2-4B. Major Safety EL.quin#nm, C m / P u v r r  Capartmeat 
With Mrbck Only 
Ewrgrncy / 
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I - .  - -  Fin/Toxi c Enr ! ;onma t Explwion 
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EVA HItch 
Pail to Open fntrrnrl 
EVA Watch 
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I 
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Figure 4.2-4C. Major Safety Requiremente, Separate Crew 8nd Parrenger Compartments 
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EVA Urtch 
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~ l g u r e  4.2-4D. UJor Safety Requirrwntu, Seprrate Crew, P u r q e r  and 
Alrlock Conpartarntr 
\ Eva-to t o  
1 Mjount Cowartant 
1 Or CONIICURATION 
Fall to Clooe Docking 
Match for Ihdoeklng 
I d l l l g  to ma Docking 
Hat& for EVA EVA 
Figure 4.243. Effect of Elimining 8 p s i  S u i t s  
(Pef erence Figure 4.2433) 
Figure 4.2-5. W r y  of Bsco~ended Requirements 
@A! Space Division North American Rockwell 
Transfer Mode 
Pressure S u i t s  t o  Crew Refuge Compartment 
Option Quant i ty 2YJS Compartment Avai-lab l e  
A l l  8 p s i  N/A 
2 8 " 
I1 
' N/A 
A l l  3.5 
I I 
IVA 
2 3.5 
8 I 
IVA 
2 3.5 EVA 
. No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
A comparison of the configurations,  using these options,  as primary parameters, 
is shown i n  Figure 4.2-6. An addi t ional  parameter, t ha t  of reac t ion  time, 
is introduced t o  s ign i fy  the amount of t i m e  ava i lab le  t o  react t o  the  cred- 
i b l e  emergencies. Seven (7) minutes 'corresponds t o  the  time required f o r  
obtaining access t o  and donning 8 p s i  s u i t s .  Two (2) d n u t e s  is t h a t  t i m e  
required f o r  personnel t o  evacuate, i n  .a s h i r t s l e e v e  environment, an af fec ted  
compartment and seek refuge i n  the adjoining compartment. 
The s a f e t y  r a t ings  as l i s t e d  are based on the reac t ion  t i m e  and avai l -  
a b i l i t y  of a rescue compartment. Options which r e s u l t  i n  minimum reac t ion  
time and exh ib i t  a rescue compartment are most favorable. The acceptable,  
good, and bes t  r a t ings  apply t o  the  combination of a p a r t i c u l a r  configuration 
and the  number and t e of reqgure q u i t s  ca r r i ed  ~ n k b o ~ r d ,  The ra t ings  
are tased' on the r e s u i  .ingj7 ca*abi l i t ies -  of ' t he  bonf igurat ion7sui t  combina- 
t ions ,  as follows: 
T 
Safety Factor 
Reaction Refuge Safety 
Time Compartment Ratinpl 
7 mins No Acceptable 
7 mins Yes Good 
2 mins Yes Best 
The acceptable and good ra t ingc .  a r e  appl icable  t o  Options A and B and 
a r e  distinguished by the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of a refuge compartment. Configurations 
f o r  which the acceptable r a t ing  appl ies  ( therefore,  Configurations 1 and 2 - 
Option A) do not have a refuge volume and, therefore,  requi re  a minimum of 7 
minutes of react ion t i m e  f o r  a11 personnel t o  loca te  and don 8 p s i  su i te .  I f ,  
however, a refuge volume is avai lab le  a s  is required by Option B, passengers 
may egress  to  i t  and be afforded a sa fe  haven within 2 minutes. Therefore, 
s ince  an addi t ional  margin of sa fe ty  i s  provided by Option B over Option A, 
Option B is given a "good" rat ing.  
- 
PRESS1 
QTY. 
- 
ALL 
- 
ALL 
- 
2 
ALL 
- 
2 
- 
2 
ALL 
2 
- 
2 
ALL 
2 
- 
2 
:E SUITS I SAFETY Fb 
TYPE REACTION TIME* 
L 
REFUGE COMPT . RATING 
ACCE PTABU 
8 PSI 1 7 MlNS ACCE KABLE 
8 PSI 1 7MlNS YES GOOD 
3.5 R I  2 MlNS YES 
YES, IF ACCESSIBLE 
YES 
POOR ** 3.5 R I  1 2 MlNS 
8 .I 1 7 MINS 
3.5 PSI 2 MINS 
7 MINS 
YES 
YES 
YES 
BE ST 
BEST 
GOOD 
3*5 I 2 MINS YES 
YES 3.5 PSI 2 MlNS 
3.5 PSI 2 MlNS YES I BEST I I I I 
AFETY: 7 MlNS TO DON SUITS; 2 MlNS TO EGRESS TO REFUGE COMPT I * REACTION TIME TO ACHIEVE ' 
Figure 4.2-6. Comparison of Cmf; +ration% rl?' 
Only one configuration, that which was not previously recomended, is 
rated as poor. This configuration, in which the crew and passenger compart- 
ments are separated by an airlock, can resulr: in isolation of the crew and ' 
passenger compartments if an airlock problem is er.countered. 
4.2.3 Conclusions and Recommendations for Raselii:,e -.-. Orbiter Configuration 
The safety conclusions and recommendat ions for the baseline orbiter con- 
figuration (Figure 4.2-1) involve compartmentation, suit provisions, airlock 
sizing, EVA ingress/egress, and operational and s u b s y s t ~  capability. These 
are : 
a wick-donning pressure suits which do .lot require prebreathing 
(8 psi suits) should be provided for aP.1 on-board personnel. 
a!!!! Space Division North Amer~can Rockwell 
0 The crew/paasenger compartment should be divided into two sections 
by a partition which can exclude etooke and fumer, and can provide 
protectton agatnst excessive heat from a flre. Pressure build-up 
beyond the capability of the partition can be provided by suitable 
pressure relief valves in each section. These sections can provide 
temporary refuge until corrective measures can be taken. 
0 All equipment required for return to earth should be capable of 
operating in a depressurized environment, and of being operated by 
the crew in pressure suits. 
Capability should be provided for returning from EVA directly into 
the crew/passenger compartment. 
Provided the above recammendations are implemented, the airlock is not 
required for safety purposes. It should be available, poseibly as a 
payload item, or missions for which EVA is planned. 
, 
- .  
XI' tile airlock is capable of accommodating all passengers in 
emergency shirtsleeve conditions through deorbit and entry, then 
8 psi suits are required only for the orbiter crew on those missions. 
The passengers have time to return to their seats for landing after 
reaching low altitudes. 
4.2.4 - Configuration With Large Airlock 
The airlock requirements for performing EVA are that the airlock be sized 
to accommodate 2 men in pressure suits with portable life support systems 
(PLSS). Such an airlock is likely to be large enough to accommodate 4 and 
possibly 6 men in shirtsleeves. 
The airlock for the baseline orbiter vhich resulted from the Phase B study 
is even larger than this requirement. It is a sphere of 2.4 m (8 it) diameter, 
intercepted by the flat hatches. As shown in Figure 4.2-7, this airlock can 
accommodate at least eight men in hammock type of supports under emergency 
shirtsleeve conditions. Enough room is available for four more men, if 
desired, making a total of 12 men in the airlock. 
Such a large airlock can be used as a second compartmentin the event 
of an emergency. In addition to being sized for two crewmen with PLSS, it 
must be capable, in an emergency, of supporting all passengers in a shirtsleeve 
environment through deorbit and reentry. This may require in excess of six 
hours life support capability in the airlock for return to C O W S  (Continental 
U.S.A.) landing sites. The capability to land with the passengers in the 
airlock is not required because the passengers can return to the crew/passenger 
compartment to their respective (or makeshift) landing positions after the 
orbiter re-enters the sensible atmosphere and the cable is repressurized to a 
habitable environment. Passenger egress from the airlock could occur at 
approximately 4500 m (15,000 ft) altitude, 4 minutes prior to landing. Specially 
sized inward bleed valves on the crewlpaeeenger compartment are required to 
ensure an adequate repressurization rate. 
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Two pressure suits only are required in this case, for use by the crew- 
men. These must be quick-donning 8 psi suits, which do not require any pre- : 
breathing. The adrlock cannot be used for getting into the suits, as the air- 
lock hatch cannot be opened when shirtsleeve passengers are inside it and the 
atmosphere in the orbiter has been lost or contaminated. The two suits should 
therefore be kept in the crew/passenger compartment, not the airlock. 
It is estimated that the time required to done the suits is 7 minutes, or 
equivalent to the time available in a shirtsleeve environment to cope with 
pressure loss through a one-inch diameter hole. Additional reaction time can 
be gained by employing flood flow control, which replaces the atmosphere at 
approximately the same rate at which it is being lost, to maintain the atmos- 
phere at the minimum acceptable pressure level. 
An operacional option which is available with this configuration, but 
which is not recommended as the normal emergency procedure, is for all per- 
sonnel, including the two crewmen, to evacuate to the airlock. Flood flow 
control is then don their suits in the airlock. Flood flow control is then 
employed to repressurize the crew/passenger compartment, which may have been 
totally evacuated to space, to at least 8 psi. After equalizing the airlock 
pressure to that of the crewlpassenger compartment, the crew egresses and 
either repairs the leak or performs an abort. This option allows the crew a 
significantly greater amount of time to don their suits, but involves a time-- 
critical operation in opening and closing the hatch. It also permits rescue 
of all personnel by means of a rescue orbiter (if available) docked to the 
airlock, if the leak in the crewlpassenger compartment exceeds flood flow 
capability. Parametric charts involving flood flow capability are included 
in the appendix of this report. 
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For missions i n  which EVA is planned as p a r t  of the  normal A s s i o n ,  
pressure  s u i t s  must be c a r r i e d  f o r  a l l  t he  passengers,  as w e l l  as f o r  the  
two crewmen and the  EVA men. These are required i n  case  an a i r l o c k  malfunc- 
t i o n  does n o t  allow r e p r e s s u r i ~ a t i ~ o n  of the  a i r l o c k  (e.g., the  e x t e r n a l  hatch 
cannot be  sea led) .  The crew and passengers then don t h e i r  s u i t s ,  the  crew/ 
passenger compartment i s  then depressur ized,  and the  EVA men can en t e r .  These 
a d d i t i o n a l  s u i t s  may be much s impler  than EVA o r  IVA s u i t s ,  as no a c t i v i t i e s  
a r e  t o  be  performed i n  them. I f  t he  EVA men plan t o  red- l ine  t h e i r  oxygen 
supply t o  maintain a few hours reserves  by t h e  time they r e tu rn ,  these  addi- 
t i o n a l  s u i t s  can be 3.5 p s i  s u i t s  which r equ i r e  perhaps two hours of pre- 
breathing before  reducing t o  the  opera t ing  pressures .  Otherwise, they should 
be 8 p s i  s u i t s .  
A l t e rna t ive  Orb i t e r  Configuration 
An a l t e r n a t i v e  s a f e t y  approach f o r  the  o r b i t e r  is shown i n  Figure 4.2-8. 
This conf igura t ion  i s  similar t o  the  base l ine  wi th  t he  except ion t h a t  the  for-  
ward loca ted  a i r l o c k  is el iminated wi th  i t s  volume being absorbed i n t o  a 
s i n g l e  hab i t ab l e  compartment; and s p e c i a l  design requirements are imposed t o  
use the  f l o o r  of the  crew compartment t o  d e a l  wi th  a f i r e  o r  atmospheric con- 
tamination. 
/ 
8 P S I  SUITS FOR CREW A I  RLOCK, IF REQUIRED BY PAYLOAD 
AND PASSENGERS 
Figure 4.2-8. Alternative Safety Approach for Orbiter 
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The recommended approach f o r  coping with  a f i r e l t o x i c  environment f o r  
t h i s  conf igura t ion  is considerably d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  recommended f o r  the  
pre fe r red  conf igurat ion.  I n  o rder  t o  i s o l a t e  the c rw/passengers  from a 
f i r e l t o x i c  environment i n  the  passenger a r ea ,  a l l  perscnnel  m u s t  eg re s s  t o  
the  crew area where they are afforded p r o t e c t i o n  by smoke-tight f l o o r s  and 
doors, and a s l i g h t l y  g r e a t e r  p ressure  i n  the  crew a rea  wi th  respec t  t o  the 
passenger a rea .  S u f f i c i e n t  vent ing must be  provided i n  the  passenger a r e a  
t o  limit excess temperatures and pressures  wi thin  t o l e r a b l e  bounds. 
I n  t he  event of a f i r e l t o x i c  environment i n  t he  crew area, the  procedure 
I s  t o  evacuate t o  the  passenger a rea ,  wi th  t h e  pressure  being adjusted t o  
prevent smoke, e t c .  en t e r ing  the  passenger compartment. Fi re-f ight ing and 
purging provis ions  a r e  required i n  both areas, as f o r  t he  base l ine  configur- 
a t ion .  
The equipment required f o r  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  must be  capable of operat ing 
and being operated i n  a depressurized condi t ion,  a s  f o r  t h e  base l ine  configur- 
a t ion .  
Pressurs  s u i t s  (8 p s i )  m u s t  be c a r r i e d  fo r  a l l  on-board personnel  f o r  
a l l  missions. Loss of p re s su r i za t ion  wi th in  the  compartment requi res  311 
personnel  t o  don t h e i r  s u i t s ,  which takes  approximately 7 minutes, the  men 
helping each o the r  i n  p a i r s  t o  don s u i t s .  Other recommendations r e l a t i v e  t o  
l o s s  of p ressure  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  t o  those previously discussed f o r  t he  pre fe r red  
conf igurat ion.  
A po r t ab l e  a i r l o c k  can be loca ted  i n  t he  cargo bay f o r  those  missions i n  
which EVA is  a planned a c t i v i t y .  Since s u i t s  a r e  provided f o r  a l l ,  however, 
emergency EVA can s t i l l  be performed from the  crew/passenger compartment. 
A redundant EVA hatch is recommended, as i n  t he  p re fe r r ed  conf igurat ion.  
4.2.6 I d e a l  Orb i t e r  Configuration 
An i d e a l  s a f e t y  conf igurat ion is one i n  which s a f e t y  is inheren t  i n  the  
conf igurat ion,  no t  through subsystems o r  time-consuming complicated procedures 
which may i n t e g r a l l y  involve personnel.  The foremost ob jec t ives  of such a 
conf igura t ion  a r e  (1) t o  de-sens i t i ze  the  veh ic l e  from the  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  
of c r e d i b l e  emergencies, (2) t o  de-sens i t i ze  the  veh ic l e  from a r b i t r a r y  c r i -  
t e r i a ,  such as vent valve s i z i n g ,  fac tored  i n t o  subsystems design r e s u l t i n g  
from a t h e o r e t i c a l  ana lys i s  of t h e  c r e d i b l e  emergencies, (3) t o  minimize the  
t i m e  required t o  safeguard personnel,  and (4) t o  maximize the  time a v a i l a b l e  
to  perform c o r r e c t i v e  ac t ion .  
One conf igura t ion  which i d e a l l y  s a t i e f  ies thelre ob jac t iveo  relative t o  
the  c r e d i b l e  emergencies and e f f e c t s  considered i n  t h i s  t m k ,  is*rhown i n  
Figure 4.2-9. The conf igura t ion  cons i s t8  of a crew campattrnent, a paaaenger 
compartment, a two-man a i r l o c k ,  a docking p o r t ,  t h r e e  i n t e r n a l  hatches ,  and 
th ree  e x t e r n a l  hatches,  one of which i e  a docking p o r t  hatch.  Two 3.5 p s i  
s u i t s  are provided f o r  t h e  two crewaen. Requirement6 inc lude  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  
abor t  wi th  t h e  passenger i n  t h e  craw compartment, c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  abo r t  
equipment t o  opera te  i n  a vacuum, and c a p a b i l i t y  abo r t  c o n t r o l s  t o  be 
operatable  by men i n  p r e e m r e  s u i t a .  
CREW 
COMPA 
WAlEVA A I  RLOCK 
Figure 4.2-9.  Idea l  Orbi ter  Safety Configuration 
In the event of loss  of pressurizat ion i n  the crew compartment, a l l  
personnel would seek refuge v i a  the hatchlopening between the compartments, 
i n  the passenger compartment. The two crewmen would then don 3.5 p s i  s u i t s  
and re turn ,  v ia  IVA through the a i r lock ,  to  the crew compartment t o  e f f e c t  a 
r epa i r  o r  otherwiee perform an abort .  Conversely, los s  of pressure i n  the 
passenger compartment would require  a l l  personnel t o  egress  t o  the crew com- 
partment and abort  i n  t h i s  compartment i f  r epa i r s ,  v i a  IVA, could not be per- 
formed t o  r e s t o r e  a habi tab le  environmelit . 
The a i r lock ,  i n  addi t ion t o  providing IVA capabi l i ty  between these 
compartments, permits emergency EVA t o  be accomplished while a vehicle  is  
docked t o  the docking port  on the passenger compartment. This emergency EVA 
' 
capabi l i ty  would a l so  be provided with no change i n  the capabi l i ty  of the 
configuration i f  the  docking por t  and the emergency EVA hatch were interchanged. 
Emergency controls ,  including those f o r  extinguishing a f i r e  and f o r  venting 
to  space and re-establishing a habi table  environment i n  e i t h e r  compartment, 
are located i n  the air lock.  
An emergency i n  the crew compartment which i n h i b i t s  re turn  t o  the  com- 
partment o r  which r e s u l t s  i n  inoperat ive abor t  equipment o r  controls  would 
require  abandonment of the  vehicle  v i a  a rescue vehicle. The rescue vehicle 
must be capable of rescuing a l l  personnel, o r  l i f e  sGpport, capable t o  eua- 
ta ining excess personnel u n t i l  the next rescue vehicle  is avai lab le ,  must be 
provided i n  the passenger compartment o r  delivered by the i n i t i a l  rescue 
vehicle. 
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4.3 SAFETY ANALYSIS OF SORTIE MODULE CONFIGURATIONS 
Evaluation of t he  s o r t i e  module conf igura t ions  i s  involved with  t he  
e f f e c t s  of the  s o r t i e  module conf igurat ion on o r b i t e r  personnel  and veh ic l e  
s a fe ty ,  and conversely with the  use of t he  o r b i t e r  as a refuge volume f o r  
s o r t i e  module personnel.  
The s o r t i e  module may be unmanned, such as a p a l l e t  type,  o r  may be 
pressur ized and hab i tab le .  A mission which employs a nonpressurizable,  un- 
manned s o r t i e  module r equ i r e s  t h a t  t he  o r b i t e r  provide the  l i f e  support ,  
l i v i n g  qua r t e r s ,  and experiment monitoring f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  experimenters, 
In such a mission,  the  s a f e t y  of t h e  experimenters is  s o l e l y  dependent on the  
o r b i t e r  i n t e r n a l  conf igura t ion ,  candidates  of which have been analyzed i n  t he  
previous sec t ion .  
Pressur ized,  manned s o r t i e  modules i n  which experimenters may spend a 
major i ty  of t h e i r  working, 1% i s u r e ,  and s leeping time must be capable of 
coping with t he  c r ed ib l e  emergencies of Section 4.1. 
In t h i s  respec t ,  t he  following a n a l y s i s  has been accomplished not  only 
t o  i d e n t i f y  and recommend primary s a f e t y  requirements f o r  t h e  s o r t i e  module, 
but  also t o  understand the  r e l a t i v e  s e n s i t i v i t y  of t h e  s o r t i e  module and 
o r b i t e r  conf igura t ions  and the  s h u t t l e  missior, ..: t h e  credible: emergencies 
and the  r e s u l t i n g  s a f e t y  requirements. 
4.3.1 Candidate S o r t i e  Module Configurations 
Among t h e  many mission c l a s s e s  planned f o r  the  s h u t t l e  are t h e  s o r t i e  
missions,  For these  missions,  t h e  o r b i t e r  w i l l  d e l i v e r  t o  o r b i t  a s o r t i e  
module which w i l l  house and support  s p e c i a l i s t s  f o r  experiments and observa- 
t ions  i n  c a r t h  o r b i t  f o r  from 7 t o  30 days. The s o r t i e  module o r  re-usable 
space lgbora tory  , i n  add i t i on  t o  providing the  necessary power supply,  
experiment racks ,  and observat ion p o r t s  f o r  experiments, w i l l  provide l i v i n g  
accomodations and l i f e  support  funct ions  which are i n  excess of o r b i t e r  
capab i l i t y  . 
Although the  s o r t i e  module may eventual ly  be  equipped wi th  systems t h a t  
would permit its sepa ra t ion  from t h e  o r b i t e r  f o r  independent opera t ions ,  
cur ren t  s t u d i e s  ( re fe rence  SOAR and *W) are constra ined t o  consider  onfy .
- 
missions i n  which t h e  s o r t i e  modtle w i l l  remain a t tached  t o  t he  o r b i t e r .  
This t a s k  considers  only manned s o r t i e  modules a t tached  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
Two b a s i c  s o r t i e  module concepts a r e  cu r r en t ly  under i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i n  
t he  *RAM s tudy, One concept considers  t h a t  a l l  experimenter. l i v i n g  accommoda- 
t i ons ,  l i f e  and subsystems support  ( i n  excess of o r b i t e r  capab i l i t y )  and 
experiment func t ions  w i l l  be contained wi th in  a s i n g l e  payload module. The 
a l t e r n a t e  concept p laces  a l l  experiment funct ions  i n  one module (RAM-Research 
Applications Module) and support  func t ions ,  such ae t h e  l i v i n g  accommodations , 
l i f e  and subsystems support ,  i n  an adjacent  a t t ached  module (RSM-RAM Support 
Module). The lat ter  concept assumes t h a t  the Support 'Module is a genera l  pur- 
pose module capable of support ing many d i f f e r e n t  kinds of  experiment modules. 
*Rerearch and Applicatione Module (RAM) Phaee B Study - Contract  NAS8-27539 
Theoe RAM o o r t i e  module concepts a r e  shown i n  Figure 4.3-1 together with 
the NR basel ine deployment concept. Airlock(6) a re  not shown but may be 
located anywhere they a r e  required, The s o r t i e  RAM o r  paplcad module may be 
unpresrurized o r  may be pressurized and habitable.  The RAM Support Module 
(RSM) is a presrurized, habi table  module and as shown i n  the f igure  the RSM 
and o o r t i e  RAM are provided with high preosurz gas s torage b o t t l e s  around the 
periphery of th.e end docking port  which in te r faces  with the o rb i t e r .  
SORTIE RAM 
" AIRtOCKS AS REQUIRED 
Figure 4.3-1. RAM Sor t i e  Module Concepts 
The o o r t i e  module configurations oelected f o r  evaluat iou are compatible 
with and encompree the RAM rtudy concepts. Six candidate configurations,  
shown i n  Figure 4.3-2, consider compartmentation arrugemento f o r  up to two 
presoure i s o l a t e a b l e  volumee, each of which is l a rge  eqough to  acccnmodate a11 
experimenters i n  the e w n t  of an emergency, and a twol.maa airlock. An r i r l o c k  
capable of rupporting a l l  e x p e r h s n t e r a  simultaneourly would be t rea ted  as 
addi t ional  volume. 
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Figure' 4.3-2,. Candidate S o r t i e  Module Configurations 
Numerous operational modes a r e  avai lab le ,  i n  addi t ion t o  the  NR 
baseline,  f o r  deploying the  s o r t i e  modules f o r  o r b i t a l  experiments, Three 
primary deployment options which include both the s i n g l e  and dual module . 
concepts and encompass the  base l ine  option (Ff gure 4.3-3)  were iden t i f i ed  , 
The f i r s t  option does not  require ,  f o r  normal experiment operations,  any 
deployment mechanism because the module remains i n  the  same posi t ion  i n  the  
cargo bay throughout the mission. Option 2 requires  a ro ta tab le  payload 
handling mechanism (MDAC payload handling concept) as compared t o  3, which 
employs a manipulator. The s o r t i e  module ou t l ine  on Option 3 indica tes  the 
posi t ion cf the s o r t i e  module when attached t o  the docking por t  of the  base- 
i i n e  configuration o rb i t e r .  
Several other  options were conceived which were not  considered ser ious ly  
because of configurational cha rac te r i s t i c s  which are deemed impractical .  
These a re  shown i n  Figure 4.3-4.  Option 1 requires  two wsdial docking 
ports ,  one attached near each end of the s o r t i e  module. Option 2 requires  
the use of both the ro ta tab le  and manipulator mechanisms. Options 3 and 4 
were given consideration i n  the  RAM study but were disqual i f ied  aa primary 
deployumt schemes. 
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4.3.2 Sor t i e  Module Compartmentation Analysis 
The candidate s o r t i e  module conf igwat ions  of Section 4.3.1 were evaluated 
f o r  t h e i r  capab i l i ty  t o  cope with se lec ted  credib le  emergencies of Table 4.1-1. 
The selected credib le  emergencies a r e  those which apply to  the s o r t i e  modules 
and can lead t o  compartmentation or iented requirements. They are:  
. F i r e l t o x i c  environment 
. Explosion 
. Emergency evacuation 
. Loss of pressure 
. Fai lure  t c  open i n t e r n a l  hatch between pressure i so la teab le  
volumes 
. Fai lure  t o  close ex te rna l  a i r lock  hatch when returning from EVA 
. Fai lure  t o  open i n t e r n a l  a i r lock  hatch when returning from EVA 
The analys is  methodology is similar t o  t h a t  employed f o r  the  o r b i t e r  i n  
Section 4.2 and involves es tabl i sh ing  major assumptions, developing operat ional  
options f o r  coping with the  credib le  emergencies, and evaluating the  opt ions t o  
a r r i v e  a t  recommended requirements. 
The major assumptions a r e  ider - t ica l  t o  t h a t  employed f o r  the o r b i t e r  
except f o r  the  following variances: 
. Airlock compartment f o r  EVA can be V 1 ,  V2, or  a i r lock  on 
s o r t i e  module 
. Achieving sa fe ty  v i a  EVA from the s o r t i e  modules t o  the  o r b i t e r  
is  considered a possible  option. This is  i n  contrast  t o  the 
o r b i t e r  assumptions where f o r  developing o r b i t e r  operat ional  
options,  i t  was assumed t h a t  sa fe ty  would not be achieved by 
performing EVA t o  t r a n s f e r  from one o r b i t e r  compartment t o  
another. 
4.3.2.1 Operational Options 
The operat ional  options avai lab le  t o  cope with the  a b w e  se lec ted  credib le  
emergencies a r e  shown f o r  each of the  candidate s o r t i e  module configurations,  
i n  Figures 4.3-5A through 4.3-5G. Again, as f o r  the o r b i t e r  ana lys is ,  an 
option which is universal ly  avai lab le  f o r  a l l  emergencies is t o  "take the 
risk". A program decision not  t o  accepc the s a f e t y  recommendations implies 
t h a t  the r i s k  associated with the  emergency is being taken. A second option 
which is  universal ly  avai lab le  f o r  a l l  s o r t i e  module emergencies is t o  use the 
o r b i t e r  f o r  refuge. 
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Three opt ions a r e  a t a i l a b l e  to  cope with a f i r e l t o x i c  e vironment, a s  
can be seen from Figure 4.3-5A; t o  seek refuge i n  a pressure i so la teab le  
s o r t i e  module compartment i n  a f i r e  i so la teab le  compartment o r  i n  the  o rb i t e r .  
Regardless of the  option se lec ted ,  the  requirement k ~ - s t s  t o  extinguish the  
f i r e .  Purging of t h e  atmosphere and re turn  t o  the affected compartment is 
necessary only i f  passengers a r e  required t o  abort  i n  the  af fec ted  compartment 
o r  i f  i t  is requireti t o  e f f e c t  cor rec t ive  ac t ion  which i f  not made could 
a f f e c t  personnel/vehicle sa fe ty  during an abort .  
COMPATIBLE 
CONFIGURATIONS 
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A primary concern, comon t o  a l l  options,  is  t h a t  of i s o l a t i n g  the  
o r b i t e r  from the  smoke, fumes, heat ,  o r  otherwise tox ic  environment generated 
within t h e  af fec ted  compartment of the  s o r t i e  module.' These e f f l u e n t s  can be 
introduced i n t o  the  habi tab le  volumes of the  o r b i t e r  v i a  open hatches to  
support the  escape of personnel, o r  v i a  o r b i t e r l s o r t i e  module atmosphere 
exchange loops. I 
The only option avai lab le  (reference Figure 4.3-5B) to  cope with an 
explosion f o r  s ing le  compartment configurations i s  t o  rescue the  injured 
personnel and evacuate a l l  t o  the o rb i t e r .  In  the  dual  compartment configura- 
t ions ,  the  addi t ional  option of eeeking refuge i n  the  second compartment is 
a v a l l a  ble  . 
t 
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An emergency evacnation, i n  which a t  least minutes of reac t ion  time is 
avai lab le ,  requi res  t h a t  the  a f f e c t  compartment be evacuated. Again, t h e  
only option ava i l ab le  as shown i n  Figure 4.3-SC, f o r  the  s ing le  compartment 
configuratione is f o r  personnel to  egress  t o  t h e  o rb i t e r .  Although egreee t o  
V2 is an option i f  Vl must be evacuated on the  dual  compartment configuratione,  
t h i s  option cannot be considered ser ious ly  because of the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
stranding perrionnel i n  V2 i f  the  emergency ant ic ipa ted  i n  V 1  does i n  f a c t  occur. 
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Figure 4.3-5A. Options - FireIToxic Environment 
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Figure 4.3-5B. Options-Explosion 
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Figure 4.3-5C. Options - Emergency Evacuation 
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Loss of p ressure  can occur i n  e i t h e r  V 1  o r  V2. The ope ra t iona l  op t ions  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  cope with t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  are shown i n  Figure 4.3-3D, and include 
abor t ing  the  passengers i n  t he  s o r t i e  module i n  s u i t s  wi thin  t h e  a f f e c t e d  
compartment, seeking re fuge  i n  a second compartment and then e i t h e r  performing 
EVA t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  or .  performing a s h i r t s l e e v e  abo r t  wi thin  t he  compartment 
o r  performing s h i r t s l e e v e  eg re s s  t o  t he  o r b i t e r .  
+ 
TO ORBITER ABORT 
, 
A 
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Figure 4.3-5D. Loss of Pressure 
ALL TO V2 
Failure t o  open an in te rna l  hatch during normal shi r ts leeve operetions 
r e su l t s  i n  i sola t ion of personnel in  the s o r t i e  module, and can lead to  a 
shi r ts leeve abort i n  the s o r t i e  module, s u i t s  fo r  a l l  with EVA t o  the  o rb i te r ,  
and redundant hatches o r  hatch opening mechanisms a s  shown in  Figure 4.3-5E. 
It is noted that  t h i s  s i tua t ion  can only occur i f  the  hatches between s o r t i e  
module volumes and between the s o r t i e  module and the o rb i te r  are closed a t  
same time during the mission. 
x 
.) 
ALL INTO 
SUITS 
The options available t o  cope with i nab i l i t y  to  close an in te rna l  EVA 
hatch upon return from EVA a re  many and complex a s  can be eeen from F i p r e  
4.3-5F. It is assumed tha t  EVA can be performed not only from the ai r lock 
but a l so  from V 1  and V2 when an a i r lock ie not available. If  an ai r lock is 
available,  then EVA is aesmed t o  be performed from the airlock. Options 
available t o  a l l  configurations are t o  abort with the EVA crewmen in the  EVA 
compartment o r  to cloee a redundant (in ser iee)  hatch. b i d e  from these 
conunon options, the 'primary factor. involved i n  the  other   option^ include pro- 
visions fo r  a backup EVA ingress route on the  o rb i te r ,  IVA t o  the o r b i t e r  o r  
to  another s o r t i e  module volume, s u i t s  f o r  dl, and sgre r r  of non-EVA pereatme1 
t o  the orbi ter .  
1 
- 8 ABORT . EVA TO 
ORBITER 
OPENING MECHANISN 
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Figure 4.3-5E. Options - F a i l  t o  Open In te rna l  Hatch 
(During Shir ts leeve Operations) 
Of p a r t i c u l a r  note i s  the  s e n s i t i v i t y  of continuing o r  aborting the  
mission to  the  s o r t i e  module configuration. A l l  options which requi re  EVA 
from e i t h e r  V 1  o r  V2 r e s u l t  i n  abort  with the  s ing le  exception of closing a 
redundant ( in  s e r i e s )  hatch. Loss of e i t h e r  one of these volumes not only 
r e s u l t s  i n  the l o s s  of tile volume t o  perform o r  support the  performance of 
experiments, but can a l so  r e s u l t  i n  i s o l a t i n g  the  adjacent s o r t i e  module 
volume and personnel i n  t h a t  volume from the  o r b i t e r ,  When EVA i s  performed 
from an a i r lock  adjacent to  the s o r t i e  module/orbiter in te r face  a s  .in 
Configurations 2 and 5, l o s s  of the a i r lock  r e s u l t s  i n  i s o l a t i o n  of the  
remaining s o r t i e  module volumes from the  o rb i t e r .  However, i f  the a i r lock  i s  
located a t  the end of the s o r t i e  module f u r t h e s t  from the %/orb i t e r  in te r -  
face,  l o s s  of the  a i r l o c k  does not i s o l a t e  s o r t i e  module compartments from 
the o r b i t e r  o r  from one another, and therefore,  enables continuation of the 
mission f q r  those experiments which do not require  use of the air lock.  
The f a c t o r s  associated with the options avai lab le  f o r  coping with in- 
a b i l i t y  to  open an i n t e r n a l  EVA hatch when returning from EVA are nearly 
iden t i ca l  t o  those discussed above f o r  i n a b i l i t y  t o  close externa l  EVA hatch 
a s  can be seen from Figure 4.3-56. A notable exception is, however, the  
addi t ion of an option which employs a backup EVA ingress  route  on the s o r t i e  
module. 
4.3.2.2 Major Safety.Requirements Options 
The operat ional  opt ions of the previous sec t ion  a r e  evaluated to  a r r i v e  
a t  major sa fe ty  requirements appl icable  f o r  each candidate s o r t i e  module 
configuration. 
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The requirements considered a s  major a r e  those which have the po ten t i a l  
of a f fec t ing  the s o r t i e  module configuration and those which involve a 
compartmentation or iented in te r face  with the o rb i t e r .  They a re t  
F i re  i s o l a t i o n  compartment 
Sui t s  f o r  a l l  
8 p s i  s u i t s  
Personnel abort  i n  a vacuum 
Personnel s h i r t s l e e v e  refuge/abort  i n  the s o r t i e  module 
Personnel s h i r t s l e e v e  refuge/abort  i n  the o r b i t e r  
EVA tolfrom the  o r b i t e r  
IVA to/from the o r b i t e r  
Hatch requirements - These include redundant opening and 
closing mechanisms, redundant hatches such as p a r a l l e l  o r  
back-to-back hatches, hatch locat ions,  and whether hatches 
are t o  be normally open o r  normally closed, 
The a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of these requirements as they r e l a t e  t o  each candidate 
s o r t i e  module configuration and credib le  emergency i s  shown i n  Figures 4.3-6A 
through 4.3-6F. 
An "x" under the  column of a requirement indica tes  t h a t  i t  is appl icable  
t o  the emergency t o  which i t  is  cross-referenced. A s e t  of requirements, a s  
is indicated by "x's" i n  the same row, are requirements which are dependent 
upon one another t~ s a t i s f y  a given operat ional  option f o r  a given emergency/ 
f a i lu re .  Multiple sets of requiremente, any set of which i r  r u f f i c i e n t  t o  
cope with the  emergency f a i l u r e  are iden t i f i ed  by brdckets. 
Reference t o  Figure 4.3-6A, f o r  example, shows t h a t  f o r  lor8 of prorsure 
of a s ing le  compartment s o r t i e  module; configuration 1, twc sets of require- 
ments a r e  applicable.  The f i r s t  set requires  t h a t  8 p e i  s u i t s  be provided 
f o r  a l l  s o r t i e  mo<*?le personnel and t h a t  the capab i l i ty  be provided t o  abort  
with the su i ted  pezsonnel i n  the  unpreeourized s o r t i e  module. The a l t e r n a t e  
requirement is f o r  a11 personnel t o  egress  to  the  o r b i t e r  and abort  with 
the personnel i n  a sh i r t s l eeve  environment i n  the  o r b i t e r ,  
The recommended requirements, shown a t  the bottom of t h e  f iguree ,  are 
the minimum requirements necessary t o  cope with a11 the credib le  emrrpnciee ,  
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Figure 4.3-6A. Major Safety Requirements - Configuration 1 
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A summary of the recommended requirements for all six candidate sortie 
module configurations is shown in Figure 4.3-7. As can be seen from an 
inspection af the chart, only four requirements are involved in the recommenda- 
tion. These are personnel shirtsleeve refuge/abort in the orbiter, personnel 
shirtsleeve refugelabort in the sortie module, EVA to and from the orbiter, 
and hatch requirements. Of these requirements, only one, the requirement for 
personnel shirtsleeve rescuelabort in the sortie module is - not common to all 
configurations. This is because it is peculiar to those configurations in 
which an airlotk or a compartment used as an airlock is located between the 
sortie module and the orbi'er. Emergencies involving internal or external 
hatches in these compartments during EVA result in isolating personnel in the 
sortie module and require the capability to abort with personnel in the sortie 
module. 
Sortie Module 
Configuration 
Conmon to  A l l  I 
Required for A l l  
X = Requirement 
* = Redundant Opening, Closing; Location 
** = Applies only i f  EVA i s  performed from Sortie Module 
*** = Only applies i f  EVA i s  performed or internal hatch is normally closed 
Figure 4.3-7. Summary of Recommended Requirements 
Also worthy of note is that the hatch requirem~nto which involve redundant 
opening, closing, and locations are applicable only if EVA is performed or 
internal hatches are normally closed. 
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The only requirement which is  common t o  a l l  candidate configurations and 
reconmended sets of requirements i s  t h a t  of personnel sh i r t s l eeve  refuge/abort  
i n  the  o rb i t e r .  The underlying ra t iona le  f o r  recommending t h i s  a l l  encompassing 
high l e v e l  requirement is  t h a t  regardless  of the s o r t i e  module configuration, 
e x i t  t o  and refuge i n  the  o r b i t e r  is  the  n a t u r a l  goal f o r  emergencies which do 
not  cu t  off the  normal egress  path t o  the  o rb i t e r .  
Because implementation of t h i s  requirement can s i g n i f i c a n t l y  reduce o r  
e l iminate  the imposition of other s ign i f i can t  requirements on the  s o r t i e  
modules, such as f i r e  i s o l a t i o n  compartment, s u i t s  f o r  a l l ,  8 p s i  s u i t s ,  and 
personnel abort  i n  a vacuum i n  the s o r t i e  module, addi t ional  a t t en t ion  is  
given i n  the next sec t ion  t o  ensuring a v a i l a b i l i t y  of an egress  path t o  the  
o r b i t e r ,  .and t o  cont ro l l ing  hazards which could cu t  off  the egress  path. 
4.3.3 Emergency Enress t o  Orbi ter  from Sor t i e  Module 
The analys is  of 4.3.2 shows t h a t  the. pos i t ion  of the  s o r t i e  module on the 
o r b i t e r ,  or  s ing le  o r  dual  s o r t i e  module configurations a r e  not  important 
f a c t o r s  i n  the  sa fe ty  evaluation. The most important configuration or iented 
sa fe ty  considerations a r e  ensuring an egress  path t o  the  o r b i t e r ,  and t h e  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and cont ro l  of hazards which could cut  off the  egress  path(s).  
Three bas ic  configuration concepts, shown i n  Figure 4.3-8, a r e  ava i l ab le  f o r  
providing emergency egress  t o  the  o r b i t e r  f o r  an emergency, such as a f i r e  o r  
explosion, which has blocked the normal egress  route. The f i r s t  concept 
employs an a i r l o c k  on the  f a r  end of the module. Egress t o  the  o r b i t e r  can 
e i t h e r  be by EVA through an EVA hatch on the a i r lock ,  o r  s h i r t s l e e v e  i f  a 
docking por t  were on the  a i r lock  and a manipulator were used to  undock the  
module, r o t a t e  i t  180 degrees, and redock it t o  the  o rb i t e r .  The second 
concept, which i s  similar t o  t h a t  employed on the  NR Modular Space Sta t ion  
modules, uses an i n t e r n a l  f l o o r  t o  divide the  module hor izonta l ly  i n t o  two 
bas ic  volumes. Access doors (or openings) are provided i n  the f l o o r  a t  each 
end of the  module with s u f f i c i e n t  clearance underneath the  f l o o r  t o  allow 
s h i r t s l e e v e  personnel t o  maneuver t o  the  e x i t  a t  the  o r b i t e r  i n t e r f a c e  and 
egress. 
AIRLOCK 
4 4  
IMERNAL 
FLOOR 
Figure 4.3-8. Emergercy Egrees From Sor t i e  Module 
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The t h i r d  concept, which requires  dual docking por ts  on both the o r b i t e r  
and s o r t i e  module (or equivalent schemes to  provide a closed arrangement), i~ 
the i d e a l  sa fe ty  configuration s ince i t  provides f o r  immediate sh i r t s l eeve  
egress  t o  the o r b i t e r  from e i t h e r  end of the  module. However, t h i s  i s  not  
considered p r a c t i c a l  because it is not  compatible with current o r b i t e r  con- 
cepts  which a r e  configured with, a t  most, ,one docking port .  
A f i r e l t o x i c  environment i n  the s o r t i e  module requires  a t  a minimum, a s  
i n  the s ing le  compartment o r b i t e r  configuration, the capab i l i ty  t o  vent the 
s o r t i e  module atmosphere t o  space t o  cont ro l  the  produced heat  and pressure 
within acceptable limits, and to  contain the  smoke, fumes and o ther  toxic  by- 
products of combustion t o  the  s o r t i e  module by crea t ing  a s l i g h t l y  lower 
pressure i n  the  s o r t i e  module r e l a t i v e  t o  the o r b i t e r  during egress  of the 
experimenters t o  t h e  o rb i t e r .  
An a l t e r n a t i v e  approach t o  the  pressure d i f f e r e n t i a l  scheme . i s  t o  provide 
an a i r lock  capable of holding a l l  experimenters simultaneously, between the  
o r b i t e r  and s o r t i e  module. To r i d  the  a i r lock  of the  toxic  e f f l u e n t s  which 
have followed the experimenters during t h e i r  escape, the a i r lock  would be 
e i t h e r  purged with a nitrogen/oxygen atmosphere, i n  which case s u i t s  m u l d  
not be required,  o r  vented t o  space, which requires  s u i t s  f o r  a l l  experimenters. 
The i d e a l  loca t ion  f o r  hazardous equipment, such as high pressure b o t t l e s  
and cryogenics s torage  vesse ls ,  is on the end of the  module which is fu r thes t  
from the o r b i t e r  in ter face .  Hazardous equipment placed a t  the  module-to- 
o r b i t e r  o r  module-to-module in te r face  could, i n  the  event of an accident,  cu t  
off  a l l  the egress  paths t o  the  o rb i t e r .  
An a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  cope with any emergency which jeopardizes the  sa fe ty  of 
the  o r b i t e r ,  once a l l  personnel are evacuated from the  s o r t i e  module, i s  t o  
r e l ease  o r  e j e c t  the  s o r t i e  module from the o rb i t e r .  
4.3.4 Consideration of Catastrophic Bnergencies 
Consideration of a ca tas t rophic  emergency i n  t h e ' s o r t i e  module such as 
l o s s  of pressurizat ion within a few seconds leads t o  consideration of means 
t o  prevent propogation of the emergency o r  its e f f e c t s  t o  the  o r b i t e r  and i ts  
crew. One method, proposed by General Dynamics f o r  the  RAM program i s  to keep 
a hatch between the  o r b i t e r  and s o r t i e  module i n  a n o n n ~ l l y  closed posi t ion.  
In pa r t i cu la r ,  the General Dynamics concept c a l l s  f o r  an o r b i t e r  a i r lock  
between the  o r b i t e r  and s o r t i e  module. During o r b i t a l  operations,  the  a i r lock  
hatch on the  o r b i t e r  s i d e  i s  normally closed while the  hatch adjacent t o  the  
s o r t i e  module is normally open. This concept is  intended t o  provide rapid 
egress ,  v i a  the  open a i r lock  hatch, of the  s o r t i e  module personnel t o  the  
a i r lock  i n  the  event of a non-catastropic emergency i n  the  s o r t i e  module o r  
conversely t o  i n h i b i t  Q r  otherwise provide an addi t ional  margin of pro tec t ion  
from, v i a  the  closed a i r lock  hatch, the  propogation of a catotrophic emergency 
t o  the  o rb i t e r .  
The a i r lock  a l s o  provides v i a  purging o r  venting, a means t o  expel t h e  
contaminated atmosphere which may have followed the  experimenter6 during t h e i r  
escape. 
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The following poin ts  must a l s o  be considered, however, a s  r e l a t ed  t o  the 
a i r lock  and the normally closed hatch arrangements. 
. The a i r lock  must be capable of supporting a l l  experimenters 
simultaneously. This is  required whether or  not  the  experi-  
menters are i n  sh i r t s l eeves  a s  they would be i f  a ni t rogen/  
oxygen atmosphere purging technique were used, o r  i f  i n  s u i t s  
ao would be the case i f  venting t o  space were employed t o  r i d  
the a i r lock  of a contaminated atmosphere. This requirement t o  
support a l l  personnel i n  the  a i r lock  is  i n  d i r e c t  c o n f l i c t  with 
a l l  known s h u t t l e  s tud ies  conducted t o  da te  which have considered 
only a two-man air lock.  
. The experimenters a r e  i so la ted  i n  the  s o r t i e  module during use of 
the  a i r lock  f o r  EVA. The s i t u a t i o n  is  fu r the r  aggravated i f  a 
problem occurs during EVA which i n h i b i t s  repressur iza t ion  of the  
a i r lock ,  o r  i f  an unplanned depressurizat ion of the  a i r lock  occurs. 
. The emergency " f a i l u r e  t o  open an i n t e r n a l  hatch" is credib le  only 
f o r  configurations i n  which hatches a r e  located such t h a t  f a i l u r e  
t o  open a closed hatch precludes sh i r t s l eeve  t r ans fe r  from one 
pressure i so la teab le  volume t o  another. The "normally closedtt 
hatch concept makes t h i s  emergency credib le  and leads t o  redundant 
hatch mechanisms, redundant p a r a l l e l  hatches, su i ted  operat ions o r  
t o  accept the  r i sk .  
. A normally closed hatch between the o r b i t e r  and s o r t i e  module 
decreased the  amount of time avai lab le  f o r  the experimenters t o  
seek refuge from a rapid,  but not necessar i ly  catastrophic,  de- 
pressur iza t ion  of the  s o r t i e  module. A n  example of the  typ ica l  
d i f ference  i n  reac t ion  time avai lab le  between having an o r b i t e r /  
s o r t i e  module hatch open and closed can be rea l i zed  by con- 
s ider ing  the  e f f e c t s  of a two-inch hole i n  the  s o r t i e  module. 
Assuming e volume of 42 m3 (1500 cu f t )  f o r  the sortie module and 
66 m3 (2360 cu f t )  f o r  the o r b i t e r ,  approximately one minute is 
ava i l ab le  f o r  a l l  experimenters t o  egress  t o  t h e  a i r lock  and c lose  
the  a i r l o c k / s o r t i e  module hatch when the  airl .ock/orbiter hatch is . 
normally closed. I f  t h i s  hatch were normally l e f t  open, exposing 
a t o t a l  o r b i t e r  plus  s o r t i e  module volume of 108 n3 (3860 cu f t )  
t o  be depressurized, the  avai lab le  reac t ion  time would be 
increased t o  approximately three  minutes. 
4.3.5 Conclusions and Recammendat ions 
Conclusions reached from the  ana lys i s  are: 
- .  
A s o r t i e  module coneieting of two separa te  preeeurized modules 
doe8 not  have aay s i g n i f i c a n t  s a f e t y  advanta~eo ccloared to a ringle 
module versioa. In both cases, the  o r b i t e r  is ava i l ab le  as a separa te  
refuge cmartment, 
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. No s a f e t y  requirement e x i s t s  f o r  an a i r l o c k  between a r o r t i e  
module and an o r b i t e r ,  provided i t  i e  acceptable  t o  abor t  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  mission i f  a deyreseur izat ion o r  contamination 
problem a r i s e s  i n  t h e  s o r t i e  iriodule. An a i r l o c k  between 
o r b i t e r  and s o r t i e  module could be u s e f u l  i n  providing IVA 
maintenance c a p a b i l i t y  i n  such an .event ,  but a l s o  poses the  
add i t i ona l  r i s k  of i s o l a t i n g  personnel i n  e i t h e r  veh ic l e  i f  
a similar problem arises i n  t h e  a i r lock .  
Recommendations made are as follows: 
The a i r l o c k ,  i f  provided, should be configured such t h a t  
i s o l a t i o n  of t h e  s o r t i e  module crew from t h e  o r b i t e r  does no t  
r e s u l t  during the  performance of EVA from t h e  a i r lock .  I f  
t h i s  is not  p r a c t i c a l ,  then the  emergency c a p a b i l i t y  t o  de- 
o r b i t  a l l  personnel i n  t he  s o r t i e  module o r  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  
should be provided, o r  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  should be provided t o  
t r a n s f e r  personnel i n  the  s o r t i e  module t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  v i a  
EVA t o  enable an abor t  of t h e  mission. 
A means of emergency exi t  (dual egress  c a p a b i l i t y )  should be 
provided i n  s o r t i e  modules, f o r  example, by a long i tud ina l  
f l o o r  providing independent personnel rou tes  above and thelow 
t h e  f loo r .  
Emergency accommodations should be provided i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  
f o r  a l l  passengers through an abort .  
A means should be provided t o  r e l e a s e  t h e  s o r t i e  module from 
the  o r b i t e r .  Release is  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  from e j e c t i o n  i n  t h a t  
no i d e n t i f i e d  c red ib l e  emergencies r equ i r e  a r eac t ion  time less 
than a few minutes, as implied by e jec t ion .  
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4.4 SAFETY ANALYSIS OF MODULAR SPACE STATION CONFIGURATIONS 
The NR and MDAC Modular Space Sta t ion  configurations r e su l t ing  from 
Phase B s tud ies  a r e  evaluated i n  t h i s  sec t ion  fo r  the inherent means avai lab le  
t o  cope with the credib le  emergencies of Section 4.1. The normal operations 
of the  space s t a t i o n  i n  between resupply'operationc a r e  covered i n  Section 
4.4.2, the space s t a t i o n  assembly i n  Section 4.4.3, and the resupply operations 
i n  Section 4,4.4. 
The analys is  assumes tha t  each of the credib le  emergencies can occur i n  
any of the  modular elements and t h a t  each modular element and the  o r b i t e r ,  
when attached t o  the  s t a t i o n ,  i e  a pressure i so la teab le  volume compartment. 
The credib le  emergencies considered lead t o  a number of bas ic  c r i t e r i a  which 
a r e  used t o  evaluate  the  s t a t i o n  configurations.  
4,4.1 Candidate Space Stat ion Configurations 
The candidate space s t a t i o n  configurations se lec ted  fo r  t h i s  task are 
those re su l t ing  from the NR and MDAC Phase B Modular Space Sta t ion  s tudies  
(Figure 4. 4-1). Both configurations exhib i t  the capabi l i ty  t o  add addi t ional  
core modules along the longi tudinal  areas  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  growth from the i n i t i a l  
s t a t i o n  6-ma5 t a p a b i l i t y  t o  a 12-man growth s t a t i o n  o r  a space base. Module 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  tmabers on the f igures  a r e  indica t ive  of the sequence i n  which 
the s h u t t l e  de l ivers  the  modules during the s t a t i o n  assembly phase. 
Integrated pressure volume summaries, of the NR and MDAC concepts, which 
iden t i fy  the primary sa fe ty  r e l a t ed  items of t e s t / i s o l a t i o n ,  s c i e n t i f i c ,  I V A ,  
EVA, contingency, and pressure i s o l a t a b l e  volumes i n  addi t ion t o  hatch loca- 
t ions ,  are shown i n  Figure 4.4-2. 
The MDAC s t a t i o n  forms an open configuration while the NR s t a t i o n ,  through 
appl icat ion of the aux i l i a ry  passages t o  interconnect modules, f a l l s  i n t o  the , 
closed configuration c lass .  The bas ic  difference between the  open and closed 
configurations AS t h a t  an obstruct ion i s o l a t e s  a volume of t h a t  element from 
t 
o the r  p a r t s  of the s t a t i o n .  In  a closed eonfigurat ion,  however, a s ing le  c u t  
through an element (with the  exception of the attached s o l a r  array power source 
and s i d e  mounted module on the  NR s t a t i o n )  cannot i s o l a t e  volumes of the s t a t ion .  
The MDAC s t a t i o n  r e l i e s  on a i r locks  on the ends of t h e  r a d i a l l y  and end 
mounted modules t o  provide a refuge haven f o r  the crew i n  the  event of an 
emergency i n  these volumes. The NR s t a t i o n ,  however, is divided i n t o  two 
bae ic  volumes, each of which is provided with l i f e  support and s t a t i o n  cont ro l  
au thor i ty  from a p a i r  of diametr ical ly  opposed modules encompassing these I 
functions. Each volume is capable of operating independently of the  o the r  1 
volume and of sue ta in ing  a crew of s i x  a t  emergency l eve l s  f o r  4 8  hours. I 
Three s h i r t s l e e v e  access routes  are avai lab le  on the NR s t a t i o n  between 
the two b a s i c  volumes as provided by the  a i r lock  and the two aux i l i a ry  pase- 1 
ages. IVA between volumes is possible  only through the core module air lock.  
EVA, however can 'be performed not  only from the  a i r lock ,  but also from air- s 
locks attached t o  the ends of the l i f e  eupport modules. I i 
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Hemispherical shaped hatches on the  MDAC s t a t i o n  f ~ m ,  vh.a two modules 
a r e  docked, a epherical  volume capable of accoamodatin8 two sn i ted  IVA 
crewmen. 
4.4.2 Operational Space Sta t ion  Compartmentation Analysis 
During the  normal operation. of the  space s t a t i o n  e , i n  between re- 
supply), the sa fe ty  of the  occupants must be assured by su i t ab le  compartmenta- 
t i o n  and other  provisions on the  s t a t i o n  i t s e l f ,  without re l iance  on the  o rb i t e r .  
Examination of the  credib le  emergencies iden t i f i ed  i n  Section 4.1 shows t h a t  
th ree  basic  c r i t e r i a  must be s a t i s f i e d .  These are: 
. Dual engress c r i t e r i a  
. Dual ingress  criteria 
. Loss of a module/compartment c r i t e r i a .  
The ra t iona le  f o r  these three  c r i t e r i a  and t h e i r  compliance i n  the 
reference configurations are discussed below. Alro discussed a r e  some addi- 
t i o n a l  operat ional  sa fe ty  considerations r e l a t ed  t o  configuration. 
4.4.2.1 Dual Xgress 
Certain emergencies i n  a module, euch as a f i r e  o r  explosion, may c u t  off 
t h e  normal escape route  t o  a survivable area resu l t ing  in entrapment of the 
crew within t h e  af fec ted  module. The p o s s i b i l i t y  of i s o l a t i n g  personnel i n  a 
compartment i n  which an emergency has occurred can be reduced ii mul t ip le  egress  
paths t o  a survivable area are provided within a habi tab le  compartment. The 
d e s i r a b i l i t y  of these provirions,  from the  aafe ty  point  of view, lead t o  t h e  
dual egress  c r i t e r i a  which is s t a t e d  asr 
. Normally habi tab le  cornpartmento of more than 25 m"880 f t 3 )  
i n  volume s h a l l  have two o r  more e x i t s  i n t o .  area8 whZch 
provide f o r  personnel survival. .  
The volume below which the  dual egress  c r i t e r i o n  does d o t  apply, 25 n3' 
(880 f t3) ,  is determined by judgement and is intended t o  reprerent  the  minimum 
compartment volume below which the  inmediately dangerou~ space (heat , flamer, 
debr i s )  i n  a credib le  emergency would prevent crew ercape and runr iva l ,  r q p r d -  
less of the  nuolber of egrese routes. 
Four conceptual means of sa t i s fy ing  the  dual  egress  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  the  
Modular Space Stat ion are avai lable:  
A. Dual s h i r t s l e e v e  entry/egrerr  inharent In th. c o n f ~ u r & t i o n  
t h r  ugh the  interconnection of modular elementr in clored "ring" 
configuration. 
B. External connecting p a s r a e e ,  ca l l ed  w i l i a r y  p u r a g e r ,  
required betmen proximate module8 t o  provide the wcond 
s h i r t r l e e v e  egrere  path. 
Space Division 
North American Rockwell 
C. Module floor& which provide escape routes above and below 
the f loor.  
D. Airlocks with docking capability for rescue by the orbiter, 
or with suff ic ient  m i t e  for EVA eecapelrescue, are required. 
These concepts are shown schematically in Figure 4 .4 -3 .  
A. CLOSED RrNG CON8XGURATION B. AUXILIARY PASSAGE 
C *  FLOOR IN MODULE 
Figure 4,4-3, Alternate Solutions for Satisfyin@ D u a l  Zgreea Criterion 
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Both the NR and MDAC s t a t i o n s  can meet the dual egress  c r i t e r i o n  by one 
or more of the above means as can be seen from Figure 4.4-4. Dual egress  
from the NR core and MDAC crew/operations modules i s  inherent i n  the  config- 
urations.  Auxiliary passaBes are employed between the  support and cont ro l  
modules which are docked t o  the core on the NR s t a t i o n  t o  e f f e c t  a sh i r t s l eeve  
egress path between rhe modules. The i n t e r n a l  arrangement of the  NR standard 
modules a l s o  employ as an addi t ional  egress  sa fe ty  fea ture ,  an i n t e r n a l  f l o o r  
which has covered openings not  only a t  the  ends, but a l so  a t  the aux i l i a ry  
passage i n l e t .  While the  power module of the i4R s t a t i o n  and a l l  other  modules 
of the MI)AC s t a t i o n  have only one sh i r t s l eeve  egress  path i n t o  the core or  crew/ 
operations module, a second egress  path v i a  EVA is possible. EVA may not be 
required from an a i r lock  a t  the  end of a module i f  a rescue s h u t t l e  is avai l -  
able  and can be docked t o  the module. However, i f  a rescue o r b i t e r  is  not  
avai lable  and EVA is required t o  gain. access t o  the shirtrrleeve volume of the  
s t a t ion ,  EVA s u i t s  must be provided i n  a l l  modules f o r  a l l  personnel inhabiting 
t h a t  module. On e i t h e r  s t a t i o n ,  normal EVA ingress  t o  a habi table  s t a t i o n  
environment would be through another s t a t i o n  a i r lock .  Unassisted ent ry  to  the 
a i r lock  by the  EVA crewmen outs ide the vehicle  could be avoided i f  o ther  s t a t i o n  
personnel entered the  a i r lock ,  donned s u i t s ,  and performed the  necessary a i r -  
lock functions . 
4,4,2,2 Dual Ingress 
Emergencies may occur which may r e s u l t  not only i n  incapaci ta t ing personnel 
but a l so  i n  cut t ing  off the  rescue path or  opening. Because personnel may be 
injured or  incapacitated,  the  time involved t o  e f f e c t  rescue may be a c r i t i c a l  
fac tor  fo r  crew survival ,  and pa r t i c ipa t ion  of the i n j u r d  personnel i n  the 
rescue operations cannot be assumed. Consideration of these possible  e f f e c t s  
of credible  emergencies leads t o  t h e  dual ingress  c r i t e r ion :  
. Access t o  two or  more sh i r t s l eeve  entrances i n t o  normally 
habi table  compartments of more than 25 m 3  (880 f t 3 )  i n  
volura s h a l l  be immediately avai lab le  from each of the  
otber  normally inhabited compartments. 
Rationale f o r  the  volume cons t ra in t  on a p p l i c e b i l i t y  of the  c r i t e r i o n  is 
iden t i ca l  t o  t h a t  previously discussed f o r  dual egress,  
The primary difference between the  dual  egress  and dual ingress  c r i t e r i a  
is t h a t  dual egress  can be s a t i s f i e d  by IVA o r  EVA, while dual  ingress  can 
only be s a t i s f i e d ,  because of time c r i t i c a l i t y ,  by s h i r t s l e e v e  operations. 
The ingress  paths avai lab le  f o r  both subject  s t a t i o n s  are shown i n  
Figure 4.4-5. As shown, an incapaci ta ted crewman in a l i f e  support or  
control module docked t o  the  core on the NR s t a t i o n  can be reached i n  a s h i r t -  
sleeve environment e i t h e r  by the  docking por t  o r  aux i l i a ry  passage openings, 
On the MDAC s t a t i o n ,  an incapaci ta ted crewman in e i t h e r  end of t h e  crew/opera- 
t ions  module, o r  i n  a module docked t o  the crew/operations module can be 
reached v i a  only one sh i r t s l eeve  path and as such does not  s a t i s f y  the dual 
ingress c r i t e r ion ,  The.al ternate  EVA route  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  disadvantageous i n  
t h i s  s i tua t ion  i n  tha t  up t o  a 3-hour prebreathing period may be required by 
the rescurets ,  unlesc 8 p s i  s u i t s ,  which require  no prebreathing are used, and 
tha t  a l l  a i r locks  and hatches must be capable of being operated, unassisted by 
the injured creman, by the EVA rescurers  ex terna l  t o  the vehicle.  
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4.4.2.3 Loss of a Module/Compartment 
An emergency i n  a module/compartment can render l i f e  support and s t a t i o n  
cont ro l  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  the  module/cornpartment t o t a l l y  inoperable and unrepair- 
able,  o r  i n  a l e s s  extreme case temporarily inoperable u n t i l  r epa i r s  can be 
effected.  During a time i n  which a modu~e/compartment has l o s t  t h i s  funct ional  
capabi l i ty ,  l i f e  support and vehic le  cont ro l  provisions must be avai lab le  t o  
s u ~ p o r t  personnel i n  another volume of the s t a t ion .  This support may be 
required u n t i l  o r b i t e r  resupply/rescue i s  avai lab le  o r  u n t i l  r epa i r s  can be 
made. 
This s i t u a t i o n  leads t o  consideration of the  l o s s  of a module/compartment 
sa fe ty  c r i t e r i o n  which provides f o r  crew surviva l  and vehic le  cont ro l  i n  a 
redundant surv iva l  volume u n t i l  resupply/rescue/repair  can be ef fec ted  follow- 
ing l o s s  of any pressure i so la teab le  module/compartment. The l o s s  of a 
module/compartment sa fe ty  c r i t e r i a  is  s t a t e d  as follows: 
. Capabili ty s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  emergency sh i r t s l eeve  
surv iva l  of a l l  onboard personnel u n t i l  the next resupply o r  
emergency s h u t t l e  f l i g h t  following the l o s s  of access t o  any 
one module/compartment and the  l o s s  of equipment and suppl ies  
in tha t  module/compartment. I f  the  l o s s  of the  module/com- 
partment divides the  s t a t i o n  i n t o  two o r  more i so la ted  
habi tab le  sec t ions ,  then each sec t ion  s h a l l  provide the  
surv iva l  capab i l i ty  f o r  a l l  onboard personnel, including an 
avai lab le  docking port .  
This surv iva l  volume can be composed of a pressure i s o l a t a b l e  compartment 
within a module, a whole module, o r  a c l u s t e r  of modules. The l o s s  of a 
module/compartment c r i t e r i o n  is s a t i s f i e d  by the  NR s t a t i o n  as can be seen 
from Figure 4.4-6, The NR s t a t i o n  is  divided i n t o  two eeparate  pressure 
i s o l a t a b l e  volumes by the  a i r lock  (AL) on the  core module, Each volume is 
serviced by two separa te  modules which provide crew h a b i t a b i l i t y ,  l i f e  
support, and vehic le  control.  Entry back i n t o  a depressurized volume from 
the surv iva l  volume would normally be accomplished by performing IVA tbrough 
the  core module air lock.  However, i f  the s t a t i o n  is i n  a configuration where 
a i r locks  have been attached t o  the ends of the  modules containing the Environ- 
mental Control and Li fe  Support Systems (EC/LS), EVA may be accomplished t o  
gain en t ry  i n t o  the depressurized volume; however, t h i s  requires  t h a t  all air- 
lock functions and cont ro ls  on the affected volume be operable by the  EVA 
crewmen externa l  t o  the vehicle. 
On the MDAC s t a t i o n ,  the  separate  volumes of the crew/operations module 
and the general  purpose laboratory serve as surv iva l  vo' mes f o r  one another. 
Access between these two modules, should one become depressurized, would be 
through a spher ica l  IUA ..irlock formed by the  hemispherically shaped hatches 
of each module a t  t h e i r  docking in ter face .  
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The modular arrangement does not ,  however, s a t i s f y  v i a  a sh i r t s l eeve  
environment, the p a r t  of the  l o s s  of a module/compartment c r i t e r i o n  which 
dea ls  with d iv is ion  of the  s t a t i o n  i n t o  two o r  more i so la ted  volumes. A s  can 
be seen from Figure 4.4-6, a po ten t i a l  hazard with t h i s  modular arrangement 
i s  t h a t  l o s s  of the  crew/operations module could i s o l a t e  the crew i n  separate  
modules i f ,  f o r  example, personnel were working i n  the  power/subsystems module, 
cargo module, or  a module or  c l u s t e r  of modules docked t o  the end of the  crew/ 
operations modzle. The only modes avai lab le  t o  r eun i t e  the  crew would be f o r  
stranded members t o  perform IVA through the crew/operations module using the 
hatch formed a i r locks  o r  t o  perform EVA t o  gain access t o  the general  purpose 
laboratory through i ts  end located i n t e r n a l  a i r lock.  Ei ther  re turn  mode i s  
disadvantageous i n  tha t  i t  requires  s torage and dispersemen t of IVA/F\lq s u i t s  
and c r i t i c a l  equipment and suppl ies  throughout the vehicle.  
4.4.2.4 Other Operational Considerations 
Among the  s a f e t y  i s sues  emerging from the  Modular Space Sta t ion  s tud ies  
a r e  (1) whether i n t e r i o r  hatches should nornally be l e f t  open o r  closed, and 
(2) whether the number of crewmen i n  a given area a t  any one time should be 
re s t r i c t ed .  
Although the hazards analys is  performed i n  consonance with t h i s  t a sk  has 
resul ted  i n  s p e c i f i c  requirements which relate t o  the  above i ssues ,  a discussion 
of the i ssues  as they r e l a t e  t o  s t a t i o n  compartmentation is given i n  the  
following sect ions.  
I n t e r i o r  Hatc 8 Sta tus  
In addressing such sa fe ty  i s sues  a s  whether i n t e r i o r  hatchee should 
normally be open o r  closed, the  tradeoff decision can best  be reached by 
comparing requirements f o r  hatch usage imposed by po ten t i a l ly  hazardous 
s i tua t ions .  The basel ine s t a t i o n  model assumes the  primary escape route  from 
s t a t i o n  modules is v i a  the  berthing por t  hatches i n t o  the  core module. In the  
event the primary pa th  is  blocked, a secondary route  (cargo  module excepted) 
is provided v i a  an aux i l i a ry  p o r t  passage. Considerations such as p o t e n t i a l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  opening hatches against  pressure d i f f e r e n t i a l s  and t h e  com- 
p lex i ty  of pressure equal izat ion valving are the p r inc ipa l  d r i v e r s  favoring 
a "hatches normally open" policy. Advantages of keeping hatches closed a r e  
(1) fewer hatches t o  close in emergency, and (2) minimum exchange of atmosphere 
between volumes. Bearing i n  mind t h a t  aux i l i a ry  passage hataches only have t o  
be used i n  emergency, and even then the  normal e x i t  is v i a  the  berthing hatch, 
tends t o  favor aux i l i a ry  passage hatches being closed. It is  pointed out  t h a t  
some contingency s i t u a t i o n s  would impose both an opening and closing ac t ion  on 
the  crew. There appears t o  be no strong d r ive r  f o r  keeping hatches closed 
s ince no more than two hatches requi re  closing i n  order  t o  i s o l a t e  a module, 
o r  three hatches t o  i s o l a t e  a pressure volume. Since no credib le  s i t u a t i o n  t o  
da te  has shown a requirement f o r  crew evacuation in seconde ra the r  than minutes, 
a "hatches normally open" pol icy is  recom~ended. A decision t o  keep hatches 
open o r  closed is  a r eve r s ib le  one, subject  t o  change a f t e r  operat ional  
experience. 
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Crew Size  i n  One Area 
I n  address ing the  s a f e t y  i s s u e  of the  number of crewmen allowed i n  one 
a r ea ,  the  maximum crew congestion is most l i k e l y  t o  occur i n  the  dining/  
r ec rea t ion  a r ea  of e i t h e r  the  NR o r  MDAC s t a t i o n  and, as  such, represen ts  a 
worst  case  condi t ion  f o r  crew evacuation following an emergency. Tota l  crew 
assembly a t  one l o c a t i o n  should not  i n  i t s e l f  cause undue concern, except i n  
a reas  where personnel  escape rou tes  a r e  r e s t r i c t e d ;  e .g . ,  cargo modules, RAM'S, 
e t c .  I n  a l l  a r ea s  where maximum crew congestion is l i k e l y ,  s p e c i a l  considera- 
t i o n  should be given t o  l oca t ing  p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous equipnent such t h a t  crew 
exposure t o  r i s k  is minimized. On the  NR s t a t i o n ,  r e loca t ion  of H2 and O2 
accumulators from immediately below the  d in ing l r ec rea t ion  a rea  (SM-3) t o  a 
l oca t ion  ou ts ide  the  hab i t ab l e  environment is  one example. 
A d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n  occurs during assembly of the  space s t a t i o n .  A t  
t h i s  t i m e  the  conf igura t ions  of the  space s t a t i o n  a r e  not  complete, and a l l  
subsystems are not  neces sa r i l y  funct ioning.  On the  o the r  hand, the  s h u t t l e  
o r b i t e r  i s  always presen t  and a t tached ( i n  the assembly opera t ions  defined i n  
the Phase B s t u d i e s )  dur ing manned opera t ions  on the  space s t a t i o n .  Because 
of these  d i f f e r ences ,  the  t h ree  bas i c  c r i t e r i a  e s t ab l i shed  i n  4.4.2 must be 
re-evaluated and modified as necessary,  and the  impl ica t ions  of applying them 
determined. 
The conf igurat ions  of the  space s t a t i o n  and o r b i t e r  during the  assembly 
operat ions  a r e  shown i n  Figure 4.4-7 f o r  the  NR s t a t i o n ,  and i n  Figure 4.4-8 
f o r  the  MDAC s t a t i o n .  These assembly opera t ions  a r e  as defined i n  the  space 
s t a t i o n  Phase B f i n a l  r e p o r t s ,  but  a r e  regarded as t y p i c a l  only f o r  purposes 
of  t h i s  study. Var ia t ions ,  such a s  which docking p o r t  the  o r b i t e r  is  a t tached  
to ,  o r  even t h e  order  i n  which modules are brought up, a r e  not  expected t o  
a f f e c t  the  r e s u l t s  derived herz .  The assembly phase is assumed complete when 
the  conf igura t ion  of the  s t a t i o n  allows s a f e  manned occupancy of the  space 
s t a t i o n  without the  o r b i t e r  being presen t .  
The terms V1, VZ, V 3 ,  etc., i n  these  f i g u r e s  i n d i c a t e  the  s epa ra t e ly  
pressur izab le  compartments a v a i l a b l e  a t  each assembly s t a g e  . Airlocks a r e  
ind ica ted  by the  letters "AL". 
Also shown i n  these  f i g u r e s  a i e  the  p o t e n t i a l  s h i r t s l e e v e  egress  paths  
from each module i n  the  event of an emergency a t  each s t age  of assembly. These 
become the  prime conf igura t ion  o r i en t ed  s a f e t y  concern dur ing  assembly, and a r e  
discussed below under each of the  t h ree  r e l evan t  c r i t e r i a .  
4.4.3.1 Dual Egress during Assembly 
The r a t i o n a l e  f o r  requi r ing  dua l  egress  during assembly is exac t ly  t he  
same as during normal operat ions ,  and the  c r i t e r i a  remains unchanged; i .em,  
normally hab i t ab l e  compartmeats of more than 25 m 3  (880 cubic f e e t )  i n  volume 
s h a l l  have two o r  more e x i t s  i n t o  areas which provide f o r  personnel  su rv iva l .  
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Examination of Figures 4.4-7 and 4.4-8 shows t h a t  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  cannot 
be m e t  i n  c l l  compartments i n  every s t a g e  of assembly. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  d i f f i c u l t y  
a r i s e s  wi th  the  "end" compartments of modules, s i n c e  these  do not  l ead  t o  a 
hab i t ab l e  a rea .  These compartments must t he re fo re  not  be  regarded as  "normally 
habi table"  during assembly. Three poss ib l e  courses appear f e a s i b l e  f o r  deal ing 
with  these  compartments; 
R e s t r i c t  s h i r t s l e e v e  access t o  such compartments during 
buildup 
Allow access ,  but  only a f t e r  p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous equip- 
ment has been checked ou t ,  and f o r  s h o r t  time per iods  only 
Allow access only,  i n  p ressure  s u i t s ,  and have EVA escape 
capab i l i t y  i n  t he  compartment 
On t h e  NR s t a t i o n  the c r i t e r i o n  can be met i n  each module only a f t e r  the  
conf igurat ion is "closed1': by the  a w t i l i a r y  passages between ad jacen t  modules, 
a s  shown i n  Sketch D of Figure 4.4-7. 
On the  MDAC s t a t i o n ,  Figure 4.4-8, t he  c r i t e r i o n  can be met on the  i n i t i a l  
launch when the  power module is pressur ized.  The power module can be used as 
a temporary refuge area from which the o r b i t e r  can rescue the  personnel ,  o r  
from which EVA can be performed. This assumes, of course, t h a t  the  module is  
l a r g e  enough t o  accomodate all. on-board personnel.  ' I f  t h e  pressure  i n  t h i s  
module is allowed t o  decay, and is is the re fo re  no t  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  immediate 
refuge,  the  earlier remarks about r e s t r i c t i n g  access t o  the  "end" compartment 
apply t o  the MDAC s t a t i o n ,  a s  w e l l .  
The MDAC concept does al low two a d d i t i o n a l  op t ions ,  however, which would 
make every compartment meet the  c r i t e r i o n .  These are: 
Maintain the  power module as a pressur ized  refuge volume 
dur ing manned assembly operat ions  
Provide rap id  p re s su r i za t ion  c a p a b i l i t y  on t h e  power module 
4.4.3.2 Dual Ingress  dur ing Assembly 
The r a t i o n a l e  f o r  dua l  i ng re s s  is a l s o  unchanged dur ing assembly, and 
t h e  c r i t e r i o n  remains: 
TVo o r  more entrances  i n t o  normally h a b i t a b l e  compartments of 
more than 25 m3 (880 cubic f e e t )  i n  volume s h a l l  be s h i r t s l e e v e  
acces s ib l e  from each of the  o ther  normally inhabi ted  compart- 
ments. 
Visual  inspec t ion  of Figures  4.4-7 and 4.4-8 shows t h a t  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  
cannot be m e t  during assembly on e i t h e r  the  NR o r  t he  MDAC space s t a t i o n .  
Only when the  conf igura t ion  becomes "closed" i n  the  NR r t a t i o n  can t h i s  czi- 
t e r i o n  be  p a r t i a l l y  met. Since the i n t e n t  of t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  is to a l low f o r  
mu l t i p l e  i n t e r n a l  rescue paths  t o  each compartment, i t  is par  titularly d e s i r a b l e  
t o  have two o r  more immediate ( i .e . ,  s h i r t s l e e v e )  access  rou tes  from the  o r b i t e r  
to. each compartment. This is obviously a v i r t u a l l y  impossible requirement t o  
meet with  cu r r en t  docking concepts. 
Steps  which can be taken t o  improve the  s i t u a t i o n  include the  following: 
Use the  "buddy" system during assembly opera t ions ,  sg  t h a t  
each man can he lp  the  o the r  i n  case  of a minor accident  
For operat ions  i n  known hazardous a r eas ,  p o t e n t i a l  rescue 
personnel may be s t a t i o n e d  i n  s a f e  ad jacen t  a r eas  
4.4.3.3 Loss of Module/Cornpartment during Assembly 
During manned assembly opera t ions  the  o r b i t e r  is at tached t o  the  space 
s t a t i o n .  I t  is immediately a v a i l a b l e  a s  a refuge i n  case of l o s s  of a module 
o r  compartment on the  space  s t a t i o n ,  and as an escape veh ic l e  f o r  r e t u r n  t o  
e a r t h ,  i f  needed. The i n t e n t  of the  c r i t e r i o n  def ined i n  Sect ion 4.4.2.3 is 
not  app l i cab le  i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  I t  is no longer  necessary t o  provide f o r  
long-term s u r v i v a l ,  b u t  only f o r  rap id  access  t o  the  o r b i t e r  o r  t o  a sho r t -  
term s u r v i v a l  area on the  s t a t i o n  which can be promptly reached by the  o r b i t e r .  
The c r i t e r i o n  i s  the re fo re  repfacad by: 
During manned space s t a t i o n  assembly opera t ions ,  l o s s  of any 
one compartment/module s h a l l  s t i l l  allow immediate access  of 
a l l  on-board &personnel  t o  the  o r b i t e r  o r  t o  an independently 
pressure  i s o l a t e a b l e  volume from which t h e  on-board personnel  
can t r a n s f e r  t o  the  o r b i t e r  e i t h e r  s h i r t s l e e v e ,  following 
o r b i t e r  redocking, o r  by EVA. 
inspection o f  Figures  4.4-7 and 4.4-8 shows t h a t  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  can be  
m e t  i n  both  & t a t i o n s  a t  a l l  s t a g e s  of assembly. Since the  l o s s  of t he  module 
o r  volume is considered t o  allow a few minutes of r e a c t i o n  t i m e  (see  Table 
4.1-2), t h i s  means t h a t  even i f  t he  a f f ec t ed  volume is posi t ioned between 
t h a  personnel  and the  o r b i t e r ,  they still have time t o  pass through i t  t o  the  
o r b i t e r .  Even i f  t he  l o s s  oc-curs suddently,  however, and the  a f f ec t ed  module 
cannot be t raversed ,  the  conf igurat ions  are a l l  such t h a t  a temporary refuge 
area can be provided by c lo s ing  o f f  one o r  more hatches ,  and t h a t  t h i s  area 
has  a v a i l a b l e  an  acces s ib l e  docking hatch t o  which the  o r b i t e r  can t ransposi-  
t i o n  and dock. 
No problems are the re fo re  expected from this c r i t e r i o n .  
S ace  S t a t i o n  R e s u ~ p l y  P-- 
During t h e  resupply of  t h e  space s t a t i o u  by an o r b i t e r ,  two s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e r ences  occur from the  norxnal opera t ion  of  the  s t a t i o n  ( i .e . ,  between 
resupply). 
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. I f  the  o r b i t e r  is changing the  s t a t i o n  crew, up t o  twice the  normal 
crew complement may be present ,  i n  addi t ion t o  the  o r b i t e r  crew. 
. The o r b i t e r  is present and i e  avai lab le  a s  an addi t ional  refuge 
area,  a s  wel l  a s  .m escape vehicle.  
The f i r s t  of these cons ide ra t ions ' i s  bas ica l ly  taken care of by the  
addi t ional  l i f e  support and volume provided by the  o r b i t e r  and i f  needed a 
rescue s h u t t l e  and thus poses no addi t ional  sa fe ty  issue.  
Similar ly,  the  second consideration shows an improved s a f e t y  compared 
with the s t a t i o n  u~aiy (which has inherent sa fe ty  i n  i t s e l f )  o r  with the  
s t a t i o n l o r b i t e r  c o d i n a t i o n  (which provides the  immediate escape o r  rescue 
capabi l i ty .  The resupply s i t u a t i o n  therefore  has the  sa fe ty  advantages of 
. 
- - both these s i t u a t i o n s ,  and the  disadvantages of ne i ther .  
No fu r the r  analysis  of the  resupply s i t u a t i o n  is therefore considered 
necessary. 
4.4.5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The following conclusions a r e  made based on the  analys is  of sec t ion  4.4: 
. li two-pressure volume configuration, such a s  provided i n  the  NR 
desigs ,  ?rnvides maximum operat ional  f l e x i b i l i t y  (e.g., mission 
continuation) i n  the  event of an accident i n  any one module. 
Adequate sa fe ty  can, however, be provided without a two-volume 
arrangement, but loss  of any one module (temporary o r  permanent) 
in te r rup t s  the mission and way need complex o r b i t e r  rescue opera- 
t ions .  
. A '*cloeed" configuration provides a t  least two independent 
personnel routes from any one module t o  any other ,  provides sa fe ty  
with s h i r t s l e e v e  operations only. The NR space sca.cion design 
provides such a "closed" configuration by providing aux i l i a ry  
passages betwoen rcodvles i n  addi t ion  t o  the main passageway 
through the core module. 
. "Open" configurations,  such as the  MDAC design, r e l y  on a i r locke  
and IVA, EVA o r  o r b i t e r  rescue t o  ensure pers'onnel eafe ty  i n  
s i t u a t i o n s  requiring emergency evacuation of a module. 
. Special  precautions must be taken during spase s t a t i o n  assembly . - 
t o  assure sa fe ty  of personnel, These precautions include restrict- 
ing access t o  s t a t i o n  compartments which do not  have dual  s h i r t s l e e v e  
eprees ,  unless the time spent i n  the  compartarent i s  shor t ,  potan- 
t i a l l y  hazardous equipment has been checked p r i o r  t o  en t ry ,  EVA 
s u i t s  a r e  provided, and buddy eyetern employed. 
. Space s t a t i o n  reeupply docs not present any unurwal s a f e t y  problems 
which require  unique c r i t e r i a ,  ?ce-qr-;vmentlr o r  r o l u t i m e ,  
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The following recommendations are made based on t h e  ana lys i s  of s e c t i o n  4.4: 
. Interconnect  a l l  modules through an a u x i l i a r y  passage t o  provide 
dua l  s h i r t s l e e v e  eg re s s ,  o r  where t h i s  is imprac t ica l ,  provide a 
f l o o r  i n  t h e  module which provides f o r  independent personnel  rou te s  
nbove and below t h e  f l o o r ,  
, Design a l l  hatches  t o  be  operable  from e i t h e r  s i d e  t o  enable  
escape from wi th in  o r  rescue  from ou t s ide  a module/compartment. 
. I n t e r i o r  hatches  s h a l l  normally be open, with t he  except ion 
of emergenr.y egress  hatches 1,rhich e h a l l  normally be  c losed,  
, P o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous equipment should no t  be loca ted  i n  o r  near  
areas where maximum crew congestion i e  l i k e l y  t o  occur; e . g , ,  
d in ing / r ec rea t ion  areas. 
, P o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous equipment should no t  be  loca ted  i n  t h e  
v i c i n i t y  of t h e  module docking i n t e r f a c e ,  
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPORTING ANALYSES-HAZARDOUS PbYLOADS 
A . 1  TYPICAL ORBITER ABORT DATA 
Orbi ter  abor t s  considered i n  t h i s  t a sk  of the  s tudy encompassed th ree  of 
f i v e  mission phases, and were inves t iga t ed  pr imar i ly  t o  provide an es t imate  
of the  reac t ion  t i m e  ava i l ab l e  t o  perform emergency payload funct ions  i n  the  
event of an abort .  
Prelaunch and mated ascent  phase abor t s  were n a t  considered. Data 
r e l a t i v e  t o  an abor t  during the  o r b i t e r  s o l o  ascen t ,  on-orbit en t ry ,  and 
atmospheric f l i g h t  I landing phases are provided below: 
1. An o r b i t e r  f a i l u r e  precluding success fu l  o r b i t  i n j e c t i o n  i n t o  a 
93 by 185 km(50 by 100 nm) o r b i t  could r e s u l t  i n  r een t ry  i n t o  t h e  
s ens ib l e  atmosphere a f t e r  a r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  (about 100 seconds 1 
b a l l i s t i c  t r a j ec to ry .  
2. Three abor t  mode -.?.-!.ions a,e ava i l ab l e  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  during t h e  
o r b i t e r  s o l o  ascer.; shase. These are shown below, toge ther  wi th  
est imated r eac t ion  times t o  pe&orm both o r b i t e r  and payload con- 
tingency funct ions:  
a. Continue t o  o r - l i t  - 50 min 7 days 
b. Once around - approximately 50 min 
c. Downrange landing - less than 100 s e c  . 
3. Shu t t l e  cargo bay doors can open i n  approximately 1 minute. 
4 .  Maximum Shu t t l e  payload weight during an abo r t  as l imi t ed  by S h u t t l e  
entry  and landing loads c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  may re'quire o f f load ing  of 
payload f l u i d s ,  o r  r e s u l t  i n  increased r i s k  u i t h  a reduct ion i n  t h e  
normal s a f e t y  f a c t o r  f o r  an abor t  s i t u a t i o n .  
A .2  TYPICAL ORBITER CARGO BAY PRESSURE ENVIRONMENT 
The projected cargo i n t e r n a l  p ressure  t i m e  h i s t o r i e s  dur ing ascent and 
r e c l t r y  are s.~awn i n  Mgures A-1 and A-2. The f i g u r e s  assume t h a t  adcquate 
venting is  provided t o  l i m i t  t h e  pressure  d i f f e r e n t i a l  access t h e  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay t o  w i th in  a s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t a t i o n  value of 13.7 x 103 ~ f m 2  (2 ps i ) .  
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A s  is shown, t he  cargo bay is  near ly  t o t a l l y  evacucted i n  less than th ree  
minutes a f t e r  launch, which is approximately four  minutes before  o r b i t  
i n j e c t i o n .  Therefore,  f o r  a normal S h u t t l e  mission,  t he  cargo bay w i l l  be 
vented p r i o r  t o  a t ta inment  of o r b i t .  
During re-entry,  approxima e l y  40 minutes e l apse  a f t e r  t he  de-orbit  burn 
before  en t ry  i n t o  the  s e n s i b l e  atmosphere, a f t e r  which normal atmospheric 
p ressure  i s  reached i n  approximately 20 minutes. 
A.3 TYPICAL SHUTTLE CARGO BAY THERMAL ENVIRONMENT 
Projected temperature l i m i t s  f o r  t he  i n t e r n a l  walls of t he  cargo bay, as 
a func t ion  of payload e x t e r n a l  s u r f a c e  temperature, a r e  shown i n  Table A-1 f o r  
payload temperatures ranging from -420°F t o  +lOO°F in .  The table assumes t h a t  
the  S h u t t l e  u t i l i z e s  LO2 and LH2 p rope l l an t s  wi th  s to rage  tanks i n  t h e  proximity 
of the  cargo bay. 
A s  can be seen from t h e  t a b l e ,  t h e  low temperature extreme of -420°F on 
the  s i d e s ,  bottom, and ends of t h e  cargo bay can r e s u l t  during t h e  on-orbit 
and en t ry  phases, and a l s o  the  cargo bay temperature is very s e n s i t i v e  t o  
payload temperature. The max-mum temperature of 250°F, which occurs on the  
i n s i d e  of the  cargo bay doors during en t ry ,  is i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  the  payload 
e x t e r n a l  su r f ace  temperature. 
A.4 UPPER STAGE VEHICLES 
Table A-2 summarizes t he  main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t he  s i x  veh ic les  con- 
s idered .  Figures A-3 through A-8 show t h e  s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e s  and conf igurat ions  
cf these  veh ic les .  The last f i g u r e  shows one poss ib l e  conf igura t ion  of t he  
OOS o r  tug and should be regarded as t y p i c a l  only. 
Table A-2, Main Cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of Upper Stage Vehicles 
Manuf act - 
'8
Agena 
Centaur 
Trans tage 
Apollo 
Service  
Module 
Orb i t - to -  
Orbi t  
S h u t t l e  
Lockheed 
GD/Convair 
Martin 
Boeing 
North 
Pmeri can 
Rockwell 
--- 
Engines 
Length 
( f t 
Tota l  Thrust  
KN, ( ~ l b )  
Main Engine 
Prope l lan ts  
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Prinary o r b i t e r  opera t ions  as r e l a t e d  t o  t he  deployment and r e t r i e v a l  
of  upper s t a g e  vehicles  a r e  shown i n  Table A-3. The operat ions ,  which 
are l i s t e d  i n  t h e  order  i n  which they occur i n  t he  mission,  were used as a 
base l ine  t o  e s t a b l i s h  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  hazardous operat ions  assoc ia ted  with 
upper s t a g e  veh ic les  as o r b i t e r  payloads. 
Table A-3. Typical  Operations f o r  Orb i t e r  Deplnyment and Re t r i eva l  
of Upper Stage Vehicles 
DEPLOYMENT 
Maintain o r b i t e r  a t t i t u d e  cont ro l .  
Mate deployment mechanism t o  upper s t a g e  veh ic le .  
Release upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  from cargo bay a t t a c h  po in t s .  
Extend upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  out  of cargo bay. 
Perform checkout t o  v e r i f y  payload i n t e g r i t y  f o r  f r e e  f l i g h t  (G&C, RCS, 
e l e c t r i c a l ,  propulsion,  R.f. Communications, e t c . ) .  
Perform upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  s epa ra t ion  from deployment mechanism a t t a c h  
po in t s  and a l l  o the r  mechanical, e l e c t r i c a l ,  f l u i d ,  and ha rd l ine  
ins t rumentzt ion i n t e r f a c e s .  
Damp o r b i t e r  s epa ra t ion  t r a n s i e n t s .  
Damp upper s cage veh ic l e  s epa ra t ion  t r ans i en t s .  
Maneuver upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  t o  s a f e  s epa ra t ion  d i s t ance  from o r b i t e r .  
Perform upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  burn and completion of mission 
RETRIEVAL 
Achieve and maintain adjacent  s t a t i o n  keeping pos i t i on  Letween the  
o r b i t e r  snd upper s t a g e  veh ic le .  
Maintain upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  a t t i t u d e  con t ro l ,  
Maintain o r b i t e r  a t t i t u d e  con t ro l  
Extend capture  mechanism from cargo bay. 
Mate cap ture  mechanism with  upper s t a g e  vehicle .  
Da: ;., mating t r a n s i e n t s .  
De-activate upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  a t t i t u d e  cont ro l .  
Lump upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  p rope l l an t s  and pressurants .  
Retract  upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  i n t o  cargo bay. 
Secure upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  t o  cargo bay a t t a c h  po in t s .  
De-mate capture  mechanism from upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  and stow in cargo bay. 
f ;  w e  cargo bay doors. 
- -- 
Potent ia l  hazards ,:ere iden t i f i ed  by considering the  hazardous slements 
of each upper s tage vehicle (Section 4.1;2.2) and failure modes 
as applicable t o  each operation (Section 4.1.2.3) . These po ten t i a l  hazards 
are l i s t e d  ,for each upper s tage vehicle i n  Tabies A-4 t o  A-8 l i r t e d  by 
mission phase. Because of  lack of de ta i l ed  hardware de f in i t ion ,  hazards 
f o r  the OSS/Tug have not been iden t i f i ed  i n  t h i s  d e t a i l ,  bu t  the  Centaur 
hazards may be regarded as typica l  of  the  OOS/Tug. 
Table A-4. Agena/Orbiter Hatrrda 
-- - 
1. Tranrport i n  the s h u t t l e  bay while i n  parking o rb i t .  
1.1 Helium tank o r  l i n e  explosion. 
1 . 2  Nitrogen tank o r  l i n e  explosion. 
1 .3 Premature pyrotechnic i n i t i a t i o n .  
1.3.1 Helium valve(s) .  
1.3.2 Turbine s tar t  so l id  propellant charge(s). 
1.3.3 Dertruct charge ( i f  required).  
1.3.4 Secondary t ranela t ion  s o l i d  rockets  ( i f  required).  
1.3.5 Payload separation pyrotechnics. 
1.3.6 Forward s t ruc tu re  sk in  panel separation. 
1.4 Oxidizer leak - Corrosive f l u i d  i n t o  closed cargo bay. 
1.4.1 Tank. 
1.4.2 Rocket engine start valve. 
1.4.3 Vent valve. 
1.4.4 Piping. 
1.6.5 Fil! valve. 
1.4.6 Gas generator valve. 
1.5 Fuel leak - Corrosive f l u i d  i n t o  closed cargo bay. 
1.5.1 Tank. 
1.5.2 Rocket engine start valve, 
1.5.3 Vent valve,  
1.5.4 Piping 
1.5.5 F i l l  valve 
1.5.6 Gas generator valve. 
1.6 Inadvertent start. 
1.6.1 Signal. 
1.6.2 Gar generator valve openr. 
1.7 Inadvertent Age= separation f r a a  EO;. 
1.7.1 Om at tackaent  point 8eparat.d. 
1.7.2 Two a t t a c b u t  point8 separated. 
1.7.3 A l l  a t t ac tpan t  point8 rrparated.  
'A! space vrwsm North Amencan Rockwell 
Table A-4. AgenalOr5 iter Hazards (Continued) 
1.8 Inadvertent satel l i te  separat ion from Agena. 
1.8.1 Agena s t r u c t u r e  f a i lu re .  
1.8.2 Signal sent  i n  e r r o r .  
2.  During s h u t t l e  boost t o  higher o r b i t .  
I 2.1 thru 2.6 same as 1.1 thru  1.8. 
2.9 Support s t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e .  
-Transitior. piece f a i l u r e  between Agena c i r c u l a r  r i n g  and EOS 
hard points.  
3. I n  the higher o r b i t .  
3.1 thru  3.8 same as 1.1 thru  1.8. 
i. While being prepared f o r  deployment. 
4.1 thru 4.8 same as 1.1 thru  1.8. 
5. During deployment and release. 
5.1 Deployment 
5.1.1 thru 5.1.3 sa-ne a s  1.1 thru  1.3. 
5.1.4 thru 5.1.6 same a s  1.6 th ru  1.8. 
5.1.7 same as 2.9. 
5.2 Release 
5.2.1 thru  5.2.3 same as 1.1 thru  1.3 
5.2.4 same as 1.6. 
5.2.5 same as 1.8. 
5.2.6 Gas jet th rus te r  f a i l ed  "on" - p i t c h  j e t  X2 o r  5. 
5.2.7 Directed helium leak  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  over-power the  gas j e t s .  
5.2.7.1 Tank. 
5.2.7.2 Helium s t a r t  valve. 
5.2.7.3 Helium f i l l  valve. 
5.2.8 Directed nitrogen leak s u f f i c i e n t  t o  overpower the  gas jets. 
5.2.8.1 Tank. 
5.2.8.2 N2 s t a r t  valve. 
5.2.8.3 N2 f i l l  valve. 
Table A-4. Agena/Orbiter Hazards (Cont inued) 
5.2.9 Directed oxid izer  l eak  s u f f i c i e n t  to  over-power t h e  gas j e t s .  
5.2.9.1 thru  5.2.9.6 same as 1.4.1 t h r u  1.4.6. 
5.2.10 Directed f u e l  l eak  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  over-power t h e  gar  jets. 
5.2.10.1 thru  5.2.10.6 same a s  1.5.1 th ru  1.5.6. 
5.2.11 No separat ion.  
5.2.11.1 A l l  separat ion po in t s  successfu l  except 1. 
5.2.11.2 No separa t ion  poin ts  successful .  
5.2.12 Fa i lu re  of c r i t i c a l  funct ions .  
5.2.12.1 E l e c t r i c a l  power. 
5.2.12.2 Gas jets. 
5.2.12.3 S t a b i l i z a t i o n  control .  
5. During r e t r i e v a l .  - No appl icable .  
7 .  During parking o r b i t  u n t i l  de-orbit.- ,Not appl icable .  
3. During and following an aborted s h u t t l e  mission a t  any of t h e  above 
s tages .  
8.1 Abort not  r e l a t e d  t o  payload. 
8.1.1 Agena and s a t e l l i t e  too heavy f o r  EOS re tu rn ,  reen t ry ,  
o r  landing. 
8.2 Abort because of hazard o r  f a i l u r e  i n  payload. 
8.2.1 Damage t o  Agena o r  EOS preventing deployment and release. 
8.2.1.1 th ru  8.2.1.8 same as 1.1 th ru  1.8. 
Space Division 
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Table A-5. Centaur/Orbiter Hazards 
1. Transport i n  the  s h u t t l e  bay while i n  parking o rb i t .  
1.1 Helium tank o r  l i n e  explosion. 
1.2 Hydrogen peroxide tank o r  l i n e  explosion. 
1 .3  Premature pyrotechnic i n i t i a t i o n .  
1.3.1 Centaur insu la t ion  panels shaped charges. 
1.3.2 Command des t ruc t  shaped charge. 
1.3.3 Centaur attachments t o  EOS and payload, i f  required. 
1.3.3.1 ~entaur/EOS adapter. 
1.3.3.2 ~entaur /payload  separation. 
1.4 Oxidizer leak  - Excessive f Iu id  i n t o  p a r t i a l l y  closed cargo bay. 
1.4.1 Tank. 
1.4.2 Oxidizer i n l e t  shutoff valve - i n t e rna l  and external .  
1.4.3 F i l l  and dra in  valve. 
1.4.4 Boost pmnp - externa l .  
1.4.5 Piping - many f i t t i n g s .  
1.4.6 Vent valve. 
1 1.5 Fuel leak - excessive f l u i d  i n t o  p a r t i a l l y  closed cargo bay. 
1.5.1 Tank. 
1.5.2 Fuel i n l e t  shutoff valve - external .  
1.5.3 F i l l  and dra in  valve. 
1.5.4 Boost pump - external .  
1.5.5 Piping - many f i t t i n g s .  
1.5.6 Vent valve. 
1.6 Inadvertent start. 
I 1.6.1 Without i g n i t i m .  
1.6.1.1 Excessive f l u i d  i n t o  p a r t i a l l y  closed cargo bay. 
1.6.1.2 Explosive atmosphere around e l e c t r i c a l  disconnects. 
1.6.2 With igni t ion .  
1.6.1.1 Combust ion gases i n t o  p a r t i a l l y  closed cargo bay. 
1.6.2.2 Combustion gas impingement on c r i t i c a l  EOS components. 
I 1.6.3 H202 i n i t i a t i o n  only. 
1.6.3.1 H2 boost pump. 
1.6.3.2 O2 boost pump. 
1 1.7 Inadvertent ac t iva t ion  of RCS th rus te r  (8). 
-Any th rus te r  o r  combination of th rus te r s .  
1.7.1 Release of hot  gas i n t o  p a r t i a l l y  cloeckd cargo bay. 
Impingement of hot  gas on cargo bay wall. 
Table A-5. Centaurlorbiter Hazards (Continued) 
1.8 H202 leak  - c a t a l y t i c  decomposition of H20Z l iqu id  o r  vapor on 
incompatible mater ia l s , ;  e.g., 
1.8.1 RCS th rus te r  valve8 (14). 
1.8.2 Tank. 
1.8.3 Piping. 
1.9 Inadvertent Centaur separat ion from EOS. 
1.9.1 Activation of any one of th ree  attachment points.  
1.10 Inadvertent satellite separat ion from Centaur. 
1.10.1 Signal sent  i n  e r ro r .  
1.11 Imbalance of pressure i n  main propellafit tanks - po ten t i a l  
rupture of colrmon bulkhead and mixing uf propel lants  i n t o  
an explosive combinat ion. 
1.12 Overboard l i n e  separat ion - configuration fo r  minimum EOS 
impact i s  ground tanked. 
1.12.1 Hydrogen vent l i n e s  (2). 
1.12.2 Hydrogen f i l l  and d ra in  l i n e .  
1.13.3 Oxygen f i l l  and d ra in  l i n e .  
1.12.4 Oxygen vent l ine .  
1.13 Helium regula tor  f o r  cx id izer  tank pressurizat ion f a i l e d  open. 
1.14 Helium regulator  f o r  f u e l  tank pressurizat ion f a i l e d  open. 
2. During s h u t t l e  boost i n t o  higher nrbi+.  
2.1 thru 2.14 same as 1.1 thru  1.14. 
2.2 S t ruc tu ra l  f a i l u r e  of any one of th ree  a t t a c m e n t  points.  
3. I n  t h e  higher o r b i t .  
3.1 thru 3.14 same as 1.1 thru  1.14. 
4. While being prepared f o r  deployment. 
4.1 thru  4.14 same as 1.1 thru  1.14 
5. During deployment and release. 
5.1 Deployment 
5.1.1 thru  5.1.3 same as 1.1 thru  1.3 
5.1.4 same as 1.6.2. 
5.1.5 th ru  5.1.7 same as 1.9 th ru  1.11. 
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Table A-5. Cen t a u r l o r b l t e r  Hazards (Continued) 
- 
5.1.8 and 5.1.9 same as 1.13 and 1.14. 
5.1.10 S t ruc tu ra l  f a i l u r e  of CentaurlEOS attachment points .  
5.1.11 I n a b i i i t y  t o  separate  overboard l i n e s  and e l e c t r i c a l  
connectors between Centaur and EOS. 
5.2 Release. 
5.2.1 th ru  5.2.3 same as 1.1 thru  1.3 
5.2.4 aame as 1.6.2. 
5.2.5 same as 1.11. 
5.2.6 and 5.2.7 same as 1.13 and 1.14. 
5.2.8 Gas jet t h r u s t e r s  s t a r t e d  "on". 
5.2.8.1 Ei ther  p i t ch  jet,. 
5.2.8.2 Any one 50# Lhruster. 
5.2.9 Directed helium leak s u f f i c i e n t  t o  overpower the  gas j q t s .  
5.2.9.1 TankGs). 
5.2.9.2 F i l l  valve. 
5.2.9.3 S t a r t  valve(s) .  
5.2.9.4 Regulator (8.). 
5.2.10 Directed oxygen leak s u f f i c i e n t  t o  overpower tht*. gas jets. 
5.2.10.1 thru 5.2.10.6 same a s  1.4.1 thru  1.4.6. 
5.2.11 Directed f u e l  leak  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  overpower th ree  gas jets. 
5.2.11.1 thru 5.2.11.6 same as 1.5.1 thru  1.5.6. 
5.2.12 No separation. 
5.2.13 Fai lure  of c r i t i c a l  function. 
5.2.13.1 E l e c t r i c a l  power. 
5.2.13.2 Gas j e t e .  
5.2.13.3 S tab i l i za t ion  control.  
1. During r e t r i e v a l  
6.1 Rendezvous and docking - a c t i v e  rendezvous by EOS and spec fa l  
docking adapter ,  s ince  Centaur RCS i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  provide 
t r ans la t ion  i n  a l l  axes. 
6.1.1 I n a b i l i t y  t o  depresrurize main tanks. 
6.1.2 and 6.1.3 same as 1.1 and 1.2 
6.1.4 H202 leak e u f f i c i e n t  t o  exhaust t h e  supply. 
6.1.4.1 thru  6.1.4.3 aame am 1.8.1 thru  1.8.3. 
Table A-5. Centaur / O r  b i t e r  Hazards (Continued) 
- - - -- -- - -  
6.105 mama a B  1.11. 
6.1.6 and 6.1.7 same a8 1.13 and 1.14. 
6.1.8 8m8 88 5.2.13. 
6.2 Retr ieval  i n t o  the cargo bay. 
6.2.1 Fa i lu re  t o  r e l i eve  helium pressure and exhaurt HZ02, 
6.2.2 same a8 2.2 
6.2.3 I n a b i l i t y  of the  cargo bay doors t o  close due to  in te r -  
f r rence with overboard connection. 
7 .  During parking o r b i t  u n t i l  de-orbit - no credib le  hazards. 
4 
Table A-6, Trans t age lo rb i t e r  Hazards 
.. Transport i n  the s h u t t l e  bay while i n  parking o r b i t .  
1.1 Helium tank o r  l i n e  explosion. 
1.2 Nitrogen tank o r  l i n e  explosion. 
1.3 Oxidizer leak - corrosive f l u i d  i n t o  p a r t i a l l y  closed cargo bay. 
1.3.1 Tank. 
1.3.2 Bipropellant valve (2).  
1.3.3 Piping. 
1.4 Fuel l eak  - corrosive f l u i d  i n t o  p a r t i l l a y  closed cargo bay. 
1.4.1 Tank 
1.4.2 Bipropellant valve (2) . 
1.4.3 Piping. 
1.5 Inadvertent start - hot  gas impingement on c r i t i c a l  r h u t t l e  
cmponentr. 
1.5.1 Ei ther  or both b ipropel lan t  valves opening. 
1.5.2 Inadvertent s i g n a l  t o  f u e l  cont ro l  solenoid. 
1.6 I n d v e r t e n t  separat ion of Tranetage f ran  EOS. 
1.7 Inadvertent actparation of payload f r a n  Transtage. 
2. During a h u t t l e  boost t o  higher o rb i t .  
2.1 t h m  2.7 u 1.1 thru  1.7. 
2.8 Support ~ t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e  - t r a n s i t i o n  piece b e t w a n  Trmtaae 
and EOS aupport. 
Space Division 
North American Rockwell 
Table A-6. Transtage/Orbiter Hazards (Continued) 
3. I n  t h e  higher o r b i t .  
3.1 thru  3.7 same a s  1.1 th ru  1.7. 
6. While being prepared f o r  deployment. 
4.1 th ru  5.7 same a s  1.1 th ru  1.7. 
5. During deployment and releaoe.  
5.1 Deployment 
5.1.1 and 5.1.2 same as 1.1 and 1.2. 
5.1.3 thru 5.1.5 same a s  1.5 th ru  1.7. 
5.1.6 same a s  2.8. 
5.2 Release 
5.2.1 and 5.2.2 same as 1.1 and 1.2 
5.2.3 same a s  1.5. 
5.2.4 Directed helium l eak  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  overpower the  
RCS jets. 
5.2.4.1 Tank. 
5.2.4.2 Piping. 
5.2.5 Directed ni t rogen l eak  su f f i cden t  t o  overpower the  
RCS jets. 
5.2.5.1 Tank. 
5.2.5.2 Piping. 
5.2.6 Directed oxid izer  l eak  r u f f i c i e n t  t o  overpower t h e  RCS 
jets. 
5.2.6.1 thru.5.2.6,3 saue acr 1.3.1 th ru  1,3,3* 
5.2.7 Directed f u e l  l eak  r u f f i c i e n t  t o  overpower the  RCS jets. 
5.2.7.1 thru  5 . 2 . 1 . 3  same as 1.4.1 thru  1.4.3. 
5.2.8 Fa i lure  of c r i t i c a l  functions.  
5.2.9.1 E l e c t r i c a l  power. 
5.2.9.2 RCS engine. - exgloeion o r  valve s t a r t e d  clored. 
5.2.9.3 S t a b i l i z a t i o n  control .  
6. During r e t r i e v a l  - not  appl icable  
7. During parking orbi t , ,  u n t i l  de-orbit - n o t  appl icable .  
Table A-6. Trau s t age lo rb i t e r  Hazards (Continued) 
- 
b. During and following an aborted r h u t t l e  mission a t  any of the  
above atagar.  
8.1 Abort not r e l a t e d  t o  Tranetage or  payload. 
8.1.1 T r a n ~ t a g e  and payload too heavy f o r  EOS re tu rn ,  
reentry,  o r  landing. 
8.2 Abort because of hazard of f a i l u r e  i n  Transtage o r  payload. 
8.2.1 thru  8.2.7 same as 1.1 thru  1.7. 
Table A-7. Burner l l / O r b i t e r  Hazards 
1. Transport i n  the  s h u t t l e  bay while i n  parking o r b i t .  
1.1 Nitrogen tank o r  l i n e  explosion. 
1.2 H202 tank or  l i n e  explosion. 
1.3 Premature pyrotechnic i n i t i a t i o n .  
1.3.1 Pyrogen i g n i t e r  - i g n i t e s  rocket engine. 
- Hot gas impingement on c r i  
components. 
. t i c a l  upper s tage 
- Large volume of hot gas i n  p a r t i a l l y  closed 
cargo bay. 
1.3.2 Burner 11 attachment t o  payload. 
- Releases payload ins ide  cargo bay. 
1.3.3 Destruct system, i f  required. 
1.4 H O2 leak - corrosive and heat generating l i q u i d  released i n t o  
the  cargo bay. 
1.4.1 F i l l  and d r a i n  port .  
1.4.2 Piping. 
1.4.3 Relief valve. 
1.4.4 S t a r t  valves (4). 
1.5 N2 pre:lsure regulator  f a i l u r e  i n  t h e  open poaition. 
-Overpressurize t h e  downstream piping and H202 tanka. 
Possible  explooion . 
1.6 Inadvertent opening of any H202 valve - re1-u of hot 
stem i n t o  cargo bay. 
Table A-7. Burner l l / O r b i t e r  Hazards (Continued) 
1 . 7  Inadvertent reparat ion of Burner 11 from upper r t a g r  vehicle.  
2. During s h u t t l e  boost i n t o  higher o r b i t .  
2 . 1  thru  2.7 same an 1.1 thru  1.7. 
2.8 Burner 11 r t r u c t u r a l  f a i l u r e  and eeparat  ion from payload 
o r  upper r tage.  
3.  In  the higher o r b i t .  
3.1 thru  3.7 rame as 1.1 thru 1.7. 
4. Whi le  baing prepared f o r  deployment. 
4.1 thru 4.7 same as 1.1 thru 1.7. 
5. During deployment and release.  
5.1 Deployment 
5.1.1 thru  5.1.3 same as 1.1 thru 1.3 
5.1.4 eame ae 1.5. 
5.1.5 same as 1.7. 
5.1.6 same as 2.8. 
5.2 Release 
5.2.1 thru 5.2.3 same ae 1.1 thru 1.3. 
5.2.4 thru 5.2.6 same ao 1.5 thru 1.7. 
5.2.7 Inadvertent opening of gars jet s t a r t  valve. 
5.2.7.1 Ei ther  p i t c h  jet. 
5.2.7.2 Ei ther  yaw jet. 
5.2.7.3 Any cotnbination of two r o l l  jets. 
5.2.8 Directed nitrogen leak r u f f i c i e n t  t o  ovirpower the  gar j e t s .  
5.2.8.1 Tanko (2). 
5.2.8.2 High prer rure  f i l l  port .  
5.2.8.3 Prerrure regulator .  
5.2.8.4 Regulated pressure f i l l  and bleed port. 
5.2.8.5 Gar jet a t a r t  valvea (6). 
5.2.9 No reparat ion of Burner 11 upper s t age  a r o r b l y  from 
deployment mechanism. 
5.2.10 P r h a r y  ba t t e ry  f a i l u r e  - l o s s  of a t t i t u d e  ccnt ro l .  
5.2.10.1 Overprerrure and expulrion of e l ec t ro ly te .  
5.2.10.2 In te rna l  rhor t .  
5.2.10.3 In te rna l  open. 
Table A-7. Burner l l / O r b i t e r  Hazards (Continued) 
5.2.11 Primary e l e c t r i c a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  harness f a i l c r r  - open 
o r  short .  
5.2.12 Gyro i n a r t i a l  r r farence f a i l u r e  - l o s s  of vheicle  
o r i en ta t ion  control.  
5.2.13 Programmer f a i l u r e  - l o s s  of cont ro l  s ignals .  
5.2.14 Inverter  f a i l u r e .  
5.2.15 Fl ight  cont ro l  a l ec t ron ic r  f a i l u r e .  
6. During r e t r i e v a l  - not applicable. 
7. During parking o r b i t  u n t i l  de-orbit - not applicable..  
8. During and fo*iowing an aSorted s h u t t l e  misrion a t  any of the  above 
stages.  
8.1 Abort not  r e l a t ed  t o  Burner 11 o r  payload. 
8.1.1 Upper s tage ,  Burner 11, and payload too heavy fo r  EOS 
r e tu rn ,  reent ry ,  o r  landing. 
8.2 Abort because of hazard o r  f a i l u r e  i n  Burner 11 o r  payload. 
8.2.1 thru  8.2.7 same a s  1.1 thru 1.7. 
Table A-8. Apollo Service Module/Orbiter Hazards 
1. Transport i n  the  s h u t t l e  bay while i n  parking o r b i t .  
1.1 Helium tank (6) o r  l i n e  explorion. 
1.2 Oxygen tank (2) o r  l i n e  explosion. 
1.3 Bydrogon tank o r  l i n e  explo8ion. 
1.4 Premature pyrotechnic iai t lat  ion. 
1.4.1 Antrnna deployment. 
1.4.2 SM reparat ion from a h u t t l e  a t t a c b e n t  pointr .  
1.4.3 Payload separat ion f ran  SM. 
1.5 N20q l eak  - corrorive f l u i d  i n t o  p a r t i a l l y  cl08.d u r 8 o  bay. 
la5.1 Tmka 
1.5.2 Pipias.  
1.5.3 Flexible  liner. 
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Table A-8 . Apollo Service ModuleIOrbiter Hazardr (Continued) 
1.6 A-50 leak - corror ivr  and h m t  generating f l u i d  i n t o  p a r t i a l l y  
closed cargo bay. 
1.6.1 Tank. 
1.6.2 Piping, 
1.6.3 Flexible  l ineu .  
1.7 Inadvertent rtart - r ignal .  
1 .8  Waterlglycol laak,  
1.8.1 Piping 
1.8.2 Radiators. 
1.9 Monomethyl hydrazinc leak  - corrosive f lu id .  
1.9.1 Tanks (8). 
1.9.2 Piping. 
2. Duriog s h u t t l e  boost t o  higher o r b i t .  
2 .1  thru 2.8 same as 1.1 thru  1.6. 
2 , 9  Struc tura l  f a i l u r e  of connection between SM 6 EOS. 
3. In  the higher o r b i t .  
3.1 thru  3.9 same as 1.1 thru  1.9. 
4. While being prepared f o r  deployment. 
4.1 thru 4.9 same a s  1.1 thru  1.9. 
4.10 Fuel c e l l  exploeion. 
5. b r i n g  deployment and release. 
5.1 Deployment . 
5.1.1 thru 5.2.4 same as 1.1 thru 1.4. 
5.1.5 same R O  1.7. 
5.1.6 rame as 2.9. 
5.1.7 same ar 4.10. 
5.2 Release 
5.2.1 t h t u  5.2.4 6- 88 1.1 thru  1.4. 
5.2.5 same ar 1.7. 
5.2.6 RCS engine ucplorion. 
Table A-8. Apollo S e r d  ce Module/Orbiter Hazards (Continued) 
- 
5.2,7 Directed helium leak  a f f i c i e n t  t o  overpower the  RCS 
engines - tank. 
5.2.8 Directed oxygen leak - tank. 
5.2.9 Directed hydrogen leak - tank. 
5.2.10 Directed N204 leak - tank. 
5.2.11 Directed A-50 leak - tank. 
5.2,12 Directed IMI l eak  - tank. 
5.2.13 No separation. 
5.2.14 Fialure  of c r i t i c a l  functions. 
5.2.14.1 E lec t r i ca l  power. 
5.2.14.2 Sequential events control.  
5.2.14.3 Pyrotechnics. 
5.2.14.4 Guidance and control.  
5.2.14.5 Reaction control.  
5.2.14.6 Structure.  
6. During r e t r i e v a l  - not applicable.  
7. During parking o r b i t  u n t i l  de-orbit - not applicable.  
8. During and following ru aborted s h u t t l e  mission a t  any of the  
above stages.  
8.1 Abort not re la ted  t o  payload - SM and payload too heavy for  
LOS re turn ,  reentry,  o r  landing. 
8.2 Abort because of hazard o r  f a i l u r e  i n  payload - damage t o  
SM preventing deployment and release.  
8.2.1 thru 8.2.9 same as 1.1 thru 1.9. 
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Potent ia l  causes f o r  the  various emergencies have been i d e n t i f i e d ,  
and are  as follows: 
.A .  Potent ia l  Causes o f  F i re  i n  o r  Near Cargo bay 
1. Leakage o f  flammable f lu ids ,  o r  f lu ids  which present a f i r e  hazard, 
i n t o  a habi table  volume. 
2. Leakage o r  venting o f  flammable f l u i d  near  RCS exhaust plume. 
3. Leakage o r  venting o f  monopropellants which impinge on ca ta lys t  
source. 
4. Simultaneous leakage o r  venting of mutually r eac t ive  f lu ids .  
5. Simultaneous venting of f l u i d s  which a re  mixed, a f t e r  venting, 
near  RCS exhaust plume. 
6. Accidental o r  inadvertent f i r i n g  o f  payload RCS engines. 
B. Potent ia l  Causes of  Explosion i n  o r  Near Cargo Bay 
- 
1. Rupture of  pressure vessel  o r  explosive f l u i d  container o r  l ines .  
2.  Leakage of  explosive f l u i d s  o r  f l u i d s  which crea te  an explosion 
hazard with subsequent ign i t ion  i n t o  the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay. 
3. Venting o f  explosive f lu id ( s )  near  RCS exhaust plume. 
4. Leakage o r  venting o f  monopropellmts which impinge on a 
ca ta lys t  source. 
5 .  Simultaneous leakage o r  venting o f  mutually reac t ive  f lu ids .  
6. Simultaneous venting o f  f l u i d s  which a re  mixed, a f t e r  venting, 
near  an RCS exhaust plume. 
7. Accidental o r  inadvertent f i r i n g  of payload RCS engines, main 
propulsion engines, and pyrotechnic o r  o the r  explosive devices. 
C. Potent ia l  Causes o f  Exposure of  Orbi te r  Personnel t o  Toxic Environment 
1. ,Release o f  a t o x i c  payload f l u i d  i n t o  a pressurized volume of  the  
payload, the  environment o f  which i s  serviced by the  o r b i t e r  o r  
in te r faces  with the  o r b i t e r  environmental control  and l i f e  support 
sys tern. 
2.  Contamination of a pressurizsd payload environment which i n t e r -  
faces  with the o r b i t e r  environment control  and l i f e  support system 
a t  some point i n  the  mission a f t e r  removal from the o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay, such as  during -- deployment and checkout ' operations . 
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D. Potent ia l  Causes o f  Corrosive Environment t o  Orbi ter  Equipm 
1. Leakage of corrosive f l u i d  container o r  plumbing. 
- 2. Venting of corrosvie f l u i d s  which contact vehicle s t r u c t u r e  o r  
ex terna l  subsystem components. 
3. Rupture of  corrosive f l u i d  container o r  plumbing. 
Flammable f l u i d  hazards can be categorized i n t o  f i v e  areas:  
1. Those f l u i d s  which are  flammable i n  t h e  presence of oxygen at 
s p e c i f i c  temperatures and pressures.  
2. Those f l u i d s  which can a c t  as oxidizing agents and increase the 
f i r e  hazard by decreasing the ign i t ion  temperature, and therefore 
increase the  po ten t i a l  sources of ign i t ion .  
3. Those f l u i d s  such as monopropellants, which do not  requi re  the  
presence o f  oxygen t o  burn, but decompose v io len t ly  i n  contact 
with a s o l i d  c a t a l y s t  under s p e c i f i c  conditions of temperature 
and pressure.  
4. Mutually reac t ive  f l u i d s ,  such as hypergolic bi-propel lants  , 
which do not  require  the presence o f  oxygen o r  an ign i t ion  source 
t o  chemically reac t  and produce high temperatures. 
5 .  Mutually reac t ive  f l u i d s ,  such as non-hypergolic bi-propel lants ,  
which require  an ign i t ion  source t o  chemically r eac t  m d  produce 
high temperatures. 
A . 5  FLUID HAZARDS 
The hazards fo r  each f lu id  ident i f ied  i n  Section .2.2.6, Table 2-4 of the 
main tex t  of t h i s  volume, are c l a s s i f i ed . in to  toxic, flaxmuable, corrosive, and 
exploaive. T h e ~ e  characterist ics  were extrapolated primarily from the th i rd  
edit ion of "Dangerous Properties of Indust r ia l  Materials" by N. Irving Sax, 
. 1968, Reinhold Book Corporation. 
Toxicity is the a b i l i t y  of a chemical t o  produce injury once it reaches a 
susceptible site i n  o r  near the body. Classes of toxic substances of concern 
a re  fumes, mists , vapors, gases, and cryogens. A l l  cryogens are toxic i n  tha t  
severe f ros tb i t e  "burns" and tissue damage can result from contact with the 
skin. Toxic f lu ids  were c lass i f ied  i n t o  those substances which (1) act as a 
simple asphyxiant, tha t  is, the gas replaces oxygen unti l  a toxic level due t o  
insuff ic ient  oxygen is reached, (2) are toxic at temperatures which are below 
that  required fo r  decomposition, and (3) are toxic. before decorposition, but 
which becomc extremely toxic when heated t o  decompo8ition. The table  does not 
distinguish between the levala of toxici ty such as s l igh t ,  loderate, o r  severe, 
nor docre it define the ef fec t s  i n  terms of acute (short duration, seconde, 
minutes, hours), chronic (long duration - days, mnths, ]run), ot  -mure 
media (inhalation, absorption, t h r o w  skan, i n t e s t ina l  c d ,  etc.). 
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Fluids which could be expected t o  c rea te  a corrosive environment f o r  
- common' spacecraf t  mater ials  a re  indicated f o r  t h e i r  poAent i a l  corrosive 
e f fec t  i n  an ear th  environmc~t.  O f  the oxid izers ,  oxyren (02) could be 
expected t o  require  a r e l a t i v e l y  long time t o  produce corrosive damage. 
Nitrogen oxide (NO) elnits corrosive fumes when exposed t o  water o r  steam. 
Nitrogen te t roxide  (N204), which is  used on the  Agena, Transtage, Apollo 
Service Module and has po ten t i a l  use on fu ture  automated payloads, is  
e x t r m e l y  corrosive and could be expected t o  be capable of producing 
s t r u c t u r a l  o r  equipnent damage within seconds a f t e r  contact. Hydrogen 
peroxide i s  high ly  ccr- x i v e  i n  concentrations g rea te r  than approximately 
40%. Hydrazine (N2H4) a d  members of the hydrazine fuily indicated on the 
table, A-50 (50% UDW + 50% hydrazine), and monomethyl hydrazine are corro- 
sive. Hydrazine fueh cmtaining hydrazine nitrate and'hydrazine diperchlor- 
ate act as acids in hydrazine solutions, n d  are responsible for higher 
corrosion rates. Corrosion and toxicity ratings for hydrazine propellants 
are listed in Table A-9, as obtained from Report SP06R70-F, Space Station 
Study of Re-Supply/Repir of Monopropellant Subsystems, Final ~ e p r t ,  
February 1971, prepared by Hamilton Standard for NASA MFC. 
Table A-9. Corrosion and Toxicity Charac ter i s t ics  of  Hydrazine Blends 
MONOPROPEL CAh'?' 
(1) Hydrazine 
(2) Monomethyl Hydrazine (MMH) 
(3) Unsymmetrical Dimethyl Hydrazine (UDMH) 
(4) Aerozine -50 (UDMH + N2Hqj 
(5) MHF-3 (MMH + N2H4) 
(6) X-Mix (MMH + N2Hq + H2O) 
(7) BA10-14 (W + N2H4 + H20) 
(8) Q-Mix (MMH + N2H4 + Hz0 + HN) 
(9) MHF-5 (MMH + N2H4 + HN) 
r10) Hydrazine - Hydrazine Ni t ra te  - Water 
(11) Hydrazine - Hydrazine Diperchlorate - 
Water 
(12) Hydrazine - Hydrazine Azide - Water 
(13) Hydrazine - Methoxharhe Ni t ra t e  
H = High 
M = Moderate 
L = Low 
CORROSIVE 
M 
L -M 
L 
L -M 
L-M 
L -M 
M-H 
M-H 
M 
H 
H 
M 
M-H 
TOXI CITY 
Explosive f l u i d  hazards can be categorized i n t o  th ree  ~ 8 8 ~ :  
(1) Those f lu ids  which a re  explosive i n  the  presence o f  oxygen a t  
s p e c i f i c  temperatures and pressures.  
(2) Those f l u i d s  which can a c t  as oxidizing agents and increase the  
explosion hazard by decreasing the ign i t ion  temperature and there-  
fore  increase t h e  po ten t i a l  sources o f  ign i t ion  while at the  same 
time increase deton: t i o n  r a t e s .  
(3) Those f l u i d s  which a re  hazardous because when heated, shocked, o r  
contaminated, t h e  concentrated material  can explode or  s tart  f i r e s .  
I t  is s i g n i f i c a n t  t o  note t h a t  hydrogen peroxide f a l l s  i n t o  category 
(3) above. 
. .  
A. 6 PROPERTIES OF PRIMARY PAYLOAD FLUIDS 
Common proper t ies  of  primary f l u i d s  t o  be ca r r i ed  as o r b i t e r  payloads 
i n  s ign i f i can t  quan t i t i e s  a re  tabulated i n  metric un i t s  (Table A-9): 
and engineering un i t s  (Table A-10). The references under flash point 
temperatures r e f e r  t o  standard equipment , u t i l i z e d  i n  industry t o  determine 
the lowest temperature a t  which a l iqu id  w i l l  give o f f  enough vapor, o r  
near i t s  surface,  such t h a t  i n  an int imate mixture of a i r  and a spark of  
flame, it ign i t e s .  LEL r e fe r s  t o  Lower Explosive L i m i t .  
A. 7 COMPRESSED GAS TNT EQUIVALENT 
The TNT equivalency o f  compressed gas is shown i n  Figure A-9. 
The equivalency is shown f o r  gas expansion t o  one atmosphere pressure 
and t o  space vacuum. The f igure  is based on the  gas behaving l i k e  a 
perfect  gas over t h e  range o f  pressures and temperatures involved. I t  
is a l s o  assmed t h a t  the  gas expands ad iaba t i ca l ly  (no heat  t r ans fe r )  and 
i sen t rop ica l ly  (maximum energy re lease) .  The r e s u l t s  should be very good 
f o r  t h e  one atmosphere case, bu t  some e r r o r s  can be expected at  the highest  
pressure shown f o r  t h i s  case, and f o r  t h e  f u l l  range f o r  the  vacuum 'case,  
because of l iquefact ion and s o l i d i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  gas a t  the extremely low 
temperatures it expands to.  
The l a rges t  ant ic ipated usage of compressed gas f o r  s h u t t l e  payloads 
is expected t o  be associated with upper s tage  vehicles requir ing propel lant  
system pressurizat ion gases, and with Space Sta t ion  modules which require  
atmospheric pressur iza t ion  and re-pressurizat ion gases. The Centaur, f o r  
example, may requi re  a s  an energy source i n  an emergency propel lant  dump 
system 5 helium pressure vesse ls  at  2.1 x 107 ~ / m 2  (3000 p s i ) ,  with each 
tank having an i n t e r n a l  volume capacity o f  0.168m3 (6 f t3 ) .  The Rn' equiva- 
l e n t  pe r  tank is 2.73 kg (6 Ib). 
The Apollo Service Module contains two l m  (40 inch) diameter helium 
tanks capable of s to r ing  0.54m3 (19.4 ft3) of  gas each a t  2.75 x 107 ~ / m 2  
400 psi .  Each tank has the equivalent of approximately 12.4 kg (27.2 lb) 
TNT i f  loaded t o  capacity. 
Space Division 
North American Rockwell 
Table A-9.! Proper t ies  of P ~ 1 p g . r ~  Payload F l a b  - Metric Unit8 
Auto I p i t i o n  T *C NA 5'19 
F l r 8 b i l i t y  Range NA 3.2 to 60 
in  Air g l d  at  
20 *C 
Flu? Point. Opon N A .-- 
c q  C 
Fluh Point, Closod NA 
C19 .C I 
--- 
Vapor Prmsrun N / ~ Z  
at  
Table A-10. Properties of Primary Payload Fluids - Engineertng Units 
PROPERTY 
Critical T n p r 8 t M  *P 
C r j t i a 1  ?irSSw* pi. 
Doiling Point *P 
Freering Point 'P 
- 
Fluh Point. Op.n 'P NA --. NA --- 5 6s --- ' 12s.6 
ct9 
Fluh Point, Clorod *? NA --- )(A .-- 11 --- 70 .-- 100 
1 
cw 
1 I I 1 I I 1 I I 
Vapor P n s a w  p i a  --- 1 . 9 a t  2 0 . t  S7at  O J a t  4 . 1 ~  0.Sl a t  0.03 at  0.07 at 
at  *P -433 -316 -2IO 0 Y) 40 6I0? 10 
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The maximum TNT equivalent of the Modular Space Sta t ion  pressure 
vcssels is  expected t o  be approximately 5 kg (11 l b ) ,  based on 0.84m 
(33 inch) diameter, 0.28m3 (10 f t 3 )  , 2.1 x 107 N / ~ Z  (3000 ps i )  tanks. 
A 141  m3 (5000 f t3 )  payload module, such as a space s t a t i o n  module, 
pressurized a t  1 atmosphere, possesses a TNT equivalent of 10.3 kg (22.5 lb) 
while the TNT equivalent f o r  the same volume i s  reduced t o  approximately 
1.64 kg (3.6 lb) a t  13,800 ~ / m 2  (2 p s i ) .  
. . .  . - -. 
The above maximum TNT equivalents a re  expected t o  represent reasonable 
upper bounds f o r  o r b i t ~ r  pressure vessel  payloads. 
A . 8  CRYOGENIC FLUID TNT EQUIVALENT 
In order t o  dscermine the  TNT equivalent of cryogenic f l u i d s ,  an 
analysis  was made of how cryogenic f l u i d s  behave when they expand i n t o  a 
low o r  zero pressure environment. 
Cryogeilic f l u i d s  a re  generally s tored  as  a l iqu id  i n  a sub-c r i t i ca l  
s t a t e ,  where a l iqu id  and gas phase can e x i s t  together i n  equilibrium, o r  
i n  a superc r i t i ca l  s t a t e ,  i n  which t h e  f l u i d  e x i s t s  i n  a s ing le  uniform 
phase, with no sharp d i s t i n c t i o n  between gas and l iquid.  The s u p e r c r i t i c a l  
phase is generally characterized by much ' larger  storage pressures.  
The analysis  indica tes  t h a t  i f  the f l u i d  pressure i s  suddenly reduced, 
e.g. as a r e s u l t  of f l u i d  leakage o r  tank rupture,  the f l u i d  expands and 
cools, going i n t o  a two-phase gas-and-liquid s t a t e .  I f  t h i s  mixture is  
confined, as i n  a cargo bay, s o  t h a t  the  gas and l iquid  can i n t e r r a c t  and 
remain i n  equilibrium, the  expansion proceeds u n t i l  t h e  temperature drops 
t o  and below the  t r i p l e  point (where gas,  l iqu id  and s ~ l i d  can co-exist 
i n  equilibrium). Below t h e  t r i p l e  point ,  t he  l iqu id  (most probably i n  a 
mis t ) ,  condenses i n t o  the  s o l i d  fom, and i f  the  expansion continues, more 
and more of  the remaining gas is converted i n t o  so l id .  The expansion s tops 
when the  l iquid/gas o r  sol id/gas mixture, f u l l y  occupies the containing vessel .  
The energy t h a t  i s  released by the  expansion and cooling of  the f l u i d  
is  used i n  accelerat ing the f l u i d ,  both the  gas,  and the l iqu id  or  so l id .  I t  
is  t h i s  energy t h a t  i s  avai lable  t o  damage s t ruc tu re  and equipment it 
impinges on, and can be equated t o  t h e  TNT equivalent.  In the  l i m i t ,  when 
the  f l u i d  expands t o  space, it theore t i ca l ly  can reach ,absolute zero temper- 
a tures  and nressure. In t h i s  condition it  is a l l  i n  a s o l i d  s t a t e .  This 
condition a l so  corresponds t o  maximum energy release.  
The f reez ing .  time f o r  oxygen, ni t rogen,  and hydrogen when the  f l u i d  
l iqu id  drop is  exposed t o  a vacuwh near i t s  bo i l ing  point is  shown i n  
Figure A-10, as a function of drop diameter. The curves were developed 
from a l i n e a r  extrapolat ion of  theore t i ca l  da ta  developed.in "Freezing of 
Liquids on Sudden Exposure t o  Vacuum" by John B. Gayle, Carl T. Egger, and 
James W. Bransijrd,  Journal o f  Spacecraft and Rockets, Voi 1, No. 3, May/ 
June 1964. 
The freezing times f o r  even large drops of  0.1 m (4 ins)  diameter range 
from 0.025 seconds f o r  hydrogen t o  0.3 seconds f o r  oxygen. In the  event o f  
... . .  _I__.__ _ _ -  , , .  - . . - 
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a cryogenic tank rupture,  therefore,  these  t i n s  ate s u f f i c i e n t l y  rapid 
f o r  the  energy released during freezing o f  t h e  l l u i d  to  be h d l a b l e  t o  
contr ibute  t o  the  TNT equivalent of tha  cryogenic f lu id .  
The TNT equivalent o f  hydrogen (parahydrogen) as it expands from typica l  
s u b c r i t i c a l  conditions t o  vacuum i s  shorn i n  Figure A-11, as being typ ica l  
of cryogenic f lu ids .  This i s  p lo t t ed  against  the temperature of  the  f lu id .  
The i n i t i a l  conditions on the r i g h t  a l l  represent  d i f f e r e n t  combinations of 
temperature and pressure,  with the  f l u i d  f u l l y  sa tura ted  -- i . e . ,  100%'gru 
f o r  the  two top curves, and 100% l iquid  f o r  the  two bottom curves. The four  
curves a re  characterized by the  entropy, which i s  assumed t o  remain constant 
during expansion. The var ia t ion  of the corresponding "quality ," or  proportion 
of gas,  during the  expansion i s  shown f o r  the four  curves i n  Figure A r 1 2 .  
If the  expansion s t a r t s  o r  terminates a t  pressures and temperatures 
within the  range shown i n  Figure k L 3 ,  the TNT equivalent of the expansion 
i s  represented by the  difference i n  ordinates  f o r  the two points .  Since i n  
prac t ice ,  expansions of i n t e r e s t  ne i the r  proceed t o  a v a c w ,  nor proceed 
i sen t rop ica l ly ,  it is seen t h a t  t h e  curves ind ica te  t h e  m a x i m u m  po ten t i a l  
TNT equ iva lmt  (remembering t h a t  entropy can only increase during a real 
process, not decrease). 
I t  i s  a lso  of i n t e r e s t  t o  note how non-linearly the  pressure decreases 
with the  temperature, as shown by the bottom sca le  o f  Figure A-31. 
Typically,  the  TNT equivalent of cryogenics is r e l a t i v e l y  low. A s  a 
comparison, Table A-11 compares the  TNT equivalent of hydrogen a t  typ ica l  
s u b c r i t i c a l  cryogenic s torage conditions as a l i a u i d ,  with the  same tempera- 
t u r e  and pressure as a gas, and with typ ica l  high pressure storage conditions 
as a gas zt room temperature. 
Table A-11. TNT Equivalent o f  Hydrogen Stored at Typical Cryogenic 
and ~ i ~ h  Pressure   as conditions 
Pressure Temperature 
- 1  ' X ( " R )  TNT Equivalent A t m  . I Phase I b/b H2 (lb/lbU2) 
Expanding t o  Zxpanding t o  I I 1 1 *tm.  Yacuum 
A. 9 BLAST OVERPRESSVRE 
6.8 
6.8 
20.4 
Face and s i d e  on overpressures r e su l t ing  from an explosion a re  shown i n  
Figure A 0 1 3  as a function of b l a s t  source TNT equivalent and distance from 
t he  source. 
The maximum allowable cargo bay pressure f o r  a current  NR o r b i t e r  design 
of  13,800 ~ / m 2  (2 ps i )  i s  shown f o r  reference together with t h e  maximum allow- 
able  face-on overpressure, 20,700 ~ / m 2  (3 psi), permissible f o r  personnel 
exposure without addi t ional  protect ion.  
29 ( 52) 
29 ( 52) 
294 (530) 
Liquid 
Gas 
Gas 
0.006 
0.031 
0.52 
0.056 
0.134 
0.75 
Figure A-11. TNT Equivalent of Cryogenic Hydrogen 
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The f igure shows t h a t  considerable cargo bay damage could r e s u l t  from 
an uncontained errplosion within the bay with l e s s  than 0.0045 kg (0.01 lb) 
TNT equivalent. For example, i f  a b l a s t  of  t h i s  energy equivalnnt were 
detonated i n  the center  of  a 4.6m (15 f t )  diameter x 18.3 m (60 f t )  length 
cargo bay, the s t ruc tu re  located at a dis tance of  2.3 m (7.5 f t )  would be 
exposed t o  an overpressure i n  excess of  69,000 ~ / m 2  (10 psi), while the  
ends of the  bay would be exposed t o  s l i g h t l y  g rea te r  than 6,900 N/mZ (1  p s i ) .  
A.10 MAXIMUM TOLERABLE LEAK RATE INTO SHlTl'TLE CARGO BAY 
An invest igat ion was made t o  determine the maximum allowable leak r a t e  
which can be to lera ted  i n t o  the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay from a pressurized payload 
vessel .  The shu t t l e  cargo bay doors were assumed t o  be closed and the bay 
provided with vents t o  l i m i t  cargo bay d i f f e r e n t i a l  pressures t o  l e s s  than 
13,800 N/m2 (2 ps i ) .  A vent area t o  cargo bay volume r a t i o  of approximately 
13.8 cm2/m3(0.06 in2/f t3)  which has been previously used i n  NR r h u t t l e  vent- 
ing s tudies ,  was assumed t o  estimate the venting area f o r  any known cargo 
bay volume. 
The maximum to lerable  leak r a t e  as a function of vent area,  i s  shown 
i n  Figure A-14 and assumes a gas temperature of -2050 C ( -3280 F) 
( typical  temperatures of gases t h a t  have leaked i n t o  the  cargo bay), a maxi- 
mum allowable cargo bay d i f f e r e n t i a l  pressure of 13,800 ~ / m 2  (2 p s i ) ,  and a 
discharge coeff ic ient  f o r  the  vent of 0.85. The leak r a t e  is r e l a t i v e l y  
insens i t ive  t o  the  gas temperature, varying inversely as  the  square root  
of the absolute temperature. 
I t  i s  seen t h a t  the  maximum leak r a t e  which can be to lera ted  is  l a rge r  
f o r  gases of high molecular weight than gases of  low molecular weight, and 
t h a t  ledcage of  hydrogen represents the  worst case. 
Current NR o r b i t e r  designs use always-open cargo bay vents o f  approxi- 
mately 0.37m2 (4 f t2 )  area.  The maximum to le rab le  steady s t a t e  leakage 
r a t e  i n t o  the  cargo bay, with doors closed, is  o f  the order of  2.5 kg/szc 
(5.5 lb/sec) f o r  hydrogen and 20 kg/sec 45 lb/sec) f o r  a i r ,  oxygen o r  n i t r o -  
gen. Larger leakage r a t e s  i n t o  t h e  cargo bay can be to lera ted  f o r  shor te r  
durations, u n t i l  t h e  cargo bay pressure goes from vacuum t o  t h e  to le rab le  . 
l i m i t .  Such a large leakage rate f o r  a prolonged period is approaching, i n  
i t s  damaging e f f e c t s ,  an explosive rupture o f  a tank, r a t h e r  than a leakage. 
I t  can be concluded t h a t  overpressurization of the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay 
f o r  normal cargo is not a major hazard. I t  must be considered, however, 
f o r  payloads containing mostly propel lants ,  such as upper s tage  vehicles  or  
propellant log i s t i c s  resupply. The hazard is then ser ious ,  however, only 
during the  time the  cargo bay doors remain closed. 
A. 11 TOXIC ENVIRONMENT I N  THE ORBITER RESULTING FROM CONTAMWATED 
PRESSURIZED PAYLOAD 
The s h u t t l e  may be exposed t o  a toxic environment of a contaminated 
payload i f  the  o r b i t e r  atmosphere, at some point  i n  t h e  mission, such as  
during o r b i t a l  manewers, d e p l o j ~ a n t ,  checkout servicing. ar cargo handling, 
in ter faces  with the payload atmosphere. 
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Eight typica l  pressurized payload configurations which lead t o  a tox ic  
o r b i t e r  environment a re  shown i n  Figure A-15. These a r e  6srived from 
combinations o f  manned payloads, unmanned payloads, payloads requir ing 
s h u t t l e  environmental cont ro l ,  payloads including self-contained environ- 
mental control ,  and pressurized payloads not requir ing environmental control .  
Payload configurations 1, 3 and 6 could present a t o x i c i t y  hazard t o  the  
o r b i t e r  during normal operations,  s ince they require  a d i r e c t  in t e r face  with 
the o r b i t e r  environment. The remaining configurations could present a 
t o x i c i t y  hazard during a contingency s i t u a t i o n  i n  which it becomes des i rable  
o r  necessary t o  perform an in te rna l  v isua l  inspection of  the payload. 
T E S T I N G  POTENTIALLY T O X I C  CARGO FOR T O X I C I T Y  
Exposure of on-orbit personnel t o  a t ~ i c  environment could r e s u l t  
upon opening of a modularized o r  equivalent cargo container,  t h e  atmosphere 
of which has been contaminated by breakage o r  leakage of in te rna l  vessels  
containing a tox ic  substance. The vessel  breakage o r  leakage could have 
occurred during ground cargo t r ans fe r  and handling operations,  s h u t t l e  
ascent t o  o r b i t ,  o r b i t a l  and docking operations,  and on-orbtt cargo handling 
operations.  
Examples of  toxic  f l u i d s  which may be delivered t o  o r b i t  t o  support 
experiment operations are  carbon t e t r a f lour ide  (CFq), carbon monoxide (CO),  
mercury, formaldehyde, and nitrogen te t roxide  (N204) . Examples o f  o ther  
tox ic  substances are  bio-organisns, and experiment sensors such as imaging 
tubes which can re lease  poisonous gases i f  broken. 
Testing po ten t i a l ly  t o x i c  cargo f o r  t o x i c i t y  i n  an environmentally 
i so la ted  t e s t  volume, such as an a i r lock ,  i s  one method which could be 
employed t o  control t h i s  hazard. Figure A-16 shows schematically a 
possible  method f o r  t e s t i n g  which is based on the following assumptions: 
1. Vessels containing tox ic  substances a re  contained within a 
la rger  pressurized container. 
2. Vessels containing tox ic  substances a re  subject  t o  leakage o r  
breakage. 
3. The container is  designed t o  be compatible with the  t o x i c i t y  
t e s t ;  it i s  f i t t e d  with necessary valves,  e tc .  
4. Leakage from plumbing connections during the  t e s t i n g  operation 
i s  possible ,  and thereby require  an environmentally i so la ted  
t e s t  volume. 
A s  can be seen from the  f igure ,  the  container can be vented t o  space 
i f  a t o x i c  atmosphere is  detected. 
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Figure .A-35. Configurations Which Can Lead t o  Toxic Enviroll~rent in Orbiter 
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A . 1 3  MAXIMUM SAFE TANK CONTENTS 
bay 
Shut 
Gaseous leakage from an upper s tage vehicle  tank i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  cargo 
cannot be allowed t o  overpressurize the  bay. The resu l t ing  damage t o  the  
. t l e  s t ruc tu re  and cargo bay doors could, i n  extreme cases, cause loss  of 
the  e n t i r e  vehicle,  including the  crew, during reentry.  F o r  lesa  severe 
cases, the  s t r u c t u r e  could bend or  break, allowing hot atmospheric plasma t o  
enter  in te rna l  volumes containing c r i t i c a l  components. 
Limiting t h e  gaseous contents of upper s tage vehicle  tanks t o  the  value 
-. --- 
shown f o r  a typica l  case i n  Figure A - n  could prevent overpgessure from the 
leakage or  rupture of any one tank. Each independent tank would not provide 
enough gas t o  increase the  cargo bay pressure above the design l i m i t  (13,800 
~ / m ~ ,  2 p s i ,  i n  t h i s  case) even under the  r e s t r i c t i o n  of no venting. 
Immediate expansion of gas i n t o  the  cargo bay i s  the  worst case, s ince some 
upper stage vehicle  tank leakage over time would a l s o  allow some cargo bay 
outflow. Immediate expansion a l s o  r e s t r i c t s  the  heat t r ans fe r ,  s o  the  process 
can approach isentropic .  The general  re la t ionship  f o r  i sent ropic  s t a t e  
changes f o r  a per fec t  gas is: 
where p = gas pressure 
V = gas volume 
Subscript 1 denotes the  i n i t i a l  pressure and volume of the  gas 
i n  t h e  tank, and subscript  2 the  expanded values, i,e., the  
allowable pressure i n  the  cargo bay, and the  cargo bay volume 
(assuming it i s  a l l  ava i lab le  f o r  expansion). 
Figure A-17 shows the  alhwahle re la t ionship  between W . n r r e s e u r e  and 
volume. This r e s u l t  takes advantage of the  decrease i n  gas temperature during 
expansion t o  allow high i n i t i a l  tank pressures  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  small tank 
volumes. The f i n a l  low temperature reduces the  immediate s p e c i f i c  volume, 
so t h a t  a l a r g e r  weight of gas is  acceptable t o  the  Shut t le  s t r u c t u r a l  
s t rength.  I t  i s  therefore  be t te r ,  from t h e  point of view of po ten t i a l  cargo 
bay overpressurization, t o  t r a n s p o r t . l a r g e  quan t i t i e s  of gas i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay a t  high r a t h e r  than low pressure (assuming the same storage tem- 
perature3 . For example, a typ ica l  Space Station module contains 156 m3 (5500 f t  ) of a i r  a t  105 ~ / m 2  (14.7 p s i ) .  This point  is on the  unsafe 
side of the  curve, i .e.,  a massive leak from the  module could damage the  
o r b i t e r  cargo bay. I f  the  same quan i t y  of a i r  is  s tored  i n  a tank of 5 1.56 m3 (55 f t 3 )  a t  a pressure of 10 ~ / m 2  (1470 p s i ) ,  and t h e  module i s  
now vented t o  space during launch and only pressurized a f t e r  s t a t i o n  assembly, 
a rupture of the  tank. w i l l  not now overpressurize the  cargo bay, as shown 
by the  f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  poin t  now l i e s  on t h e  safe  s i d e  of the  curve. 
The f i n a l  gas s t a t e  a f t e r  a leakage continues t o  change slowly due t o  
heating from the  cargo bay s t ruc tu re ,  kt venting w i l l  compensate f o r  the  
spec i f i c  volume increase. The curve i s  conservative because no gas condensa- 
t ion  t o  so l id  was considered, i.e., sublimation pressures a r e  extremely small. 
3530 100- 
Tank 
Volume 
1 0- 
Space Dlvlrion 
North American Rockwell 
\ Isentropic expansion of diatomic gas from tank into  18.3 m (60 f t )  x 4.6 m (15 f t )  
diameter shut t le  cargo bay \ 
Bay Pressure 
SAFE 13,800 N / r n 2 ~  
I n i t i a l  Tank Pressure 
1.45 14.5 145 1450 psia 
~ i ~ ~ r ~  A-17. Safe Content of Gas Tanks 
A.14 MAXIMUM SAFE TANK CONTENTS - LIQUID 
Safe liquid content of upper stage vehicle tanks i s  a function of the 
amount of gas generated when liquid leakage occurs. Storable propellants 
release a small amount of gas because of rapid solidif icat ion.  The differ-  
ence between sol idi f icat ion temperature.and normal operating temperature is  
small and the heat l o s t  through evaporation is  large, e.g., one pound of 
water a t  21*~-'(70~~) requires only 0.073 kg(0.16 l b )  of water evaporation t o  freeze. 
. 
In contrast, cryogenic propellants vaporize a larger percentage of the 
liquid before the remainder is solid; e.g., a t  l eas t  259 fo r .  hydrogen and 
53% for  oxygen. Expansion t o  a higher pressure than vacuum may resu l t  i n  
a decrease i n  the amount of gas generated, but a t  a higher temperature. 
Specific analysis i s  required fo r  each combination of l iquid and storage 
conditions t o  identify safg liquid tanks volumes, 
Some upper stage vehicle tanks may not be within the allowable contents 
t o  preclude overpressurization of the cargo bay i n  the event of leakage. 
Reduction of pressure and/or volume could be made. fo r  improved safety. 
Volume reduction t o  reduce the potential ef fects  of a fa i lu rn  of any 
one tank could be accomplished by the use of u l t i p l e  tanks or  collputaenta- 
t ion of the larger sizes. ' Multiple tanks are more feasible fo r  high pnsrum 
storage because of the increased efficiency of  structural s h p e  possible. 
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Compartmentation could be used f o r  l a rge r ,  low pressure volumes,where bulk- 
heads need not have excessive weight. In most cases, however, the  tank 
configuration has already been determined by exis t ing  designs (e.g., Centaur, 
Agena, Apollo se rv ice  module), o r  w i l l  be determined by o ther  considerations.  
and 
t ing 
Pressure reduction i s  more f l e x i b l e  because variation with time is possible 
i n  some cases desirable .  Merely reducing the  pressure by regula tor  set- 
; i s  a s t e p  i n  the  r i g h t  d i rec t ion  f o r  l iqu id  propel lan ts  because it could 
r e s u l t  i n  safe  tank contents,  and it does reduce the driving force f o r  
leakage. Storage of the addi t ional  gas f o r  operat ional  pressur iza t ion  imposes 
no weight penalty i n  the  gas quant i ty  and only a small weight increase i n  the  
high pressure gas tanks. 
Further improvement f o r  low leakage can be achieved by cut t ing  o f f  the 
pressurizat ion supply t o  the  lower pressure tanks e n t i r e l y  p r i o r  t o  upper 
s tage vehicle  operation. Leakage w i l l  then decrease the in te rna l  pressure 
and temperature s t i l l  fu r the r ,  with a d i r e c t  decrease i n  leakage flow. Should 
only l iqu id  be exposed t o  the  leak source, a l l  the l iqu id  would normally be 
expelled. However, i f  only pressurizing gas were exposed t o  t h e  leak source, 
much of the l iqu id  i n  the tank would be s o l i d i f i e d  and would not be avai lab le  
f o r  leakage u n t i l  s i g n i f i c a n t  heat t r a n s f e r  had increased the  vapor pressure. 
The time h i s to ry  of the  leak would be much more gradual and would give the  
Shut t le  vents the  time t o  d i s s i p a t e  the e a r l y  leakage. Therefore, the  cargo 
bay pressure r i s e  would be more gradual with a lower peak. 
A $15 ORBITER CARGO BAY VENTS 
Venting of the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay starts with the  launch and re-entry 
t rans ients .  The atmospheric gas flow i s  out  and i n ,  respect ively,  and the  
p r a c t i c a l  so lu t ion  i s  always-open vent holes. However, vent s iz ing  f o r  t h i s  
condition does not consider the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  upper s tage  vehicle  leakage 
at the same time. These holes  must be small enough t o  prevent excessive 
ingest ion of hot, atmospheric plasma; therefore,  the  individual and t o t a l  
hole a rea  is  l i m i t e t .  In addition,  payload leak r a t e s  during on-orbit 
operations with t h e  cargo bay doors closed could r e s u l t  i n  bay overpressure; 
e.g., leaks from large  propel lant  tanks and large,  pressurized modules which 
a r e  more than one-half the  cargo bay i n  volume. 
Increased venting capacity could be avai lab le  through d i f f e r e n t i a l  
pressure act ivated r e l i e f  valves. Single d i rec t ion  venting from ins ide  t h e  
cargo bay,to space would be s u f f i c i e n t  because the i n t e n t  is  t o  prevent 
o r b i t e r  d i s a s t e r  a s  a r e s u l t  of upper s tage vehicle  la rge  leakage i n t o  the  
bay o r  generation of la rge  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  gas i n  the bay through f i r e .  
Although la rge  leakage and f i r e  a r e  unlikely,  they a r e  hazards whose e f f e c t s  
iavolve grave consequences f o r  o r b i t e r  crew and equipment. Tradeoff of 
r i s k  with venting capacity should be made during de ta i l ed  design of o r b i t e r  
and payload. 
Completely open cargo bay doors e s s e n t i a l l y  provide a space environment. 
The space exposed s i d e  of the  o r b i t e r  payload has no confinement and could 
accept a l l  leakage without overpressure; but the  o r b i t e r  s i d e  could s t i l l  be 
loca l ly  confined as a consequence of cargo bay wall proximity t o  the  upper 
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stage vehicle. With reasonable precaution in insta l la t ion design, the 
likelihood of cargo bay overpressure should be acceptably small. Open cargo 
bay doors t o  the maximum extent possible while in earth orb i t  resolves 
several part icular hazards and i s  therefore recommended. 
The complete orbi ter  of 
A-18. 
t Always Open - Vent Holes Cargo 
shutt le cargo bay venting is shown in Figure 
t- Cargo Bay- Relief Valves - Open Cargo Bay Doors 
Figure A-18. Cargo Bay Venting S p e c t m  
Bay 
Pressure 
0 
Any on-orbit operations that  could prevent door closure following 
payload ac t iv i t i e s  are hazardous t o  the orbiter.  A current orb i te r  require- 
ment is closed cargo bay doors during reentry due t o  aerodyadc b u i k t h g  
and heating. Payload ac t iv i t i e s  in  orbi t  generally require opening of the 
cargo bay doors t o  expose sensors t o  the space environment or  to  off-load 
free flying vehicles into  space. Possible incorporation of environaental 
control cooling radiators on the door internal surfaces would also require 
door opening for  on-orbit use. W e  upper stage vehicle insta l la t ion con- 
figurations (e . g . , Centaur) have recmunended vent, e lectr ical ,  f i t t i n g  and 
dumping connections through the door. Any one of these hard connections 
could interfere with the door closing by misaligment of e i ther  mating piece. 
Retrieved upper stage vehicle indexing within the orbiter wauld have to  be 
very precise. Connections would be inaccessible t o a e i t e r  crew by IVA o r  
EVA because of small clearances. Therefore, connections t o  the doors are 
not reconmended because of added hazard and low flexhbility. 
--------- -- ---- // Allowable L i m i t  
0 - 
Upper Stage Vehicle Leakage o r  Gas Generation Rate 
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An a l t e r n a t e  locat ion of interconnections between upper s tage vehicles  
and the o r b i t e r  would be from the  upper surfaces (those exposed t o  space 
when the door i s  open) of the  upper s tage vehicle  t o  the  cargo bay walls.  
This locat ion would allow connection independent of e i t h e r  upper stage 
r e t r i e v a l  i n t o  the  bay, o r  of  the cargo bay door closing. In addition,  
the connections would be accessible  t o  manned adjustment and r e p a i r  before 
de-orbit.  
A.16 ORBITER CREW CONTROL 
The prime sa fe ty  requirement of the  upper s tage vehic le /orb i te r  combina- 
t i o n  i s  re tu rn  of the crew t o  ear th ,  The only immediate means i s  the  o r b i t e r .  
Monitoring f o r  performance abnormalit ies by the crew provides the information 
necessary upon which t o  base mission continuation o r  abort  decisions.  Com- 
puter  control  can provide some normal operating sequences, but the  more 
complex normal and abort  sequences may be performed by crew cont ro l  more 
ef fec t ive ly .  The crew can provide an in ter lock  capab i l i ty  f o r  hazardous 
operations without addi t ional  weight and with crew assurance. 
One of the  most severe hazards from upper s tage vehic les  i s  overpressure 
of the tanks with subsequent explosion. ,Crew monitor of tank pressure is  
a back-up f o r  the  automatic measure, and crew control  of vent and pressurizing 
valves is  a back-up f o r  automatic pressure l eve l  control ;  t h i s  may include 
separate  sensors and readouts f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew, over-ride opening and 
closing of the vent valves, and over-ride opening and closing of pressurizing 
gas supply valves. Where inadvertent  initiation^ of  upper s tage vehicle  
I processes could present  a hazard t o  the  o r b i t e r ,  a separate  cut-off should 
A be avai lab le  t o  the  o r b i t e r  crew; e.g., e l e c t r i c i t y  t o  the  upper s tage 
vehicle  engine start valves. Switchover from o r b i t e r  crew command control  
t o  upper stage vehicle in te rna l  control  should occur only when the  o r b i t e r  
is  e i t h e r  out  of hazard range e n t i r e l y  o r  i s  capable of performing evasive 
P maneuvers t o  avoid a f a i l e d  upper s tage vehicle under the  case of maximum 
possible  vehicle  accelerat ion.  
A i l 7  ORBITER CARGO BAY ISOLATION 
G Several o r b i t e r  hazards from upper s tage  vehicles  o r  any one of a 
t v a r i e t y  of payloads could propagate i n t o  o r b i t e r  equipment through proximit] 
: I e.g., overpressure from leakage, pressure shock from explosion, shrapnel 
impingement from explosion, and excessive heat t r a n s f e r  from f i r e .  In case 
of emergencies r e su l t ing  from such hazards, remedial ac t ion  must be taken 
by the o r b i t e r  crew i n  order  t o  r e tu rn  sa fe ly  t o  the  ground, 
The o r b i t e r  equipment necessary f o r  de-orbit , reentry, .md landing must 
remain i n  a safe  operating mode, but o r b i t e r  equipment surrounding t h e  cargo 
bay has a higher chance of being damaged than remote equipmcnt. Much equip- 
ment must be placed i n  and near the  cargo bay because of funct ional  require-  
ments and i n  order t o  minimize the o r b i t e r  t o t a l  volume. Orbi te r  equipment 
required f o r  sa fe  r e tu rn  should not be placed i n  exposed pos i t ions  around 
the cargo bay because of the  added r i sk .  In  addition,  damage t o  this nearby 
equipment can be prevented from af fec t ing  remote e q u i p e n t  by the expedient 
Space Dlvlsh 
NorthAmencanRockwell 
of i so la t ion .  I so la t ion  can be implemented by in ter locks  o r  shutoff valves 
within branches of the subsystem, o r  by separate  subsystems which in te r face  
through i so la t ing  components; e.g . , cathode followers, heat exchangers, and 
informat ion storage. 
I so la t ion  of the  external  in te r face  between o r b i t e r  and upper s tage 
vehicle  requires  c o n s i a r a t i o n  of fragment b a r r i e r s  and thermal insulat ion.  
These sa fe ty  devices cauld be placed on each payload according t o  the  
pecul ia r  requirements o r  on the  o r b i t e r  as a minimum common requirement 
t h a t  does not  penalize upper s tage  performance; e.g., a s ing le  insula t ion  on 
the o r b i t e r  cargo bay surface (inner o r  outer)  which ameliorates a l l  three  
e f f e c t s  . 
The o r b i t e r  cargo venting system should be i so la ted  from the r e s t  of 
the o r b i t e r  venting system. I n t e r s t i c e s  between the o r b i t e r  tanks and 
conduits need t o  be vented t o  the atmosphere and space during ascent m d  
re-entry.  Combining the vent system f o r  the two volumes would increase the 
number of  f a i l u r e  modes appl icable  t o  the  o r b i t e r  tanks; e.g., corrosion 
from upper s tage vehicle,  co:rosive f l u i d  leakage and increased heat t rans-  
f e r  i n t o  o r b i t e r  cryogenic propel lants  ( for  o r b i t e r s  with i n t e r n a l  hydrogen 
and/or oxygen t m k s ) .  Leakage from any upper s tage vehic le  would destroy 
the hard vacwn surrounding o r b i t e r  cryogenic tanks which is  necessary f o r  
insula t ion  effect iveness .  In addi t ion,  any leak i n  the  o r b i t e r  tanks 
would increase the  pressure experienced by t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay. Providing 
a separate  venting system f o r  each volume would confine f a i l u r e s  t o  the  
l o c a l i t y  of t h e  i n i t i a l  f a i l u r e s ,  and would improve t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
remedial action. 
In summary, the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay venting system shauld normally be 
separate  from the  o r b i t e r  tank volume venting system. Always-.open vent 
holes  t o  space could be used f o r  both. Vent requirements could be s a t i s f i e d  
by r e l i e f  valves between the  two volumes (simultaneous emergencies i n  both 
volumes a r e  unl ikely)  o r  between each volume and .qace. The more l i k e l y  
small leaks should be well  within the  always-open vent capac i t i e s  de tewined 
by launch and re-entry requirements. Requirements of open s h u t t l e  cargo 
bay doors and avoidance of in te rna l  confined volumes would provide the  
maximum venting over t h e  longest time period. The current  o r b i t e r  time-line 
includes short  periods of operation i n  o r b i t  with the  cargo bay doors closed 
immediately on achieving o r b i t  and again before de-orbit.  
A 18 ROCKET ENGINE INSTABILITY 
Rocket ezgines u t i l i z e  very high temperature gases  in t h e  v io len t  
chemical reac t ion  of combustion t o  provide e f f i c i e n t  thzus t  in  space. 
Control of t h i s  process is primari ly  empirical in current  designs. Extensive 
t e s t i n g  is required t o  explore the  s t a b l e  region of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  design 
used and safeguards are provided for insuring operation only within that 
region, but uncontrolled combustion is  still possible.  The effects of 
uncontrolled c a b u s t i o n  are catas tqhic  to  the engine and i d i a t e  s u t i  
raundings through f l u e ,  s a p n e l  loss of ful l  th rus t ,  and misciirsc: :d 
t h m s t  . 
Space Division 
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Checkout of a t t i t u d e  control  engines before upper s tage  vehicle  re lease ,  
i f  required,  should occur i n  the  f u l l y  extended pos i t ion ,  i f  possible.  
Att i tude hold immediately following release should be performed by cold gas 
j e t s  o r  by engines on the  opposite s ide  of the  uppor s tage vehicle  from the  
o r b i t e r ,  
Intent ional  operation of upper s tage vehicle  main rocket engines should 
be planned only when relnote from the  o r b i t e r ,  and main engine burn should be 
i n i t i a t e d  at a dis tance from which evasive act ion by the  o r b i t e r  could 
prevent damage o r  co l l i s ion .  Return of an upper -"sge vehicle  t o  the  o r b i t e r  
can be performed i n  a similar manner; e,g.,  t u rn  orf upper s tage vehicle  
main engine before o r b i t e r  approach and switch t o  cold gas j e t s  when near the 
orb5 t e r  . 
A.19 HAZARDOUS FLUIDS IN 1971 BLUE BOOK EXPERIMENTS 
An analysis was made of the 1971 Blue Book to identify fluide which are 
specifibd in the varioua experiments, Tables A-12 through A-18 present the 
1971 Blue Book experiments, by discipline, with the associated fluids where 
specified. Quaatities, pressures, volumes and other relevant parameters are 
shown where available. 
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A.20 RADIOACTIVE EXPERIMENT SOURCES 
The radioact ive sources i d e n t i f i e d  from a review' o f  the  1971 NASA 
Experiments Blue Book a r e  l i s t e d  i n  Table A-19. 
. 
Table A-19 ; Identified Radioactive Saurcee 
Source 
co60 o r  cs 137 
C-14 Methionine 
- -  Quantity 
2-3 cur ies  
Unknown 
10 m i l l i -  
cur ies  
Discipl ine 
Life sciences 
Life Sciences 
Life Sciences 
Experiment 
Radiobiology 
Role of  gravi ty  
i n  l i f e  processes 
o f  microscopic 
organisms arid 
cul tured t i ssues .  
EEf'ect of  the  
space environment 
on inver tebra te  
behavior. . 
Usage 
- 
Gamma Isotope 
Radiation Source. 
Radiation Source 
f o r  tr ibolium 
experiments. 
A s  can be seen from the  above t ab le ,  cobalt-60 and cesium-137 Gamma 
Isotope Radiation Sources could present a s i g n i f i c a n t  rad ia t ion  hazard if 
shielding i s  damaged while i n  the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay o r  during cargo handling 
and t r ans fe r  operations. Typical cha rac te r i s t i c s  o f  1 cur ie  of  these isotopes 
as shown below: 
A radia t ion  hazard due t o  sp i l l age  is  not  an t ic ipa ted  f o r  co60, s ince  
it would be expected t o  be a s o l i d  me ta l l i c  material and not subjec t  t o  
rupture;  however, radioact ive sources which a re  of  a powdered .form enclosed 
i n  capsules could present a s p i l l a g e  hazard. 
Isotope 
Shielding requirements f o r  l imi t ing  design dose r a t e s  t o  0.1 R/week i n  
working areas a re  shown i n  Figure A-19 and illustrate typical Industrial 
design standards f o r  coho and cslJ7. 
A.21 MINIATURE AIRLOCK FOR PLUMBXNG INTERFACE CONNECTXONS 
Hal f - L i  fe 
A po ten t i a l  hazard during t r a n s f e r  of  hazardous f l u i d s  between containers 
i n  mated modules v i a  piping, i s  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of f l u i d  leakage from plumbing 
in te r face  connections i n t o  habi table  vehicle  volumes. Safety 'considerations 
f o r  the  non-mated module . make . it desireable  t h a t  terminal points  of  t r ans fe r  
. , . . .  . 
Roentgens 
Per Hour 
a t  1 F t  
Roentgens 
Per Hour 
a t  1 Meter 
SpaceDkrtsion 
North American Rodtwell 
Figure A-19. Radioactivity of Cobalt 60 and Cesium 137 
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l i nes  fo r  hazardous f l u i d  containers be vented t o  space. . However, a f t e r  
I mating it i s  des i rable  t o  make module plumbing in te r face  connections i n  a 
sh i r t s l eeve  environment, but perform subsequent t r ans fe r  operations with the 
plumbing in te r face  connections vented t o  space. A possible  way t o  accomplish 
these object ives  is  through use of a miniature ~ i r l o c k  which i s  described, 
including operations,  i n  Figure A-20. 
. -- - . .. - . . .  - -  - . -  
A.22  BOMB BLANKET 
A cursory inves t iga t ion  was conducted t o  determine the f e a s i b i l i t y  of 
employing bomb blankets, s i m i l a r  t o  bomb blankets used by pol ice department 
bomb squads, t o  contain explosions of pressure vessels  and pyrotechnic devices. 
Contact with the  Los Angeles Police Department Bomb Squad provided the follow- 
ing information on the  commercially avai lab le  blankets.  
Blanket Manufacturer: 
Davis Bomb Blanket Corporation 
Scut te rs  and Woodbone Ave. 
North Port, Long I s l and  11768 
Blanket Charac ter i s t ics  : 
Size: 1.2m x 1.2m x 0.6cm (4 f t  x 4 f t  x 1/4 in )  
Weight: 11 kg (25 lb)  
Material  : ' Laminated B a l l i s t i c  Material 
Test  Devices: MK2 hand grenade and various pipe bombs 
ranging i n  s i z e  frcm 1.3cm (1/2 in]  t o  
3.8cm (1 1/2 i n )  in te rna l  diameter x up 
t o  20cm (8 in)  length f i l l e d  with various 
types of gunpowder. 
Test  Results : Limited shock wave reduction with approxi- 
mately 90% shrapnel containment. 
The use of  such blankets does not  appear feas ib le  f o r  pro tec t ing  large 
pressure vessels  because of  the large weight penal t ies  involved and the 
a b i l i t y  t o  prevent shrapnel from small TNT equivalents oillye Technology 
advances i n  blanket mater ial  and design could possible  improve the cont ro l l -  
able energy leve ls  t o  values o f  t h e  order  o f  pounds of TNT equivalent.  An 
addi t ional  disadvantage i s  t h a t  t o t a l  shrapnel c o n t a i n h n t  is' not accomplished. 
I t  appears feas ib le  however, t h a t  the blankets ,  with modification t o  
improve shrapnel containment, could be used t o  (1) contain explosions and 
shrapnel of pressure vesse ls  with energy leve ls  on the  order  o f  0.01 kg 
(0.022 lb) TNT equivalent,  (2) provide portable  temporary b l a s t  sh ie lds  
f o r  personnel performing non-rout ing maintenance i n  po ten t i a l ly  hazardous 
volumes, (3) provide portable  temporary blast sh ie ld  f o r  personnel perform- 
ing repa i r  or disarmament o f  m i s  f i ed  pyrotechnic .devices, o r  o ther  po te? t i a l ly  
explosive elements, and (4) provide a b l a s t  s h i e l d  between adjacent pressure 
vessels .  
I t  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  note t h a t  any development e f f o r t  i n  t h i s  area 
would have d i r e c t  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  t o  c i v i l i a n  pol ice  departments. , 
Space Dlvision 
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- C - -- 
- ' a  - - -C 
C C Inspection 
-- 
~in'dow (Optional) ' -\ 
I=13.q = Pressurized habitable volume 
1 1 = Airlock o r  volume vented t o  space 
Operat ions : 
- Perform mating of supply vehicle t o  receiving vehicle 
- Perfom p l d i n g  in terface  connections i n  pressurized habitable environment 
- Vent airlock t o  space 
- Perform and monitor f l u id  t rans fe r  operations 
- Vent plunbing t o  spgw o r  purge with i n e r t  g,as t o  clear l ines  of  any 
residual toxic  f l u id  
- Pressurize airlock 
- Remove pl-ine in ter face  connections 
Figure A-20. Miniature Airlock for P l u b i n g  Interface ConnectLon8 
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockweli 
OF TUG ORRITER 
Upper stage vehiclea must be man-compatible; Le., man rating safety 
criteria must be applied to systems-and functfons of the upper stage vehicle 
which could create a hazard to the orbiter while the upper stage vehicle is in 
or near the orbiter. The term man-rating, while not strictly defined, means 
that the safety, i.e., lack of hazards to the Shuttle and Shuttle personnel, 
has been adequately demonstrated so that the residual risks to personnel 
are judged to be acceptable. This is, of course, a subjective matter and 
no definite man-rating criteria can be cited. 
On the Saturn S-I1 and Apollo CSM programs, two successful unmanned 
flights were the last phases of man-rating a new launch vehicle. It is not 
clear what the equivalent requirement is for upper stage vehicles, since the 
mission phases which require man-compatibility are the relatively passive 
phases of launch, boost, on-orbit deployment and retrieval, deorbit, re- 
entry, and landing. 
The test requirements for man-compatibility must therefore be developed, 
and must be consistent with the corresponding man-rating requirements on the 
Shuttle. 
One possibility is that a safe unmanned test be performed on the 
Shuttle, in which one or both propellants are replaced by equivalent fluids 
which cannot react chemically. For example, L02/LH2 vehicles may be launched 
into orbit and returned to earth using LN2/LH2. The liquid nitrogen will 
provide an adequate simulation of the liquid oxygen, but neither the nitrogen 
nor the hydrogen on their own, nor in combination, can produce a chemical 
reaction. Other propellants can be replaced by chemically inert fluids with 
analogous density, thermal, and other properties. Such a flight test can 
also be used to satisfy man-compatibility requirements; but it can alsc; be 
used as a part of the vehicle qualification testing because the Shuttle 
environment is perfectly reproduced. Such combined testing may prove very 
cost effective, replacing a large portion of the ground qualification test- 
ing, as well as man-rating the vehicle. . 
An alternative man-compatibility test may consist of launching the 
upper stage vehicle into orbit as a kick stage, using a booster which exhibits 
environments at least as severe as the Shuttle. Such a test imposes design 
constraints on new upper stage vehicles (i,e., the tug/OOS) to make it com- 
patible with the Shuttle orbiter - and the other booster, 
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SUPPORTING ANALY SES-DOCKIl?G 
This  appendix p r e s e n t s  suppor t ing  ana lyses  performed dur ing  Task 2 ,  
Analys is  of  Ear th  O r b i t a l  Shutt le/Modular  Space S t a t i o n  Docking Options.  
I t  should  be  read  as a t e c h n i c a l  appendix t o  S e c t i o n  3.0 of t h i s  volume. 
B . 1  DOCKING DYNAMICS WITH DOCKING PORTS OFFSET FRO11 THE CENTERS OF IIASS 
The c u r r e n t  exper ience  of docking on t h e  Gemini and Apollo programs 
has d e a l t  w i t h  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which the  c e n t e r l i n e s  of t h e  docking p o r t s  
were e s s e n t i a l l y  a l igned  wi th  t h e  c e n t e r s  of m g s s  of the  two docking vehi- 
c l e s .  This  r e s u l t s  i n  minimum angu la r  motions upon c o n t a c t .  
The c u r r e n t  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  of t h e  o r b i t e r  and t h e  modular space  s t a t i o n  
r e s u l t  i n  docking p o r t  a l ignments  which a r e  o f f s e t  from t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  
c e n t e r s  nf mass, a s  shown i n  Figure  B-1. This  l eads  t o  an angu la r  motion 
of t h e  two v e h i c l e s  upon i n i t i a l  docking c o n t a c t ,  which must be cance l l ed  
o u t  by t h e  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  systems of  t h e  v e h i c l e s  ( o r  by t h e  manipu la to r ,  
where used f o r  the  f i n a l  docking, i f  t h i s  h a s  t h e  necessary  torque  c a p a b i l i t y ) .  
The d i r e c t i o n  of  t h e  angu la r  motions (assuming ze ro  angu.'.ar r a  tss be f o r e  con- 
t a c t )  w i l l  be i n  the  same d i r e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  two v e h i c l e s  i f  t h e  docking p o r t  
l ies between t h e  two c e n t e r s  of mass, ( see  Figure  B-2A), o r  i n  o p p o s i t e  
d i r e c t i o n s  i f  both  c e n t e r s  of mass a r e  on t h e  same s i d e  of t h e  c e n t e r  of 
mass ( s e e  Figure  B-2B). The angu la r  v e l o c i t y  of  each v e h i c l e  depends on 
the  c o n t a c t  v e l o c i t y ,  the  v e h i c l e  mass, moments of  i n e r t i a  and d i s t a n c e  o r  
the  c e n t e r  of mass from t h e  docking pozt .  The v e l o c i t i e s  f o r  t h e  two v e h i c l e s  
w i l l  i n  g e n e r a l  be  d i f f e r e n t ,  and i f  t h e  necessary  c o r r e c t i o n s  a r e  n o t  
promptly a p p l i e d  by t h e  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  sys tems,  c o n t a c t  wi th  t n e  two vehi- 
c l e s  w i t h  consequent damage w i l l  r e s u l t .  The dynamics of  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  
angu la r  r a t e s  and angu la r  excurs ions  reached,  as w e l l  as the  conseuqences of 
a  c o n t r o l  system f a i l u r e  a t  the  c r i t i c a l  moment a r e  t h e r e f o r e  of i n t e r e s t  
from t h e  s a f e t y  p o i n t  of view, and are examined h e r e  f o r  t y p i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s .  
Four cases  have been analyzed,  using combinations of  a  l a r g e  and s 
small o r b i t e r  docking r e s p e c t i v e l y  t o  a l a r g e  and a smal.1 space  s t a t i o r  , 
The l a r g e  o r b i t e r  is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  f u l l y  re-usable o r b i t e r  w i t h  
b u i l t - i n  p r o p e l l a n t  t anks ,  a s  s t u d i e d  i n  t h e  Phase B S h u t t l e  Study. Tht. 
small o r b i t e r  is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  o r b i t e r  w i t h  s e p a r a t a b l e  p r o p e l l a n t  
t anks ,  a s  s t u d i e d  i n  t h e  Phase B S h u t t l e  ex tens ion  s t u d i e s .  The l a r g e  and 
small space  s t a t i o n s  r e p r e s e n t  d i f f e r e n t  s t a g e s  of build-up, t h e  l a r g e  one 
being the  bu i l t -up  &man v e r s i o n ,  and t h e  small be ing t h e  s i n g l e  module 
launched i n i t i a l l y .  
a!!!!! Space Division North Amercan Rockwell 
Figure B-1. Typical Orbiter to  Station k c k i n g  Configurations Showing 
Relative Positions of Centers of Mass and Docking Ports. 
Figure B-2. Direction of  I n i t i a l  Angular Motions Fo l lwing  Docking. 
Space Division 
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Table B-1 shows the mass p - q t r t i e s  and relevant diutcaatons for  the 
four cases (see Figure B-1 for  the def ini t ion of the dimensions) . These 
properties are typical of orbi ters  and s t ~ t i o n s  studied i n  the NR phase B 
shu t t l e  and s ta t ion  studies. 
Table B-1. Mass Properties and Dipensions of Four 
Cases of Orbiter to  Stat ion Docking 
Case 
-
Orbiter 
Station 
Orbite? Properties 
Mass, kg x 104 (slugs) 
Moments of Iner t i a  
kg .m2x10~ (slug. f t 2~106: 
"a", m ( f t )  
Station Properties 
 ass , kg r 104 (slugs) 
Moments of Ine r t l a  
kg .m2x106(slug. f t2rl06: 
"b", m ( f t )  
Large 
Large 
15 (10,000) 
2E (20) 
21 (71) 
5 (3500) 
1.7 (1.3) 
4.5 (15) 
Small 
Large 
8(5,5OO) 
8 ( 6 )  
21 (71) 
5 (3500) 
1.7 (1.3) 
4.5 (15) 
Large 
Small ' 
4 
Small 
Small 
8(5,5OO) 
8 ( 6 )  
21 (71) 
1 (700) 
0.13 (0.: 
3 (10) 
The angular excursion which w i l l  be experienced depends on the i n i t i a l  
angular velocity and the control authority available from the vehicle a t t i tude  
control system, This authority d i f f e r s  by orders of magnitude between the 
orbi ter  and s ta t ion.  The orbi ter  uses reaction control jets of 9500 N (2100 lb) 
thrust  on the NR design. and 7100 N (1600 lb) on the MDAC design. The space 
s ta t ion  jets, on the other hand, are 45 and 90 N (10 and 20 1b) respectively 
on the NR and MDAC designs, w i t h  moment arms smaller than. an the orbi ter .  
The capability for  applying torques is 150 to  1000 times la rger  on the orb i t e r  
than on the s ta t ion ,  and taking the  differences i n  moments of i n e r t i a  i n t o  
a c c a n t ,  the control euthority (expressed as angular acceleration capability) 
is aywhere from 2.2 to  125 times larger  on the o rb i te r  than on the s ta t ion.  
The l e a s t  control authority exists on the large, built-up space s ta t ion ,  which 
has the re la t ively  large moments of i ne r t i a ,  but only 45 to  90 N (10 t o  20 lb) 
jets .  Chis can only produce angular ecceler'ations ( in  the pftch plane) of 
about . O l  deg/sec2. 
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Because the  s t a t i o n  control  system has the l e s s e r  control  authori ty ,  
and hence the  g rea te r  po ten t i a l  f o r  problems, the remainhg analysis  is con- 
cerned with t h e  s t a t i o n  only. Table B-2 shows the  angular r a t e s ,  decelera- 
t ions ,  and other  parameters of i n t e r e s t  f o r  the four  cases considered. The 
docking impact ve loc i ty  is taken t o  be 0.3 m/sec ( 1  f t / sec )  and the control  
moment tha t  can be applied 545 N.m (400 l b  . f t )  , 
Table B-2. Angular Motion of Space Sta t ion  Following Docking 
With Orbi ter  a t  0.3 m/sec ( 1  f t / sec )  and 545 N.m. 
(400 lb.  f t )  Control Moment 
The t ab le  shows t h a t  the worst s i t u a t i o n  occurs i n  C a s e  1, i n  which 
a la rge  o r b i t e r  docks t o  a l a rge  s t a t ion .  The la rge  i n e r t i a s  involved, 
t r ans fe r  a s u b s t a n t i a l  angular momentum t o  the  s t a t i o n ,  and t h i s  turns  
through a 32 degree angle (assuming tha t  the i n i t i a l  capture la tches  hold), 
i n  72 seconds, before the motion is arrested.  This obviously poses geometric 
problems, both i n  the  d e t a i l  design of the docking mechanism i t s e l f  t o  allow 
f o r  such angular misalignments, and i n  the  po ten t i a l  of inadvertent  contact 
between the vehicles.  
For the  o ther  cases, the combination of i n e r t i a s  may lead t o  l a rge r  o r  
smaller  i n i t i a l  angular v e l o c i t i e s ,  but  the r e su l t ing  angular excursions are 
l e s s .  
1 
4 
1.6 
0.14 
9 
l2 I 
The above example assumed a docking ve loc i ty ,  V, of 0.3 m/sec (1 ft/sec) 
and a cont ro l  moment, M of 545 N.m (400 lb .  f t )  . For o ther  values of these 
. parameters the  r e s u l t s  vary as follows: 
Case 
I n i t i a l  Angular 
Velocity , deg/sec 
Deceleration, 
deg/sec2 
Angular Excursion, 
deg . 
o Angular accelerat ion oc: M 
Time t o  Decelerate, 1 sec.  I l2 I 39 1 l5 
2 
0.45 
0.01 
10 
1 
0.8 
0.01 
32 
o Angular ve loc i ty  v 
3 
2.1 
0.S 
16 
o Angular excursion oc: v2hl 
o Time t o  decelerate  6 v/M 
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The problems associated with the la rge  angular excur3ions can t h w  be 
considerably a l l ev ia ted  by reducing the  docking ve loc i ty ,  V. For example, 
a t  0.12 m/sec (0.4 m/sec) , 2s planned on the MDAC s t a t i o n ,  the 32 degrees 
excursion fo r  Case 1 is reduced t o  8 degrees. The excursion is fu r the r  
reduced to  about 4 degrees by using the l a r g e r  control  j e t s  of 9C N (20 lb)  
used i n  the MDAC s t a t i o n  design. 
A t  the docking ve loc i t i e s  used by the manipulator system, of 0.03 m/sec 
(0.1 f t /sec) , the  problem e s s e n t i a l l y  vanishes, with an angular excursion 
of 0.3 degrees. This s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  docking ve loc i ty  and control  mo~ents  
is  shown i n  Figure B-3. 
Similar  considerations show t h a t  the o r b i t e r ,  with cont ro l  authori ty  
about two orders of magnitude grea ter  than the s t a t i o n ,  can counteract 
angular motions p rac t i ca l ly  instantaneously,  and does not  have t h i s  kind of 
problea. 
A ser ious  hazard occurs i f  the a t t i t u d e  control  system f a i l s  a f t e r  
capture,  but  before motion has been ar res ted  and the ve3icles  s t ab i l i zed .  
I f  t h i s  happens, the  a t t e c t e d  vehicle  w i l l  continue i ts angular motion, 
the docking in te r face  w i l l  be broken, and the  vehicles  w i l l  co l l ide  with 
each other.  ?!he docking in te r face  w i l l  no t  normally be r ig id ized  u n t i l  t h e  
docking t r ans ien t s  have been thoroughly damped, s o  t h a t  the  docking por t  
w i l l  not a t  t h i s  time be i n  a configuration t o  transmit correct ive moments 
applied by the other  vehicle 's  control  system. This is a pa r t i cu la r ly  d i f f i -  
c u l t  problem i f  the f a i l u r e  occurs on the s t a t i o n .  The o r b i t e r ,  with i ts  
l a r g e r  cont ro l  authori ty ,  w i l l  have i n e r t i a l l y  s t a b i l i z e d  i t s e l f  p r a c t i c a l l y  
instantaneously,  but  the s t a t i o n  w i l l  keep on moving. 
The obvious so lu t ion  is  t o  rapidly undock and back the  o r b i t e r  away 
from the s t a t i o n  s o  as t o  avoid damage. I n  such a case, however, i f  the 
s t a t i o n  control  system problem cannot be corrected,  i t  may be impossible 
t o  ever re-dock t o  the s t a ion  again, and t h e  s t a t i o n  would have t o  be 
abandoned, with an emergency EVA evacuation by the  s t a t i o n  personnel. 
The recommended so lu t ion  is  t o  f l y  the o r b i t e r  s o  t h a t  i t  follows the  
space s t a t i o n  motion. This would involve complex sensing devices or proced- 
ures ,  t o  t rack the  s t a t i o n  angular motions, and possible  minimum impulse 
a t t i t u d e  adjustments on the  o rb i t e r .  This maneuvering' would continue u n t i l  
the angular motions of the two vehicles  have been damped out enough t o  enable 
r ig id iz ing  t o  be performed while the  two vehicles  a r e  sti l l  r o t a t i n g  i n  
i n e r t i a l  space. Once r ig id iz ing  has occurred, the  o r b i t e r  can transmit 
moments through the  docking por t ,  and s top  the motion of both vehicles.  
I f  t h e  f a i l u r e  is i n  the  cont ro l  system of the  o r b i t e r ,  the  suggested 
correc t ive  procedures'can be applied i n  reverse,  with t h e  s t a t i o n  tracking 
the o r b i t e r  motion u n t i l  the two vehicles can be r ig id ized  and the motion 
ar res ted .  The correct ive act ion w i l l  i n  t h i s  case be much slower, and the  
sensing devices could be simpler,  possibly even v isua l  inspection. 
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I f  the manipulators are used f o r  docking, then the  same problem can 
a r i s e ,  and the same correc t ive  procedures applied,  i f  the cont ro l  system 
f a i l u r e  i s  i n  the control  system of the manipulator. I n  t h i s  case, however, 
the motion is much l e s s  than f o r  d i r e c t  docking because of the dynamics 
(AS shown above), the  manipulators could possibly provide some damping 
torques, and the  s t a t i o n  a t t i t u d e  control  sys tem provides a back-up t o  the 
manipulator cont ro l  system, This problem is  therefore not very severe where 
manipulators a r e  used f o r  docking. 
E.2 NON-COLLISION DOCKING AdPROACH VECTOR 
A po ten t i a l  hazard e x i s t s  when two docking vehicles  approach each 
other  on a l ine-of-site course, as  usually planned f o r  the f i n a l  docking 
a ~ n e u v e r .  This is e s s e n t i a l l y  a c o l l i s i o n  course, and i f  a control  system 
fai lur ;  occurs on the ac t ive  vehicle ,  s o  t h a t  the  f i n a l  ve loc i ty .  reductions 
cannot be achieved, a c o l l i s i o n  v i l l  occur a t  a ve loc i ty  higher than the  
capabi l i ty  of the  docking sys tem, with consequent damage. 
I n  order t o  avoid t h i s  hazard, a new procedure is  suggested here ,  
which avoids the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of an inadvertent  c o l l i s i o n  a t  too high a 
veloci ty .  This consis ts .  o f  aiming the approach ve loc i ty  vector not a t  the 
docking port  of . t h e  t a rge t  vehicle ,  but  a t  an imaginary "pseudo-target" 
some distance t o  one s i d e  of the  t a rge t  vehicle.  This is  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  
Figure B-4. The pseudo-target is s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  the s i d e  of the ta rge t  
vehicle t h a t  i f  a control  system f a i l u r e  should occur, the  ac t ive  vehicle 
passes by the  t a rge t  without the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of contact.  Some margin may 
be allowed fo r  possible  ro ta t ions  and er rors .  
This non-collision approach vector  is  maintained while the ve loc i ty  
of the ac t ive  vehicle'  is above the docking system at tenuat ion capabi l i ty .  
Deceleration through the various "braking gates" occurs along t h i s  d i rec t ion .  
The ve loc i ty  vector is  only changed t o  be on a l ine-of-site,  or  c o l l i s i o n ,  
course when i ts  ve loc i ty  has been reduced t o  with thedocking system attenua- 
t ion  capabi l i ty .  I f  a control  system f a i l u r e  occurs now, the docking system 
can withstand the c o l l i s i o n  without damage. 
The method i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure B-4. This shows how the o r ig ina l  
vector  and the pseudo-target a re  se lec ted ,  so  as  t o  avoid po ten t i a l  contact ,  
and how the f i n a l  ve loc i ty  correct ion is  applied t o  br ing the two vehicles 
together  a t  0.12 mlsec (0.4 f t l s e c ) ,  the  assumed docking veloci ty .  The 
f i n a l  d i r ec t iona l  change m u s t  be made a t  the  correct  time, when the two 
docking systems are opposite each other ,  
A number of options a re  avai lable  i n  applying t h i s  procedure. F i r s t l y ,  
the  ac t ive  vehicle  may be or iented orthogonally t o  the t a r g e t  vehicle ,  s o  
t h a t  i t  is moving crabiwise u n t i l  the f i n a l  ve loc i ty  change, This is the  
way i l l u s t r a t e d ,  and does not require  a re-orientation of the vehicle ,  bu t  
only of i t s  ve loc i ty  vector.  Alternat ively the vehicle  may be or iented i n  
the  d i rec t ion  of the  approach ve loc i ty ,  L e o ,  toward6 the pseudo-target, and 
change or ienta t ion  a t  the same time as the  ve loc i ty  vector.  
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STATION PSEUDO 
TARGET 
/ / 
p- 
/ / 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
0.12 mlsec (0.4 ft lsec) or 0 
0.12 m/eec (0.4 ft/sec) 
0.3 m/sec (1 ft/se;c) 
0.6 m/sec (2 ft/sec) 
- VELOCITY VECTOB 
1.5 m/sec (5 ft/sec) 
I 
/ 
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The o ther  option r e f e r s  t o  the  f i n a l  braking maneuver. I n  the  f igure  
shown, the  ve loc i ty  is reduced t o  0.12 mlsec (0.4 f t l e e c )  while s t i l l  point- 
ing towards t h e  pseudo-target, and a r e l a t i v e l y  small correct ion applied 
when opposite the  t a rge t ,  which does not  change the magnitude of the ve loc i ty ,  
but  only i ts  d i rec t ion .  Alternat ives  to  t h i s  cons is t  of making a combined 
f i n a l  correct ion i n  the f i n a l  braking gate ,  (which is r e l a t i v e l y  complex 
i n  timing and di-rection, but  minimizes propel lant  usage) ; o r  f i r s t  coming 
t o  an absolute h a l t  opposite the t a r g e t ,  and then accelerating on the f i n a l  
l ine-of-site vector (which s impl i f i e s  the procedurt, but increases propel lant  
usage) , 
Two p o t e n t i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  can be foreseen with t h i s  procedure. F i r s t l y  , 
t he  guidance of the  vehicle towards a non-existent pseudo-target is  a more 
complex maneuver than a simple l ine-of-s i te  approach. It may be found, 
however, t h a t  a "bias" can be introduced simply and rel ' iably i n t o  the o p t i c a l  
system. The angle of view of the t a r g e t  vehicle  w i l l  continually change, 
however. 
Secondly, the a t t i t u d e  control  sys tem programming i s  more complex, 
possibly requiring more propel lan ts ,  and more complex computer aided 
controls.  I f  the o r i en ta t ion  of the ac t ive  vehicle is maintained constant,  
the braking maneuvers require  simultaneous f i r i n g  of severa l  j e t s  i n  a pre- 
determined but  constant r a t ion ,  and t h i s  i s  a non-optimum use of .the system. 
The sa fe ty  advantages, of completely avoiding the p o s s i b i l i t y  of an 
inadvertent c o l l i s i o n  a t  a ve loc i ty  t o  cause damage, must be evaluated 
against  the p ~ t e n t i a l  disadvantages pointed out. This preliminary evalua- 
t ion  indica tes  t h a t  the  advantages may be worth the penal t ies  involved. A 
f u l l e r  evaluation of the method, including simulations with v i sua l  displays,  
should be made. 
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APPENDIX C 
SUPPORTING ANALYSIS-ON BOARD SURVIVABILITY 
This appendix presents  supporting analys is  performed during Task 3, 
Analysis of Traf f ic  Pa t te rns ,  Escape Routes, and Compartment I so la t ion .  It  
should be read a s  a technical  appendix t o  Section 4 , 3  of t h i s  volunie. 
C.l Flood Flow Rate 
A rapid loss  of pressure i n  an inhabited pressure volume can r e s u l t  i n  
loss  of personnel i f  evacuation of the compartment t o  a succor volume, the  
donning and u t i l i z a t i o n  of pressure s u i t s ,  o r  r epa i r  of. t he  leak cannot be 
accomplished i n  s u f f i c i e n t  time. One method proposed i n  the  tegt, to  en- 
hance crew react ion time t o  cope with a depressurization emergency, involved 
the flooding of the affected v o l u ~  with atmosphere a t  a rate which is  a t  
l e a s t  equivalent t o  tha t  at which i t  is being l o s t  t o  space, This flooding 
operation need not be i n i t i a t e d  u n t i l  the  atmosphere preeeure l e v e l  is  
approaching the minimum, below which the crew cannot function o r  survive.  
This l e v e l  is  nominally estimated t o  be approximately 8 p s i .  I f  the  crew 
has evacuated the compartment and it  is necessary t o  re-enter  the compart- 
ment a f t e r  i t  has dropped below the  minimum acceptable pressure,  the  flood 
flow r a t e  of atmosphere required must exceed the loss  r a t e ,  
The atmosphere flood flow r a t e  required to  maintain compartment press- 
ures between 4.82 x 104 n/m2 (7 ps ia)  and 10.12 x 104 n/m2 (14.7 psia)  , as 
a function of the hole diameter through which atmosphere i e  being l o s t  t o  
space, is shown i n  Figure C-1. The flood flow r a t e  is  independent of the 
compartment volume, 
From the char t  i t  can be seen t h a t ,  f o r  a 2,54 cm (1 i n )  diameter hole ,  
a flood flow r a t e  of approximately 7.7 kg/min (17 lb/sec) i e  required t o  
maintain the atmospheric pressure at  10.,12 x 104 n/m2 (14.7 psia)  . . The 
react ion time gained f o r  any reserved quant i ty  of flood flow atmosphere 
would be added to  the time involved t o  reduce the af fec ted  compartment 
pressure t o  the l e v e l  a t  which flood flow is  i n i t i a t e d  t o  arrive a t  the 
t o t a l  afforded reac t ion  time. For example, 77 kg (170. lb)  of s tored  atmos- 
phere can extend the crew react ion time t o  cope with a 2,54 cm (1 in)  hole  
i n  a 56.8 rn3 (2000 f t 3 )  o r b i t e r  crew/passenger compartment by 10 minutesi i . c . ,  
from 6 t o  16 minutes. 
The i n a b i l i t y  to open o r  c lose ha t  ches during IVA (intravehicular Act ivi ty)  
o r  EVA (Extravehicular Act ivi ty)  is a po ten t i a l  hazard whf ch a f f e c t s  o r b i t e r ,  
s t a t i o n ,  and s o r t i e  module escape routes and compartmentation requirements. 
I V A  is defined as  su i t ed  crew operations within the s t r u c t u r a l  confines of 
a vehicle  while EVA i s  s u i t e d  crew operations outs ide the e t r u c t u r a l  confines 
of the vehicle ,  
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Flood Flow Rate (kg /dn)  
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Figure C -1. Atmosphere Flood Flow Rate v8. Hole Size 
The performance of IVA and EVA during a time i n  which other crewmen 
are  unsuited, requires air lock capabil i ty within the vehicle. The various 
configuration options which can resu l t  from the most simple air lock con- 
f i j p r a t i on  (an air lock with two hatches) when an inoperative hatch ( inab i l i ty  
t o  open o r  close) is considered, are shown i n  Figure C-3 fo r  EVA and Figure 
C-2 for  IVA. The i nab i l i t y  to  open an external  hatch i,n an air lock from 
which EVA egress was performed is not considered credible,  and is therefore 
not accounted for  i n  the assessment of impact because the hatch, a f t e r  initYaL 
opening, would normally be l e f t  open during the performance of EVA. Reference 
is made t o  Table C-1 for  typical  IVA and EVA operations.. 
Configuration a l ternat ives ,  shown with hatches and vol-s which are 
i n  addition t o  the bas ic  configuration d r m  with dashed l ines ,  range from 
aimply back t o  back o r  reduudant hatches within the baseline air lock t o  
multiple completely independent and redundant airlocks. 
Examinat-lan of the EVA composite configurations of Figure C-2, the 
resul t ing configuration when the hatch and independent v o l u v  requireumts 
arc combined fo r  i nab i l i t y  t o  open o r  close a hatch, shave tha t  a dairua 
of four hatches within the air lock,  o r  four hatches conibined with the air- 
lock and an additional pressure volume are required t o  cope with au inopera- 
tive air lock hatch during EVA. 
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Table C-1 ,  Typical  Operations f o r  Performing IVA o r  EVA 
1 EVA 
-:"I1 (Airlock) 
- I V A  - 
Sequent ia l  Operation 
Enter  Airlock 
Don Pressure  S u i t s  (Less Helmat and gloves) 
* Don Pre-Breath Unit 
* Perform Pre-Breathing (Approximately 3 Hours) 
Don PLSS o r  Attach Umbilical 
Close Airlock Hatches 
* Doff Pre-Breath Unit 
Don Helmet and Glove8 
De-Pressurize Airlock 
Open EVA Hatch 
Open IVA Hatch 
E x i t  and Perform EVA 
Exit and ~ e r f o r m  IVA 
Ente r  Airlock 
Close EVA Hatch 
Close IVA Hatch 
Repressurize Airlock 
Open IVA Hatches 
Doff S u i t s  and PLSS o r  Detach Uabilical 
End IVA o r  EVA Sequence 
* Required only f o r  3.7 p s i 8  s u i t e ,  pre-breadhing i e  
no t  required f o r  8 pe ig  e a t .  
Operation 
A . ~ p l i c a b i l i t ~  
A s imi lar  evaluation of the impact of an inoperative hatch during IVA 
operations is shown i n  Figure C -3. A minimum of four  hatchev on two adjacent 
a ir locks o r  s ix  hatches, two p a i r s  of which a r e  back t o  back i n  a s i n g l e  
air lock,  a re  required f o r  protect ion against  an inoperative hatch during 
IVA. A unique a l t e rna te  method fo r  performing IVA is ,  however, ava i lab le  
as can be seen from Option D o  I n  t h i s  option an EVA route  is used as a 
backup f o r  IVA. The priinary disadvantage.with t h i s  option is t h a t  i t  requires  
s i x  hatches and three independent a ir locks.  An a l t e r n a t e  configuration which 
can employ use of an EVA route  f o r  IVA backup is  shown i n  Gption E. A8 can 
%e seen from the chart ,  t h i s  option requires  seven hatches and tvo independent 
airlocks.  
C.3  TWPERATURE AND PRESSURE EFFECTS OF FIRE 
During the analysis  of the impact of a f i r e l t o x i c  environ-nt on 
vehicle configuration, subsystems, and operation, several  questions arose 
which required fur ther  analysis.  These a re  (1) what temperature range can 
be reached i n  a compartment of given voluns i f  a f i r e  i n  the compartment is 
permitted t o  burn u n t i l  i t  is extinguished by the gradual depletion of oxygen? 
and (2) i f  i t  were required t o  l i m i t  the  thermal energy allowable i n  a given 
compartment t o  control the  po ten t i a l  e f f e c t s  of a f i r e ,  what is the re la t ion-  
sh ip  between avai lable  thermal energy, compartment volume, end produced heat  
and pressure. 
A simple calculat ion,  which assumed tha t  a combustible source with ,e 
thermal capacity approximately t h a t  of coal 33 x lo6  Jouleslkg (15000 b tu l lb )  
was burned i n  a compartment u n t i l  a l l  oxygen i n  the compartment was depleted, 
shoved that  the temperature i n  the  compartment could approach 2 5 7 3 q  ( 4 5 0 0 ~ ~ )  
i f  a l l  the generated heat were absorbed by the atmosphere. 
This value is w e l l  beyond the surviva l  capabi l i ty  of the  s t r u c t u r e  and 
subsystems of any vehicle. Although i n  a real s i t u a t i o n ,  the generated heat  
would a l so  be absorbed i n  the s t ruc tu re  and other  mater ial  and p a r t i a l l y  
diss ipated t o  space, the magnitude of the  f e a s i b l e  temperature and the  possi- 
b i l i t y  tha t  the f i r e  could be of s u f f i c i e n t l y  rapid  combustion t o  render hea t  
absorption rates of media other  than the atmosphere negl ig ib le  leads t o  t h e  
conclusion tha t  l e t t i n g  a f i r e  burn out from lack of oxygen is not acceptable. 
The e f f e c t  of re leasing a given quant i ty  of thermal energy i n t o  a known 
compartment volume, which relates t o  the  second question, is shown i n  Figure 
C-4. Aa shown on the char t ,  the ressure of a typica l  vol- f o r  the  o r b i t e r  S crewlpassenger compa&ent, 566 m (2000 f 3 ) ,  would be increased between 
7 kn/m2 (1 psi)  and 14 k n / d  (2 p s i )  and the temperature increased by 283% 
(5O0P) from 294% (70°17) t o  322% (120°F') f o r  a thermal input  of 2.1 x lo6 
Joules (2 x 103 btu's) .  The temperature lidt of 322% (120°J?) is indicated 
because i t  is estimated tha t  above t h i s  temperature crew evacuation from the 
compartmnt would be required. Although the  ptessure increases shuwn do not  
appear large,  s t r u c t u r a l  damage can occur i f  these po ten t i a l  increases  are 
not accounted f o r  i n  design. A f i r e  isoletable compartment, which t€?$ptreB 
a s l i g h t  d e l t a  pressure between i t  and the af fec ted  voltrae to  prevent smoke 
and f u m  contamination can a l s o  be rendered ine f fec t ive  w i t h  such s l i @ t  
! pressure deltas. 
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C.4 FALLIBILITY Or DUAL EGRESS CRITERIA 
Concern over the possible  entrapment of personnel i n  a volumc due t o  an 
emergency i n  the  volume which has blocked the only egress path t o  s a f e t y  led  
i n  t h i s  study, as w e l l  as i n  previous s tud ies  t o  a dual egress c r i t e r i o n .  
I n  addi t ion t o  providing f o r  dual  sh i r t s l eeve  egress  cap.ability, the pre- 
vention of crew i s o l a t i o n  through forced egress  i n t o  non-common volumes is 
inherent i n  i ts i n t e n t .  
The dual egress c r i t e r i o n  as expressed i n  a previous *safety study 
performed f o r  MSC is as  follows: 
"Each compartment should have a minimum of two escape routes  which 
should not terminate i n  a r;o:.mo: :ompartmen:" 
A compartmentation arrangement which s a t i s f i e s  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  i s  shown 
i n  the diagram below, 
It can be seen from the diagram, however, t h a t  even though the dual 
egress  criteria is s a t i s f i e d  as s t a t e d ,  personnel can s t i l l  become i s o l a t e d  
from one another, An emergency i n  compartment A which blocks e i t h e r  egress 
opening divides the  vehicle  i n t o  two p a r t s  i n  which compartments B,  C, and 
F become i so la ted  from compartments B, E, and G. These compartments can be 
made accessible  t o  one another i f  an access route  o r  opening were provided ' 
between compartments C and D o r  F and G. 
*Contract NAS9-9046, Space Sta t ion  Safety Study, Document 116C-00189, dated 
January 1970 
I ' ,  
, . 
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C . 5  PASSENGER TRANSFER TIME - AIRLOCK TO CREWIPASSENGER COMPARTMENT 
The recommended approach t o  cope with loss  of pressur iza t ion  i n  the  
crewlpassenger compartment of the  basel ine o r b i t e r  configuration, a s  
iden t i f i ed  i n  sect ion 4,3.3.3 of t h i s  repor t ,  is f o r  t h e  passengers t o  
egress t o  the  a i r lock  while the crew dons pressure s u i t s  (which do not 
require  pre-breathing) and proceeds t o  perform an abort  from the  depressurized 
compartment. 
Because an o r b i t a l  abort  may require  i n  excess of 6 hours f o r  o r b i t a l  
phasing with and landing a t  a CONUS (Continental United Sta tes)  landing 
s i t e  and may r e s u l t  i n  normal entry maneuver, and landing acce lera t ion  
loads approach 3 g 's ,  passenger abort  i n  t h e  a i r lock  requi res  t h a t  the  
a i r lock  be f i t t e d  with emergency type l i f e  support and passenger r e s t r a i n t  
provisions. Reference i s  made t o  Figure 4.3.3-5 f o r  one concept, previously 
iden t i f i ed  and discussed i n  sec t ion  4.3.3-3, of providing emergency r e s t r a i n t s  
within the  a i r lock .  Because of the  questionable capabi l i ty  of emergency type 
r e s t r a i n t  devices, such as the  hammock type employed i n  t h e  referenced f igure ,  
t o  limit and cont ro l  d i r ec t iona l  body excursions t o  prevent crew in jury  
during an emergency landing i n  which impact and braking accelerat ions w i l l  
be approximately double than those ant ic ipa ted  f o r  normal en t ry  and vehicle  
maneuvers, t h e  recommendation w a s  made t o  re turn  the  passengers t o  t h e i r  
respect ive landing pos i t ions  i n  the  crewlpassenger compartment a f t e r  t h e  
o r b i t e r  re-enters the  sens ib le  atmosphere and the  cabin is re-pressurized 
t o  a habi tab le  environment. 
This recommendation is  based on an assessment of the  t i m e  ava i lab le ,  
p r io r  t o  landing, t o  t r ans fe r  t h e  passengers from the  a i r lock  t o  t h e i r  
s e a t s  i n  the  passenger compartment. The maximum a l t i t u d e  a t  which the  
t r ans fe r  can be made is  t h a t  which can physiologically sus ta in  the  passengers 
and permit t h e i r  functioning i n  a s h i r t s l e e v e  environment. This c r i t e r i a  is  
s a t i s f i e d  only with an atmospheric pressure of approximately 5.5 X 104 n/m2 
(8 p s i )  o r  above which corresponds not  only t o  an a l t i t u d e  of 4500 m (1500 
f t ) ,  but t o  the nominal operating pressure l e v e l  f o r  IVAIEVA s u i t s  cur rent ly  
under development, which do not impose a pre-breathing requirement. 
The t i m e  ava i lab le  t o  t r ans fe r  t h e  passengers from the  a i r lock  t o  the  
passenger compartment is, therefore ,  equ&alenr t o  the  difference i n  t i m e  
between t h a t  when the o r b i t e r  has descended t o  4500 m (15,000 f t )  and t h e  
event of touchdown, A typ ica l  o r b i t e r  descent t imelfne,  which uses the  
, 7ominal vehicle  descent values of a 15 degree bank angle and a l i f t  t o  
drag r a t i o  of seven (7) i s  shown in Figure C-5. A s  can be seen from the 
curve an a l t i t u d e  of 4500 m (15,000 f t )  is achieved approximately 4 t o  5 
minutes p r i o r  t o  landing. This time i s  estimated t o  be  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  the  
personnel t r ans fe r  provided t h a t  a time consuming period of pressure 
equal izat ion between the  a i r lock  and passenger compartment is not  required 
a t  the  time of t ransfer .  The need f o r  s p e c i a l  pressure equal iza t ion  pro- 
cedures a t  the  time personnel t r ans fe r  is required can be eliminated i f ,  
when the  abort  is i n i t i a t e d  o r  a t  a s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  before i n i t i a t i o n  of 
personnel t r ans fe r ,  pressure within the  a i r lock  is reduced t o  5.5 X 104 
n/m2 (8 p s i ) .  Transfer would then be i n i t i a t e d  upon an indica t ion ,  via a 
sensor,  t h a t  pressures within the  two  compartment^ were equalized. 
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APPENDIX D 
1.0  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
This appendix of the Final  repor? contains analyses of the hazards o r  
emergencies iden t i f i ed  during the study. The hazards/emergency analysis  
performed, with the requirements and guidelines t h a t  were developed, a re  
contained i n  f i v e  sect ions,  corresponding t o  the  f ive  tasks performed i n  the  
study. Each sec t ion  i s  divided i n t o  subsections, according t o  the  subtasks 
of each of  t h e  f i v e  tasks.  
The hazards and emergencies iden t i f i ed  are  spec i f i c .  t o  the  study tasks, 
and mst not  be in terpre ted  as a complete l is t  of hazards o r  emergencies 
a s s o c i a t e d i t h  the shu t t l e ,  s h u t t l e  pay loads and space s t a t ion .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  
t h e  hazards/emergencies considered are  those t h a t  can occur i n  o r b i t  only, i n  
accordance with t h e  scope of the study. Hazards/emergencies associated wi th  
prelaunch, launch, boost, deorbi t ,  reent ry  and landing a re  not considered. 
The hazarddemergencies which were analyzed a re  generalized s i tua t ions  
r a t h e r  than hazards o r  emergencies specif ic  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  hardware, designs 
o r  operations.  For example, each separate f l u i d  tank presents  individual 
hazards, according t o  i t s  contents,  pressure,  volume, location, e t c .  A l l  
these hazards, however, a re  grouped i n t o  explosion, corrosiveness, and t o x i c i t y  
hazards, without specifying the  sever i ty  of  each hazard associated with each 
tank. This was done f o r  two reasons: f i r s t l y ,  t o  make the t o t a l  nunher of 
hazard/emergency analyses f o r  the  t o t a l  study manageable; and secondly, so a s  
t o  make the  r e s u l t i n g  requirements and guidel ines applicable i r r e spec t ive  of 
changes t o  the s p e c i f i c  design concepts current a t  the  time of the analyses. 
?'he requirements and guidelines which were generated were ca re fu l ly  
worded so  as t o  s a t i s f y  three c r i t e r i a  t h a t  were considered very important. 
These c r i t e r i a  a r e  t h a t  the  requirements and guidel ines should: 
(a) be ver if iable-- i .e  ., i t  should be possible  t o  unambiguously 
ve r i fy  whether each requirement o r  guideline has been met 
i n  the design o r  i n  the  planned operations.  Ambiguous o r  
non-verifiable words such as  "to the maximum extent  possible" 
o r  lladequate" have therefore been avoided. 
(b) meet the  mathematician's "necessary but su f f i c i en t "  c r i t e r ion-  - 
i . e . ,  they should specify every condition t h a t  must be met to  
s a t i s f y  the  safe ty  objective,  but they should not specify more 
than i s  required f o r  safety.  The l a t t e r  point  i,s p a r t i c u l a r l y  
important s ince the  tendency is t o  s e l e c t  p a r t i c u l a r  design 
o r  operational solut ions which red t r i c  t the designer1 s choice, 
r a t h e r  than s t a t i n g  only the requirement i n  general terms, 
(c) be wr i t ten  i n  prec ise  and unambiguous language, s u i t a b l e  f o r  
iiworporation i n t o  pre liminary requirements spec i f ica t ions  
f o r  Phases B o r  C .  
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A l i s t i n g  of t h e  hazards  and emergencies which have been i d e n t i f i e d  and 
analyzed f o r  each of t h e  f i v e  t a s k s  i n  t h e  s tudy  i s  conta ined i n  Sec t ions  2.5, 
3.7, and 4.1 of t h i s  volume. The d i s p o s i t i o n  of each hazard/emergency i a  a l s o  
i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e s e  t a b l e s  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  two t a sk s .  S ince  t h e  purpose of t h e  
t h i r d  t a s k  was no t  t o  e l i m i n a t e  o r  reduce t h e  emergencies considered,  but  t o  
provide  t h e  on-board s u r v i v a l  fo l lowing t h e i r  occurrence ,  t h e r e  i s  no cor- 
responding d i s p o s i t i o n  of t h e s e  emergencies. 
Hazards/emergencies can be d isposed of i n t o  one o r  more of the  fo l lowing 
c a t e g o r i e s  : 
O Resolved Hazard. The recommended requirements  and gu ide l i ne s ,  
when implemented, e i t h e r  e l im ina t e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of t h e  hazard 
occurr ing;  o r  reduce t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of t h e  hazard ,  i f  i t  
does occur ,  s o  t h a t  n e i t h e r  i n j u r y  t o  personnel  nor  damage t o  
equipment can r e s u l t .  
O Residual  Hazard. The recommended requirements  and g u i d e l i n e s ,  
when implemented, do n o t  e n t i r e l y  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
occurrence  of  t h e  hazard ,  o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of i n j u r y  t o  
personnel  o r  damage t o  e q u i p e n t ,  however low t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y .  
Res idual  hazards  a r e  f u r t h e r  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  Acceptable Risks,  
SRT Requirements, and Unresolved Sa fe ty  I s sues .  
Acceptable Risk. A r e s i d u a l  hazard i s  an  accep tab le  r i s k  i f  
t h e  r i sk-- i .e . ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of occurrence and t h e  p o t e n t i a l  
damage t h a t  may resu l t - -a re  small enough a f t e r  t h e  recommended 
requirements  and gu ide l i ne s  have been implemented, t h a t  no 
f u r t h e r  s a f e t y  measures need be taken t o  f u r t h e r  reduce t h e  r i s k .  
Support ing Research and Technology (SRT) Requirements. It i s  
n o t  pos s ib l e ,  w i t h  t h e  p resen t  s t a t e  of t echno log ica l  knowledge 
t o  determine i f  t h e  hazard can b e  adequate ly  reso lved  (Resolved 
Hazard),  o r  i f  t h e  r i s k  can be s u f f i c i e n t l y  reduced (P x e p t a b l e  
Risk) .  SRT requirements  can be i d e n t i f i e d ,  however, which w i l l  
reduce t h e  hazard t o  a n  accep tab le  l e v e l ,  o r  determine t h e  
e x t e n t  of t h e  hazard.  
0 Unresolved Sa fe ty  I s sue .  The n a t u r e  of t h e  hazard i s  such t h a t  
no p r a c t i c a l  requirements ,  g u i d e l i n e s  o r  SRT requirements  have 
been i d e n t i f i e d  which can r e so lve  t h e  hazard o r  reduce  i t  t o  an 
accep t ab l e  r i s k .  Continuous review i s  necessa ry  of t h e s e  
unresolved s a f e t y  i s s u e s  dur ing a p r o g r m  t o  reduce t h e  r i s k  as 
much a s  p o s s i b l e  by des ign and o t h e r  means. 
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2.0 TECHNICAL APPROACH 
The main purpose of performing hazards/emergency analyses i s  t o  iden t i fy  
sa fe ty  requirements and kuidelines i n  a methodical way. The format used was 
developed from hazard analyses performed on the Phase B Space S ta t ion  and 
Shut t le  contracts  a t  NR/SD, and is i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 2-1.  An 
explanation of the  various features  of t h i s  form follows. The item numbers 
below r e f e r  t o  the  c i r c l ed  numbers i n  the  figure.  
PROGRAM. An X indicates  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one recommended 
requirement or guide1 ine from t h i s  hazard/emef gency analysis  
i s  applicable to  the  a ~ p r o p r i a t e  program (Shutt le ,  Sor t i e  or 
S ta t ion) ,  and appears respectA;ely i n  Volumes IV' o r  V of 
t h i s  repor t .  
NO. Each hazard/emergency analys i; is numbered sequential  ly 
with th ree  numbers i n  a decimal. system. The f i r s t  two 
numbers r e f e r  t o  the task and subdivision of  t h e  task i n  
accordance with Table D - 1 ,  and t h e  last three d i g i t  number i s  
the  sequential  number f o r  the hazard/emergency analyses within 
the  subtask. (e.g . , .2 .l.OO3 r e f e r s  ro the  t h i r d  hazardiemergency 
analys is  f o r  the  f i r s t  subdivision of task 2) .  
DATE. This is t h e  da te  on which the analysis was i n i t i a t e d .  
I t  i s  included as a guide t o  the  reader as t o  the  general 
concepts and progrdms which were current  a t  the time of the 
analysis .  
HAZARD/EMERGENCY. This descr ibes  the hazard o r  the emergency 
which i s  being considered, and contains ident ica l  wordixig as 
i n  Volume 11. 
SOURCE. This cross-references t o  t h e  sec t ion  in  Volume I1  
i n  which the hazarr'. o r  emergency i s  iden t i f i ed  and/or discussed. 
The Roman numeral i d e n t i f i e s  the repor t  volume (normally 
Volume 11) and the  subsequent number the  spec i f i c  sec t ion  o r  
sec t ions  of t h s t  volume. 
ASSUMPTIONS. Ihe v a l i d i t y  of each hazard/emergency analysis  
i s  dependent on various assumptions. While it is very 
d i f f i c u l t  a t  times t o  recognize t h a t  ce r t a in  assumptions are 
impl ic i t  i n ' a n  analysis ,  a strong e f f o r t  has been made t o  
iden t i fy  and state a l l  the relevant  assungtions here. In  t h i s  
way each analysis can be reviewed a t  any t i m e ,  and i f  the 
assumptions a re  s t i l l  applicable,  then the, requirements and 
guidelines are s t i l l  applicable;  i f  t h e r e  have been program 
changes so t h a t  the assumptions a re  no longer va l id ,  then the  
whole hazard/emergency analys is should be reviewed. 
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockwell 
Table D-1. Numbering System f o r  Hazard/Emergency Analyses 
HazardIEmergency 
Analys is  Number Task 
lazardous P a y l o a h  
I I 
locking 
In-board 
Su rv ivab i l i t y  
Subdivision 
Upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  
Hazardous F lu id  Vessels 
Cargo handl ing and t r a n s f e r  
Hazards common t o  a l l  
systems and modes 
Hazards s p e c i f i c  t o  t h e  
d i r e c t  docking s y s  t e m  
Hazards s p e c i f i c  t o  t h e  
extendable  tunne l  docking 
system 
Hazards s p e c i f i c  t o  t h e  
manipula tor  docking s y s  t e m  
Hazards s p e c i f i c  t o  f r e e  
f l y i n g  module docking mode 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
PROGRAM SHUTTLE 
STATION 
I tiAZARD/€MERGENCY 1 1, SOURCE 1 Is) I 
I ASSUMPTIONS I 
L REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES J CODE 
- 
RGD REF. 
Figure 2-1. Buard Emergency Aadyrir Format 
- 1 - 6  
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In addition,  assumptions which a re  applicable to a l l  
-haza-&/emergency analyses f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  task a re  defined 
in  the baseline model for  t h a t  task,  
7. "OTENTIAL EFFECTS. The potent ia l  e f f e c t s  of the hazard or  
emergency are  described b r i e f l y  . General ly  only the  
immediate e f fec t s  are  described. Since a good de f in i t ion  
o f  the system i s  not avai lable ,  configurations and designs 
can always be imagined i n  which even a minor e f f e c t  could 
-lead,  by a chain of events, t o  a catastrophic s i tua t ion .  
Therefore no attempt was made, in g z r a l ,  t o  t race  a l l  
potent ia l  e f f e c t s ,  s ince i n  every case these would have 
been the  same: loss  of personnel and loss  of vehicle .  
Where the immedidte e f f e c t s  could be predicted,  however, 
these were described, as f a r  a s  possible ,  i n  terms of in jury  
o r  loss  of personnel or  of damage or loss of equipment: 
The objcct ive of the hazard/emergency analys is ,  of course, 
i s  t o  ident i fy  p rac t i ca l  requirements and g u i d e l i ~ e s  which 
would e i t h e r  make the  occurrence of the hazard o r  emergency 
impossible or  extremely unl iks ly ,  o r  which would reduce the 
po ten t i a l  e f f e c t s  so t h a t  injury or  damage w i l l  not  r e s u l t  
even if the  hazard o r  emergency occurs. The p t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  
therefore r e f e r  t o  before the requirements and guideline. are  
implemented. 
8. REQUIREMENTS E GUIDELINES. Individual requirements and guide- 
l ines  a r e  iden t i f i ed  here which w i l l  e i t h e r  prevent the hazard 
o r  emergency, make it less  l ike ly ,  o r  reduce the po ten t i a l  
e f fec t s .  The difference betheen a requirement and a guidel ine 
is as foll;.~ws: 
o A requirement i s  regarded as a "must implerr.entw 
item from the safe ty  point of view. I t  el iminates 
an appreciable element of r i s k  from the t o t a l  
spectrum of  r i s k s  associated with t5e p a r t i c u l a r  
hazard o r  emergency. I f  recommended, a require- 
ment is therefore not cr..isidered a s  an item to  
be re jec ted  f o r  cost ,  weight o r  s imi la r  reasons, 
s ince i t  s ign i f i can t ly  impacts safe ty .  
A guideline i s  regarded as a "strongly recommendedH 
item from the safe ty  point of ciew. I t  does not 
e l iminat t  any appreciable element of r f  s k, although 
i t  may reduce the occurrence o r  the r e s u l t i n g  
e f f e c t s  of the hazard. ?he increase i n  s a f e t y  frcfm 
a gutdeline i n  c e r t a i n  cjrcumstances may no t  be 
commensurate with the penal t ies  9f implementing it, 
and therefore it may be traded o f f  aga ins t  cos t ,  
weight, e t c .  There is ,  in a l l  cases,  a sa fe ty  
penalty [ i n  the folm of exposure t o  :;am addi t ional  
risk! whenever a guideline is not  implemented, and 
t h i s  must be recognized whenever such a decision is  
ta ien .  
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The requirements and guidelines a r e  numbered sequent ial ly  
in  each hazard/emergency analysis .  A l e t t e r  behind the 
nurber indica tes  t h a t  the  requirement o r  guideline i s  common 
t o  more than one hazard/emergency analys is .  Such repeated 
requirements and guidelines a re  1 i s t e d  by the ident i fying 
analysis  i n  f ron t  o f  each task. In a methodical perusal of the  
rt?quirements and guidelines,  the  reader can therefore avoid 
re-reading items iden t i f i ed  by a l e t t e r .  
CODE. A four ddj g i t  code i d e n t i f i e s  c e r t a i n  judgments made 
against  each requirement o r  guideline. The four d i g i t s  of 
the  code a re  explained i n  items 10 through 13 below. When- 
ever a requirement o r  guideline appears i n  more than one 
hazard/emergency analysis ,  the  iden t i ca l  code 5s used. 
RECOMMENDED (X)  OR NOT (-). For each hazard/emergency 
analysis  a s e t  of the iden t i f i ed  requirements and guide- 
l i n e s  is  recommended (by an X i n  the code). This recommended 
set i s  considered the  best  s e t  of requirements t o  deal with 
the hazard o r  emergency. State-of- the-ar t ,  complexity, cost  
and weight were considered i n  a r r iv ing  a t  the  recommendations. 
Where a p a r t i c u l a r  requirement o; guideline i s  not recommended 
(indicated by a - s ign) ,  t h i s  was done on one of several  
I t  i s  not p rac t i ca l  (e.g., because it severely 
i n t e r f e r e s  with the mission objec t ives) .  
I t  i s  beyond the  current  s ta te -of - the-ar t .  
An a1 terna t ive  and preferred means of deal ing 
with the  p a r t i c d a r  r i s k  e x i s t s  i n  another 
recommended requirement o r  guideline.  
Only a negl ig ib le  increase i n  s a f e t y  r e s u l t s .  
New hazards a r e  introduced which reduce o r  
n u l l i f y  any increase i n  safety.  
I t  should be noted t h a t  i n  many cases an item iden t i f i ed  as 
a requirement i s  not recommended. This i s  done on one of 
the  above grounds, and does not represent  an inconsistency. 
I t  may represent a judgment t h a t  i t  is not  p rac t i ca l  o r  
within the s ta te -of - the-ar t  t o  implement, o r  t h a t  the  r i s k  
i s  eliminated by another (recommended) requirement. 
Only recommended requirements and guidel ines  a re  included 
- - i n  Volumes IV and V. 
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11. NO. OF HRPS (1, 2 ,  3,  4 ) .  HRPS r e f e r s  t o  the  Hazard 
Reduction Precederxe Sequence of t he  NASA OMSF Safe ty  Program 
Direc t ive  No. 1, Revision A (SPD-lA), 1700.120, December 1 2 ,  
1969. This i s  quoted ve2batim a s  follows: 
"HAZARD REDUCTION PRECEDENCE SEQUENCE 
Actions f o r  reducing hazards i d e n t i f i e d  i n  above analyses  
s h a l l  be, i n  o rder  o r  precedence, a s  s p e c i f i e d  i n  paragraphs 
1 through 5 of these  requirements. 
1. Design f o r  Minimum Hazard 
The major e f f o r t  throughout the  design phases s h a l l  be t o  
i n su re  inheren t  s a f e t y  through the  s e l e c t i o n  of 
appropr i<- te  design f e a t u r e s  as  f a i l  sa fe ,  redundancy, and 
increased u l t i m a t e  s a f e t y  f ac to r .  
2 .  Safe ty  Devices 
Known hazards which cannot be e l imina ted  through design 
s e l e c t i o n  s h a l l  be  reduced t o  t h e  acceptable  l e v e l  through 
t h e  u se  of  appropr ia te  s a f e t y  devices  as p a r t  of t h e  system, 
subsystem, o r  equipment. 
3. Warning Devices 
Where it is  not pos s ib l e  t o  preclude the  ex is tence  o r  
occurrence o f  a known hazard, devices s h a l l  be employed f o r  
t h e  t imely d e t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  condi t ion and t h e  generat ion 
of an adequate warning s igna l .  Warning s i g n a l s  and t h e i r  
app l i ca t ion  s h a l l  be designed t o  minimize t h e  pr-obabil i t y  
o f  wrong s i g n a l s  o r  o f  improper personnel  r eac t ion  t o  t h e  
s i g n a l s .  
4. Spec ia l  Procedures 
Where it i s  not  pos s ib l e  t o  reduce the  magnitude of an 
e x i s t i n g  o r  p o t e n t i a l  hazard through des ign ,  o r  t he  use of 
s a f e t y  and warning devices ,  s p e c i a l  procedures s h a l l  be 
developed t o  counter  hazardous condi t ions  f o r  enhancement 
o f  ground and f l i g h t  crew sa fe ty .  Precautionary no ta t ions  
s h a l l  be s tandardized i n  accordance with t he  d i r e c t i o n  of 
the  procur ing a c t i v i t y ,  
5. Residual. Hazards 
Residual hazards f o r  which s a f e t y  o r  warning devices  and 
s p e c i a l  procedures cannot be developed o r  provided f o r  
counte rac t ing  the  hazard s h a l l  Lz s p e c i f i c a l l y  i d e n t i f i e d  
t o  s a f e t y  and program management . Continuation o f  e f f o r t  
t o  e l imina te  o r  reduce such hazards s h a l l  be accomplished 
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throughout the  program by maintaining awareness o f  new 
s a f e t y  technology o r  devices  being developed and t h e i r  
app l i ca t ion  t o  t he  res idua l  hazards.  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
t he  r e t e n t i o n  of r e s idua l  hazards s h a l l  be documented ." 
The numbers 1 through 4 the re fo re  represen t  t he  appropr ia te  
paragraphs of  t h e  HRPS s a t i s f i e d  by t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  r equ i r e -  
ment o r  gu ide l ine .  No. 5, r e s i d u a l  hazard, i s  not used here ,  
s i nce  the  term i s  reserved f o r  the  hazard o r  emergency as  a 
whole (see i tem 15 below). 
! 2 .  REQUIREMENT (R) OR GUIDELINE (G). This i d e n t i f i e s  by t h e  
l e t t e r  R o r  G whether t h i s  i s  considered a requirement o r  
guidel ine ,  as  explained i n  i tem 8. 
13. PREVENTIVE (P)  OR REMEDIAL (R) . This i n d i c a t e s  whether t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  requirement o r  guide l i n e  con t r ibu t e s  towards 
preventing (P) the  s t a t e d  hazard/emergency (item 4) ,  o r  towards 
remedying.(R) the  s i t u a t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  hazard o r  emergency has 
occurred. This does - not r e f e r  t o  whether o r  not  t he  r equ i r e -  
ment o r  gu ide l ine  prevents  i n j u r y  or  damage following the  
occurrence of the  hazard o r  emergency. 
14. RGD REF. This reference i n d i c a t e s  t h e  volume and s e c t i o n  o f  
the  Requirements and Guidelines documents (Volumes IV-V ) o f  
t h i s  r epo r t  i n  which the  ind iv idua l  requirements and guide- 
l i n e s  a r e  documented. ~ h u s ,  V-1-3.2 i n d i c a t e s  Volume V, p a r t  
I ,  s e c t i o n  3.2. The inc lus ion  of a requirement o r  gu ide l ine  
i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  volume, say Volume IV (Earth Orb i t a l  S h u t t l e ) ,  
must not  be taken as  a dec i s ion  t h a t  t he  reauirement o r  nuide- 
l i n e  must be implemented by t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  Droeram I the  
S h u t t l e  i n  t h i s  case) o r  charned t o  t h a t  Dronrarn. I t  i n d i -  
ca t e s  t h a t  p rov is ion  w i l l  phys i ca l ly  be implemented on t h a t  
veh ic le  ( the  Shu t t l e )  . 
15. RESOLVED HAZARD. A hazard o r  emergency i s  considered t o  be 
resolved ( f o r  purposes o f  t he  study) i f  t he  recommended 
requirements and g u i d e l i n e s ,  when implemented, e l imina te  t he  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n j u r y  o r  l o s s  o f  personnel  o r  damage t o  o r  
l o s s  o f  equipment from t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  hazard o r  emergency. 
A resolved hazard i s  ind ica ted  by an X i n  t h i s  box. 
16. RESIDUAL HAZARD. A hazard o r  emergency is  considered t o  be  
r e s i d u a l  i f  i n j u r y  o r  l o s s  o f  personnel  o: damage t o  o r  l o s s  
o f  equipment i s  s t i l l  poss ib le  from t h i s  hazard o r  emergency, 
even when '-ne recommended requirements and gu ide l ines  have 
been implemented. A r e s idua l  hazard i s  ind ica t ed  by an X 
i n  t h i s  box. Each hazard/emergency is c l a s s i f i e d  e i t h e r  as 
a resolved hazard o r  a r e s idua l  hazard.  A f u r t h e r  d i s p o s i t i o n  
of t h e  r e s i d u a l  hazards i n t o  acceptable  r i s k s ,  support ing 
research and technology requirements and unresolved s a f e t y  
i s sues  i s  contained i n  Volume I1 o f  t h i s  repor t .  
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3.0 HAZARD/EMERGENCY ANALYSES 
This s ec t ion  contains  t h e  completed hazard/emergency analyses.  I t  i s  
organized i n  f i v e  s e c t i o n s ,  3.1 - 3.5, covering t h e  analyses from t h e  f i v e  
i nd iv idua l  tasks of  t h e  s tudy.  Each of these  f i ve  s ec t ions  is organized 
as fol lows:  
o A l i s t i ~ g  o f  requirements and gu ide l ines  which a r e  common t o  
more than m e  hazard/emergency a n a l y s i s ,  i d e n t i f i e d  by l e t t e r s  
whj :' a r e  cross  - referenced i n  t h e  hazard/emergency analyses 
( - - d o n  2.0, i tem 8) . 
o The hazard/emergency analyses,  i n  numerical o rder  ( see  s e c t i o n  
2.0, item 2) .  
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REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES APPEARING I N  MORE THAN ONE HAZARD/ENERGENCY 
ANALYSIS. 
1. HAZARDOUS PAYLOADS 
Upper s t a g e  veh ic le  p ressures  s h a l l  be l imi ted  whi le  in o r  near the  
s h u t t l e  such t h a t  t h e  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  a r e  a t  Least equal  t o  
the  s h u t t l e  tank f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y .  
Gaseous content  of upper s t a g e  veh ic le  tanks sha31 be small  enough 
s o  t h a t  rapid i s e n t r o p i c  expansion i n t o  t h e  s h u t t l e  cargo bay w i l l  
not  r e s u l t  i n  overpressure.  
Tanks s h a l l  be designed s o  t h a t  f a i l u r e  due t o  overpressure w i l l  n o t  
produce shrapnel .  
Rel ief  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  t h e  upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  tanks 
which automat ical ly  l i m i t  maximum pressure .  Venting s h a l l  be  t o  
space o r  t o  a tank a t  lower pressure ,  and s h a l l  be  arranged s o  t h a t  
mutually r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  cannot mix and r e s u l t  i n  a f i r e  o r  explosion.  
An e x t e r n a l  con ta iner  of s u f f i c i e n t  s i z e  and s t r eng th  t o  contain  a l l  
upper s t a g e  veh ic le  contents  s h a l l  be  p r o d d e d .  
Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided t o  d e t e c t  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e s  by 
measurement of f l u i d  pressures ,  temperatures,  tank s t r a i n s ,  o r  
o the r  means. " 
Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  s h u t t l e  crew t o  vent  and dump 
upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  p ressur ized  o r  hazardous f l u i d s  t o  space wi th in  the  
time cons t r a in t s  imposed by an abo r t  s i t u a t i o n .  This c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  
b e  a v a i l a b l e  wi th  the cargo bays open o r  closed.  
P re s su r i z ing  gas on upper s t a g e  veh ic les  s h a l l  be  turned o f f  until  
immediately p r i o r  t o  r e l e a s e  of the  veh ic l e  from t h e  s h u t t l e .  
Cargo bay thermal i n s u l a t i o n  s h a l l  be designed as a fragmentation 
b lanke t .  
S h u t t l e  hardware requi red  f o r  abor t  s h a l l  be loca ted  remotely from 
t h e  cargo bay, o r  p ro tec ted  aga ins t  the  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of upper 
s t a g e  veh ic l e  explosions which would not  cause primary s h u t t l e  
s t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e .  
Always-open cargo bay ven ts  t o  space s h a l l  b e  provided on t h e  s h u t t l e  
which limit i n t e r n a l  cargo bay p r e s s u r e s  from upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  
leakage t o  the  cargo bay al lowable l i m i t s .  
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Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided on the  s h u t t l e  f o r  automatic cargo bay 
vent ing when t h e  always-open vents  a r e  inadequate, i n  order  t o  increase  
t h e  allowable flow from i n s i d e  t o  ou ts ide  and t o  p ro t ec t  aga ins t  re- 
e n t r y  inges t ion  through always-open vents.  
Cargo bay doors s h a l l  be open a t  a l l  times i n  e a r t h  o r b i t .  
A l l  s h u t t l e  hardware contained i n  and near  the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay s h a l l  
be capable of being func t iona l ly  i s o l a t e d  from those components necessary 
f o r  de-orbi t ,  re-entry  and landing s o  t h a t  an accident i n  t he  cargo bay 
s h a l l  no t  prevent s h u t t l e  abor t .  
Vented gases from t h e  s h u t t l e  cargo bay s h a l l  not  be allowed t o  flow 
p a s t  the  s h u t t l e  p rope l lan t  tanks.  
S h u t t l e  equipment and s t r u c t u r e  exposed t o  vented gases from t h e  cargo 
bay s h a l l  be protected aga ins t  the  e f f e c t s  of corrosion and be capable 
of inspec t ion  on t h e  ground. 
Liquid prope l lan ts  of r e t r i eved  upper s t a g e  veh ic l e s  s h a l l  b e  dumped 
t o  space  before  i n i t i a t i o n  of the  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  deorb i t  maneuver. 
Upper s t age  veh ic l e  prope l lan t  tank pressures  s h a l l  be reduced t o  the  
minimum opera t ing  value before  r e t r i e v a l  i n t o  the o r b i t e r  cargo bay. 
Cargo bay pressure  and se l ec t ed  wal l  temperatures s h a l l  be monitored. 
Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided i n  t h e  s h u t t l e  cargo bay f o r  t he  de t ec t ion  
of leakage of s p e c i f i c  f l u i d s  on board the  upper s t a g e  vehic les .  
Orb i t e r  crew cont ro l  of upper s t a g e  vehic le  s h a l l  be  provided u n t i l  
separa t ion  from t h e  o r b i t e r  precludes p o s s i b i l i t y  of recontact .  
Cargo bay sur face  ma te r i a l s  which may be exposed t o  leaking corrosive 
f l u i d s  from payload s h a l l  be constructed o r  protected aga ins t  corrosion.  
The upper s t a g e  vehic le  s h a l l  be extended and re leased  outs ide  of t h e  
cargo bay such t h a t  upper s t age  veh ic l e  r o t a t i o n  about i ts  center  of 
g rav i ty  i n  any d i r e c t i o n  upon r e l ease ,  w i l l  no t  impact any p a r t  of the  
o r b i t e r .  
Procedures s h a l l  be ava i l ab le  f o r  extra-vehicular inspec t ion  and release 
o r  re-attachment of p a r t i a l l y  re leased upper s t a g e  vehic les  i n  o r b i t .  
Toxic f l u i d  containers  s h a l l  be located i n  unpressurizcd volumes of 
pressur ized payloads, o r  s h a l l  be  double contained with  the  c a p a b i l i t y  
of dumping the  f l u i d  t o  space o r  off-loading t o  another double conta iner ,  
and of venting t h e  space betwwn t h e  two containers  t o  space. 
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Z. Double contained tox ic  f l u i d  conta iners  s h a l l  be provided with means t o  
d e t e c t  leakage of the  t ox i c  f l u i d  i n t o  the  space between the  conta iners ,  
and wi th  means t o  de t ec t  pene t ra t ion  of t he  ou ts ide  contaiver .  
a. Means s h a l l  be provided f o r  de t ec t ing  a  t ox i c  environment i n  p ressur ized  
o r b i t  payloads containing t o x i c  o r  p o t e n t i a l l y  t o x i c  f l u i d s .  
b .  Emergency c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided t o  s u s t a i n  personnel when i n  a 
manned payload, fol1.owing d e t e c t i o n  of a tox i c  environment in t h e  payload, 
u n t i l  escape i n t o  t he  o r b i t e r  can be  e f f ec t ed .  
c. Spec i a l  p r o t e c t i v e  garments and equipment s h a l l  be  provided f o r  personnel  
working i n  a t ox i c  environment o r  near  p o t e n t i a l l y  t o x i c  payload elements. 
d. Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  purge o r  dump i o  space a  t ox i ca l ly  
contaminated atmosphere i n  a pressurfzed o r b i t e r  ~s l - !cad.  
e. Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  purge o r  vent  the  o r l i i t e r  a i r l o c k  
and tunnel  t o  space following emergency egress  of  passengers from a 
tox ic  payload environment, o r  fol lowing I V A  personnel  en t ry  f o r  
inspec t ion  and subsequect r e t u r n  t o  prevent t h e  t ox i c  encironment 
from contaminating t h e  o r b i t e r  crew and passenger compartment. 
f .  Means sha l l .  be  provided t o  decontaminate personnel  who have been exposed 
t o  a t o x i c  environment i n  t h z  payload which can be propagated t o  t he  
o r b i t e r  before  en te r ing  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew and passenger compartments. 
g. Instrumentation of payloads s h a l l  be  provided t o  assist i n  i s o l a t i n g  
cause and source of  f i r e .  
h. Capabi l i ty  t o  r e l e a s e ,  e j e c t ,  o r  extend the  payload s h a l l  be  provided s o  
as t o  prevent damage t o  the  a r b i t e r  a t  the  expense of t h e  payload. 
i. Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent  and dump 
flammable o r  hazardous payload r l u i d s  t o  space wi thin  t h e  time c o n s t r a i n t s  
imposed by an abo r t  s i t u a t i o n .  This c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  ava i l ab l e  wi th  
t he  cargo bay doors open o r  closed.  
j. Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided t o  switch o f f  a l l  e l e c t r i c a l  l.oads t o  payload 
from the  o r b i t e r .  
k. Thermal i n s u l a t i o n  s h a l l  be  provided an o r b i t e r  cargo bay s t r u c t u r e  t o  
mini-mize orbiter s t r u c t u r e  absorpt ion of rad ia ted  hea t  from pay1 old  f i r e .  
1. Thermal i n s u l a t i o n  s h a l l  be provided between o r b i t e r  cargo bay/payload 
a t t a c h  po in t s  and o the r  phys ica l  i n t e r f a c e s  t o  minimize thermal con- 
duct ion t o  o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e .  
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m. F i r e  a rd  h e a t  r e s i s t a n t  p ro t ec t ion  of o r b i t e r  t o  payload command end 
-Lrrstrumentatiol? i n t e r f a c e s  s h a l l  be  provided* 
n.  I g n i t i o n  scurces  i n  the  o r b i t e r  vay, such AS switches and r e l a y s ,  s h a l l  
be sea led  o r  otherwise contained s o  a s  t o  prevent i g n i t f o n  of flammable 
f l u i d s .  
cj. Hazardous f l u i d s  o r  ma te r i a l s  s h a l l  be  double contained during handling 
and t r a s n f e r  in p r e ~ s u r i z e d  a reas .  Capabi l j ty  s h a l 1 . b ~  provided t o  
ve r i fy  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  of both  conta iners  b e f ~ e  and a f t e r  t r a n s f e r .  
p. Capabi l i ty  shal l .  be provided t o  vent  t he  space between douhle containers  
f o r  hazardous f l u i d  h a n d l h g  t o  space and f o r  dumping the  f l u i d  t~ space 
o r  off- loading t o  another conta iner .  
q. Proc.ediires s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  handling and t r a n s f e r r i n g  hazardous 
f l u i d s  o r  ma te r i a l s  i n  a p ressur ized  a r ea  from a s i n g l y  penetra ted 
double container  t o  a s to rage  conta iner  without r e l ea s ing  f l u i d  o r  
ma te r i a l  t o  the spacec ra f t  atmosphere. 
r .  A lower pressure  than the  ambient atmosphere s h a l l  be mafntained i n  
conta iners  of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  ma te r i a l s  during handling a rd  
t r a n s f e r  i n  pressurf  zed a reas .  
s .  A sepa ra t e  volume with  tin i s o l a t e d  environmental c o s ~ t r o l  s h a l l  $be 
provjded f o r  t e s t i n g  and opening suspect  hazardous f l u i d  o r  ma te r i a l  
cargo conta iners .  This volume s h a l l  have the  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  vent  and 
dump the  ma te r i a l  t o  space and t o  he  purged of h a z a r d o * ~ ~  f l u i d  o r  
mater ia l .  
t .  Means s h a l l  be  provided f o r  de t ec t ing  t h e  presence o f  s p i l l e d  hazardous 
f l u i d s  o r ,  m a t e r i a l s  whi le  being hand1 ed o r  t r ans fe r r ed  between pressur ized  
modules. 
u. Manual handling and t r a n s f e r  of hazardous flu!.ds o r  materials s h a l l  be  
c a r r i e d  out  by two ox more personnel  who s h a l l  have 110 other  d u t i e s  
during t h i s  operat ion.  
v. During handl ing and t r a n s f e r  of hazardcrus f l u i d s  o r  materials, no o the r  
manned opera t ions  s h a l l  be planned along t h e  t r a n s f e r  path.  
w e  Mutually r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  s h a l l  no t  be  handled o r  t r ans fe r r ed  simul- 
taneously.  
x. The pressures ,  temperatures ,  or o the r  parameters which i n d i c a t e  t h e  
s t a t u s  of  hazardous f l u l d s  o r  materials s h a l l  be  v e r i f i e d  be fc re  they 
a r e  t ranspor ted.  
y .  Band c a r r i e d  cargo s h a l l  he  l imi t ed  t o  45 kg (100 l b )  mass, provided 
the  cen te r  of miass  i s  wi th in  35 crmw (14 ins . )  of t he  handhold. Cargo 
whi'zh exceeds these  limits aha3 1 be t r snspor ted  wi th  mechanical assist. 
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z .  Cargo i n  which a rtipture o r  leakage through t h e  conta iners  would r e s u l t  
i n  uncontrolled motion of t he  cargo because of propuls ive   force^ beyond 
a s i n g l e  man's capab i l i t y  t o  con t ro l  o r  because t o x i c i t y  requi res  
immediate abandonment and evacuation of the  a r ea  s h a l l  not be hand- 
c a r r i e d .  
aa. Packaging of hand-carried cargo s h a l l  be  provided with mul t ip le  hand 
ho lds ,  s h a l l  allow forward v l  s i b i l i t y  by the  con t ro l l i ng  personnel ,  and 
s h a l l  be  capable of surv iv ing  impact aga ins t  a sharp ob jec t  a t  3 m/sec 
(10 f t / s e c )  . 
bb. Provis ions  s h a l l  be  made r'or r ap id ly  secur ing hand-carried cargo t o  
var ious  s t r u c t u r a l  po in t s  along the  t r a n s f e r  path s o  as t o  prevent l o s s  
of  con t ro l  cf  t h e  cargo i n  t he  event of an emergency. 
cc . Emergency procedures s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  handling,  containing,  and 
disposing of s p i l l e d  h a ~ a r d o u s  f l u i d s  o r  ma te r i a l s  so  as t o  safeguard 
the  personnel ,  o r b i t e r  and payload, i n  t h a t  order .  
dd. Cargo handling mechanisms s h a l l  allow f o r  stoppage of the  motion, 
r e v e r s a l  of the  motion, o r  r e l e a s e  of t h e  cargo a t  any po in t  along 
the  t r a n s f e r  path. 
ee. The t r a n s f e r  of cargo with mechanical assist s h a l l  e i t h e r  be  v i s u a l l y  
monitored by personnel who a r e  f r e e  of o ther  d u t i e s ,  o r  s h a l l  be  
provided with  sensing devices  which automat ical ly  s t o p  the motion i f  
t h e  cargo i n t e r f a c e s  wi th  s t r u c t u r e  o r  equipment. 
f f .  Personnel  w i l l  not  be  loca ted  during cargo t r a n s f e r  i n  pos i t i ons  which 
can - r e s u l t  i n  t h e i r  entrapnent i f  t h e  cargo mechanism f a i l s .  
gg. Emergency procedures s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  the  release, handling 
and t r anspor t a t i on  of remotely cont ro l led  cargo i n  t he  event of f a i l u r e  
of t h e  handling mechanism, o r  of damage t o  t he  packaging of t h e  cargo. 
hh. Cargo handling mechanisms s h a l l  be  designed t o  wi ths tand the  propuls ive  
fo rces  t h a t  would r e s u l t  from a leak ing  o r  ruptured f l u i d  cargo. 
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REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES APPEARING IN MORE THAN ONE HAZARD/ENERGENCY 
ANALYSIS . 
2. DOCKING 
The r eac t ion  jet cont ro l  system s h a l l  provide redundancy t o  preclude 
t t jet  s tuck  off"  condi t ions .  
The r a t e  command and r a t e / a t t i t u d e  feedback loops of the  r o t a t i o n a l  
I t  c on t ro l  system s h a l l  provide redundancy t o  preclude open loop" 
f a i l u r e s  . 
I n h i b i t  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided t o  con t ro l  the  "jet vtuck on" 
condi t ion.  
Space S t a t i o n  modules which a r e  used i n  the  f r e e  f l y i n g  docking mode 
s h a l l  be provided with  redundant means f o r  communication, guidance, 
con t ro l ,  power, propulsion,  and o the r  funct ions  c r i t i c a l  t o  the  docking, 
The opera t iona l  s t a t u s  of systems on Space S t a t i o n  modules which are 
used i n  t he  f r e e  f l y i n g  docking mode, including redundant systems, 
s h a l l  be v e r i f i e d  before  the  module i s  separated from t h e  o r b i t e r  
o r  s t a t i o n .  
Emergency procedures s h a l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  the  o r b i t e r  t o  pursue and, 
i f  pos s ib l e ,  dock t o  a Space S t a t i o n  module used i n  t h e  f r e e  f l y ing  
module docking mode which has  l o s t  con t ro l ,  These procedures s h a l l  allow 
personnel  escape o r  rescue wi th in  t h e i r  l i f e  support  capab i l i t y .  
Pressure  s u i t s  and back packs s h a l l  be  provided f o r  a l l  personnel  on- 
board Space S t a t i o n  modules used i n  t h e  f r e e  f l y i n g  module docking 
mode. These s u i t s  s h a l l  be  s u i t a b l e  f o r  emergency EVA escape t o  a 
nearby Space S t a t i o n  o r  o r b i t e r .  
An air1-ock c a p a b i l i t y  which allowe a l l  on-board 2ersonnel  t o  perform 
EVA emergency escape s h a l l  be p rmided  on-board Space S t s t i o n  modules 
used i n  t he  f r e e  f l y i n g  module docking mode. This may be  provided by 
a sepa ra t e  2-man a i r l o c k  o r  may be an i n t e g r a l  c a p a b i l i t y  of  t h e  
whole module. 
Emergency l i f e  support  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  a l l  on-board personnel  s h a l l  be 
provided on Space S t a t i o n  modules used i n  the  f r e e  f l y i n g  docking mode 
u n t i l  emergency escape o r  re.scue can be achieved. 
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockwell 
REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELIhTS APPEARING I N  MORE THAN ONE HAZARD/EMERGENCY 
ANALY'S I S . 
3. ON-BOARD SURVIVABILITY 
Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided t o  reduce t h e  pressure  i n  each compartment 
s u f f i c i e n t l y ,  o r  increaee i t  i n  the  adjoining compartment(s) and t o  cut  
o f f  a i r  c i r c u l a t i o n ,  s o  t h a t  i n  an emergency t h e  atmosphere i n  the  
a f f ec t ed  compartment w i l l  not  be  propogated i n t o  adjoining compartments. 
This c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  cont ro l led  remotely from each compartment. 
Automatic vent ing c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided i n  each compartment s o  
t h a t  i n  t h e  event of a f i r e  o r  r e l ea se  of gases wi th in  the  compartment 
t h e  pressure  w i l l  not  exceed the  s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t s  of t h e ' s t r u c t u r e  o r  
the  c a p a b i l i t y  of s e a l s  t o  o ther  compartments t o  exclude the  contaminated 
atmosphere. 
Normally hab i t ab l e  compartments of more than 25 m3 (880 f t 3 )  i n  volume 
s h a l l  have two o r  more e x i t s  i n t o  a r eas  which provide f o r  personnel  
su rv iva l .  These e x i t s  s h a l l  be  a t  least  3 m e  (10 f t )  apa r t .  
Flammable, explosive o r  gas generating material s h a l l  be  loca ted  s o  t h a t  
t h e  energy content  which-can-be proPogated at  any one loca t ion  s h a l l  no t  
r e s u l t  i n  overpressur iza t ion  of the  compartment from h e a t  and gas 
production. 
Flammable explosive o r  gas generat ing material wi th in  3 m (10 f t )  of the  
entrance t o  compartments with only one en t ry j eg re s s  path s h a l l  be l imi t ed  
s o  t h a t  t h e  energy content ,  i f  re leased ,  w i l l  no t  r e s u l t  i n  damage o r  
an environment which prevents  s h i r t s l e e v e  access through the  entrance.  
Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  t h e  emergency s h i r t s l e e v e  s u r v i v a l  a f  
al l  on-board personnel  u n t i l  t he  next  resupply o r  emergency s h u t t l e  f l i g h t  
following t h e  loss  of  access t o  any one module/compartment and t h e  l o s s  of 
equipment and suppl ies  i n  t h a t  module/compaxtment. A s h i r t s l e e v e  acces s ib l e  
docking po r t  s h a l l  be  ava i l ab l e .  I f  t h e  l o s s  of t h e  module/compartment 
d iv ides  t h e  s t a t i o n  i n t o  two o r  more i s o l a t e d  hab i t ab l e  r ec t ione ,  then 
each s e c t i n  s h a l l  provide the  s u r v i v a l  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  a l l  on-board personnel ,  
including an ava i l ab l e  docking por t .  
Eesrgency c a p a b i l i t y  shall  b e  provided on o r b i t e r  f l i g h t s  wi th  a manned 
s o r t i e  module f o r  the  r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  of a l l  t he  passengers i n  t he  
o r b i t e r ,  without support  from t h e  s o r t i e  module. 
Emergency c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided ou manned s o r t i e  modules f o r  t h e  
r e t u r n  t o  e a r t h  of a l l  t he  pasrengeru i n  the  sortie module, without, 
l i f e  support  from the  o r b i t e r .  
Orb i t e r  equ$pmeat required f o r  r e tu rn ing  the o r b i t e r  t o  e a r t h  s h a l l  be  
capable of operatif.; ~ L I  -:. ? c p r e ~ ~ u r i z e d  environment. The con t ro l s  
f o r  t h i s  eqUipr~:l;t, & a 1 ~  bn operable by crewmicn i n  pressure  s u i t s .  
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockwell 
J, A blckup EVA egress r ' tngress  ha t ch  which can b e  used f o r  contingency 
EVA s h a l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e .  Capab i l i t y  f o r  dep re s su r i z a t i on  and r ep re s su r i -  
z a t i o n  of t h e  connecting compartment/module s h a l l  b e  provided. 
K. On o r b i t e r  missions wi thout  a t t a ched  manned s o r t i e  modules i n  which 
EVA is  planned as p a r t  o f  t h e  normal miss ion,  p r e s su re  s u i t s  s h a l l  
b e  c a r r i e d  f o r  a l l  on-board personnel .  
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NO. 1 1.1.001 
DATE 7-2 7-71 I 
'1 ASSUMPTIONS j 
! 
) 
Explosion/rupture of a pressurized container  i n  an upper s t age  vehic le  tns ide  o r  
near o rb i t e r .  
2. Upper s tage  --ehicles r e t a i n  t h e i r  current  oomplement of pressurized containers.  
i 
1. Shut t le  f l u i d s  a r e  l iqu id  hydrogen, l i qu id  oxygen, gaseous helium, J P  fue l ,  Aerozine -50, 
hydraulic f l u i d ,  water/glycol,  ni t rogen gas and ni t rogen te t roxide .  
- .  3 and increases hea t  leaks i n to  s h u t t l e  propel lant  tanks. 
ij 
E: 
1.A.Upper s tage  vehic le  pressures s h a l l  be  l imi ted  while  i n  o r  near the  
s h u t t l e  such t h a t  the f a c to r s  of s a f e ty  are a t  l e a s t  equa. t o  
the  . ,hut t le  ;ank f a c to r s  of safe ty .  
(Continued on Page 2. ) 
! 2.B.Gaseous content of upper s t age  vehic le  tanks s h a l l  b e  small enough / s o  t h a t  rapid  i sen t rop ic  expansion i n t o  the  r l u t t l e  cargo bay w i l l  
not result i n  overpressure. 
ii I POTENT IAL EFFECTS J 
$ Damage t o  s h u t t l e  s t r u c t  -7;. and eqLipment p r inc ipa l ly  i n  cargo bay from: (1) Rupture of i pressurized containers  inco fragments, (2) I n i t i a t i o n  of a pressure wave producing shock, 1 (3) Release of e.xcessive f l u i d  which increases carqo bay pressure beyond venting capab i l i ty  
3.C.Tanks s h a l l  be d e s i p e d  so t ha t  f a i l u r e  due t o  overpressure w i l l  not  
produce shrapnel. 
4 
4.D.Relj.ef capab i l i ty  shaJ.1 be provided f a r  t he  uvper s t age  veh ic le  tanks 
: which automatically l i m i t  maximm pressure. Venting s h a l l  b e  t o  
space o r  t o  a tank a t  l k e r  pressure,  and s h a i l  be arranged s o  t h a t  
i mutually reac t ive  f l u i d s  cannct m i x  and r e s u l t  i n  a f i r e  o r  explosion. 
-.E,An extkrnal  container of s u f f i c i e n t  s i z e  and s t reng th  t o  contain 
a l l  upper s t age  vehicle contents  shall. be  provided. 
(Continued on Page 2. ) , 
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) 3xplosion/rupture of a pressurized container i n  an upper s tage  vehicle  ins ide  o r  near 
I orb i t e r .  
I . -.-- -.- - - .  I 
, (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT I N  THE ORDER OF SHEET I . )  
ASSUMPTIONS (cont) 
2. (Continued) 
Agena Centaur Trans tage 
Helium Tarks X X X 
Nitrogen Tanks X X 
Nitrogen Tetroxide Tanks X 
Aerozene -50 Tanks X 
Hydrogen Peroxide Tanks 
Liquid Oxygen Tanks 
Liquid Hydrogen Tanks 
Monomethyl Hydrazine Tanks 
~ a t e r / G l y c o l  Tanks 
Unsymmetrical Dimethyl 
Hydrazine X 
Inhibi ted Red Fuming N i t r i c  X 
Burner I1 - SM OOS/Tug 
i 6.F. Capabili ty s h a l l  be provided t o  de tec t  po ten t i a l  rank f a i l u r e s  by I X 3 R P  
measurement of f l u i d  pressures,  temperatures, tank s t r a i n s ,  o r  f 
other  means. I ! 
1 7.G. Capabili ty s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  s h u t t l e  crew t o  vent and dump I X 2 R P I upper s tage  vehicle  pressurized o r  hazardous f l u i d s  tr, space within 1 the time cons t ra in ts  imposed by an abort  s i tua t ion .  This capabi l i ty  / s h a l l  be avai lab le  with the  cargo bay d ~ o r s  open o r  closed. I I 8 8 .  Pressurizing gas on upper s tage  vehicles s h a l l  be turned of f  u n t i l  ( X 4 R P I immediately p r io r  t o  r e l ease  of the vehicle  from the  shu t t l e .  ! i 1 
I 
19.1. Cargo bay thermal insula t ion  s h a l l  be  designed as a fragmentation 1 -  1 G R  i blanket 
! 
O J .  Shut t le  hardware required f o r  abor t  s h a l l  be located remotely from 1 X 1 R A 
the cargo bay, or  protected agains t  the po ten t i a l  ec fec t s  of upper 
s tage  vehicle  explosions which would not cause primsry s h u t t l e  i 
s t ruc tu re  f a i lu re .  I i 
(Continued on Page 3.) 
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REOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont) 
I 
I 11.K.Always-open cargo bay vents  t o  space s h a l l  be provided on the  s h u t t l e  which l i m i t  i n t e r n a l  cargo bay pressures from upper s tage  
I 
I 
i I
vehicle  leakage t o  the cargo bay allowable l i m i t s .  
I i 12.L. Capability s h a l l  be provided c;l the  s h u t t l e  f o r  automatic cargo 
bay venting when t h e  always-open vents a r e  inadequate, i n  order  t o  
I 
! increase the  allowable flow from ins ide  t o  outs ide and t o  pro tec t  
I 
\ against  re-entry ingest ion through always-open vents. 
! I 
1 l3.M. Cargo bay doors s h a l l  be open a t  a l l  times i n  e a r t h  o rb i t .  
I / 14.N.All s h u t t l e  hardware contained i n  and near the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay 
1 s h a l l  be capable of being funct ional ly  i so la ted  from those cam- ponents necessary f o r  de-orbit,  re-entry end landing so t h a t  an 
accident i n  the  cargo bay s h a l l  not  prevent s h u t t l e  abort. 
15.0.Vented gases from the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay shall no t  be allowed t o  
flow p a s t  the  s h u t t l e  propel lant  tanks. 
16. P .Shuttle equipment and s t r u c t u r e  exposed t o  vented gases from the 
cargo bay s h a l l  be protected against  the e f f e c t s  of corrosion and 
be capable of inspection on the ground. 
17.4. A l l  upper s tage  vehicle  l iqu id  propel lants  s h a l l  be dumped t o  
space before r e t r i e v a l  of the  vehicle  i n t o  the o r b i t e r  cargo bay. 
I 
'18.R. Upper s t age  vehicle  propellant tank pressures s h a l l  be reduced t o  I 
i .  the  minimu-. operating value before r e t r i e v a l  i n t o  the o r b i t e r  
I cargo bay. 
CODE 
-
X 1 R l  
X 1 ' G l  
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
I PROGRAM 
HAZARD/EMERGENCY 1 ( SOURCE 1 11-2.1.2 I 
NO. 
Combination of m!~tual ly  r e a c t i v e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  f l u i d s  leading t o  e x ~ l o s i o n  o* 
f i r e  i n s i d e  o r  nea r  o r b i t e r .  
1.1.002 
-I 
- 
1. S h u t t l e  f l u i d s  a r e  l i q u i d  hydrogen, l i q u i d  oxygen, gaseous helium, JP f u e l ,  Aerozine -50 
hydrau l i c  f l u i d ,  water /g lycol ,  n i t rogen  gas and n i t rogen  t e t rox ide .  
2. Upper s t a g e  veh ic l e s  r e t a i n  t h e i r  cu r ren t  complement of propel lan ts .  
(Continued on Page 2.) 
I POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
r J 
Damage t o  s h u t t l e  s t r u c t u r e  and equipment p r i n c i p a l l y  i n  cargo bay from: 1) I n i a t i o n  of 
- . - 
a p ressu re  wave producing shock; and 2) Heat inpu t  from r a d i a t i o n ,  c i r c u l a t i o n ,  and 
conduction of products of combustion. 
l . A  Upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  pressures  s h a l l  be l imi t ed  while  i n  o r  near  t h e  
s h u t t l e  such t h a t  t he  ' f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  are a t  l e a s t  equal  t o  
t h e  s h u t t l e  tank f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y ,  
2.B.Gaseous content  of upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  tanks s h a l l  be small enough 
s o  t h a t  rap id  i s e n t r o p i c  expansion i n t o  the  s h u t t l e  cargc bay w i l l  
no t  r e s u l t  i n  overpressure.  
3.D .Relief c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  t h e  upper s t a g e  ~ e h i c l e  tanks 
which automatical ly  limit maximum pressure.  Venting s h a l l  be  t o  
space o r  t o  a tank a t  lower pressure ,  and s h a l l  be arranged s o  t h a t  
mutually r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  cannot mix and r e s u l t  i n  a f i r e  o r  explosion. 
4 . E . h  e x t e r n a l  conta iner  of s u f f i c i e n t  s i z e  arL1 s t r e n g t h  t o  conta in  
a l l  upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  contents  s h a l l  be provided. 
5 .F. Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  d e t e c t  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e s  by 
measurement of f l u i d  p res su res ,  temperatures,  tank s t r a i n s ,  o r  
o t h e r  means. 
(Con:hued on Page 2.) . 
x x x x  
CODE 
- 
X l G P  
X l G R  
RGD REF. 
H A Z A R D I E ~ E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y  S I S 
( C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE - 2 OF 3 
- 
HAZARD./EMERGENCY 
Combination of mutually r e a c t i v e  upper s t age  veh ic le  f l u i d s  i n  explosion o r  
f i r e  i n s i d e  o r  near  o r b i t e r ,  
. -.- 
-- - -
I (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT I N  THE ORDER OF SHEET I . )  I ASSUMPTIONS (cont)  
I 
I 
; j 2. (Continued) 
Agena Centaur Transtage Burner 11 SM OOS/Tug 
- - 
/ Nitrogen Tetroxide X / Aerozene 
i Hydrogen Peroxide 
Liquid Oxygen 
Liquid Hydrogen 
Monomethyl Hydrazine 
Water/Glycol 
Unsymmetrical Dimethyl Hydrazine X 
Inh ib i t ed  Red Fuming N i t r i c  Acid X 
REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont)  
6.G.Capability s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  s h u t t l e  crew t o  vent  and dump 
upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  p ressur ized  o r  hazardous f l u i d s  t o  space wi th in  
t he  t i m e  c o n s t r a i n t s  imposed by an abor t  s i t u a t i o n ,  This capab i l i t y  
s h a l l  be  ava i l ab l e  wi th  the  cargo bay doors open o r  closed. 
7.H. Pressur iz ing  gas on upper s t a g e  veh ic les  s h a l l  be  turned of f  u n t i l  
immediately p r i o r  t o  r e l e a s e  of t he  veh ic l e  from the  s h u t t l e .  
8.I.Cargo bay thermal i n s u l a t i o n  s h a l l  be  designed as a fragmentation 
blanket  . 
9 .J. S h u t t l e  hardware requi red  f o r  abor t  s h a l l  be  loca ted  remotely from 
t h e  cargo bay, o r  protected aga ins t  the  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of upper 
s t a g e  veh ic l e  explosions which would no t  cause primary s h u t t l e  
s t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e  . 
.O.KmAlways-open cargo bay ven ts  t o  space s h a l l  be  provided an t h e  
s h u t t l e  which l i r n i t  i n t e r n a l  cargo bay pressures  from upper s t a g e  
veh ic l e  leakage t o  t h e  cargo bay al lowable l i m i t s .  
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
CODE 
-
X 2 R P  
X 4 R P  
- 1 G R  
X l R R  
X l R R  
X 
X 
RGD REF 
IV-3 . 2 
V-11-3. 
IV-3.4 
V-11-3, 
- 
IV-3.1 
IV-3 .1  
(Continued on Page 3. ) 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y  S I S 
( C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE 3 OF 3 
- - 
NO. 1.1.002 J 
Corllbination of mutually r e a c t i v e  upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  f l u i d s  i n  explosion o r  
f i r e  i n s i d e  o r  nea r  o r b i t e r .  
, -.- .-- . -- - - 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT I N  THE ORDER OF SHEET I . )  
REOUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES (cont)  
11.L. Capabi l i ty  a h a l l  be provided on the  s h u t t l e  f o r  automatic cargo 
bay vent ing when the  always-open vents  a r e  inadequate,  i n  o rder  t o  
i nc rease  the  allowable flow from i n s i d e  t o  ou ts ide  and t o  p ro i ec t  
aga ins t  re-entry i nges t ion  through always-open ven ts .  
12.~.Cargo bay doors s h a l l  be open a t  a l l  times i n  e a r t h  o r b i t .  
l3.N. A l l  s h u t t l e  hardware contained i n  and near  t h e  s h u t t l e  cargo bay 
s h a l l  be capable of being func t iona l ly  i s o l a t e d  from those con- 
ponents necessary f o r  de-orbit ,  re-entry and landing s o  t h a t  an 
accident  i n  the  cargo bay s h a l l  not  prevent s h u t t l e  abor t .  
14.0.Vented ases  from the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay s h a l l  no t  be allowed t o  
flow p t s t  the  s h u t t l e  p rope l lan t  tanks. 
15.P.Shuttle equipment and s t r u c t u r e  exposed t o  vented gases  from t h e  
cargo bay s h a l l  be pro tec ted  aga ins t  the  e f f e c t s  of corrosion and 
be capable of inspec t ion  on the  ground. 
16,s. Cargo bay pressure  and s e l e c t e d  w a l l  temperatures s h a l l  be 
monitored. 
17.T. Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided i n  the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay f o r  t h e  
de t ec t ion  of leakage of s p e c i f i c  f l u i d s  on board the  upper s t a g e  
vehicles .  
18.Q.liquid prope l lan ts  of r e t r i e v e d  upper s t a g e  veh ic les  s h a l l  be dmped 
t o  space before  i n i t i a t i o n  of t he  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  deo rb i t  maneuver. 
19.R. Upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  p rope l l an t  tank pressures  s h a l l  b e  reduced t o  
t h e  minimum opera t ing  va lue  before  r e t r i e v a l  i n t o  t he  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay. 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
NO. 1.1.003 
\ 
I 
DATE 8-5-71 I 
HAZARDAMERGENCY 1 I SOURCE 111-2.1.7 I 
PROGRAM 
hadver ten tde tona t ion  of explosive charge on upper s t age  vehic le  i n s i d e  o r  near  
o r b i t e r .  
- -- 
1. Upper s t a g e  vehic les  r e t a i n  t h e i r  current  complement of pyrotechnics: 
(Continued on Page 2.) 
SHUTTLE 
SORT1 E 
STATION 
1 POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
X , 
X 
Damage t o  the  s h u t t l e  s t r u c t u r e  and equipment p r i n c i p a l l y  i n  the  cargo bay from (a)  de tonat io  
of the  explosive charge and s h a t t e r i n g  of t h e  housing sending 1) shrapnel  and 2) pressure  
waves i n t o  the  surroundings, and (b) from separa t ion  of the  upper s t age  vehic le  i n  t h e  cargo 
bav. 
1. Housings of explosive charges s h a l l  be designed t o  prevent damage t o  
equipment required f o r  s h u t t l e  abor t  i n  t h e  event of inadver tent  
detonation. 
2. A l l  powder f i l l e d  volumes s h a l l  be  designed t o  allow v e r i f i c a t i o n  of 
content by neutron ray inspect ion  before  f l i g h t .  
3. Destruct  charges s h a l l  no t  be incorporated i~ upper s t a g e  vehic les  
when launclhed i n  t h e  s h u t t l e .  
4.1. Cargo bay thermal i n s u l a t i o n  s h a l l  be designed as a fragmentation 
b lanket  
5.3. S h u t t l e  hardware required f o r  a b o r t  s h a l l  be  loca ted  remotely from 
t h e  cargo bay, o r  protec ted  aga ins t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of upper 
s t a g e  veh ic le  explosions 'which would not  cause primary s h u t t l e  
s t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e .  
(Continued on Page 2.) 
CODE 
X l R P  
K l R P  
X l R R  
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
( C O N T I N U E D )  2 PAGE OF 2 
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NO. 1.1.003 J 
-- .-- 
HAZARD 'EMERGENCY 
Inadvertent  detonat ion of explosive charge on upper s t age  vehic le  ins ide  o r  near o r b i t e r .  
I 
I 
i (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.)  
ASSUMPTIONS (cont) 
I (Continued) 
I 
i 
I i Connections Between Modules - 
i Cutters .  1 Helium Valves. 
Sol id  Propel lant  I g n i t e r s .  
Turbine S t a r t  Sol id  Pro- 
pe l l a n  t Charges. 
Explosive Bol ts  - Payload 
Separation. 
Linear Shaped Charge - Panel I separat ion.  
/ Destruct Shaped Charges. 
External  Extensions - 
Antennae. 
REQUIREMENTS 61 GUIDELINES (cont) 
Agena Centaur Transtage Burner I1 CSM O O S / T U ~  
-
X 
X X 
X 
X X X 
X X 
Y. X X 
X 
6.N.All s h u t t l e  hardware contained i n  and near  t h e  s h u t t l e  cargo bay 1 s h a l l  be capable of being func t iona l ly  i s o l a t e d  f r o l  those corn- / ponents necessary f o r  de-orbi t ,  re-entry and landing s o  t h a t  an 
I accident  i n  the  cargo bay s h a l l  not  prevent s h u t t l e  abort.  
I 
I 7.  The amount of charge i n  each housing s h a l l  b e  below 0.1 l b  TNT 
I equivalent .  
I 
1 8. In te r locks ,  redundancy,grounding and i s o l a t i o n  devices s h a l l  b e  
I provided on explosive charges s o  t h a t  no s i n g l e  de tec tab le  
I f a i l u r e  o r  combination of undetectable f a i l u r e s  s h a l l  r e s u l t  
i i n  premature detonation. 
I SHUTTLE 
PROGRAM X I 
I SORTIE X L . STATION 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
Page 1 of 3 
- 
- NO. 1.1.004 
DATE 8-5-71 I 
Rapid decomposition of monopropellants located i n  o r  leaking from the  upper s t a g e  
vehic le  while i n s i d e  o r  near  o r b i t e r .  
ASSUMP1 IUN3 
Agena Centaur Transtage Burner I1 - SM OOS/Tug 
Aerozene -50 X X 
Monome thy l Vydrazine X .  
Hydrogen Peroxide 
Solid Propel lant  X 
Unsymmetrical Dyme thy1 X 
Hydrazire 
POTENTIAL E f  FECTS j 
Damage t o  s h u t t l e  s t r u c t u r e  and equipment, p r inc ipa l ly  i n  the  cargo bay from: 1 )  shrapnel ,  
2) pressure wave and 3) heat .  
1. Upper s t a g e  vehic le  monopropellant temperatures and pressures  s h a l l  
be monitored. 
2. Crew procedures f o r  monopropellant dump s h a l l  be provided i n  case of 
rapid  rise i n  pressure  or  temperature. 
3. Cleanliness of the  monopropel1a1.t and a l l  ma te r i a l s  i n  normal 
contact  with the  f l u i d  s h a l l  be con t ro l l ed  s o  t h a t  spontaneous de- 
composition i n  normal and emergency environments is not  possible .  
4. Cata lys t  mater ia ls  s h a l l  not  be  placed i n  the  cargo bay where they 
may come i n t o  contact  with monopropellants from a leaking o r  ruptured 
l i n e  o r  tank. 
5 .B. Gaseous content of upper s t a g e  vehic le  tank.s s h a l l  be small enough 
s o  t h a t  rapid  i s e n t r o p i c  expansion inco the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay w i l l  
no t  resubt  i n  overpressure. 
6 .De Relief  capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided f o r  the upper s t a g e  veh ic le  tanks 
which au:omatically limit maximum pressure. Venting s h a l l  b e  t o  
space o r  t o  a tank at lower pressure ,  and s h a l l  be arranged s o  t h a t  
mutually r e a c t i v e ,  f l d  .s cannot mix and r e s u l t  i n  a f i r e  o r  explosion. 
CODE 
X 3 R R  
X 4  R R  
X 4 R P  
- I G P  
X i G  R 
X Z R P  
X X X X  
RGD REF. 
v-3.3 
-11-3.3 
v-3.4 
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I I (Continued cn Page 2.) 
.. 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
( C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE 2 OF 3 
- - 
NO. 1.1.004 I 
I j 
DATE 1 8-5-71 ) 
- I HAZARDIMEROENCY I Rapid decomposition of monopropellants l c sa ted  i n  o r  leaking from the  upper s t a g e  
vehic le  while  i n s i d e  o r  near  o r b i t e r .  
- .- 
.--- ------- 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT I N  THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) I 
I REOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont)  
I 7.c.Tanks s h a l l  b e  designed s o  t h a t  f a i l u r e  due t o  overpressure w i l l  no t  
I produce shrapnel.  
I 
8.F.Capability s h a l l  b e  provided t o  d e t e c t  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e 8  by 
I measurement of f l u i d  pressures ,  temperatures, tank s t r a i n s ,  o r  
o the r  means. 
9.G.Capability s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  s h u t t l e  crew co vent and dump 
upper s t a g e  vehic le  pressurized o r  hazardous f1ul~:ls t o  space wi th in  / t h e  t i m e  cons t ra in t s  imposed by an abor t  s i t u a t i o n .  This c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be ava i l ab le  with t h e  cargo bay dcors open o r  closed. 
10.I.Cargo bay thermal i n s u l a t i o n  s h a l l  be designed as a fragmentation 
blanket .  
11J. S h u t t l e  hardware required f o r  abor t  s h a l l  be loca ted  remotely from 
the  cargo bay, o r  protected agains t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of upper 
s t age  vehic le  explosions which would no t  cause primary s h u t t l e  
s t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e .  
12.K.Always-open cargo bay vents  t o  space s h a l l  be provided on the  
s h u t t l e  which l i m i t  i n t e r n a l  cargo oay pressures from upper s t a g e  
vehic le  leakage t o  the cargo bay allowable l i m i t n .  i 
/13.L. Capabil i ty  s h a l l  be provided on t h e  s h u t t l e  f o r  automatic cargo 
bay venting when the  always-open vents  a r e  inadequate,  i n  order  t o  
I 
I increase  the  allowable flow from i n s i d e  t o  ou t s ide  and t o  p ro tec t  
i 
! 
aga ins t  re-entry inges t ion  through always-open vents.  
I 
,14'.M.Cargo bay doors s h a l l  be open at  a l l  times i n  e a r t h  o r b i t .  
I 
1 1 5 . ~ ~ ~ 1 1  s h u t t l e  hardware contained i n  and near  the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay 
I 
s h a l l  be capable of being funct ional ly  i s o l a t e d  from those c o w  
ponents necessary f o r  de-orbit ,  re-entry and landing s o  t h a t  an 
accident  i n  the  cargo bay s h a l l  not  prevent s h u t t l e  abort.  
l o .  0.Vented gases from the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay s h a l l  not  be allowed t o  
I flow p a s t  t h e  s h u t t l e  propel lant  tanks. 
X 3 R P  
X Z R P  
- 1 G R  
X l R R  
X l R R  
X l C R  
X 4 1 ; R  
X l R R  
X l R R  
I (Continued on Page 3. ) 
C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE - 3 OF - 3 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C V  A N A L Y S I S  
DATE 1 8-5-71 I 
Rapid decomposition of monopropellants located i n  o r  leaking from the  upper s t a g e  
vehic le  while i n s i d e  o r  near o r b i t e r .  
. -..- 
.------a- -.. .- 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) I I 
REQUIREMENTS 61 GUIDELINES (cont) 
l7.P S h u t t l e  equipment and s t r u c t u r e  exposed t o  vented gases from the  
cargo bay s h a l l  be protected aga ins t  the  e f f e c t s  of corrosion and 
be capable of inspect ion  on the  ground. 
18.Q.Liquid propel lants  of r e t r i eved  upper utage vehic les  s h a l l  b e  dumped ' X 4 R V-3.4 
t o  space before  i n i t i a t i o n  of t h e  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  deorbi t  maneuver. T -11-2 
H A Z A R D I E M F R G E N C Y  A N A i Y S  I S  
I 
PROGRAM SHUTTLE X I 
Uncontrolled comhustion i n  a c t i v e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  r e a c t i o n  c o n t r o l  engines  wh i l e  
nea r  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
AS-$ I 
J 
1. RCS p r o p e l l a n t s  remain the  same on upper s t a g e  veh ic l e s .  
Aerozene -50 + Nitrogen Tet roxide  
Monomethyl Hydrazine + Nitrogen Tet roxide  
Hydrogen Gas + Oxyge? Gan 
Trandtage - SM 
i (Continued on Page 2 .) 
I POTENTIAL EFFECTS 1 
Damage t o  s h u t t l e  s t r u c t u r e  and equipment, p r i n c i p a l l y  i n  t he  cargo bay from explos ion  -f 
t h e  engine  sending,  1 )  shrapv+.el, 2)  p r e s su re  waves , and 3) h e a t  i n t o  s h u t t l e  equipment, 
and f r i m  uncont ro l led  upper- s t a g e  v e h i c l e  motion. 
w- I REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDE LINES^ 
1. Cold gas  jets o r  c o n t r o l  moment gyros f o r  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  s h a l l  
b e  used when ope ra t ing  n e a r  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
2. The upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l l  use  jets on t h e  oppos i t e  s i d e  from t h e  
o r b i t e r  f o r  maxieuvers Eear t h e  orb i t e r .  
3. Capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided tG d e t e c t  comtustion i n s t a b i l i t y  J u r i n g  
f i r i n g ,  
4.U O r b i t e r  cr- c o n t r o l  of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l l  be  ptovided u n t i l  
s e p a r a t i o n  from t h e  o r t i t e r  p rec ludes  p o s s i b i l i t y  of r econ tac t .  . 
5 .  O r b i t e r  o r i e n t a t i o n  s h a l l  p o i n t  t h e  1 .ongi tudinal  a x i s  toward t h e  
s e p a r a t e d  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  mt i l  a ssfe s e p c r a t i o n  d i s t a n c e  h a s  
k e n  achieved. 
CODE 
- 
- 1 G P  
RGD REF. 
IV-3.4 
V - I  1-4.1 
X X X X  
1 
I H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
( C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE 2 O F  2 
- - 
Uncontrolled combusticn i n  active upper stage vehicle reaction control engines while 
near the orbiter. 
i 
i - -  - - (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT I N  THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) I ASSUMPTIONS (cont) 
The upper stage vehicle reaction control system is activated immediltely upon 
separation from the orbiter. 
Main engine burn w i l l  occur on the upper stage vehicle a t  a large, safe,  
separation distance from the orbiter. 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  IS  
PROGRAM I SHUTTLE X I 
I 
STATION I I 
I NO. 1 1.1.006 I 
DATE 8-9-71 I 
Leakage 3f corros ive  f l u i d s  from upper s t a g e  vehic le  tanks while  i n s i d e  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
I ASSUMPTIONS I 
1. Upper s t a g e  vehic les  r e t a i n  cur ren t  complement of co.r.rosive f l u i d s :  
Agena Ceqtaur Transtage Burner - SM 0~S/Tug 
Nitrogen Tetroxide X 2i 
Hydrogen Peroxide X X 
Liquid Oxygen X X X 
Inhibi ted  Red Fuming X 
N i t r i c  Acid 
I POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
Damage t o  o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e  and equipment p r inc ipa l ly  i n  t h e  cargo bay from corrosion 
of o r b i t e r  components as a r e s u l t  of leakage of corros ive  f l u i d s .  
l . A  Upper s t a g e  vehic le  pressures s h a l l  be  l imi ted  while  i n  o r  near  the  
o r b i t e r  such t h a t  the  f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  are a t  l e a s t  equal  t o  
the  o r b i t e r  tank f a c t o r s  of sa fe ty .  
2 . B  Gaseous content  of upper s t a g e  vehic le  tanks s h a l l  b e  small  enough 
s o  t h a t  r ap id  i s e n t r o p i c  expansion i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay w i l l  
no t  r e s u l t  i n  overpressure. 
3.E An e x t e r n a l  container  of s u f f i c i e n t  size and s t r e n g t h  t o  contain 
a l l  upper s t a g e  vehic le  contents  s h a l l  be  provided. 
4.F Capabil i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  de tec t  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e s  by 
measurement of f l u i d  pressures ,  temperatures, tank s t r a i n s ,  o r  
o the r  means. 
5.G Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent and dump 
upper s t a g e  vehic le  pressurized o r  hazardous f l u i d s  t o  space wi th in  
t h e  t i m e  cons t ra in t s  imposed by an abor t  s i t u a t i o n .  This  capab i l i ty  
s h a l l  be ava i l ab le  with t h e  cargo bay doors open o r  closed. 
(Continued on Page 2.) 
-- 
CODE 
K l G P  
K l G R  
- 2 G R  
L 3 R P  
L 2 R P  
X X X X  
RGD REF. 
H A Z A R D I E h E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
( C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE 2 OF 3 
- - 
DATE 8-9 - 71 
i HAZARD/EMERGENCY 
1 Leakage of corros ive  f l u i d s  from upper s t a g e  veh ic le  tanks while  i n s i d e  the  o r b i t e r .  
! 
I - --.- 
I (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT I N  THE ORDER OF SHEET I . )  
f REOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont)  6 . H  Pressur iz ing  gas on upper s t a g e  vehic les  s h a l l  be  turned o f f  u n t i l  
imnediately p r i o r  t o  r e l e a s e  of t h e  veh ic le  from t h e  o r b i t e r ,  
7.D Rel ief  c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  t h e  upper s t a g e  vehic le  tanks 
which automatical ly l i m i t  maximum pressure. Venting s h a l l  he t o  
space o r  t o  a tank a t  lower pressure,  and s h a l l  be arranged s o  t h a t  
mutually r e a c t i v e  f l u i d s  cannot mix and r e s u l t  i n  a f i r e  o r  explosion 
8.K Always-open cargo bay vents  t o  space s h a l l  be provided on the  
s h u t t l e  which l i m i t  i n t e r n a l  cargo bay pressures from upper s t a g e  
veh ic le  leakage t o  t h e  cargo bay allowable l i m i t s .  
g,L Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided on t h e  o r b i t e r  f o r  automatic cargo 
bay venting when the  always-open vents  a r e  inadequate,  i n  order  t o  
inc rease  t h e  allowable f l w  from i n s i d e  t o  outs ide  and t o  p r o t e c t  
aga ins t  re-entry inges t ion  through always-open vents.  
1O.M Cargo bay doors s h a l l  be open a t  a l l  times i n  earth. od:l , i t .  
118 A l l  o r b i t e r  hardware containeE i n  and near  t h e  sh l r t t l e  cargo bay 
s h a l l  b e  capable of being func t iona l ly  i s o l a t e d  froni those com- 
ponents necessary f o r  de-orbi t ,  re-entry and landing s o  t h a t  an 
acc ident  i n  t h e  cargo bay s h a l l  not  prevent o r b i t e r  abor t .  
L2.0 Vented gases from the  s h u t t l e  cargo bay s h a l l  not  be aS Lowed t o  
flow pas t  t h e  o r b i t e r  propel lant  tanks. 
L3.P Orbiter  equipment and s t r u c t u r e  exposed t o  vented gases from t h e  
cargo bay s h a l l  be protected aga ins t  t h e  e f f e c t s  of corrosion and 
, be capable of inspect ion  on t h e  ground. 
L4.S Cargo bay pressure and s e l e c t e d  w a l l  temperatures s h a l l  be 
monitored. 
L5.T Capabil i ty  s h a l l  be  provided i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay f o r  t h e  
de tec t ion  of leakage of s p e c i f i c  f l u i d s  on board t h e  u?per s t a g e  
vehic les .  
16.V Cargo bay sur face  mate r i a l s  which may be  exposed t o  1eak.ing 
corros ive  f l u i d s  from payload s h a l l  be  constructed o r  protec ted  1 agains t  corrosion. 
- 
(Continued on Page 3.) - 
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1 HAZARD 'EMERGENCY 
I 
/ Leakage of corros ive  f l u i d s  from upper s t a g e  vehic le  tanks while i n s i d e  t h e  o r b i t e r  
I .  --- - -- 
' (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT I N  THE ORDER OF SHEET I . )  
I 
REOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (ccnt) 
i 17. J Orb i t e r  hardware requi red  f o r  abort  s h a l l  b e  loca ted  remotely from 
I the  cargo bay, o r  protected agains t  the  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of upper 
I s t a g e  vehic le  explosions which would not  cause primary orb i t e r  
I s t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e .  
I 
( 19.R Upper s t a g e  veh ic le  propel lant  tank pressures s h a l l  be  reduced t o  
the  minimum operat ing value before  r e t r i e v a l  i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay. 
CODE 
-
K l R P  
-- - - 
3GD REF 
CV-3.1 
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SHUTTLE 1 I PROGRAM X I 
Inadvertent s t a r t  of an upper s t a g e  vehic le  main or  r eac t ion  con t ro l  rocket  engine while 
ins ide  o r b i t e r  cargo bay. 
1. Upper s t a g e  vehic le  r e t a i n s  t h e  current  complement o t  .ocket engines. 
Number of Engines 
Type of Engine Agena Centaur Trans tage  Burner I1 00s / T U ~  
Main Engine 
RCS Engine 
2. Inadvertent  f i r i n g  of an upper s t age  vehic le  main propulsion engine while  i n  t h e  
cargo bay w i l l  be ca tas t roph ic  t o  the  o r b i t e r .  
1 POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
I I 
Damage t o  o r b i t e r  equipment i n  the  cargo bay from 1) over-heating by d i r e c t  hea t ing  from 
the exhaust plume, 2) over-pressure from t h e  products of combustion, 3) changing the 
j insu la t ing  p roper t i e s  of the  space between s h u t t l e  tanks, and 4 )  impulse, r o t a t i o n  and 
- -  - 
a t r ans la t ion ,  leading to  s t r u c t u r a l  and equipment damage. 
: 1. Propellant  shut-off valves upstream from a l l  start valves s h a l l  be  
i 
' provided s o  t h a t  inadver tent  main va lve  opening would no t  s t a r t  
engines on upper s t a g e  veh ic les  while  i n  o r  near  t h e  o r b i t e r .  
L 
2. The design of the  upper s t a g e  veh ic le  c o n t r o l  system s h a l l  only allow 
supply of e l e c t r i c a l  energy t o  t h e  s t a r t  valves of t h e  rocket  engines 
i following p o s i t i v e  ac t ion  by t h e  orb iter crew during upper s t a g e  i vehic le  count-down i n  o r b i t .  
3.G Capabil i ty  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent  and dump 
7 
1 
f u p p e r  s t a g e  vehic le  pressurized o r  hazardous f l u i d s  t o  space wi th in  
the  time cons t ra in t s  imposed by an abor t  s i t u a t i o n .  This c a p a b i l i t y  
s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  with the  cargo bay doors open o r  closed. 
i 4.H Pressur iz ing  gas on upper s t a g e  veh ic les  s h a l l  be  turned o f f  u n t i l  
? immediately p r i o r  t o  release of t h e  veh ic le  from t h e  o r b i t e r .  
i 5. Always-open cargo bay vents  t o  space .hall  be provided on t h e  
1. o r b i t e r  which l i m i t  i n t e r n a l  cargo bay pressures from t h e  combustion 
rY products of a s ingle .upper  s t a g e  veh ic le  r eac t ion  con t ro l  rocket  
Y 
engine t o  t h e  cargo bay allowable l i m i t s .  
(Continued on Page 2. ) 
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1 Inadvertent  s t a r t  of an upper s t age  veh ic le  main o r  r eac t ion  con t ro l  rocket engine 
I while i n s i d e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay, 
, . -.-- 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I . )  
/ REnU IREMENT S & GUIDELINES (cont) 
! 
j 6.L Capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided on t h e  orb t e r  f o r  automatic cargo 
1 bay venting when t h e  always-open vents  a r e  inadequate,  i n  order  t o  
increase  the  allowable flow from i n s i d e  t o  outs ide  and t o  p ro tec t  
I 1 aga ins t  re-entry inges t ion  through always-open vents .  
I ; 7.M Cargo bay doors s h a l l  be open a t  a l l  times i n  e a r t h  o r b i t .  
1 
8 . N  All o r b i t e r  hardware contained i n  and near  t h e  o r b i t e r  cdrgo bay ! 
i s h a l l  be  capable of being funct ional ly  i s o l a t e d  from those com- ponents necessary f o r  de-orbit , re-entry and landing s o  t h a t  an 1 accident  i n  the  cargo bay s h a l l  not  prevent o r b i t e r  abor t .  
I 
i 9.0 Vented gases from the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay s h a l l  not  be allowed t o  
1 flow p a s t  the  o r b i t e r  propel lant  tanks. 
10.P Orbiter  equipment and s t r u c t u r e  exposed t o  vented gases from t h e  
cargo bay s h a l l  be protec ted  aga ins t  the  e f f e c t s  of corrosion and 
be capable of inspect ion  on the  ground. 
11. Insu la t ion  patches s h a l l  be provided on t h e  cargo bay walls 
opposi te  a l l  payload reac t ion  con t ro l  engines which w i l l  p ro tec t  
the  wal ls  from the combustion products. 
! 
112.~ Orb i t e r  crew contro l  of upper s tage  vehic le  s h a l l  be provided u n t i l  
i separa t ion  from t h e  o r b i t e r  precludes p o s s i b i l i t y  of recontac t .  
I 
1 3 .  Q Liquid p rope l l an t s  of re t r i i v e d  upper s t age  vehic les  s h a l l  be dumped 
I t o  space before  i n i t i a t i o n  of the  s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  denrbi t  maneuver. 
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I PROGRAM 1 SHUTTLE X 1 
STATION w DATE 1 8-12-71 1 
1 HAZARD/EMERGENCY 1 I SOURCE 111-2.1.2 1 
Inadvertent separa t ion  of a r  upper s t age  veh ic le  a t t a c h  point  while  i n  the  o r b i t e r .  
The upper s t a g e  vehic les  ai'e supported i n  the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay a t  a d i s c r e t e  number 
of attachment points .  
1 I 
1. Damage t o  the  o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e  and equipment, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  the  cargo bay, from 
c o l l i s i o n  with loose upper s t a g e  vehic le  equipment o r  payload. 
2 .  I n a b i l i t y  t o  re-enter and land o r b i t e r  i f  payload remains loose i n  cargo bay. 
1. The f a c t o r s  of s a f e t y  f o r  the  upper s t a g e  veh ic le  and o r b i t e r  a t tach-  
ment point  s h a l l  be  a t  l e a s t  'equal t o  : the  normal o r b i t e r  
s t r u c t u r e  f a c t o r s  of sa fe ty .  
2.  The upper s t a g e  vehic le  s h a l l  be supported i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  s o  t h a t  
fai lure.  of any one s t r u c t u r a l  support member w i l l  not jeopardize 
support of t h e  upper s tage  veh ic le  during re tu rn  t o  ear th .  
3. The design of the  upper s t a g e  vehic le  con t ro l  system s h a l l  only 
allow supply of e l e c t r i c a l  energy t o  the  separa t ion  mechanism 
following p o s i t i v e  ac t ion  by the  o r b i t e r  crew during upper s t a g e  
vehic le  count-down i n  o r b i t .  
i. The i n t e r n a l  sur face  of the  cargo bay s h a l l  be coated with a shock 
absorb en t b lanke t . 
. A r e s t r a i n t  system s h a l l  be provided f o r  t h e  upper s t a g e  vehic les  
i n  the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay which prevents contac t  of the  vehic le  with 
o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e  o r  eqaipment i n  t h e  event of p a r t i a l  o r  t o t a l  
r e l e a s e  of t h e  attachment points .  
:Continued on Page 2.J 
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1.1.008 
DATE 8-12-71 
--- -- - ---- 
HAZARD 'EMERGENCY 
I Inadve r t en t  s e p a r a t i o n  of an upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  a t t a c h  p o i n t  whi le  i n  t he  o r b i t e r .  
I 
- -- . . . - - . - - - - .. - - - 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REWIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont )  
Procedures s h a l l  be  a v a i l a b l e  t o  apply u n i d i r e c t i o n a l  t r a n u l a t i m s l  
o r  r o t a t i o n a l  a c c e l e r a t i o n  t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  i n  t h e  event  of a p a r t i a l  
o r  t o t a l  r e l e a s e  of t h e  payload i n  t h e  cargo bay u n t i l  loose  p a r t s  
and t h e  payload have s e t t l e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  a l low f u r t h e r  cor rec t ivc  
ac t ion .  
Procedures s h a l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  backing o f f  t h e  o r b i t e r  f r o n  an 
upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  i n a d v e r t e n t l y  s epa ra t ed  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay wi thout  con tac t  of t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  w i th  o rb  i t e r  strc.ct- 
u re  o r  equipment: wh i l e  in  o r b i t .  
Procedures s h a l l  b e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  ex t r a -veh icu la r  i n s p e c t i - ,  2ad 
release o r  re-attachment of p a r t i a l l y  r e l ea sed  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e s  
i n  o r b i t .  
Means s i ~ a l i  b e  provided LO ii.idicare to rhe o r b i t e r  crew t h a t  a 
r e t r i e v e d  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  is p o s i t i v e l y  secured a t  all a t t a c h  
p o i n t s  p r i o r  t o  d e o r b i t  and r e e n t r y .  
- -- 
CODE 
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SHUTTLE 
PROGRAM 
SORT I E 
STAT ION 
NO. 1.1.009 . 
+ DATE 8-12-71 - 
[HAZARD~MERGENCY 1 I SOURCE 1 11-2.1.2 I 
Loss of a t t i t u d e / t r a n s l a t i o n  con t ro l  of upper s t a g e  vehic le  upon release from o r b i t e r ,  
1 ASSUMPTIONS j 
1. Upper s t age  vehic le  has a t t i t u d e  hold and/or t r a n s l a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  
Agena Centaur Transtage Burner I1 00S/Tug 
Trans la t ion  - Main Engine X W *  X(1) x (1) x (3 x(1)  xC1) 
- RCS )E (1) X (2) X(6) X(6) 
- Auxiliary X x(1)  
At t i tude  Hold - RCS Couples X X 
- Off-Center X X X 
* ( ) Number of d i r e c t i o n s  (Continued on Page 2 .) 
1 POTENTIAL EFFECTS J 
1. Damage t o  s h u t t l e  s t r u c t u r e  and eq-dpment on cargo bay doors and near  e x t e r n a l  sk in  
from c o l l i s i o n  with the  out-of-control upper s t a g e  vehic le  o r  payload. 
2. Catastrophic damage t o  upper s t age  vehic le  leading t o  explosion and o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r a l  
f a i l u r e .  
[ REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINESJ 
1. Att i tude  cont ro l  couples i n  a l l  six r o t a t i o n a l  modes s h a l l  be  provided 1 G  p 
on upper s t a g e  vehicles .  I 
2. The planned a t t i t u d e s  of the  upper s t a g e  vehic le  during release at!d b 4 ~ R  
separa t ion  from the  o r b i t e r  s h a l l  b e  such t h a t  t b s  a t t i t u d e  con t ro l  
engines at no time acce le ra te  the veh ic le  towards t h e  o r b i t e r .  I 
3. A l l  a t t i t u d e  con t ro l  engines and e l e c t r o n i c s  s h a l l  b e  redundant on k i w  
upper s t a g e  vehicles .  I I 
4. The cargo bay doors s h a l l  be opened suf  f i c i e n t l y  03 t h e t  they cantrot - 1 G R 
be s t r u c k  by t h e  re leased  uppe'r s t a g e  vehic le  under any r o t a t i o n  
about its cen te r  of gravi ty .  
5.~.~he upper s t a g e  vehic le  s h a l l  be extended and re leased  ou t s ide  of =he 1 R R 
cargo bay such t h a t  upper s t a g e  vehic le  r u t a t i o n  aboutLtr  (tenter of  
g rav i ty  i n  any d i r e c t i o n  upon release, w i l l  not  impact any p a r t  of 
t h e  o r b i t e r .  
6. A l l  venting of the  upper s t a g e  vehic lec  while near  t h e  o r b i t e r  s h a l l  
be non-propulsive o r  . s h a l l  t r a n s l a t e  t h e  vehic le  may irom t h e  o r b i t e r .  
t ... 
I 
I (Continued on Page 2.) 
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i HAZARD 'EMERGENCY 
! 
I 
i 
/ Loss of a t t i t u d e / t r a n s l a t i o n  c o n t r o l  of upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  upon r e l e a s e  from o r b i t e r .  I 
-..- __ _ _ . _.-_ A__--__ _ - 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I . )  1 i 
I ASSUMPTIONS ( c o n t j  
- 
I 
2. Socrce! of s t a b i l i t y  remains t h e  same as c u r r e n t  veh ic l e s .  
I 
I 
! Agena Centaur Transtage Burner I1 SM 0OS/Tu& 
- - 
, Gyro Referent; X X 
' Accelerometers X X 
Computer/Flight Control  X X 
' 3. Thz c a p a b i l i t y  of  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  a c c e l e r a t e  dur ing  upper s t a g e  deployment is 
I than t h a t  of t h e  upper s t a g e  vehic le .  
I I 
I REW LREMENT s 6 GUIDELINES (con t ) CODE 
-
Less 
RDG REF, 
IV-3.1 
V-11-3.1 
; 7. No torques  s h a l l  be  imparted t o  t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  by t h e  , X  1 G P 
I s e p a r a t i o n  rechanism. 
i 8. O r b i t e r  s h a l l  be  moved away frcm upper s t a g e  veh ic l e  immediately X 4 R R~IV-3.4 
I on r e l e a s e .  
i Up2er s t a g e  v e h i c l e  a t t i ~ u d e  and t r a n s l a t i o n  s h a l l  b e  monitored ! 
I 
X 4 R RIIV-3.4 
I by t h e  o r b i t e r  crew immediately f o l l a d n p ,  rel-ease.  
I i 
I l l O .  L'gper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  a t t i t u d e  s h a l l  b e  c o n t r o l l e d  by comnand of  x 4 R R!IV-3.4 
I t h e  o r b i t e r  crew w d i a t e l y  fol lowing r e l e a s e ,  "-11-3.4 
'11. I n t e r n a l  a t t i t u d e  c o h t r o l  s i g n a l  of  t h e  upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l l  x 4 R : : r  -3.4 1 
I be monitored f o r  accuracy by the  o r b i t e r  crew be fo re  r e l ea se .  
I iv 
I 
,12. IJpper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l l  b e  switched from comnand c o n t r o l  t o  
i 
X 4 R P  
i n t e r n a l  a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  a f t e r  o r b i t e r  has  been s u f f i c i e n t l y  ' moved t h a t  no a t t i t u d e  change could r e s u l t  i n  c o i l i s i o n .  
3. Upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  s h a l l  kc switched from comand e c n t r o l  by t h e  , X 4 R R  
o r b i t e r  crew t o  i n t e r n a l  t r a c s l a t i o n  c o n t r o l  when s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  
is a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  execute  evas ive  maneuvers. 
fo l lowing  any main propuls ion o r  guidance f a i l u r e ,  
14, Upper o r b i t e r  s u r f a c e s  capable  of  baing s t r u c k  by t h e  r e l e a s e d  - 1 G R  
upper s t a g e  v e h i c l e  dur ing any a t t i t u d e  maneuver s h a l l  b e  s t r enq th -  
I sned t o  prevent damags ( t o  o r b i t e r  ccnnponents r equ i r ed  f o r  da-orbi t  , . 
re-antry,  and landing)  f o r  t he  condi t ion  of t h e  wors t  p o s s i b l e  a t t i t u d e  I a e e e ~ e r a t i o n .  - .  
( C O N T I N U E D )  
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
PAGE 3 OF 3 
- - 
1 HAZARD.'EMERGENCY 
. 1 
Loss of a t t i t u d e / t r a n a l a t l o n  con t ro l  of vpper s t a g e  veh ic le  upon r e l e a s e  from o r b i t e r .  
i 
i I 
". . -.- 
--- - 
I (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT I N  THE ORDER OF SHEO I . )  I 
tEOUZREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES ( cont ) 
15. Coverings around t h e  upper s tbge  vehic le  ttinks shall be  provided - 2 G P  
t o  prevent any l eak  from becoming d i r e c t i o n a l  and imparting ur.- 
wanted a t t i t u d e  o r  t r a n s l a t i o n  motion. 
L6.J. Orbi te r  hardware requi ied  f o r  abor t  s h a l l  be  loca ted  remotely I X  1 R R  
from t h e  cargo bay, o r  prote-fed aga ins t  the  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of [ 
cpper s t a g e  vehic le  explosions which would not  cause primary orbiter1 
s t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e .  ! 
A l l  o r b i t e r  hardware contained i n  and near  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay 1 x 1 ~ ~  
s h a l l  be capable of being functionally i s o l a t e d  fro:: those com- 
ponents necessary f o r  de-orbi t ,  re-entry and landing s o  t h a t  an ! 
accident  i n  t h e  cargo bay s h a l l  not  prevent o r b i t e r  abort .  
The t r a j e c t o r i e s  of the  o r b i t e r  and t h e  upper s t a g e  veh ic le  s h a l l  X 4 R R 
be cont inual ly  compared following r e l e a s e ,  and a means f o r  
s h u t t i n g  down the  upper s t a g e  veh ic le  s h a l l  be provided i f  a. 
c o l l i s i o n  appears imminent. I 
XGD REF. 
0 
IV-3.1 
IV-3.1 
IV-3.4 
V-11-3.4 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  IS 
1 PROGRAM SHUTTLE I X . 1 
I STATION I 1 
NO, 1.1.010 
1 
1 
Hangup of upper s tage  vehic le  during re lease  from o r b i t e r ,  
I ASSUMPTIONS I 
1. Attachment methods w i l l  be the  same a s  cu r ren t ly  required f o r  boost  vehicles .  
Agena Centaur Transtage Burner I1 
Explosive Bolts X 
Linear Shaped Charge X X X X 
Not Defined X 
)POTENTIAL EFFECTS 1 
1. Damage t o  o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e  and equipment from random motion of the  upper s t a g e  veh ic le  
i n  an extended posi t ion.  
2. I n a b i l i t y  of the  o r b i t e r  t o  re-enter because of the  open cargo bay doors. 
1. Redundancy s h a l l  be  provided i n  t h e  means f o r  separa t ing  the  upper 
s tage  vehicle .  do s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  s h a l l  r e s u l t  i n  unprogrammed motion 
o, the upper s t age  vehicle .  
?.w,The upper s t age  vehic le  s h a l l  be extended and re leased  ou t s ide  of the  
'cargo bay such t h a t  upper s t a g e  vehic le  r o t a t i o n  about any one a t tach-  
ment poin t  i n  any d i r e c t i o n  upon re lease ,  w i l l  not impact any p a r t  of 
the  o rb i t e r .  
3. Specia l  o r b i t e r  a t t i t u d e  and t r a n s l a t i o n  motions s h a l l  be planned t o  
assist release of any s i n g l e  r e s i d u a l  connecticn with the  upper s t age  
vehicle.  
4.. Orbi ter  t o  upper s t age  vehic le  connections s h a l l  be designed f o r  
emergency manual release by o r b i t e r  crew member i n  ext ravehicular  
a c t i v i t y  . 
5. Emergency release of the  extension mechanism s h a l l  b e  poss ib le  i n  
order  t o  save the  o r b i t e r  a t  the  expense of t h e  upper s t a g e  vehicle .  
(Continued on Page 2 .) 
COLE 
- 
X l R P  
X l R R  
X l R R  
X l R R  
X X X X  
RGD REF. 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
( C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE OF 
HAZARD/EMERGENCY 
Hangup of upper s tage vehicle during re lease  from orb i te r .  
. -.-- 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER O F  SHEET I.) 
REOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont ) 
6.X.Procedures s h a l l  be avai lable  f o r  extra-vehicular inspectian ani  
re lease  o r  re-attachment of p a r t i a l l y  released upper s tage  vehicles 
i n  o rb i t .  
Procedures s h a l l  be avai lable  t o  apply unidirect ional  t r a n s l a t i m a 1  
o r  ro ta t iona l  accelerat ion t o  the  o rb i t e r  i n  the event of a p a r t i a l  
re lease  of the  upper s tage vehicle i n  the  extended posit ion t o  pre- 
vent random motion. 
'CODE -., 
X 4 R 
- 4 G R  
- 
RGD RE1 
RIV-3.4 
V-11-3. 
- 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
L Page 1 of - 
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I PROGRAM I SHUTTLE X 1 
SORTIE I X 1 
I STATION 1 I 
I C NO. 1.1.011 
OAT E 8-16-71 I 
Rupture of comon bulkhead tanks i n  upper s t a g e  vehic le  while i n  o r  near  o r b i t e r .  
I ASSUMPTIONS I 
1. Some upper s t age  vehic les  w i l l  use common bulkhead tanks, e.g., Centaur. 
1 POTENTIAL EFFECTS j 
A propel lant  combination which could burn immediately ( f o r  hypergolics)  o r  could become 
- - 
an explosive mixture ( f o r  cryogenics) capable of being detonated by a small  energy 
input.  Orb i t e r  damage would be  ca tas t roph ic  i n  e i t h e r  case. 
1. For upper s t age  vehicles  with propulsion tanks using comon bulkheads, 
d i f f e r e n t i a l  pressure between t h e  two tanks,  common bulkhead s t r a i n ,  
o r  o the r  ind ica t ions  of p o t e n t i a l  f a i l u r e ,  s h a l l  be monitored by t h e  
Orb i t e r  crew. 
2. For upper s tage  vehic les  with propulsion systems using co:nmon bulk- 
heads, venting of the  high pressure tank s h a l l  be  automatic when a 
high d i f f e r e n t i a l  pressure o r  s t r a i n  is measured between the  two tanks 
3. Capabil i ty  s h a l l  be  provided f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  s e l e c t i v e l y  
p ressur ize  o r  vent each tank of an upper s t a g e  vehic le  nsing a 
common bulkhead. This c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  ava i l ab le  with the  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay doors open o r  closed. 
4 .~ .PresSur iz ing  gas on upper s t a g e  vehic les  s h a l l  b e  turned o f f  u n t i l  
immediately p r i o r  t o  r e l ease  of the  vehic le  from t h e  o r b i t e r .  
5 . ~ .  Relief  capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be prbvided f o r  t h e  upper s t a g e  vehic le  tanks 
which automatical ly l i m i t  maximum pressure. Venting s h a l l  be t o  
space o r  t o  a tank a t  lower pressure ,  and s h a l l  be  arranged s o  t h a t  
mutually react ive.  f l u i d s  cannot mix and r e s u l t  i n  a f i r e  o r  explosion. 
(Continued on Page 2.) 
I 
X 3 R P  
- 2 G P  
K 2 R P  
t 4 R P  
t 2 R P  
X X X X  
RGD REF. 
RECOMEHDEO X )  OR NOT 
No, OF HRPS 1 2, 3, 4 I EQIJIRWMT R! OR UIDELINE (6) 
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H A Z A P D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S 
( C O N T I N U E D )  
NO. 1.1.011 I 
DATE 8-16- 7 1  I 
Rupture of common bulkmad t ~nks i n  upper s tage  vehicle while i n  o r  near  o r b i t e r  . 
. .-- - 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN :':iE \3RDER OF SHEET I . )  
REOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont ) 
6.G.Capability s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent and dum~ 
upper s t age  vehic le  preusurized o r  hazardous f l u i d s  t o  space wi th in  
t he  time cons t ra in t s  imposed by an abor t  s i t ua t i on .  This capab i l i ty  
s h a l l  be  ava i l ab le  with the  cargo bay doors open cr closed. 
For upper s t age  vehic les  with ::lropulsion systems using conrmon bulk- 
heads, the design of  the  propulsion system s h a l l  only allow press- 
u r i za t ion  of both tanks t o  occur simultaneously, s o  a s  not t o  exceed 
the allowable d i f f e r e n t i a l  pressure. 
I PROGRAM I SHUTTLE I 
OAT E 18 -17-71  I 
Loss of p ressur iza t ion  i n  pressure s t a b i l i z e d  upper s t a g e  vehic le  u t ruc tu re  while i n  
o r  near o r b i t e r .  
1. upper s t a g e  veh ic les  w i l l  use a pressure s t a b i l i z e d  s t r n c t ~ ~ r c ,  l,g, t l ~ c l  Centaur. 
2.  It i s  d e s i r a b l e  t o  r e t u r n  a c o l l a p ~ e d  upper s t age  vehic le  t o  ea r th  . r a the r  than 
abandon i t  i n  o r b i t .  
1. Reparable o r  permanent damage t o  the  upper s t age  vehicle .  
2.  Damage t o  o r b i t e r  equipment and s t r u c t u r e  from col lapse  of the  upper stage vehic le .  
) REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES 
1, A backup means s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent o r  
p ressur ize  upper s t a g e  veh ic les  with a pressure  s t a b i l i z e d  s t r u c t u r e .  
2. The support s t r u c t u r e  of a pressure s t a b i l i z e d  upper s t age  vehic le  i n  
t h e  s h u t t l e  s h a l l  allow s h u t t l e  de-orbi t , re-en t r y  and landing follow- 
ing  l o s s  of p ressur iza t ion  i n  the  upper s t a g e  veh ic le  while i n  the 
o r b i t e r  cargo bay i n  o r b i t .  
3 .~ .Capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided t o  d e t e c t  p o t e n t i a l  tank f a i l u r e s  by 
measurement of f l u i d  pressures ,  temperatures, tank s t r a i n s ,  o r  o the r  
means. 
4. J . 0 r b i t e r  hardware required f o r  abor t  s h a l l  be loca ted  remotely from 
t h e  cargo bay, o r  protec ted  aga ins t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  e f f e c t s  of upper 
s t a g e  vehic le  explosions which would not  cause primary o r b i t e r  
s t r u c t u r e  f a i l u r e .  
5,N.All o r b i t e r  hardware contained i n  and near t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay 
s h a l l  be capable of being func t iona l ly  i s o l a t e d  from those com- 
ponents necessary f o r  de-orbit ,  re-entry and landing s o  t h a t  an 
acc ident  i n  t h e  cargo. bay s h a l l  not  prevent o r b i t e r  abort .  
'Continued on Page 2.) 
CODE 
X l R P  
X l G R  
X 3 R P  
X l R R  
X l R R  
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
( C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE 2 OF 2 
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NO. 1.1.012 4 
DATE 8-17-7 1 1 
Loss of pressurization i n  pressure s t ab i l i zed  upper s tage vehicle s t ruc tu re  while i n  
o r  near o rb i te r .  
. -- 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REQUIREMENTS d GUIDELINES (cont) 
6.X. Procedures s h a l l  be avai lable  fo r  extravehicular  inspection and 
re lease  o r  re-attachment of depressurized upper s tage vehicles 
i n  orbi t .  
Suff ic ient  upper s tage vehicle support s h a l l  be provided by the  
o rb i t e r  t o  prevent collapse during any transport  phase, regard- 
less of pressure. 
The pressure s t ab i l i zed  s t ruc tu re  s h a l l  be capable of being f i l l e d  
and s t ab i l i zed  with foam while i n  o r b i t  following j e t t i s o n  o r  use of 
i n t e rna l  f lu ids .  
CODE 
-
RGD REI 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
Page - 1 of 2 
I 
SHUTTLE I 
PROGRAM X I 
SORTIE X 1 I STATION I I 
I NO. 
I DATE 
I n a b i l i t y  t o  dump propel lants  o r  pressurants  i n  r e t r i e v e d  upper s t age  vehicle .  
1. Upper s t a g e  vehic les  r e t a i n  t h e i r  current  complement of pressurized containers .  
(Continued on Page 2 .) 
1 POTENTIAL EFFECTS J 
Damage t o  o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e  and equipment from r e l e a s e  of r e s i d u a l  propel lants  o r  press- 
urants  i n t o  the  cargo bay. 
I REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES J CODE 
-. 
b 
i 
- 
.i { 
1 
- i 
4 
i 1 
1 
4 
,? 
i 
! 
i i 
i 
'i 
5 
- 
I j 
- ?  
- i b
i i 
j 
i 
i 
I 
\ 
I 
t 
I 
"WENDED i" " '-1 \I I I / WO, of WS 1 2 , 3 , 4  . RESOLVED HAZARD RE I ~ W T  rj  OR WIDELINE e) RESIDUAL HAZARD M 8 NTIVE (P) @ ROlEOIM (R 
D-48 
Dumping of propel lants  and pressurants  from a r e t r i e v e d  upper s t a g e  I x ~ R P  
veh ic le  s h a l l  be  accomplished before i n i t i a t i o n  of the s h u t t l e  o r b i t e r  
I de'orb i t  maneuver. 
Dumping of propel lants  and pressurants  from a r e t r i e v e d  upper s t a g e  
veh ic le  s h a l l  be  cont ro l led  by the  o r b i t e r  crew. 
A backup means of dumping propel lants  and pressurants  from a re t r i eved  
upper s t a g e  veh ic le  s h a l l  be ava i l ab le ,  
The o r b i t e r  a u x i l l i a r y  propulsion system s h a l l  provide an upper s t a g e  
veh ic le  propel lant  s e t t l i n g  maneuver before  f i r i n g  of t h e  
o r b i t  maneuvering system, de-orbit engines. 
An upper s t a g e  veh ic le  i n  which propel lant  and pressurants  have not  
been dumped s h a l l  not  be returned i n t o  t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay. 
K 4 R P  
X l R P  
- 4 G R 
X X X X  
RGD REF. 
ASSUMPTIONS (cont) 
Agena Centaur Transtage Burner I1 SM OOS/TUR 
- 
Helium Tanks 
Nitrogen Tanks 
Nitrogen Tetroxide Tanks 
Aerozene -50 Tanks 
Hydrogen Peroxide Tanks 
Liquid Oxygen Tanks 
Liquid Hydrogen Tanks 
Monomethyl Hydrazine Tanks 
~ a t e r / ~ l y c o l  Tanks 
Unsymmetrical D i m e  thy1 
Hydras ine 
Inhibited Red Fuming Ni tr ic  
Acid 
r- H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S Page 2 of 2 
- I 
I SHUTTLE X 
NO, 1.1.014 
I DATE I 
I n a b i l i t y  t o  dump upper s tage  vehic le  propel lants  o r  pressurants  during o r b i t e r  abort .  
1, Upper s t a g e  vehic les  r e t a i n  t h e i r  current  comple-ent of pressur ized  containers .  
(Continued on Page 2.) 
I POTENTIAL EFFECTS j 
1, I n a b i l i t y  t o  r e t u r n  upper s t age  veh ic le  t o  ear th .  1 
2. Damage t o  o r b i t e r  s t r u c t u r e  and equipment from overloading during de-orbit ,  re-entry 
and landing w i t h  f u l l y  loaded launch payload. I 
) REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES ] CODE I RGD REF. 
1 
1, The o r b i t e r  s h a l l  have the  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  de-orbit ,  re-enter and land X 1 R R IV-3- 1 
with a fqdly loaded upper s t a g e  veh ic le  as payload. 
2. S u f f i c i e n t  propel lants  f o r  o r b i t e r  de-orbit  and landing with on-board, X 4 R R IV-3-4 
f u l l y  loaded upper s t a g e  vehic le  s h a l l  be  re ta ined on the  
u n t i l  main engine i g n i t i o n  of the  upper s t age  vehicle.  
3.G.Capability s h a l l  be provided f o r  t h e  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent and dump X 2 R P IV-3.2 
upper s t age  vehic le  pressurized o r  hazardous f l u i d s  t o  space wi th in  V-I 1-3.2 
the  time cons t ra in t s  imposed by an abor t  s i t u a t i o n .  This c a p a b i l i t y  
s h a l l  be ava i l ab le  with t h e  cargo bay doors open o r  closed, 
- H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
! 1 
I 
! HAZARD,'EMERGENCY 
! 
Inab i l i t y  t o  dump upper a tage vehicle propellants o r  pressurants during o r b i t e r  abort.  
ASSUMPTIONS (cont) 
(Continued) 
I . -.- 
I (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
I 
Agena Centaur Transtage Burner I1 OOS/TU& 
Helium Tanks 
Nitrogen Tanks 
Nitrogen Tetroxide Tanks 
Aerozene -50 Tanks 
Hydrogen Peroxide Tanks 
Liquid Oxygen Tanks 
Liquid Hydrogen Tanks 
Monomethyl Hydrozine Tanks 
~ a t e r / G l y c o l  Tanks 
Unsymmetrical D i m e  thy1 X 
Hydrazine 
hh ib i ted  Red Fuming N i t r i c  Acid X 
The s h u t t l e  is designed f o r  a lower re turn  payload weight t h ~ *  
t o  o rb i t .  
The shu t t l e  and i ts  payload has achieved orb i t .  
i t  can del iver  
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S 
Page 1 of 2 
DATE 1 8-17-71 1 
Inab i l i t y  t o  close cargo bay doors a f t e r  r e t r i e v a l  of upper s tage vehicle because of 
in terference with upper stage vehicle. 
Orbiter  zargo bay doors must be closed before re-entry. 
I I POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
I 
Inab i l i t y  of a r b i t e r  t o  re-enter. 
' 2 .  Damage t o  orbif  e r  cargo bay doors o r  cargo bay. 
3. Damage or l o s s  of upper s tage vehicle. 
1 REQUIREMENTS L GUIDELINES 
1. Capability s h a l l  be provided for  visual inspection of an o r b i t e r  
payload before i n i t i a t i n g  r e t r i e v a l  and loading i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  
cargo bay. 
2. Posi t ive  indication s h a l l  be prnvided t o  the  o r b i t e r  crew t h a t  a 
re t r ieved  payload has been properly eecured i n  the  cargo bay before 
closing the  cargo bay doore. 
3. Automatic means s h a l l  be provided fo r  detecting interferences  by the  
payload wit .: the  closing of the  cargo bay doors and stopping the  
motion b e f ~ . e  damage r e su l t s  t o  the  doors o r  the  door mechanima. . 
4. Means s h a l l  be  provided fo r  re-opening the cargo bay doom from any 
. p a r t i a l l y  cloeed position. 
5 .  Capability s h a l l  be provided f o r  visual inspection of an o r b i t e r  
payload i n  the  o rb i t e r  cargo bay with the cargo bay doors open. 
6. Procedures e h a l l  be available for  extravehicular o r  remote in8pect im,  
extension, and re lease  o r  re-positioning of improperly staved upper 
s tage  vehicles in. o rb i t .  
I (Cont h u e d  on Page 2. ) 
CODE 
- 
X ~ R P  
X 3 R P  
X 2 R R  
X l R R  
K 2 R P  
r b a a  
x x x x  
RGD REF. 
IV-3.4 
11-1-4.1 
W-11-4.1 
tv-3.3 
11-1-6.1 
W-11-4.1 
tV-3.2 
tV-3.1 
IV-3.2 
tv-3.4 
r-11-4.1 
7 H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  I 
I DATE 8-17-71 
b 
/ I n a b i l i t y  t o  c lose  cargo bay doors a f t e r  retrieval of upper s t a g e  vehic le  because of 
I in te r fe rence  with upper s t age  vehicle.  
I i .  - 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEO I.) I REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES (cont ) 
Capabil i ty f o r  extra-vehicular a c t i v i t y  s h a l l  be provided t o  d i r -  
connect, sever ,  o r  otherwise f r e e  cables,  deployed mechanisms o r  
o ther  upper s t age  vehic le  protruberances which could i n t e r f e r e  
with r e t r i e v a l  and stowage i n  the  o r b i t e r .  
Pos i t ive  indica t ion  s h a l l  be provided t o  the o r b i t e r  crew t h a t  t5e 
cargo bay doors have closed and la tched befoi s i n i t i a t i n g  de-orbit. 
TLe capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided on upper s t age  vehic les  f o r  remote 
emergency j e t t i son ing  of deployable equipment t o  allow r e t r i e v a l  
and stowage i n  the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay. 
--- 
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[ DATE 
Exposure of the  o r b i t e r  crew o r  passengers t o  a t ox i c  environment released from a 
vesse l  i n  the  payload containing a tox ic  f lu id .  
IASSUMPTIONS j 
1. The payload is capable of being pressurized f o r  manned occupancy. 
2 .  An a i r lock  in te r face  exists between the o r b i t e r  and the  payload. 
3. Toxic o r  po ten t i a l ly  t ox i c  f l u i d s  a r e  ca r r i ed  i n  the  o r b i t e r  payload. 
I POTENTIAL EFFECTS J 
.I. In jured o r  disabled o r b i t e r  crewmen o r  passengers due t o  tox ic  payload f l u i d s  -aining 
access t o  the o r b i r e r  environmental con t ro l  and l i f e  support system. 
2 .  In jured o r  disabled passengers i n  pressurized payload due t o  t ox i c  payload environment. 
1.Y Toxic f l u i d  containers  s h a l l  b e  located i n  unpressurized volumes of 
pressurized payloads, o r  s h a l l  be double contained wi th  t he  capa- 
b i l i t y  of dumping t he  f l u i d  t o  space o r  off-loading t o  another 
double container,  and of venting the space between the  two conta 
t o  space. wrs 
2.2 Llouble contained t ox i c  f l u i d  containers  sha1.1 be provided with means 
t o  de tec t  leakage of t he  tox ic  f l u i d  i n t o  t he  space between the  con- 
t a i ne r s ,  and with means t o  detect penetrat ion of t h e  outs ide  container 
3.a Means s h a l l  be provided f o r  de tec t ing  a tox ic  environment i n  press- 
urized o r b i t e r  payloads containing t ox i c  o r  po t en t i a l l y  t o x i c  f lu ids .  
4.b Emergency capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  s u s t a i n  personnel when in a 
manned ?ayload, following detec t ion  of a t ox i c  environment i n  the  
payload, u n t i l  escape i n t o  t he  o r b i t e r  can be ef fec ted .  
5.c Special  p ro tec t ive  garments and equipment s h a l l  be provided f o r  
personnel w ~ r k i n g  i n  a toxic environment o r  near  po t en t i a l l y  tox ic  
payload elanrents. 
(Continued on Page 2.) I 
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DATE 1 Q - 71 
i HAZARD/EMERGENCY I 
Exposure of the o r b i t e r  crew o r  passengers t o  a t ox i c  environment released from a I vessel i n  the payload containing a tox ic  f lu id .  
I - i . .-- 
! (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) REOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont) 
6.d Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  purge o r  dump t o  space a tox ica l ly  
contaminated atmosphere i n  a pressurized o r b i t e r  payload. 
7.e Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  purge o r  vent the  o r b i t e r  a i r lock  
and tunnel to  spac. following emergency egress  of  passengers from 
a tox ic  payload environment, o r  following I V A  personnel en t ry  f o r  
inspect ion and subsequent r e tu rn  t o  prevent the  t ox i c  environment 
from contaminating the  o r b i t e r  crew and passenger compartment. 
8.f Means s h a l l  be  provided t o  decontaminate personnel who have been 
exposed t o  a toxic  environment i n  the  payload which can be  pro- 
pagated to  the  o r b i t e r  before  enter ing t he  o r b i t e r  crew and 
passenger compartments. 
9. Means s h a l l  be provided f o r  determining t he  presence of an 
unacceptable tox ic  environment i n  the  o r b i t e r  as a r e s u l t  of 
tox ic  contaminaticn i n  a payload. 
LO. Emergency capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided i n  the  o r b i t e r  t o  purge t he  
o r b i t e r  pressurized volumes of a tox ic  environment t h a t  may r e s u l t  
from tox ic  contamination of a payload, and t o  sue t a in  o r b i t e r  
personnel during the  purging operation. 
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PROGRAM 
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STATION 
I NO. 11.2.002 I 
OAT E 8-27-71 I 
A f i r e  i n  the cargo bay resu l t ing  from release  and ign i t ion  of a flammable f l u i d  
i n  an unpressurized payload. 
I ASSUMPT1oNS 1 1 The payload is unpressurized and contains vessels  of flammable f lu ids .  
r Lpressur ized  payload - Flammable f l u id  vessels  
2. Fire  can be sustained i n  the  unpressurized cargo bay long enough t o  
cause damage. 
1 POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
r J 
1. Damage t o  payload. 
2. Damage t o  o rb i t e r  s t ruc tu re  and equipment i n  the  cargo bay, possible preventing 
de-orbit, re-entry, and landing. 
1. The o r b i t e r  cargo bay- s h a l l  be  vented t o  space or the o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay doors s h a l l  be opened at a l l  times while on-orbit t o  preclude 
buildup of pressures i n  the  cargo bay capable of supporting combustion, 
2. Fi re  detection and locat ion capabi l i ty ,  such as dis t r ibu ted  t h e m -  
couples, infrared detectors,  o r  remote control  TV, s h a l l  be prodded 
i n  the  cargo bay f o r  use while the  cargo bay doors are closed. 
3. Procedures s h a l l  be  avai lable  f o r  m e d i a t e l y  i n i t i a t i n g  opening ' of 
the  cargo bay doors i f  a f i r e  is detected i n  the- cargo bay while the  
doors are shut. 
4.g Instrumentation of payloads s h a l l  be provided t o  a s s i s t  i n  i so l a t i ng  
. cause and source of f i r e .  
5. h Capability t o  release, eject, or  extend the  payload s h a l l  be  provided 
s o  as t o  prevent damage t o  the  o rb i t e r  at the ~l-xpen8e.of the  payload. 
6. i Capability s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  o r b i t e r  crew t o  vent and d w p  
flammable o r  hazardous payload f lu id s  t o  space within the  ti= con- 
s t r a i n t s  imposed by ah abort  s i tuat ion.  This capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be  
I 
avai lable  with the cargo bay doors opep o r  closed. 
1 (Continued on Page 2.) 
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A f i r e  i n  the cargo hay resu l t ing  from re lease  and ign i t i on  of a flanmeble f l u i d  
i n  an unpressurized payload. 
I I ..- 
: (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
IEOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont) 
7 . j  Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  switch off  a l l  e l e c t r i c a l  loads t o  
payload from the orb i te r .  
3.k Thermal insula t ion s h a l l  be provided on o rb i t e r  cargo bay s t ruc tu re  to  
minimize o r b i t e r  s t ruc tu re  absorption of radia ted hea t  from payload 
f i r e .  
1.1 Thermal insula t ion s h a l l  be provided between o rb i t e r  cargo baylpayload 
a t tach points  and other physical  in te r faces  t o  minimize thermal con- 
duction t o  o rb i t e r  s t ructure .  
Om F i r e  and heat  r e s i s t a n t  protect ion of o r b i t e r  t o  payload cornand m d  
instrumentation in te r faces  s h a l l  be  provided. 
1. A warning indicat ion s h a l l  be  provided t o  the orbi ter .  crew of a sp i l l ed  
flammable f l u i d  o r  a f i r e  hazard environmant in the orb i t e r  cargo 
2. Capability s h a l l  be  provided t o  deluge monopropellant and chemical 
decomposition f i r e s  with cold i n e r t  gas t o  reduce o r  elinhate 
chemical a c t i v i t y  i f  venting t o  space does not el iminate fire. 
3. n Igni t ion sources i n  the  o r b i t e r  bay, such as B W L t h  and relays, 
s h a l l  b e  sealed o r  otherwise contained s o  as t o  prevent ign t t fon  
of f l m a b l e  f lu ids .  
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A f i r e  i n  a pressurized payload i n  the  cargo bay resu l t ing  from release  and ign i t ion  
of a flannnable f lu id .  
-- 
' [ ~ s ~ u ~ ~ ~ ~ c ~ ~  I 1. The payload is pressurized,  but not necessar i ly  manned a t  a l l  times, 
and contains vessels  of flaxmuable f lu ids .  . 
Pressurized payload / Flammable f l u i d  vessels 
\ I 
2. Igni t ion sources w i l l  ex i s t , du r ing  manned operations i n  the  payload. 
3. An a i r lock  in te r face  e x i s t s  between the  o r b i t e r  and the  payload. 
--- 
EFFECTS I 
I ;. Damage t o  pay;oad. 
2. Rupture/explosion of the  payload, leading t o  damage t o  orbi ter .  
3. Injury o r  l o s s  of personnel i n  the  payload module. 
I REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES I 
13 Flammable f l u i d  containers s h a l l  be located in unpressurized vol- 
umes of pressurized payloads, o r  s h a l l  be double contained with 
the  capabi l i ty  of dumpiag the  f l u i d  t o  apace o r  off-loading t o  
another double container, and of venting the  space between the  
two containers t o  space. 
2.2 Double contained flammable f l u i d  containers s h a l l  be provided with 
means t o  detect  leakage of the flammable f l u i d  i n t o  t he  space . 
between the  containers, and with means t o  detect  penetrat ion of 
the  outs ide  container. 
3. a Means s h a l l  be praoided f o r  detect ing a flaaaaable o r  oxygen en- 
. r iched environment in pressurized s h u t t l e  payloads containiag 
flammable f lu ids .  
4. Means s h d l  be provided f o r  detect ing the  presence of a fire i n  
pressurized s h u t t l e  payloads. 
(Continued aa Page 2.) 
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REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont ) 
A f i r e  i n  a pressurized payload i n  the  cargo bay resu l t ing  from release and ign i t ion  
of a flammable f lu id .  
. --- - 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEO I.) 
Manually and remotely controlled means s h a l l  be provided i n  
pressurized o rb i t e r  payloads f o r  control l ing and extinguishing 
f i r e s .  
Emergency l i f e  support s h a l l  be provided f o r  a l l  personnel i n  
manned o rb i t e r  payloads s u f f i c i e n t  t o  allw them t i m e  t o  control  
a f i re  and/or escape t o  the  orb i te r .  
Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  i s o l a t e  o r b i t e r  environmental 
control  system from payload t o  prevent tox ic  fumes from enter ing 
the  orbi ter .  
Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  automatically shut  off  forced 
air  c i rcu la t ion  in a pressurized o rb i t e r  payload upon detection 
of a f i r e ,  
Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  re l ieve  atmoepheric pressure froma 
o r b i t e r  payload so as t o  prevent pressurization beyond the  payload 
s t r u c t u r a l  limits. This capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be automatic when the  
payload is  not mrmned, and m d e r  control  of the  occupants when. 
manned. The maximum dump rate s h a l l  not exceed the  venting capa- 
b i l i t y  of the  o rb i t e r  cargo bay with the  cargo b ly  doors c100ed. 
10. i Capability s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  o rb i t e r  crew t o  vent and dump 
flammable o r  hazardous payload f lu id s  t o  space within the  tima / constra ints  imposed by an abor t  s i tua t ion .  This capabi l i ty  s h a l l  , be avai lable  with the cargo bay doom open o r  closed. 
1l.d Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  purge or dump t o  space a tox ica l ly  
contaminated atmosphere i n  a pressurized o rb i t e r  payload. 
112 . j  Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  switch of f  a11 e l e c ~ r i c a l . l o a d r .  t o  
I payload f ram orb i te r .  ( (Continued on Page 3.) 
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A f i r e  i n  a pressurized payload i n  the  cargo bay resu l t ing  from release  and ign i t ion  
of a flammable f lu id .  
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont) 
1 3 a  Igni t ion sources i n  o r b i t e r  pressurized payloads, such as switches 
and re lays ,  s h a l l  be sealed o r  otherwise contained so  as t o  prevent 
ign i t ion  of flamnable f lu ids .  
14.h Capability to  re lease ,  e j e c t ,  o r  extend the payload s h a l l  be pro- 
vided so  a s  to  prevent damage t o  the  o r b i t e r  a t  the  expense of the  
payload. 
1 5 4  Instrumentation of payloads s h a l l  be provided t o  assist i n  isola-  
t i n g  cause and source of f i r e .  
l6.k Thermal insula t ion s h a l l  be provided on o r b i t e r  cargo bay s t ructure  
t o  minimize o rb i t e r  s t ruc tu re  absorption of radia ted hea t  from pay- 
load f i r e .  
17.1 Thermai insula t ion s h a l l  be provided between o r b i t e r  cargo baylpay- 
18.m Fi re  and heat  r e s i s t a n t  protection of o rh i t e r  t o  payload command 
and instrumentation in te r faces  e h a l l  be provided. 
19. Materials  used in pressurized payloads s h a l l  be subject  t o  the 
same flaumabil i ty control  procedures as those used within the  
o rb i t e r  pressurized volumes. 
load a t tach  points  and other-physical  in te r faces  t o  minimize thermal 
conduction t o  o rb i t e r  s t ructure .  
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( PROGRAM I SHUTTLE X I 
I DATE 18-27-71 j 
A corrosive environment i n  the o r b i t e r  cargo bay r e su l t i ng  from leakage o r  rupture 
of a payload vesse l  containing a corrosive f lu id .  
1. An a i r lock  i n t e r f ace  e x i s t s  between t he  o r b i t e r  and the  payload,. 
I 
2. Corrosive f l u i d s  a r e  ca r r i ed  i n  the  o r b i t e r  payload. 
1. Damage t o  payload. 
2. Damage t o  o r b i t e r  s t r uc tu r e  and equipment i n  t he  cargo bay, poss ib le  preventing de- 
- 
o r b i t ,  re-entry, and landing. 
- 
1 .Y Corrosive f l u i d  containers  s h a l l  be located  i n  unpressurized 
volumes of pressurized payloads, o r  s h a l l  be double contained with 
the  capab i l i ty  of dumping the  f l u i d  t o  space o r  off-loading t o  
another double container ,  and of venting the . space  between t he  
two containers  t o  space. 
2.2 Double contained corrosive f l u i d  c o n t a h e r e  s h a l l  be provided wi th  
means t o  de tec t  leakage of the  corrosive f l u i d  i n t o  the  space be- 
tween the  containers ,  and with means t o  de tec t  penet ra t ion  o f  the 
outs ide  container .  
3.d Capabil i ty s h a l l  be provided t o  purge o r  dmp t o  space a corrosive 
atmosphere i n  a pressurized o r b i t e r  payload. 
4.V Cargo bay surface  mate r ia l s  which may be exposed t o  leaking corro- 
s i ve  f l u i d s  from payload s h a l l  be conetructed o r  protec ted  agains t  
corrosion. 
5. Instrumentation s h a l l  be provided t o  de tec t  leakage of corrosive 
f l u i d s  from container  o r  piping. 
(Continued on Page 2.) 
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-- 
HAZARD 'EMERGENCY 
A corrosive environment i n  the o r b i t e r  cargo bay resul t ing from leakage o r  rupture 
of a payload vessel  containing a corrosive f lu id .  
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
EOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont) 
3 .  Access f o r  v i sua l  inspection by int ravehicular  a c t i v i t y  o r  remotely 
by instrumentation s h a l l  be provided t o  a l l  primary s t ruc ture  in- 
s ide  the  cargo bay ; r equipment i n  the  cargo bay required fo r  r e tun  
t o  ear th .  
7. Access f o r  v i sua l  inspection by intravehicular  a c t i v i t y  o r  remotely 
by instrunentat ion s h a l l  be provided t o  a l l  primary s t ruc ture  of 
pressurized payloads while i n  the  o rb i t e r  cargo bay. 
B. Means s h a l l  be provided for  the l oca l  application of radiant  o r  
other type of heat  remotely o r  by personnel i n  1VA o r  EVA 
a c t i v i t y  t o  evaporate accmulatibns of frozen f lu id s  from c r i t i c a l  
areas. 
3.0 Vented gases from the  o rb i t e r  cargo bay s h a l l  not be allawed t o  
flow past  the  o r b i t e r  propellant tanks. 
0 3  Orbiter  equipment and s t ruc ture  exposed t o  vented gases from the  
cargo bay s h a l l  be protected against  the  e f f ec t s  of corrosion and 
be capable of  inspection on the  ground. 
1.V Cargo bay surface materials which may be exposed t o  leaking 
corrosive f l u id s  from payload s h a l l  be constructed o r  protected 
agains t corrosion. 
2.e Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  purge o r  vent the  o r b i t e r  a i r lock  
and tunnel space following emergency egress of passengem from 
. a corrosive payload enviroxment, o r  following LVA personnel entry  
fo r  inspection and aubeequent re turn t o  prevent the  corrosive 
environment from contaminating the  o rb i t e r  crew and paosenger 
compartment. 
3.f Means s h a l l  be provided t o  decontcrminate personnel who have been 
exposed t o  a corrosive environment i n  the  payload which can be pro- 
pagated t o  the o r b i t e r  before entering the  o r b i t e r  crw and paom- 
enger compartments. 
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1 1 
NO. 11.2.005 
r I 
An explosion i n  the o rb i t e r  cargo bay of a po ten t ia l ly  explosive payload vessel. 
LASSUMPTIONS ] 
The o rb i t e r  payload includes po ten t ia l ly  explosive f l u i d  tanka i n  (a) the  unpressurized 
cargo bay, o r  (b) i n  a pressurized o r  unprersurized module which cannot contain the 
exp 10s ion. 
P O T E N T I A L  EFFECTS 
damage t o  o rb i t e r  s!ructure and equipment pr incipal ly  i n  cargo bay from: (1) Rupture of 
pressurized containers i n t o  fragments, (2) I n i t i a t i o n  of a pressure wave producing shock, 
(3) Release of excessive f l u i d  which increases cargo bay pressure beyond venting capabi l i ty  
and increases heat leaks i n t o  o r b i t e r  propellant  t&ks.- 
1. The fac tors  of s a f e ty  of pressure verseb while i n  o r  near the 
o r b i t e r  s h a l l  be a t  least equal t o  the  o r b i t e r  tank fac tom 
of safety.  
2. Gaseous content of pressurized tanka s h d l  be  small enough r o  t ha t  
rapid i sen t rop ic  expansion i n t o  t h e  orbs ta r  cargo bay w i l l  no t  rerult 
i n  overpressure. 
3 . C  Tanks s h a l l  be designed so  tha t  f a i l u r e  due t o  overpressure w i l l  not 
produce shrapnel. 
4 .  Relief capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provldad f o r  ?ressurized tank6 which 
automatically limit maldarrm pmrrure.  Venting s h a l l  be t o  space or 
, to  a tank a t  lower pressure, and s h a l l  be arrraged so tha t  mutually 
reactive fluids cannot mix m d  rsrult i n  a f i r e  o r  explosionb 
5.F Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  de tec t  po ten t ia l  tank f a i l u r e s  by 
measurement of f l u i d  p r e s r u r u ,  tanperaturer ,  tank r t r a ino ,  or other 
means. 
(Continued on Page 2. ) 
CODE 
- 
X l G P  
X l R R  
X l G R  
X 2 R P  
X 3 R P  
X X X X  
RGD REF. 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  1 5  
PAGE OF 3 
- - 
( NO. ( 1.2.005 I 
DATE 8-2 7-71 1 
HAZARD.'EMERGENCY 
An explosion in  the orb i te r  cargo bay of a potentially explosive payload vessel, 
; . -.-- - .-- 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont) 
6.1 Capability qhall  be provided for the orbi ter  crew t o  vent and dump 
pressurized or  hazardous fluids to  space within the time constraints 
imposed by an abort s i tuat ion.  This capability s h a l l  be available 
w i t h  the cargo bay doors open or  closed. 
7 . 1  Cargo bey thermal insulation s h a l l  be desigued as a f r apen ta t ion  
blanket . 
8. Orbiter hardware required for  abort sha l l  be located remotely from 
the cargo bay, or  protected against the potential  e f fec ts  of payload 
explosions which would not cause primary shut t le  s t ructure fai lure ,  
9 .  Always-open cargo bay vents to  space s h a l l  be provided on the orb i te r  
which limit in terna l  cargo bay pressures from leakage to  the cargo 
bay allowab l e  limits . 
L O L  Relief valves s h a l l  be provided on t heorb i t e r  for  auzamatic cargo 
bay venting when the always-open vents are inadequate, i n  order t o  
increase the allowable flaw from imi& t o  outaide and t o  protect  
against r e e n t r y  ingestion through always-open vents. 
L1M Cargo bay doors s h a l l  be open at al l  timeis i n  ear th orbit .  
KH A l l  o rb i te r  hardware contained i n  and mu the o rb i t e r  u q o  bay 
s h a l l  be capable of being f\nrctionally b o l a t a d  from &me c a -  
ponents necessary for  &-orbit, re-entry and landing so that sa 
accident i n  the cargo bay s h a l l  not prevent o rb i t e r  abort. 
;L3. Pressurized tanks shall be located or  protected by ahraise1 proof 
1 barr ie rs  s o  tha t  explosion of m e  w i l l  not prop-ate t o  others. 
i 4. Pressurized tanks s h a l l  be located o r  provided with shrapnel proof barriera s o  tha t  orb i te r  crew a d  pa~menger capartmatr and eqdp- oent required fo r  o rb i t e r  return to earth w i l l  be protected in the event of a tank explooiar. L 
' (Coatiausd on Page 3.) I 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
( C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE 3 OF 3 
NO. I 1.2.005 J 
DATE 1 0-27-71 1 
4n explosion in  the orbiter cargo bay of s potentic. * v  exploeive payload vessel .  
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHE€? I.) 
IEOUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont) 
Biowout plugs s h ~ l l  be  provided for prearure release from payload to 
space. 
Blowout panels shal l  be provided inorbiter cargo bay which could 
b e  re-sealable after we. 
.-----. .- - .  . --- - - -- 
- -- - 
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1 8-17-71 J 
- --- ----- 
HAZARDAMERGENCY 1 -LfP~k~€I]11-2.3.4 --- - T---- 
Spillage o r  leakage of hazardous f l u id  o r  material  during manual t rans fe r  i n  
pressurized moduLs. 
Hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials  a re  not carried i n  o r  transported through the o r b i t e r  
crew and passenger compartments or  through the air lock.  
I ;. ~ n j u r y  o r  loss  'of personnel. 
2. Damage t o  spacecraft equipment. 
1.0 Hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials shal lbe  double contained during 
handling and t ransfe r  i n  pressurized areas. Capability s h a l l  be 
provided t o  ver i fy  the i n t e g r i t y  of both containers before and 
a f t e r  transfer .  
2.p Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  vent the space between double 
containers f o r  hazardous f l u i d  handling t o  space and f o r  dunping 
the  f l u i d  t o  space o r  off-loading t o  another container. 
3.q Procedures s h a l l  be avai lable  f o r  handling and t ransferr ing 
hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials i n  a pressurized a rea  from a s ingly  
penetrated double container t o  a storage container without releas- 
ing f l u i d  o r  material t o  the  spacecraft  atmosphere. 
4.r A lower pressure than the  ambient atmosphere s h a l l  be maintained 
in containers of hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials  during handling and 
t ransfe r  i n  pressurized areas. 
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DATE 8-17-71 
Spil lage o r  leakage of hazardous f l u i d  o r  mater ia l  during manual t rans fe r  i n  1 pressurized modules. I 
I . -  - 
' (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) ! 
I 
1 
REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cone) 
5.8 A separate vo lme with an i so la ted  environmental control  s h a l l  be 
provided f o r  t es t ing  and opening suspect hazardous f l u i d  o r  mater- 
i a l  cargo containers. This volume s h a l l  have the capabi l i ty  t o  
vent and dunp the mater ia l  t o  space and t o  be purged of hazardous - 
f l u i d  o r  material.  
6 . t  Means s h a l l  be provided fo r  detecting the  presence of s p i l l e d  
hazardous f l u id s  o r  saterials while being handled o r  t ransferred 
between pressurized modules. 
7. b Emergency capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  sus ta in  personnel when i n  
manned payload, following detection of a toxic  environment i n  the  
payload, u n t i l  escape i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  can be effected.  
8. c Special protect ive  garments and equipment shal.1 be prodded  f o r  
personnel working i n  a tox ic  enpironment o r  near po ten t ia l ly  
toxic  payload elements. 
9 .  d Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  purge o r  dunp t o  space a toxical ly  
contaminated atmosphere i n  a preseurieed o r b i t e r  payload. 
.O.u Manual handling and t ransfe r  of hazardous f l u ld s  o r  matefials  s h a l l  
be car r ied  out  by two o r  more personnel who s h a l l  have no other  
duties during t h i s  operation. 
.l.v During handling and t ransfe r  of hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials, 
no other manned operations s h a l l  be planned along the  t r ans fe r  
path. 
2 . w  Mutually react ive  f lu ids  s h a l l  not be handled o r  t ransferred 
s imul taneous l y  . 
3.x The pressures, temperatures, o r  o ther  parameters which ind ica te  
the  s t a t u s  of hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials s h a l l  be ver i f ied  
be£ ore  they are transported. 
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S 
( C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE 3 OF 3 
DATE 
Spillage or  leakage of hazardous f luid or  material during manual transfer i n  
pressurf zed modules. 
. .-- - 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I . )  
EQUIREMENTS 61 G U I D E L I N E S  (cont) 
4.) Hand carried cargo sha l l  be limited t o  45 kg (100 lb)  mass, pro- 
vided the center of mass is  within 35 cme (14 ins.) of the 
handhold. Cargo which exceeds these limits s h a l l  be transported 
with mechanical a s s i s t .  
5.2 Cargo i n  which a rupture .or leakage through the containers would 
resul t  i n  uncontrolled motion of the cargo because of propulsive 
forces beyond a single man's capability t o  control or  because 
toxicity requires immediate abandonment and evacuation of the 
area s h a l l  not be hand-carried. 
6. aaPackaging of hand-carried cargo s h a l l  be provided with multiple 
hand holds, s h a l l  allow forward v i s i b i l i t y  by the controlling 
personnel, and s h a l l  be capable of surviving impact against a shar  
object at 3 m/sec (10 f t l sec ) .  
7.bbProvisions s h a l l  be made f o r  rapidly securing hand-carried cargo 
to  various s t ruc tura l  points along the t ransfer  path s o  as t o  
prevent loss  of control of the cargo i n  the event of an emergency. 
8.cc hergency procedures sha l l  be available fo r  handling, containing, 
and d i s ~ s l n g  of sp i l led  hazardous f lu ids  o r  materials so as t o  
safeguard the personnel, orb i te r  and payload, i n  tha t  order. 
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Spil lage o r  leakage . ; hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials  during mechanically assis ted 
o r  remote t ranefer  - ~ ~ ~ s ~ l i r i z e d  modules. 
1. Mechanical assist may range from a simple guide-rqil f o r  t ranspor ta t ion by hand, 
t o  fu l ly  automatic mechanism o r  f l u i d  t rans fe r  system remotely and with no 
I physical manned par t ic ipat ion.  
2. Hazardow f lu ids  o r  mater ia ls  a r e  not carr ied i n  o r  transported through 
the o rb i t e r  crew and passenger compartments, o r  through the  air lock.  
1. Injury o r  l o s s  of personnel. 
2. Damage t o  spacecraft  equipment. 
1. o Hazardous f l u id s  o r  mater ia ls  sha l l  be double contained during 
handling and t r ans fe r  i n  pressurized areas.' Capability s h a l l  be 
provided t o  ver i fy  the  i n t e g r i t y  of both containers before and 
a f t e r  t ransfer .  
2. p Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  vent the  space between double 
containers f o r  hazardous f l u i d  handling t o  space and f o r  dunping 
the f l u i d  t o  space o r  off-loading t o  another container. 
3. q Procedures s h a l l  be avai lable  fo r  handling and t ransferr ing 
hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials  i n  a pressurized area from a s ingly  
penetrated double container t o  a storage container without releas- 
ing f l u i d  o r  mater ia l  t o  the spacecraft  atmosphere. 
4. r A lower pressure than the  ambient atmosphere s h a l l  be maintained 
i n  containers of hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials during handling and 
t ransfe r  i n  pressurized areas. 
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y  S I S 
( C O N T I N U E D )  
- 
NO. 1.3.002 
HAZARD/EMERGENCY 
Spil lage o r  leakage of hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials  during mechanically ass i s ted  
o r  remote t ransfe r  i n  pressurized modules. 
; (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont) 
5 .8  A separate volume with an i so la ted  environmental control  s h a l l  be 
provided f o r  t e s t i ng  and opening suspect hazardous f l u i d  o r  mater- 
i a l  cargo containers. This voltnne s h a l l  have the capabi l i ty  t o  
vent and dump the  material  t o  space and t o  be purged of hazardous 
f l u i d  o r  material .  
6.t Means s h a l l  be, provided f o r  detecting the  presence of s p i l l e d  
hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials while being handled o r  t ransferred 
between pressurized modules. 
7.b Emergency capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  sus ta in  personnel when i n  r 
manned payload, following detection of a tox ic  enviornment i n  the  
payload, m t i l  escape i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  can be  effected.  
8. c Special protect ive  garments and equipment s h a l l  be provided f o r  
personnel working i n  a tox ic  environment o r  near po ten t ia l ly  
tox ic  payload elements. 
9 ,d  Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  purge o r  dtmp t o  space a toxical ly  
contaminated atmosphere i n  a pressurized o r b i t e r  payload. 
.O .v During handling and t r ans fe r  of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  materials, 
no other  manned operations s h a l l  be planned along the  t ransfe r  
path. 
, l o w  Mutually reactive f l u i d s  s h a l l  not  be handled o r  t ransferred 
simultaneously. 
2 . r  The pressures, temperatures, o r  o ther  p a r m t e r s  which ind ica te  
the  status of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  materials s h a l l  be ve r i f i ed  
before they are transported. 
3. Transfer l i n e s  f o r  hazardous f l u i d s  s h a l l  be located outside of 
pressurized vessels o r  s h a l l  be d o d l e  walled with the  capabi l i ty  
of venting the  space between the  two containers to space. 
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(Continued on Page 3,) 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
( C O N T I N U E D )  
NO. 1 1.3.002 
I I 
DATE 1 8-17-71 
Spil lage o r  leakage of hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials during mechanically ass i s ted  
o r  remote t ransfe r  i n  pressurized modules. 
- 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT I N  THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES (cont) 
14. Plumbing connections f o r  1,azardous f l u i d  t rans fe r  i n  yressurized 
areas s h a l l  be double contained with the  capabi l i ty  of venting 
the space between the  two containers t o  space. 
15. Transfer l i n e s  i n  pressurized areas,  including double walled 
l i n e s ,  s h a l l  be purged a f t e r  the  t rans fe r  'of hazardous f l u id s  
and before breaking plmbing connections. 
16. Cargo beyond the limits allowed f o r  hand t r ans fe r  s h a l l  be trans- 
ferred on guide r a i l s  o r  other mechanisms which posi t ively  con- 
s t r a i n  the angular and l i n e a s  motion of the  cargo except i n  the  
di rect ion of motion. 
17.ddCargo handling mechanisms s h a l l  allow f o r  stoppage of the  motion, 
reversa l  of the  motion, o r  release of the  cargo at  any point 
along the  t ransfe r  path. 
18.eeThe t ransfe r  of cargo with mechanical assist s h a l l  e i t h e r  be 
v i sua l ly  monitored by personnel who are f r ee  of other dut ies ,  
o r  s h a l l  be provided with sensing devices which automatically 
s top the  motion i f  the cargo in te r faces  with s t ruc ture  o r  
equipment. 
19.ffPersonnel w i l l  not  be located during cargo t r ans fe r  i n  posit ions 
which can r e su l t  i n  t h e i r  entrapment i f  the  cargo t r ans fe r  mech- 
anism f a i l s .  
20.ggEmergency procedures s h a l l  be avai lable  f o r  the  re lease ,  handling 
and transportat ion of remotely controlled cargo i n  the  event of 
f a i l u r e  of the  handling mechanirm, o r  of dkmaga t o  the pack!@ng 
of the  cargo. 
2l.hhCargo handling mechanisms eha l l  be designed t o  withstand the  pro- 
pulsive forces t ha t  would r e su l t  from a leaking o r  ruptured f lu id  
cargo. 
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HAZARD/EMERGENCY 1 SOURCE 1x1-2.3.4 
-. J 
Spillage o r  leakage of hazardous f l u i d  o r  mater ia l  during remote t ransfe r  i n  
unpressurized area. 
1. Mechanisms fo r  cargo t ransfe r  may range from being f u l l y  k d a r  m-d control ,  t o  
fu l ly  preprogramed and automated. 
2. Hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials  a re  not carr ied i n ,  cr transported through, the 
o rb i t e r  crew and passenger compartments o r  tlircug'~ ch.2 air lock.  
T~NTIAL EFFECTS I -- 
I 
Damage t o  spacecraft  s t ruc tu re  and equipment. 
REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES 1 
1. Corrosive f l u i d s  o r  materials s h a l l  be double contained during 
handling and t r aus fe r  i n  unpressurized areas. Capability s h a l l  
b e  provided t o  ver i fy  the  i n t e g r i t y  of both containers before 
and a f t e r  t ransfer .  
2.wMutually reactive f l u i d s  s h a l l  not  be handled o r  t ransferred 
simultaneously. 
3.xThe pressures, temperatures, o r  other  parameters which indicate 
the  s t a t u s  of hazardous f l u i d s  o r  materials s h a l l  be ver i f ied  
before they are transported. 
4. Transfer lines in unpressurized areas  s h a l l  be purged a f t e r  the 
the  t r ans fe r  of hazardous f l u id s ,  
5. dka rgo  handling mechanisms s h a l l  allow f o r  stoppage of the lot ion,  
reversa l  of the motion, or re lease  of the  cargo a t  any point  
along the  t r ans fe r  path. 
(Continued on Page 2.) 
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( DATE 18-20-71 I 
Spil lage o r  leakage of hazardous f l u i d  o r  mater ia l  during remote t ransfe r  i n  
unpressurized area. 
. .-- 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
WQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (cont) 
i .eeThe t ransfe r  of cargo with mechanical aee i s t  s h a l l  e i t h e r  be 
visual ly  monitored by pereonnel who a re  f r ee  of o ther  dut ies ,  
o r  s h a l l  be provided with sensing devices which automatically 
s t o p  t h e  motion i f  the  cargo in te r faces  with s t ruc ture  o r  
equipment . 
7.gg Emergency procedures s h a l l  be avai lable  f o r  the re lease ,  handling 
and transportat ion of remotely controlled cargo i n  the  event of 
failure of the handling mechanism, o r  of damage t o  the  ~ a c b g i n g  of 
the  cargo. 
3.hhCargo handling mechanisms s h a l l  be deeigned t o  withstand the  pro- 
pulsive forces tha t  would r e s u l t  from a leaking o r  ruptured f l u i d  
cargo. 
Separate l i n e s  s h a l l  be used fo r  t he  t r an r f e r  of f u e l  a d  oxidizer,  
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HAZARDfiMERGENCY 1 
~ U R C E  - 1-2- . . 
Failure of transfer mechanism and/or l o w  of control of cargo during tranefer i n  
pressurized or unpressurized areas. 
I Possible fa i lure  modes include: 
l 
a. Cargo moving lonse i n  zero g. 
b. Cargo moving attached to  runaway cargo t ransfer  mechanism. 
c. Cargo jammed. 
I - 1. Injury t o  personnel. 
2. Damage to spacecraft s t ructure and equipment. 
1. Cargo of more than 45 kg (100 lb)  mass, o r  hazardom cargo s h a l l  be 
tethered a t  a l l  times during handling and t ransfer  in pressurized 
areas e i the r  t o  the spacecraft s t ructure o r  t o  the t ransfer  mech- 
anism so  as  t o  l i m i t  the possible t ravel  of the cargo following a 
fa i lure  of the primary cargo attach mechanism. 
2. Automatic and/or crew controlled emergency means s h a l l  be provided 
for  shutting off power and arrest ing the motion of cargo transfer 
mechanisms . 
3. Cargo s h a l l  be packaged during t ransfer  so  ae t o  have no updeed 
sharp edges o r  corners. 
4. Crew controlled cargo transfer velocity s h a l l  be limited so tha t  
the cargo can at a l l  times be stoppad within the v i s ib le  r q e .  
5. Emergency procedures s h a l l  be available f o r  mlearins cargo wblch 
has became jamaed i n  hatches o r  other r e r t r i c t ed  areas without 
causing damage t o  the epacecraft s t ructure o r  equipwrt.  
I (Continued on Page 2 .) 
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DATE I 
Fai lure of t rans fe r  mechanism and/or loss  of control  of cargo during t ransfe r  i n  
pressurized o r  mpreseurized areas. 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REQUf REMENTS d GUIDELINES (cont ) 
6.u Manual handling and t ranufer  of hazardous f l u id s  o r  materials  s h a l l  
be carr ied out by two o r  more personnel who s h a l l  have no other 
dut ies  during t h i s  operation. 
7.y Hand carr ied cargo s h a l l  be l imi ted t o  45 kg (100 lb )  mass, pro- 
vided the center  of mass 5s within 35 cme (14 in s , )  of the  
handhold. Cargo which exceeds these l imi t s  s h a l l  be transported 
with mechanical a s s i s t .  
8.2 Cargo i n  which a rupture o r  leakage through the  containers would 
r e s u l t  i n  uncontrolled motion of the  cargo because of propulsive 
forces beyond a s ing le  man's capabi l i ty  t o  control  o r  because 
tox ic i ty  requires Immediate abandonment and evacuation of the  
area s h a l l  not  be hand-carried. 
3.aaPackaging of hand-carried cargo s h a l l  be provided with mult iple 
handholds , s h a l l  allow forward v i s i b i l i  ty,  by the  control l ing 
personnel, and s h a l l  be capable of rur iviving impact againet a eharp 
object  a t  3 mlsec (10 f t /eec) .  
LO M r o v i s i o n s  s h a l l  be made f o r  rapidly securing hand-carried cargo 
to various s t r u c t u r a l  points along the t ransfe r  path eo as t o  
prevent l o s s  of control  of the  cargo' in the  event of an emergency. 
LlaeThe t ransfe r  of cargo with machanical a e r i s t  s h a l l  e i t h e r  be 
v i sua l ly  monitored by pereonnel who are f r ee  af other du t ie r ,  
o r  s h a l l  be provided with sancing devices which automatically 
s top  the  motion i f  the  cargo interface# with s t ruc ture  or 
equipment. 
L2ffPersonnel w i l l  not be located during cargo t r ans fe r  %n positiancl 
. which can r e su l t  i n  t h e i r  en frapment i f  the cargo trunofer mech- 
anism f a i l s .  
13. Cargo beyond. the l imi t s  allowed f o r  hand t r u r r f e r  r h a l l  be trm- 
ferred on guide rails o r  other  akchanbm which por i t ive ly  con- 
s t r a i n  the  angular and l i n e a r  motion of the  cargo cureapt in the  
di rect ion of motion. 
(Continued on Page 3.) 
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
1 NO. 1 1.3.004 
DATE 8-20-71 
i HAZARD/EMERGENCY I ( Failure of t ranefer  mechanism and/or lolls of contzol of cargo during t ranafer  i n  
pressurized o r  unpreasurized areas. 
/ . . .  
I 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
1EQUIREMENTS & CUI DELI NES (con t ) 
14dd Cargo handling meet .,?isms s h a l l  allow f o r  etoppage of the  morion, 
revereal  of the  motion, o r  re lease  of the  cargo a t  any point 
along the  t ranefer  path. 
LSgg Emergency procedures e h a l l  be available f o r  the  re lease ,  handling 
and transportat ion of r-otely controlled eargo i n  the  event of 
f a i l u r e  of the  handling mechanism, o r  ofdamage t o  the packaging of 
the  cargo. 
L6hh Cargo handling mechaniems s h a l l  be designed t o  withetand the  pro- 
pulsive force6 tha t  would r eeu l t  from a leaking or ruptured f l u t d  
cargo. 
-- 
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1 PROGRAM SHUTTLE I X I I 
SORTIE ! x  1 
( A radioactive environment i n  a s o r t i e  acdule o r  space s t a t i o n ,  resul t ing from I exposure o r  escape of radioactive mater ia l  during- t rans fe r  and handling-of radioactive 
/ 1. Equipment exposure t o  radia t ion envir-ent is not harardoua . 
1 2. Radioactive materials  w i l l  be carr ied i n  pressurized s o r t i e  modules and space 
i s t a t i o n  modules only,but  these may be unmanned a t  times. 
1 3. Normal precautions fo r  radioactive materials  a re  iricluded as pa r t  of the  experiment. 
4. Typical radioactive sources are Iden t i f i ed  below: 
(Continued on Zage 2. ) 
/ I J 1. Exposure of o rb i te r ,  s o r t i e  module, o r  space s t a t i o n  personnel t o  excessive 
radiat ion.  
2. L,ss of control  of radioactive material. 
1. Spare shielded containers e h a l l  be avai lable  i n  which radioactive 
materials  can be temporarily r to red  i n  the event of an accident. 
2. Meanb s h a l l  be provided fo r  locat ing radioactive mater ia l  which 
has been inadvertently re lesred i n  a module. 
3.  The environmental control  sylrtenu of modules containing radioactive 
material  which can r e su l t  i n  macceptable rad ioac t iv i t -  l eve l s  i n  
the  event the radioactive mater ia l  is releared i n  the  atmorphere, 
s h a l l  be capable of operating without ~oatrrminating the  atmorphere 
of the  o rb i t e r  o r  o ther  in terfacing spacecraft  o r  moduler. 
4. Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  rapidly evacuate personnel from 
and s e a l  o f f  radioactively contrrminated moduler u n t i l  they cur be 
returned t o  earth.  
5 .  The environmental cofitrol sys t em of modular containin# radioactive 
material  s h a l l  be  capable of extract ing .nd containing radioactive 
material inadvertently r e l e u e d  !.n the  atnrorphere. 
6. Means e h a l l  be available f o r  tiecontaminating equiplecwt rod pernoonel I exposed t o  radioactive material a d  for r t o r ing  und rerrCurniag t o  
CODE 
K 2 R R  
K Z R R  
- 1 R R  
X l R R  
- 1 R R  
R l R R  
X X W X  
RGD REF. 
V-1-3.2 
'-111-3 . : 
V-I  -3.2 
'-111-3.; 
-- 
IV-4.1 
IV-4.3 
V-1-3.1 
1-111-3 . 
0- 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y  5 I S  
( C O N T I N U E D )  PAGE 2 O F  2 
- - 
NO, 1.3.005 1 1 DATE ' 1 8-13-71 1 
I 
A radioactive environment i n  a s o r t i e  module o r  space s t a t i o n ,  resu l t ing  from 1 exposure or  escape of radioactive material  during t ransfe r  and handling of radioactive / materials. 
I 1 . _.-- - --- 
1 (LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN TI:: ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
I / ASSUMPTIONS (cont) 
4. (Continued) 
Source 
co60 o r  cs 137 
C-14 Methionine 
Discipline Experiment - Usage 
2-3 curies Life  Sciences Radiobiology Gama Isotope 
Radiation Source. 
Unknown 
10 &lli- 
curies  
Life  Sciences Role of gravi ty  ---- 
ia  l i f e  process- 
e s  of microscopic 
organisms and 
cultured t issues .  
Life  Sciences Effect  of the  Radiation Source 
space t miroamt , : f o r  t r ibol i l ln  
on inver tebrate  experiments. 
behavior. . 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
I PROGRAM SHUTTLE I X I 
SORTIE 1 1 
Impairment of v i s i b i l i t y  a t  c r i t i c a l  momentduring docking. 
[ A ~ ~ I O N S  I
1. Direct v i sua l  o r  video visual  cues are required t o  maneuver vehicle  t o  contact alignment. 
!. Sunlight and/or a r t i f i c i a l  l i g h t  are requj red fo r  docking. , 
5 .  Crew opt ical  alignment o r  video monitor a ids  a r e  required. 
i. The o r b i t e r  i s  the  act ive  docking vehicle. 
I POTENT lAL EFFECTS I 
r J 
1. w e  o r  vidicon damage from d i r e c t  o r  re f lec ted  l i gh t .  
. Inadvertent -vehicle contact and damage caused by loss  of v i sua l  cues. 
1 REQUIREMENTS a GUIDELINES J
Maneuvering procedures during docking shall preclude d i rec t ing  sunl ight  
i n to  control l ing crew's eyes o r  i n to  the  vidicon tubes of the  v i sua l  
system. 
The ref lectance o r  surfaces on docking vehicles and the  docking system 
t h a t  a r e  v i s i b l e  t o  the  control l ing crew and T.V. cameras s h a l l  be 
below eye and vidicon damage levels.  
The vidicon tubes for  docking s h a l l  be designed f o r  low s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  
tu; e image burn . 
Redundant o r  replaceable l i gh t ing  provieions s h a i l  be provided f o r  
docking . 
Redundant o r  replaceable vidicon tubes s h a l l  be prwided f o r  docking. 
Redundant o r  replaceable video monitors s h a l l  be provided. 
Wind~w, vidicon, and EVA visor  f i l t e r s  s h a l l  be provided t o  protect  eyet 
and camera from docking l a s e r  l i g h t  dcmrsge. 
. . 
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X l R P  
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I SHUTTLE 
PROGRAM X 1 
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
NO. 2.1.002 
3 
( Loss of veh ic le  con t ro l  p r i o r  t o  docking contact.  
I ASSUMPTIONS I 
6 I 
1. Active veh ic le  r o t a t i ona l  con t ro l  is  a r a t e  command, react ion  jet contro l  system with 
a t t i t u d e  hold capabi i i ty .  
I 2. Active veh ic le  t r an s l a t i on  con t ro l  is an acce le ra t ion  command, react ion  jet control  system. 
13. Active veh ic le  is f ly ing  t o  t a rge t  vehic le  alignment of i ts  docking system, docking 
system is belng extended, vehic le  t r ans la ted  t o  cause contac t  at  docking in te r face .  
I ' I 
,l. Inadvertent  veh ic le  contac t  and damage. 
'I. Damage t o  docking system. 
I. I n a b i l i t y  t o  dock. 
The reac t ion  jet con t ro l  system s h a l l  provide redundancy t o  preclude 
"jet s tuck off"  conditions. 
The rate command and r a t e l a t t i t u d e  feedback loops of t h e  ro t a t i ona l  
con t ro l  system s h a l l  provide redundancy t o  preclude "open loopw 
f a i l u r e s  . 
I nh ib i t  capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  con t ro l  the "jet s tuck on" 
c m d i  t ion. 
Automatir docking system stowage camand capab i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided. 
The t r a n s l a t i o n a i  co~mrand c i r c u i t s  s h a l l  przvide redundancy t o  precludc 
"open c i r c u i t "  f a i l u r e s .  
The docking system s h a l l  be designed t o  opera te  wi th  continuous co~a~snc 
of t h e  contro l  system i n  t h e  event t ha t  minimum b p u l s e  command has 
been l o s t .  
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SHUTTLE 
PROGRAM 
SORCIE 
ST ATION 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
NO. 2.1.004 
DATE 10-18-71 * 
Failure t o  i n h i b i t  a t t i t u d e  hold of one vehicle a f t e r  capture. during docking. 
1 ASSUMPTIONS I 
1. Capture has been accoql ished.  
2. At t i tude hold must be done by one vehicle only during and a f t e r  r ig id iz ing  t o  avoid 
a t t i t u d e  control  system incompatibil i t ies.  
POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
I 
1. Docking system damage by osc i l l a t i ng  motion and loads. 
?. Vehicle damaged from fa i led  extendible docking system. 
3. Vehicle damage from excessive reaction jet plume mpingement. 
1 REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES] 
1. Posit ive,  redundant indicat ion of docking capture l a t c h  s h a l l  be 
provided the  vehicle  which is t o  i n h i b i t  i ts control  system, 
2. Either manual and/or redundant automatic a t t i t u d e  hold i n h i b i t  function 
s h a l l  be provided t o  the applicable docking vehicle on indicat ion of 
capture. 
3. The docking system s h a l l  be capable of withstanding vehicle  o sc i l l a t i on  
and loads generated by inadvertent a t t i t u d e  control  system a c t i v i t y  of 
e i t h e r  o r  both vehicles during draw down t o  r i g id i ze  the  capture in te r -  
face. 
4. Thermal protection shall be provided t o  prevent jet plume impingement 
damage from docking vehicles within the  design angular and l i n e a r  
- misalignments. 
5 ,  Control eyetan i n h i b i t  switches eba l l  be protected from inadvertent 
act ivat ion or dsac t ivat ion 
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  l S 
NO. 2.1.005 
Loss of docking system function o r  control .  
[ ASSUMPVONS I 
The docking system functions considered a r e  from deployment of  module from o r b i t e r  cargo 
bay t o  completion of r ig id iz ing .  
I POTENTIAL EFFECTS ] 
1. Vehicle damage caused by l o s s  of a t t enua t ion  control .  
2. Damage to  l a tch  - s  and f a i l u r e  t o  dock attempting t o  use prematurely actuated la tches .  
3 .  C r e w  f a t a l i t y  d .e to  explosive decompression i f  seal l a t che s  r e l e a se  a f t e r  p ressur iza t ion  
of in te r face .  
4. Crew i n ju ry  caused by f a i l e d  r e l e a se  of l a t c h  s to red  energy. 1 REQUIREMENTS a GUDELINES J 
1. Pos i t ive  ind ica t ion  of cargo bay door deployment and closure s h a l l  be 
provided. 
2 .  Pos i t ive  ind ica t ion  of docking capture l a t c h  s t a t u s  s h a l l  be provided 
t o  assure  they are each (1) armed, (2) t r iggered,  (3) engaged, and 
( 4 )  locked. 
3.  Pos i t ive ,  redundant ind ica t ion  of docking por t  s e a l  l a t c h  s t a t u s  s h a l l  
be prcvided t o  assure  they a r e  each (1) armed, (2) t r iggered,  (3) 
engaged, and ( 4 )  locked p r i o r  t o  opening t r a n s f e r  tunnel. 
4. Capabil i ty s h a l l  be provided t o  recycle  both  capture and seal la tches  
on the  docking system from any qhase of t h e i r  s t a t u s .  
5. Doc!cing la tching systems recycle switches s h a l l  be protected from 
inadver tent  ac t iva t ion .  
6. Docking l a t c h  power source sh ie ld ing  s h a l l  be provided t o  p ro tec t  crew 
from f a i l u r e  re lease  of s tored  energy. 
7 .  Translat ion acce le ra t ion  camnand minimum impulee capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be 
provided t o  permit s t a t i o n  keeping d r i f t  t o  a minimum and reduce 
a t tenuat ion requireuents .  I 
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NO, 2.1.005 
HAZARD~MERGENCY 
Loss of docking system function o r  control .  
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
'OTENTIAL EFFECTS (continued) 
5 .  Entry prevented by f a i l u r e  t o  separa te  from core  module, stow core module, o r  close 
cargo bay doors. 
ZQIJIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (continued) 
Bore s i g h t  alignment of video o r  d i r e c t  v i s u a l  view with the  
center  l i n e  or  the  docking i n t e r f a c e  from a point  no t  g r ea t e r  than 
2.0 meters from the docking plane s h a l l  be provided t o  reduce 
contact  energy misalignment. 
Docking ?or t  environmental covers s h a l l  be deployed and no t  
je t t i soned.  
..L 
CODE RGD RE1 
K l G P  
K l R P  
I H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
I I PROGRAM I SHUTTLE ) X NO, 2.1e006 
Fa i lu re  of o r b i t e r  payload module deployment mechanism.prior t o  docking. 
I 1. The payload module must be deployed from t h e  o r b i t e r  cargo bay, such a s  manipulators o r  a r o t a t ab l e  mechanism, p r i o r  t o  docking the  module. 
2 .  The returned payload module is stowed i n t o  the  o r b i t e r  cargo bay by the same 
mechanism before t h e  o r b i t e r  can r e tu rn  t o  ea r th .  
I J 
1. Docking prevented by f a i l u r e  of deployment re lease .  
I 2 .  P a r t i a l l y  deployed module p roh ib i t s  en t ry  of o r b i t e r .  
3 .  Recontact with cargo bay causes module o r  cargo bay damage. 
1. Pos i t i ve  means f o r  j e t t i son ing  t h e  payload module s h a l l  be provided i n  
t he  event of a f a i l u r e  of t h e  payload deployment mechanism. 
2. Guiderai ls  o r  s im i l a r  device s h a l l  be provided t o  prevent recontact  
between payload module and cargo bay i n  the  event of deployment 
tiechanism f a i l u r e .  
3. Pos i t ive  means f o r  j e t t i son ing  o r  col laps ing payload deployment 
mechanism s h a l l  be provided i f  mechanism w i l l  a t  any point  i n  t he  
deployment de s t ruc t  the  c losure  of the  cargo bay doors. 
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
SHUTTLE 1 X I 
SORTIE 1 
STATION I X I 
Hardware prot rus ions  i n  t h e  docking tunnel.  
NO. 
The docking tunnel  is used f o r  personnel t r a n s f e r  when t h e  two veh ic les  are docked and 
2.1.007 
r ig id ized .  
1 POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
J 
1. In ju ry  t o  crew from bumping i n t o  protrusions.  
I REQUIREMEI'TS & GUIDELINES j - 
1. Al l  hardware i n  t h e  docking tunnel  w i l l  be f l u s h  mounted t o  i n t e r i o r  
walls of t h e  cargalcrew t r i s f e r  tunnel. 
CODE 
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X X X  
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
I PROGRAM S H U ~ L E  I X NO. 2.1.008 I 
Unsecured equipment and personnel l u r i ng  docking. 
1, The acce le ra t ions  during docking are not  severe  enough to  c a w e  i n ju ry  t o  personnel 
o r  damage t o  equipment. 
2 .  The ve loc i t y  changes during docking are not  l a rge ,  but  can r e s u l t  i n  out-of-control 
motions f o r  untethered objects .  
I p*T'AL -1 
1. Injury t o  crew caused by accelera ted  ob jec t s  and crew. 
. Hardware damage. 
Stowage o r  tie dawn s h a l l  be provided f o r  crew and critical equipmont 
during docking. 
Annunciator warning to  a l l  personnel shall be provided p r i o r  t o  lalnned 
docking maneuvers, 
CODE 
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H A P A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
L DATL 110-18-71 A 
Degradation of l i f e  support system during docking. 
1 ASS^^ I 
1. The docking maneuvers are under crew control. 
2 .  The orbiter i e  the active docking vehicle. 
i I 
1.  Loss of conscioueneas a t  cr i t i ca l  moment during docking. 
3. Vehicle amage caused by lo s s  of control. 
1 UEQUIUEM€NTS 6 GUIDELINES I 
1. Emergency l i f e  support provisions shal l  be available t o  the docking 
crew during docking operatione. 
1 R P  
x x x  
- 
R G D  REF. 
- -- 
H A Z A W  D I E M t R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S 
1 I SORTIE 1 I I 
STATION 1 X 1 
NO* 1 2.1.010 1 
Docking hatch opened when pressure  equa l i za t ion  incomplete. 
I ASSUMPTIONS 
__1 
1. Crew i n j u r y  o r  f a t a l i t y  from hatch impulse and explosive decompression. 
2. Hatch damage. 
3. Inadvertent  environment loss .  
Means s h a l l  be provided t o  equa l i ze  pressures on both s i d e s  of  a 
ha t& before  opening it. 
The pressures on each s i d e  of a ha tch  s h a l l  be v e r i f i e d  before opening 
the hatch. 
Means s h a l l  be provided t o  ve r i fy  the  i u t e g r i t y  of a docking hatch  s e a l  
before separa t ing  a docked module o r  vehicle .  
Stops s h a l l  be provided on h ~ t c h e s  t o  prevent u n c m t r o l l e d  opening i f  
opened when a pressure d t f f e r c n t i a l  exists, 
X X X X  
- 
H A Z A R D i E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
Elec t r ic  discharge during i n i t i a l  docking.contact. 
1 ASSUMPTIONS 1 
1. S t a t i c  e l e c t r i c t y  d i f f e r e n t i a l  can e x i s t  between docking vehicles. 
1 POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
i J 
1. Instrumentation wer load  damage. 
2. Crew e l e c t r i c  shock. 
3. Inadvertent pyrc i n i t i a t i on .  
4. ~ i r e / exp los ion  from spark ign i t ion  of environment. 
I REQUIREMENTS 6 GMDELINES I 
Circui t  breaker protection of a l l  in te r face  instrumentation s h a l l  be 
provided. 
All docking in te r face  equipment s h a l l  be grounded. 
Electrical umbilicals s h a l l  be grounded u n t i l  connection of the  
docking interface .  
-- 
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
I NO. 
Loss of vehicle control in  close proximity t o  other vehicle.during docking. 
I ASSUMPTIONS I 
The direct docking system is used, which requires the docking vehicles to  be flown 
in to close proximity . 
1 POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
J 
1. Inadvertent vehicle contact and damage. 
2 .  Failure to dock. 
[Requirements and guidelines are the same as 2.1.0021 
- 
CODE RGD REF. 
I RESOLVED HAZARD i 
b-91 
t RESIDUAL HAZARD X 
? 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
NO. 2 . 2 . 0 0 2  1 PROGRAM 
Loss of a t t enu ta t ion  capab i l i t y  during docking. 
1 I ~ssu~ptlh.rs 1 
1. The d i r e c t  docking system is used, which employs hydraulic ,  s h o r t  s t r oke  at tenuation.  
SHUTTLE 
SORTIE 
2 .  An extreme opera t ional  temperature range i s  encountered by t h e  docking system, leading 
t o  po t en t i a l  l o s s  of t he  a t tenuat ion capabi l i ty .  
X 
A 
1 I POTENTIAL EFFECTS I 
I I 
1. Docking system overload s t r u c  t u r d  damage. 
2. Fa i l u r e  t o  dock. 
b I REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES 1 
1. Thermal blanket temperature con t ro l  of h y d r ~ , u l i c  camponents s h a l l  
provide proper opera t ing  temperature. 
2 
K l R P  
RGD REF. 
:v-3.1 
-111-3. : 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
PROGRAM 1 NO. 
I DATE ( 10-25-71 1 
SHUTTLE 
v 
SORTIE 
r 
STATION 
[HAZARD/FMERGENCY 1 \ - L SOURCE I 11-3.2.4 j 
->Y 
X 
X 
Loss of vehic le  con t ro l  p r i o r  t o  docking contact  by extendable tunnel. 
I ASSUMPTIONS ] 
1. The extendable tunnel  docking system is used. 
2. Separation d is tance  of the  two vehic les  p r i o r  t o  docking cantac t  is  such t h a t  c o l l i s i o n  
by two veh ic les  is  not  l ike ly .  
I A 
1. S t r u c  t u r d  damage t o  ex tendable docking system . 
2. Fai lure  t o  dock. 
[ REQUIREMENTS a GUIDELINES J 
[Requirements and guidel ines  a r e  the same as 2,1.002] 
CODE 
- 
x x x  
RGD REF. 
- 
RESOLVED HAZARD 
RESIDUAL HAZARD x 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
I PROGRAM SHUTTLE I X I 
1 I STATION 1 X I 
NO. 2.3.002 . 
Loss of vehicle control after capture by extentable tunnel docking system. 
1. The extendable tunnel docking system is used. 
I J 
1. Structural damage to extendable system caused by buckling. 
2. Damage to vehicles by contact. 
3 .  Failure t o  dock. 
[Requirements and guidelines are the same as 2.1.0031 
x x x  
RGD REF. 
. 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
I 
PROGRAM 
SORTIE I I NO. 12.3.00,3 I L DATE ( 10-25-71 J 
AZARD/EMERGENCY 1 SOURCE I 11-3.2.4 ] 
Loss of pressure i n  the pneumatic extension and energy absorption 
mechanism of the  docking system. 
1 ~ssu~PfiiSNT J - 
1. The extendable tunnel docking system is used. 
2. A pneumatic s i n g l e  o r  double walled tunnel is used f o r  achieving t he  docking system 
extension and f o r  a t tenuat ion.  
TP~NTIAL EFFECTS I 
1 I 
1. Contact damage t o  veh ic le  caused by f a i l u r e  of energy a t tenuat ion system. 
?. Fai lure  t o  dock. 
L REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES 1 
1, Pos i t ive  redundant ind ica t ion  of t he  pneumatic a t tenuat ion system 
s t a t u s  of the  extendable docking system s h a l l  be provided, 
CODE 
- 
X 3 R R  
X X X X  
RGD REF. 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
I PROGRAM I SHUTTLE X I 
OAT E 10-25-71 j 
Loss of vehic le  contro l  p r i o r  t o  capture by manipulator during docking. 
- - 
. . The manipulator docking system is  used. 
I. The manipulator i s  deployed and f u l l y  extended p r i o r  t o  i n i t i a l  contac t  maneuvers. 
~ N T I A L  EFFECTS I 
. St ruc tu r a l  damage t o  extended manipulator arms. 
.. St ruc tu ra l  damage t o  veh ic le  from collapsed a m .  
3 .  Fai lu re  t o  dock. 
I REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES 1 
[Requirements and guidel ines  are t h e  same as 2.1.0021 
CODE 
- 
x x x  
RGD REF. 
PROGRAM 
, STATION 
Loss of vehic le  contro l  a f t e r  capture by manipulator during docking. 
, , 
, : :.*: -. 
. .  . I ASSU~V~T~~NS J 
1. The manipulator docking system is used. 
2 .  The manipulator moves the  two veh ic les  towards each o the r  f o r  docking a f t e r  capture. 
- .  . -. - .-. 
TIAL EFFECTS I 
1. S t ruc tu r a l  damage t o  manipulator arms caused by veh ic le  jacknife  dynamics. 
2. St ruc tu r a l  damage t o  vehic le  from collapsed arms. 
3. Fa i lu re  t o  dock. 
[Requirements and guidel ines are t he  same as 2.1.003] 
-- - - . --- - .- - - -. - 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
Lose of manipulator j o i n t  motor control  during docking. 
TA~M~~~CS'N$ 1 
L. The manipulator docking system is  used, 
! The manipulator uses e l e c t r i c a l ,  hydraulic o r  o ther  power act ivated motors a t  each 
jo in t  f o r  control l ing i ts motion, 
3 .  The manipulators a r e  i n s t a l l ed  i n  the o rb i t e r ,  but  not i n  the  Space Station. 
I J 
1. Inadvertent vehicle/docking system contact damage. 
2 ,  Vehicle contact through l o s s  of r e l a t i v e  motion control.  
3.  Failure t o  dock. 
. Loss of personnel i f  the  docked module is used f o r  personnel tranefer. 
-- I REQUIREMENTS L GUIDELINESJ 
1. Control feedback loops s h a l l  be provided on each manipulator j o i n t  
control  which l i m i t  motion when u c e s e i v e  forces  o r  torques are 
experienced. 
2 .  Redundant jo in t  motor power supply c i r c u i t s  shall be provided on 
manipulators . 
3 .  Arm j o i n t  on manipuJ.ators s h a l l  be designed t o  lock on indicat ion o 
j o in t  control  o r  motor fa i lu re .  The lock shall incorporate a s l i p  
c lutch capabi l i ty  t o  prevent e t ruc tu ra l  f ai lureo.  
I 
14. A manipulator i n h i b i t  o r  "freeze1' capabi l i ty  oha l l  be provided. 
5. Elec t r ica l  o r  mechanical s tops  s h a l l  be provtded t o  prevent the 
s m i p u l a t o r  from being driven i n t o  surfacem of itr awn vehicle. 
6. Modules which are ured f o r  paroamel  t r a a r f e r  by manipulator doc- 
s h a l l  be provided with EVA pressure r u f t r  fo r  a11 an-board permorma1 
and with EVA e x i t  capabi l i ty  eo t h a t  th parroao.1 can emcape to 
the o r b i t e r  o r  the Space Sta t ion i n  tba  event ths rrdul8 bec- 
I stranded between vehicle8 by a manipulator failure. 
CODE 
X 2 R R  
X l G P  
X Z R B  
- 1 6 R  
X Z G R  
- 1 R R  
X X X X  
RGO REF. 
1 NO. 12.4.003 
Loss of manipulator j o in t  motor controlduring docking. 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REQUIREMENTS & WIDLINES (continued) 
. Modules which a re  used fo r  personnel t rans fe r  by manipulator docking 
s h a l l  provide emergency l i f e  support fo r  a l l  on-board personnel un t l  
they can be rescued by external  means i n  the event t he  module become 
stranded between vehicles by a manipulator fa i lu re .  
8 .  Personnel w i l l  only be transferred between the o r b i t e r  and the  
stat ior .  through a r ig id ly  connected docking in te r face  between the 
two vehicles. 
3 .  Two or  more manipulators shall be provided id  a manipulator docking 
system. Each manipulator s h a l l  be capable of performing docking 
by i t s e l f ,  and s h a l l  a lso  be capable of continuing any docking 
function i n  the  event of a f a i l u r e  of the  other  manipulator at any 
stage of the docking. 
LO. An emergency je t t i son ing  capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided for  manipu- 
l a t o r s ,  independent of the  normal manipulator system. This s h a l l  
be capable of j e t t i son ing  the  manipulator ant configuring the  
o r b i t e r  fo r  reentry and landing following a f a i l u r e  o r  accident 
which does not allow stowage of the mmipulator. 
CODE 
- l R R  
X 4 R R  
X l R R  
X l R R  
RGD REF 
- 
IV-3.4 
V-111-3, 
I V-3.1 
-111-3. : 
IV-3.1 
-. - . . -  --- - .  - -- - . .  - .  - a 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
DATE 1 10-25-71 J 
Lose of manipulator compurer aided con t ro l  system during docking, 
~ h i t i ' i s  J 
1. The manipulator docking s y s t m  is used. 
2, The con t ro l  system 1.8 computer aided. 
3. The manipulators are i n s t a l l e d  i n  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  but  not  i n  t he  Specs Sta t ion .  
--- 
1. Inadvertent  vehfcle/docking ayatem contact  damage. 
2. Vehicle contact  through l o s s  of r e la tgve  motion control .  
3, Fa i lu re  t o  dock. 
4. Loss of personnel i f  the  docked module is used f o r  personnel t r an s f e r .  
I 1 REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES] 
Redundaut con t ro l  feedback loops s h a l l  be provided each a x i s  of 
computer aLded con t ro l  f o r  the  manipulator. 
The manipulator computer aided con t ro l  system s h a l l  f a i l  t o  t h c  
"no command" mode. 
hranual overr ide  of computer aided manipulator con t ro l  ~ 4 a l l  be 
provided. 
CODE 
K l R P  
K l G R  
K 1 R R  
RGD REF. 
.- 
SHUTTLE 1 
- 
2. The f r e e  f ly ing  module is unmanned. 
EFFECTS I 
. -..- - - .- 
HAZ&RD/EMERGENCY I L SOURCE 1 11-3.2.5 I 
Loss of communications/comnand capab i l i ty  during docking by unmanned f r e e  f ly ing  
module. 
1. The f r e e  f ly ing  aodule docking mode is used. 
, 
I 1. Vehicle damage1 by contsc t  . 
2. Stranded f r e e  f l y ing  module. 
Space s t a t i o n  modules which are used in  the  f r e e  f l y ing  dscking 
mode s h a l l  be provided with redundant means f o r  communication, 
guidance, contro l ,  power, propulsion, and other  functions c r i t i c a l  
t o  t he  donking. 
The operat ional  s t a t u s  of systems on Space S ta t ion  modules which 
a r e  used i n  t h e  f r e e  f ly ing  docking mode, including redundant 
cy s t em,  s h a l l  be v e r i f i e d  before t h e  module is separated from 
the  o r b i t e r  o r  s t a t i on .  
CODE 
- l R P  
K X X X  
RGD REF. 
- -..-. - -. - - - 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
I PROGRAM SHUTTLE 
Loss of propulsion or  control  capabi l i ty  during docking by manned f r ee  f ly ing module. 
1 ASSUMR~~'NIS 1 
1. The f r e e  f ly ing module docking mode i s  used. 
2 .  The f r e e  f ly ing  module is manned by crew and/or passenge-s, but may be controlled 
from on-board o r  from the  o rb i t e r  o r  s ta t ion .  
3. The l i f e  support system capabi l i ty  is fo r  a few hours only, and emergency rescue 
o r  escape can exceed t h i s  duration. 
-.------------^I.- -. a - - . - . -. - . . - - - -- . -- 
I P O T E N T I A L  EFFECTS 1 
1. Vehicle damage by contact.  
2. Stranded f r e e  f ly ing module. 
3. Loss of on-board personnel. 
.-- I REQUIREMENTS ------- 6 GUIDELINEKJ 
The react ion jet control  system s h a l l  provide redundancy .to preclude 
"jet stuck off" conditions. 
The rate command and r a t e l a t t i t u d e  feedback loops of t he  ro ta t iona l  
control  system s h a l l  provide redundancy t o  preclude "open loop" 
f a i l u re s  . 
Inh ib i t  capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided t o  control  the  "jet stuck.onl' 
condition. 
Space Sta t ion modules which are used i n  the  f r e e  f ly ing docking 
mode s h a l l  be provided with redundant means f o r  cormauaication, 
guidance, control ,  power, propulsion, and other functions c r i t i c a l  
t o  the  docking. 
The operational  s t a t u s  of systems on Space Sta t ion modules which 
are used i n  the f r e e  f ly ing docking mode, including redundant 
systems, s h a l l  be ver i f ied  before the  module is separated from 
the  o r b i t e r  o r  s ta t ion .  
Emergency procedures s h a l l  be avai lable  f o r  the  o r b i t e r  t o  pursue 
and, i f  ponnible, dock t o  a Space S ta t ion  module used i n  the  f r e e  
X 2 R R '  
- l R P  
- 4 R P  
- 4 R R  
X X X X  
f ly ing module docking mode which has l o s t  control ,  These procedures 
s h a l l  allow pereonael escape or  RECDmENQEQ X )  OR NOT (- 
NO. OF HRPS 1 2, 3, 4 ) 
RESOLVED HAZARD I I
PREVENTIVE (P) OR REMEDIAL (R) 
REQUIREHENT (RI OR GUIDELINE (GI 
. ' RESIDUAL HAZARD l X 
- -- - - -  
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S 
DATE 10-25-71 I 
HAZARD~MERGENCY 
Loss of propulsion o r  control  capab i l i ty  during docking by manned f r e e  f ly ing  module. 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (continued) 
(continued) 
rescue wi thin  t h e i r  l i f e  support capabi l i ty .  
Pressure s u i t s  and back packs shall be provided f o r  a l l  personriel 
on-board Space S ta t ion  qodules used i n  t h e  f r e e  f l y ing  module 
docking mode. These s u i t s  s h a l l  be s u i t a b l e  f o r  emergency 
EVA escape t o  a nearby Space S t a t i on  o r  o rb i t e r .  
An a i r l ock  capab i l i ty  which allows a l l  on-board personnel t o  
perform EVA emergency escape s h a l l  be provided on-board Space 
S ta t ion  modules used i? t h e  f r e e  f l y ing  module docking mode. 
This may be provided by a separa te  2laan a i r lock ,  o r  may be  
an i n t e g r a l  capab i l i ty  of t h e  whole module. 
Emergency l i fe  support capab i l i ty  for  a l l  on-board personnel 
s h a l l  be provided on Space S t a t i oa  moduleo used i n  t he  f r e e  
f ly ing  docking mode u n t i l  emergency escape o r  rescue can be  
achieved. 
CODE RGD REF. 
0 
- 
- 
0 
.*-- - - -. .. . -. - . . .. --- - . -. - -- - 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
1 I PROGRAM I SWTTLE / I 
! I STATION 
I 
NO. 2.5,00? 1 
Loss of l i f e  cupaort c apab i l i t y  during docking by manned f r e e  f l y ing  module. 
- -- 
I j A S S U ~ ~ T ~ ~ N S  1 
1. The f r e e  f l y ing  module docking mode is  used. 
3. The l i f e  support system capab i l i ty  is foi. a few hours only,  and emergency rescue 
o r  escape can exceed t h i s  durat ion.  
- - - . . . - . -  --- 
-- - 
! POTENTIAL EFFECTS 1 
I I 
1. Loss of on-board 2ersonnel. 
2. Stranded f r e e  f ly ing  module. 
Space S ta t ion  modules which a r e  used i n  t h e  f r e e  f l y ing  docking 
mode s h a l l  he provided with redundant means f o r  comunicat ion,  
guidance, contro l ,  pcwer, propulsion, and other  functions c r i t i c a l  
t o  t he  docking. 
The ope r l t i ona l  s t a t u s  of systems on Space S t a t i on  modules which 
are used i n  t he  f r e e  f l y ing  docking mode, including redundant 
systems, s h a l l  be v e r i f i e d  before the module is  separated from 
the  o r b i t e r  o r  s t a t i o n .  
Emergency procedures s h a l l  be ava i l ab le  f o r  the o r b i t e r  t o  pursue 
and, i f  poss ib le ,  dock t o  a Space S ta t ion  module used i n  the  f r e e  
f l y ing  module docking mode which has l o s t  contro l .  These pro- 
cedures s h a l l  allow personnel escape o r  rescue wi th in  t h e i r  l i f e  
support capab i l i  ty . 
Preesure s u i t s  and back packe s h a l l  be provided f o r  a l l  personnel 
on-board Space S ta t ion  moOules used i n  t h e  f r e e  f l y ing  module 
docking mode. These s u i t s  s h a l l  be s u i t a b l e  f o r  emergency EVA 
escape t o  a nearby Space S ta t ion  o r  o rb i t e r .  
~ - -- 
CODE 
- l R P  
- 4 R P  
- 4 R R  
- 2 R R  
X X X X  
RECOWENDED I)  OR NOT (- ) I NO. OF HRPS 1 1 2, 3, 4 ) 
REQUIREMELT (R] OR GUIDELINE (6) 
PREVENTIVE (P) OR REHEDIAL (R) /
R G D  REF. 
- 
- 
- 
- 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  l S 
I NO. 12.5.003 I 
Loss of l i f e  support c apab i l i t y  during docking by manned f r e e  f l y ing  module. 
- - 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (contizued) 
An a i r l ock  capab i l i ty  which allowe a l l  on-board personnel t o  
perform EVA emergency escape s h a l l  be provided on-board Space 
S ta t ion  modules used i n  t he  f r e e  f l y ing  module docking mode. 
This may be provided by a separa te  21nan a i r lock ,  o r  may be  
an i n t e g r a l  c apab i l i t y  of t h e  whole module. i 
Emergency l i f e  support c apab i l i t y  f o r  a l l  on-board 2ersonnel 
s h a l l  be provided on Space S t a t i on  modules used i n  the  f r e e  
f l y ing  docking mode u n t i l  emergency escape or rescue can be 
achieved. 
CODE %GD REF. 
Space Dlvirlon 
C -.-- . - 
North American Rockwell 
Fire / tox ic  environment. 
1. The f i r e  and/or tox ic  environment is severe enough t o  require evacuation from 
the immediate area,  but  does not r e su l t  i n  personnel injury.  
2. Means a re  avai lable  fo r  extinguishing f i r e s  and get t ing r i d  of toxic  environments, 
which can be act ivated remotely from other compartments. 
3. The immediate sphere of influence of the f i r e  o r  toxic environment is  of the 
order of 3 m. (10 f t )  diameter. 
..--A 
1. Loss of personnel from a contaminated environment and/or heat .  
2. Loss of vehicle. 
1. The o rb i t e r  s h a l l  be divided i n t o  two or  more compartments 
which can be rapidly sealed off  i n  an emergency t o  prevent the 
ingress of flames and contaminated atmosphere from the other 
compartment (8) . Each ~f these compartments s h a l l  be capable 
of accommodating a l l  on-board o rb i t e r  personnel u n t i l  the  f i r e  
and/or toxic  environment can be eliminated and a habi table  
environment restored. 
2A. Capability s h a l l  3e  provided t o  reduce the  pressure i n  each 
compartment su f f i c i en t ly  , or increase it  i n  the  adjoining com- 
par tment (~)  and t o  cut  off a i r  c i rcu la t ion ,  s o  t ha t  i n  an emer- 
gency the atmosphere i n  the  affected compartment w i l l  not  be 
propagated i n t o  adjoining compartments. This capabi l i ty  s h a l l  
be controlled remotely from each compartment. 
3B. Automatic venting capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided i n  each compart- 
ment s o  t ha t  i n  the event of a f i r e  o r  release of gases within 
the compartment the pressure w i l l  not exceed the s t r u c t u r a l  
l i m i t s  of the s t ruc tu re  o r  the capabi l i ty  of s ea l s  t o  other  com- 
partments t o  exclude the contaminated atmoephere. 
CODE 
L l R R  
: 2 R R  
: 2 R R  
K X X X  
RGD REF. 
IV-3.1 
IV-3.2 
V-1-3.2 
!-111-3. 
[V-3.2 
if-1-3.2 
'-111-3. 
DATE 12-17-71 I 
F i re / tox ic  environment. 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REQUIREMENTS 61 GUIDELINES (Cont) CODE RGD REF. 
-
4 C .  Normally habi table  compartments of more than 25 m3 (880 f t3 )  X 1 R R IV-3.1 
i n  volume s h a l l  have two o r  more e x i t s  i n t o  areas which provide V-1-3 . 1 
for  personnel survival ,  These e x i t s  s h a l l  be a t  l e a s t  3 m. V-111-3. 
(10 f t )  apart .  
- - 5D* Flammable, explosive o r  gae generating mater ia l  s h a l l  be located, 1V-3 
o r  the energy content limited, R O  that  the energy content which V-1-3.1 
can be propagated a t  any one location s h a l l  not r e su l t  i n  over- V-111-3.1 
pressurization of the compartment from heat  and gas product ion. 
6E. Flammable explosive or  gas generating material  within 3 m X 1 R R IV-3.1 
(10 f t )  of the entrance t o  compartments with only one entry/  V-1-3.1 
egress path s h a l l  be l imited so that the  energy content, i f  0-111-3.1 
released, w i l l  not r e su l t  i n  damage o r  an environment which 
prevents sh i r t s leeve  access through the entrance. 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
Page 1 of 2 
Explosion. 
1. The explosion is severe enough t o  incapaci ta te  personnel i n  the . ixnediate  v i c in i ty ,  
but  not  t o  cause catastrophic damage t o  the  vehicle o r  module. 
2. Fire ,  tox ic  contamination and loss  of pressure may r e s u l t  from the explosion 
(see other hazardlemergency analyses). 
3. The affected compartment o r  module may not be habi table  u n t i l  major repairs  
a re  made ( i n  space o r  on the ground). 
--- 
I pmTIA1 rrFm I 
1. Loss of personnel from immediate e f f e c t s  o r  from lack of medical treatment and 
loss  of habitable environment. 
2. Loss of vehicle. 
1 REQUIREMENTS 4 GUlOLLlNtS 1 
LF. Capability s h a l l  be provided f o r  the emergency sh i r t s leeve  
survival  of a l l  on-board personnel u n t i l  the  next resupply o r  
emergency s h u t t l e  f l i g h t  following the loss  of access t o  any one 
module/compartment and the loss  of equipment, and supplies i n  t ha t  
modulelcompartment. A sh i r t s l eeve  accessible docking por t  s h a l l  
be avai1abl.e. I f  the  l o s s  of the  module/compartment dfvidea the 
s t a t i o n  i n t o  two o r  more i so la ted  habitable sect ions ,  then each 
sect ion s h a l l  provide the surv iva l  capabi l i ty  fo r  d l 1  on-board 
pereonnel , including an avai lable  docking port.  
U. Capability s h a l l  be provided t o  reduce the pressure i n  each 
compartmant euf f ic ien t ly ,  o r  increase i t  i n  the adjoining com- 
par tment (~)  and t o  cut off air ci rcula t ion,  so  t ha t  i n  an emr- 
gency the  atmosphere i n  the  affected compartment w i l l  not be 
propagated i n t o  adjoining compartments. This capabi l i ty  s h a l l  
be cantrolled remotely from each compartment. 
38. A u t o r ~ t i e  venting capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided i n  each compart- 
ment s o  t h a t  i n  the  event of a f i r e  o r  re lease  of gaser within 
the compartmant the  pressure w i l l  not  exceed the  s t r u c t u r a l  
limits of the r t ruc tu re  o r  the  capabi l i ty  of reale t o  other com- 
partments t o  exclude the contaminated atmosphere. 
----- ..-.  -- -- - - -  . - PAGE 2 OF 2 
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NO. 3.1.002 J 
DATE ( 12-17-71 I 
Explosion. 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (Cont) 
3 Normally h l i t a b l e  compartments of wore than 25 m (880 f t3 )  
i n  volume s h a l l  have two o r  more e x i t s  i n t o  areas which provide 
fo r  personnel survival .  These e x i t s  s h a l l  be a t  l e a s t  3 m. 
(10 f t )  apart .  
Flammable, explosive o r ,  gas generating material s h a l l  be located 
s o  tha t  the energy content which can be propagated a t  any one 
location s h a l l  not r e su l t  i n  overpressurization of the compart- 
ment from heat and gas production. 
Flammable explosive o r  gas generating material  within 3 m 
(10 f t )  of the entrance t o  compartments with only one entry/  
egress path s h a l l  be l imited s o  t h a t  the  energy content, i f  
released, w i l l  not r e s u l t  i n  damage o r  an environment which 
prevents sh i r t s leeve  access through the  entrance. 
b o  o r  more entrances i n t o  normally habf t ab le  compartments 
of more than 25 m3 (880 f t3 )  i n  volume s h a l l  be sh i r t s l eeve  
access ible  from each of the  other normally inhabited compart- 
ments. These entrances s h a l l  be a t  least 3 m (10 f t )  apar t .  
Emergency capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided on o r b i t e r  f l i g h t s  with 
a manned s o r t i e  module fo r  the re turn  t o  ea r th  of a l l  the  pass- 
engers i n  the  o rb i t e r ,  without support from the s o r t i e  module. 
Emergency capabi l i ty  s h a l l  be provided on manned s o r t i e  modules 
fo r  the return t o  ea r th  of all the  passengers i n  the s o r t i e  
module, without l i f e  support from the  orb i te r .  
'=he o r t r t e r  crew s h a l l  not en te r  manned s o r t i e  modules during 
the conduct of hazardoue experiments. 
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I I STATION I X J 
Erne rgency evacuation 
1. No ca tas t roph ic  accident (such as a f i r e  o r  e x p 1 0 s i o ~ ) ' h a s  ye t  happened a t  the 
time evacuation is required. 
2. Evacuation can be performed f a i r l y  de l ibe ra te ly  -- i.e., i n  minutes r a t h e r  than 
i n  sesonds. 
3. The evacuated compartment cannot be occupied again on t ha t  missicn. 
4. The s u i t e d  o r b i t e r  crew can s t i l l  have access t o  the crew compartment t o  re tu rn  
the  o r b i t e r  t o  ear th .  ---- 
Not determinable. 
Capabil i ty s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  emergency sh i r t e i a eve  
su rv iva l  of a l l  on-board personnel u n t i l  the  next resupply o r  
emergency s h u t t l e  f l i g h t  following the l o s s  of access t o  any one 
module/compartw.nt and the  l o s s  of equipment, and suppl ies  i n  t h a t  
module /compartment. A s h i r t s l e e v e  access ib le  docking por t  s h a l l  
be avai lable .  I f  t he  l o s s  of the  module/compartment d iv ides  the 
s t a t i o n  i n t o  two o r  more i so l a t ed  hab i t ab le  sec t ions ,  then each 
sec t ion  s h a l l  provide the su rv iva l  capab i l j ty  f o r  a l l  on-board 
personnel,  including an ava i l ab le  docking por t .  
Emergency capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided on o r b i t e r  f l i g h t s  with 
a manned s o r i t e  module f o r  the r e tu rn  t o  e a r t h  of a l l  t he  pm6- 
engers i n  the  o r b i t e r ,  without support from the  s o r t i e  module. 
Emergency capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be provided on manned s o r t i e  module6 
f o r  t he  r e tu rn  t o  e a r t h  of a l l  the pasoengerr i n  the s o r t i e  
module, without l i f e  support from the o rb i t e r .  
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
SHUTTLE 
m m A M  
S a t l E  
I I STATION I X 1 
Loss of pressure. 
1. Minutes of reaction ti-e are available before physiological impairrnnt or injury 
w i l l  r esu l t ,  and emergency evacuation to  another compartment, or emergency 
donning of space s u i t s  which do not require pre-breathing, is possible i f  
these are available . 
NO. 
L 
RATE 
2. The source of leakage may not be detectable and r e p a i r l l e  during the mission. 
3.1.004 
. 
12-17-71 . 
1. Loss of personnel. 
2. Loss of vehicle. 
Capability s h a l l  be provided fo r  the emergency shir ts leeve 
survival of a l l  on-board personnel u n t i l  the next resupply o r  
emergency shut t le  f l igh t  following the loss  of access t o  any one 
module/colapartment and the loss  of equipment and supplies i n  that  
module/compartment. A shir ts leeve accessible docking port  s h a l l  
be available. I f  the loss  of the  module/compartment divides the 
statj.g4- in to  two o r  more isolated habitable sections, then each 
secff cn s h a l l  provide the survival capability fo r  a l l  on-board 
personnel, including em available docking port. 
Errgency capability s h a l l  be provided on orb i t e r  f l igh t s  d t h  
a M M C ~  s o r t i e  d u l e  for  the return t o  ear th of a l l  the pure- 
engers i n  the orb i te r ,  without support from the s o r t i e  module. 
Laergcacy capability s h a l l  be provided on manned s o r t i e  rodults 
for  the return t o  ear th of a11 the passengers i n  the s o r t i e  
module, wlthout l i f e  support from the orbiter.  
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  IS  
DATE 1 1.2-17-71 
Loss of pressure.  
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER O F  SHEFT I.) 
REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES (Cont ) -- CODE RGD REF. 
Pressure s u i t s  and a t tendant  l i f e  support  s h a l l  be provided f o r  X 2 R  R IV-3.2 
the  o r b i t e r  crew on every f l i g h t .  
Pressure s u i t s  and a t tendant  l i f e  support  s h a l l  be provided f o r  X 2 R R  IV-3.2 
a l l  o r b i t e r / s o r t i e  module passengers on mieeians where t h e  con- IV-4.3 
f i g u r a t i o n  does no t  provide two separa te  pressur izable  campart- V-1-3.2 
ments capable of re turning a l l  passengers t o  ear th .  V-1-4.1 
Orb i t e r  equipment required f o r  r e tu rn ing  the  o r b i t e r  t o  e a r t h  X l R R  IV-3.1 
s h a i l  be capable of operat ing i n  a depressurized environment. 
The con t ro l s  f o r  t h i s  equipment shal: be operable by crewmen 
i n  pressure  s u i t e .  
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  1 S  
Page 1 of 2 
b 1 
Failure t o  open in t e rna l  hatch between pressure i so l a t ab l e  volumes. 
1. Spacecraft may be operated with i n t e rna l  hatches open o r  closed, as found 
convenient, and i r respec t ive  of safe ty  recommendations. 
1. Entrap-nt of personnel with i n su f f i c i en t  l i f e  support o r  i n a b i l i t y  t o  
leave vehicle. 
2. Inab i l i t y  t o  reach c r i t i c a l  supplies o r  equipment. 
1 REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES] 
Where only one sh i r t s leeve  ingresslegress path is provided i n t o  
a compartmaent o r  module, redundant means s h a l l  be avai lable  f o r  
opening the  connecting hatch(es) from e i t h e r  side.  
CODE 
t l R R  
X X X X  
tGD REF, 
- -  
:v-3.1 
r-1-3 . 1 
-111-3 
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No* A m c a n  Rockwell - 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S I S  
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I NO. 1 3.1.006 1 
Fai lu re  t o  open docking hatch a f t e r  docking. 
/ ASSUMPTIONS j 
1. Docking i n t e r f ace s  f o r  normal missions involving docking hatches e x i s t  between 
a) Orb i t e r  and manned s o r t i e  modules 
b) Orb i t e r  and space s t a t i o n  modules 
c) Space s t a t i o n  modules and space s t a t i o n  
2. The inopers t ive  hatch may on e i t h e r  one of the  i n t e r f ac ing  vehic les .  
1. I s o l a t i o n  of personnel i n  a spacecraf t  with i n s u f f i c i e n t  l i f e  support o r  
i n a b i l i t y  t o  re tu rn  t o  ea r th .  
2. I n a b i l i t y  t o  continue mission. 
I REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDELINES 1 
1. Personnel s h a l l  not be allowed i n  a s o r t i e  o r  space s t a t i o n  
module during reposi t ioning of t he  module from one docking 
p o r t  t c  another. 
2. The space s t a t i o n  s h a l l  be  configured s o  t h a t  it always has a t  
least two docking po r t s  ava i l ab l e  which can accommodate a s h u t t l e  
o r b i t e r  resupply o r  rescue mission. 
1 3. Emergency l i f e  support capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be ava i l ab le  on the  space 
I s t a t i o n  following the  non-arrival of the  next planned o r b i t e r  
u n t i l  t h e  following resupply o r  rescue o r b i t e r  f l i g h t .  
CODE 
K 4 R R  
X l R R  
X l R R  
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  IS 
STATION I X 1 
Page 1 of 2 
Failure t o  close docking hatch before undocking. 
-- 
1 ~srdbn~dks J
1. Docking interfaces  f o r  normal missions involving docking hatches e x i s t  be tween : 
a) Orbiter  and manned s o r t i e  modules 
b) Orbiter  and space s t a t i on  modules 
c) Space s t a t i on  modules and space s t a t i o n  
2. The inoperative hatch may be on e i t h e r  one of the in terfacing vehicles. 
3. Space s t a t i o n  personnel ascent t o  o r b i t  and re turn to  ea r th  i n  the  o r b i t e r  crew/ 
passenger compartment, not i n  the  space s t a t i o n  modules. 
---- 
I PO 
1. I n a b i l i t y  t o  undock. 
2. Inab i l i t y  t o  re turn o r b i t e r  to  earth.  
L REQUIREMENTS 6 GUIDEL~NES J 
IF. Capability s h a l l  be provided f o r  the  emergency sh i r t s leeve  
survival  of a l l  on-board personnel u n t i l  the next resupply o r  
emergency s h u t t l e  f l i g h t  following the l o s s  of access t o  any one 
module/compartment and the l o s s  of equipment and supplies i n  t h a t  
module/compartment . A sh i r t s leeve  accessible docking por t  s h a l l  
be available.  I f  the loss  of the module/compartment divides the 
s t a t i o n  i n t o  two o r  more i so l a t sd  habitable sect ions ,  then each 
sec t ion  s h a l l  provide the  survival  capabi l i ty  f o r  a l l  on-board 
personnel, including an avai lable  docking port.  
2. Manned s o r t i e  modules and space s t a t i o n  modules s h a l l  be designed 
s o  t h a t  they can be undecked, re t r ieved i n t o  the  o rb i t e r ,  cargo 
bay and returned t o  ear th  unpressurized. 
3. Capability shall be provided t o  depressurize docked modules 
before undocking . 
C O D E  
t 1 R R  
: 1 G R  
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HAZARD/EMERGENCY 
Fai lu re  t o  c lose  docking hatch before undocking. 
(LIST ADDITIONAL CONTENT IN THE ORDER OF SHEET I.) 
REQUIREMENTS & GUIDELINES (Cont) 
Emergency c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be provided on o r b i t e r  f l i g h t s  with . 
a manned s o r t i e  module f o r  the  re tu rn  t o  e a r t h  of a l l  the  pass- 
engers i n  t h e  o r b i t e r ,  without support from t h e  s o r t i e  module. 
Emergency c a p a b i l i t y  s h a l l  be  provided on manned s o r t i e  modules 
f o r  the  re tu rn  t o  e a r t h  of a l l  t h e  passengers i n  t h e  s o r t i e  
module, without l i f e  support  from t h e  o r b i t e r .  
Orb i t e r  equipment required f o r  r e tu rn ing  t h e  o r b i t e r  t o  e a r t h  
s h a l l  be capable of operat ing i n  a depressurized environment. 
The con t ro l s  f o r  t h i s  equipment s h a l l  be operable by crewmen 
i n  pressure  s u i t s .  
RGD REF 
Space Division 
North Amencan Rockwell 
- - --. - I 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  IS  I 
Page I of 1 I 
Inab i l i t y  t o  use docking hatch f o r  EVA when EVA required. 
1. Contingency EVA may be required t o  correct  a problem which in t e r f e r e s  with the  
use of the docking hatch; e m  g. , the orb i ta r  manipulator has jammed the docking 
mechanism on a docked module without seal ing the in te r face .  
2. The normal EVA egress i s  v i a  a docking hatch. 
k 4 
1. I n a b i l i t y  t o  perform contingency EVA when required. 
LJ. A backup EVA egress/ ingress hatch which can be used f o r  contin- 
gency EVA s h a l l  be available.  Capability f o r  depressurization 
and repressurization of the connecting compartment/module s h a l l  
be provided. 
~ -- 
CODE 
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Fai lu re  t o  c lose  e x t e r n a l  a i r l o c k  hatch when re tu rn ing  from EVA. 
1. This emergency is considered only f o r  missions i n  which EVA is planned a s  
p a r t  of the  normal operat ions.  
1. I n a b i l i t y  of EVA personnel t o  r e t u r n  i n t o  spacecraf t .  
=QUIREMENTS r GUIDELINES J 
1J. A backup EVA egress / ingress  hatch which can be used f o r  contin- 
gency EVA s h a l l  be ava i l ab le .  Capabi l i ty  f o r  depressur iaa t ion  
of the  connecting compartmentlmodule s h a l l  be provided. 
2K. On o r b i t e r  missions without at tached manned s o r t i e  modules i n  
which EVA is planned as p a r t  of the normal mission, pressure 
suits s h a l l  be c a r r i e d  f o r  a l l  on-board personnel. 
3. Dual external hatches s h a l l  be provided on a i r locks ,  e i t h e r  one 
of which can seal t h e  a i r l o c k  agains t  the  space vacuum. 
- 
a00 REF. 
Space Division 
- -.--. 
North American Rockwell 
H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  I S  
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I NO. 13.1.010 J 
Failure t o  open in terna l  airlock hatch when returning from EVA. 
1. This emergency is considered only for missions i n  which EVA is p lhned  as 
par t  of the normal operations. 
1; Inabi l i ty  of EVA personnel t o  return i n t o  spacecraft. 
i 
I 
tb. A backup EVA egresslingreas hatch which can be used for  contin- 
gency EVA s h a l l  be available. Capability for  depressurization 
of the connecting compartment/module shall '  be provided. 
1K. On orbi ter  miesiona without attached manned s o r t i e  modules i n  
which EVA is plaaned as pa r t  of the normal mission, pressure 
u u i t s  , sha l l  be carried for  a l l  on-board personnel. 
3. D u a l  in terna l  hatch- aha l l  be provided on dr locko ,  k t h e r  one 
of which can provide access t o  the spacecraft. 
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H A Z A R D I E M E R G E N C Y  A N A L Y S  IS 
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 I NO. 1 3.1.011 1 
- - I HAZARMMERGENCY I I SOUKE 111-4.1 1 
Fai lu re  t o  c lose  I V A  a i r l ock  hatch on depressurized/contaminated s i d e  o r  t o  open 
hatch on preasurized/habitable s i d e  when re turning from IVA. 
-. 
1. IVA as  a  planned a c t i v i t y  is carr ied  out on the Space S ta t ion  only. 
2. This emergency is not considered on the  o r b i t e r  o r  s o r t i e  modu1e.s. 
3.  IVA s u i t s  can be used i n  an emergency i n  an EVA mode. 
4. Planned I V A  w i l l  use unibllicals r a the r  than back-packs f o r  l i f e  support. 
1. I n a b i l i t y  f o r  I V A  personnel t o  r e t u rn  t o  a  habibable environment. 
An emergency I V A  or  EVA r e tu rn  route  s h a l l  be ava i l ab le  f o r  any 
planned TVA a c t i v i t y  independent of the  normal I V A  a i r l ock  route. 
Depressurization and repressur iza t ion  capab i l i ty  s h a l l  be  provided 
f o r  the  add i t iona l  compartment (8) o r  module(s) which must be used. 
Emergency por table  l i f e  support s y s t e m  s h a l l  be ava i l ab le  i n  the  
a i r lock  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s u s t a i n  IVA personnel i n  an emergency I V A  
o r  EVA re tu rn  from a planned I V A  a c t i v i t y .  
CODE 
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